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ABSTRACT 
The centrai argument of this thesis is that unlike in the West, organizational behavior in the 
Middle East and the Indian sub-continent is, predominantly, not a function of work/task-
related imperatives but largely determined by the broader socio-cultural context, norms and 
values of the respective societies. Based on extensive interviews and participant and non-
participant observation in the Middle East and sub-continent, and coment analysis of media 
reports and lìterature, the effects of the respective socio-cultural contexts are documented in 
terms of three key determinants of organizational behavior, conflict, control and motivation. 
The thesis examines traditional and modera 'Western' sources of literature regarding control, 
conflict and motivation and the nature of culture itself and draws attention to the need for 
modification in certain 'Euroamerican' theories when applied to the strong social, familial 
and cultural structures, values, beliefs and assumptions present in the two other cultures 
investigated. Recornrnendations are put forward as to the kind of changes in the socio-cultural 
context of the Middle East and Indian sub-continent, if organizational behavior is to be 
transformed. 
In conclusion, a picture emerges of the stark differences between the cultures in terms of 
status, incomes, rote of family and state, social control, family structure, population 
pressures and religious control - ali of which are evidence of the predominance of the socio-
cultural context in determining organizational behavior. A theory is offered stating that 
organizational behavior is primarily a derivative of the structures and functions of broader 
socio-cultural institutions. A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict, 
and motivation are strongly influenced by the structural-functional properties of a socio-
cultural system, and hence, 'intrinsic motivation' is a rare phenomenon. 
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Introduction and Explanation of the Key Terms Used in this Work 
The 'Sub-continent': The term refers to the three countries of the Indian sub-continent 
namely, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which constituted one country prior to 1947; 
Pakistan separated from India in 1947, while Bangladesh in turn separated from Pakistan in 
1971. Although there are wide cultural dissimilarities between and within the said countries, 
we are concerned in this work with their common cultural and organizational characteristics. 
Where there are organizational or cultural variations, thèse have been made explicit. 
'Asians inBritain', 'Asians in the Middle East', or the abbreviation 'Asian': The term refers 
to Indians, Pakistanis, and Bengalis, domiciled in Britain and Middle East respectively, and 
deals with their common cultural/organizational characteristics, unless otherwise mentioned. 
'Middle East': The term refers to the Muslim Middle Eastern countries, particularly the 
Arabian Gulf (GCC) states. Most findings do not pertain to the Christian Arabs. 
The abbreviation 'Eastern': We shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern', for convenience sake, 
to refer to empirical déductions that are equally and interchangeably applicable to the Indian 
sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle Eastern cultures and organizations. 
'Euroamerica'. the 'West', or 'Western': The terms refer to the common socio-cultural and 
organizational characteristics among the United States and Western Europe. Although there 
are many cultural and organizational dissimilarities [see endnote 1] between the said 
countries, for the sake of comparison, the typical and commonly found socio-cultural and 
organizational characteristics of the countries constituting 'Euroamerica' or the 'West' have 
been counter-juxtaposed against the same of the sub-continent and the Middle East. 
Définition of 'Culture': Although researchers have shown flexibility in the range of 
applicability of the culture concept, many définitions of culture are remarkably concentrically 
applied to large social aggregates, while the term "subcultures" deals with smaller groups 
in the mainstream culture. Gregory (1983: 339) has quoted Spardly and McCurdy that the 
concept of culture in anthropology is "most fully developed" as "culture concerns ail aspects 
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of a group's social behavior". Hofstede's (1980) division of countries into "cultural areas" 
is analogous to the concept of "culture continent" in Patai (1973); 
"even two such widely separated cultures as of Morocco and Iraq appear quite similar 
when compared with, say, the Greek, or Italian (p. 25) ... to represent 'the West' and 'the 
Arab World' as if each were a homogeneous entity requires a high level of abstraction and 
generalization. In reality, both 'worlds' can be construed as homogeneous only when viewed 
from a distance. These... considerations... suggest the use of the term 'culture continent' for 
both the Middle East,... and the Western world; and to insist that each of these two 'culture 
continents' is made up of several, mutually delimitable 'cultural areas'{p. 278)". 
We have used the term 'culture' as representing all those common social factors 
mentioned in definitions quoted below, and found in broad geographical regions: 
Whyte (1961: 30), "[Culture] refers to the pattern of belief and behavior of a society ". 
Barnouw (1963: 68-69), "A culture is... the configuration of all of the more or less 
stereotyped patterns of learned behavior which are handed down from one generation to the 
next through the means of language and imitation. " 
Hoebel (1971: 208-211), " culture is... the integrated sum total of learned behavioral 
traits which are manifest and shared by the members of a society... Culture is, wholly the 
result of social invention... social heritage transmitted by precept to each new generation... " 
Kroeber ( 1963: 8 & 60-61 ), "...the mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, 
habits, techniques, ideas, and values - and the behavior they induce - is culture... the humans 
that come under its influence behave and operate quite differently from the way they would 
under another culture... Taylor says that 'culture or civilization is that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society '. Linton equates culture with 'social heredity '. Lowie 
calls it, 'the whole of social tradition '... social and cultural, are closely related concepts. " 
Our definition for culture is not unique: Hofstede's (1980) findings that prestige, 
wealth and power are of crucial importance to social relationship in some societies but less 
important in other societies reminds one that researchers have long argued that it is possible 
to extract dimensions of cultural differences in various societies (Triandis, 1972). Linton and 
Kardiner (1945) developed a concept of "basic personality type for a society" defined as: 
"that personality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the society's members 
as a result of the early common experiences; it does not correspond to the total personality 
of the individual but rather to the projective systems or .. the value of attitude systems which 
are basic to the individual's personality configuration. Thus the same basic personality type 
may be reflected in many different total personality configurations". 
A similar idea is presented by Triandis (1982: 86): 
"Hofstede, similar to Wallace, Born, LeVine, and others, argues that people carry 
'mental programs' developed in early childhood when particular actions are rewarded and 
punished. Socialization continues in other contexts such as schools and organizations. 
Members of a particular culture gradually, 'get shaped' to use similar mental programs". 
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Many researchers who subscribe to the culture and personality approach, see the 
situation not as one sided but as an interrelationship, and emphasize not just the early 
enculturative expériences but the ongoing process of mutuai interaction throughout one's life. 
There have been criticisms on the abstractions "personality types", "national culture", or 
"modal personality" but the basic concept is widely accepted. Hence Patai (1973: 18), defines 
"national character" as "the sum total ofthe motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the 
plurality in a national population". Karl Young referred to a relevant concept as "collective 
psyché"; Kroeber (1963: 101-102) uses the term "ethos" to refer to the distinctive character, 
spirit and attitudes of a people, culture, era, etc.. Hoebel (1971: 221) explains how the 
concept of "type" does not deny the existence of individuai différences. "The character of 
each individuai is unique, for one's expérience never matches those of another... But the... 
configurations of the cultures of différent societies produce distinctive personality types...". 
Définitions of 'Control'. 'Conflict'. and 'Motivation': The said three concepts are widely 
employed in organizational behavior literature, and have been used here in their widest 
possible définitions so as to allow for cultural variations in the understanding, interprétation 
and use of thèse concepts. Narrowly applicable définitions are likely to be culture-bound so 
much so that organizational behavior and social-psychology have been accused of being 
'monocultural' subjects (Chapman, 1992). However, when a définition is broad, its aspects 
are likely to be found in many cultures, thus facilitating search for common as well as 
differentiating characteristics. The said concepts will be elaborated where referred to in the 
text of this work, and in the context of the empirical investigations. 
The Key Research Problems 
I have taught Organizational Behavior (Western text books) in Pakistan, Britain, and 
the Gulf, in three languages (Urdù, English and Arabie) over the last ten years and realized 
that Organizational Behavior grew as an académie discipline mainly from Euroamerican 
organizational expérience but both have shown remarkable diffusion almost ali around the 
world. However, I have frequently observed, during my various jobs, that there are wide 
différences in organizational behavior across many countries so that one commonly finds that, 
(l)organizations with similar goals and Euroamerican technical/operative methods, in various 
cultures, do not employ similar methods of control, conflict resolution, and motivation; 
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(2)the nature of conflict and means of conflict resolution are dissimilar in various societies 
and in their organizations; (3)people in various cultures are not motivated by similar 
aspirations, ambitions, goals and status symbols, and that, (4)people in various cultures do 
not subscribe to similar views of control, conflict and motivation. 
In 1990, when I enrolled for a PhD, I was interested in the relationships between 
organizational behavior, democracy, and ethics. However, the areas of study that such a 
project entailed were considered too wide-ranging for a doctoral thesis. A compromise was 
reached by picking up, for studies, factors of organizational behavior that reflected processes 
of democracy as well (namely control and conflict) and another factor that over-lapped 
organizational behavior and ethics (namely, motivation). And, because I had exposure to the 
sub-continent and British culture, in addition to that, over the last two décades, I had read 
numerous European and American authors, I proposed that studies of the three factors be 
conducted in their socio-cultural contexts. In 1992, when I went to teach in the Arabian Gulf 
states, I added the Middle Eastern comparative dimension to this work. 
ï defined my research problems as trying to find out, by empirical studies, 
(1) the similarities and dissimilarities in control, conflict and motivation patterns found among 
the organizations in the three cultures in question; 
(2) explanations for similarities and dissimilarities mentioned in point (1); 
(3) socio-cultural factors that give rise to similarities/dissimilarities mentioned in point (1); 
(4) relationships between fmdings regarding the socio-cultural and organizational factors. 
The aim was to theorize from the data of my empirical studies in order to answer 
questions such as: Why is it that while private enterprise in the West, in conjunction with 
government efforts, has succeeded in eradicating coercion and mass poverty, this is not the 
case in many underdeveloped countries of the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East which 
claim to follow the Euroamerican economie system? Why are control and conflict-resolution 
methods, long discarded in the West because of their ineffectiveness, stili being used in the 
sub-continent and the Middle East? Why is there greater manifest conflict in sub-continent 
organizations compared to Western? Why is there no manifest conflict in Middle Eastern 
organizations? Why is there many times more employée aliénation from decision-making in 
the Middle Eastern and sub-continent organizations compared to that in the Western? Why 
has motivation for the vast majority in the said cultures been reduced to money seeking? And 
finally, what if any, is the nature of 'intrinsic motivation'? 
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In short, I have tried to see what is the signìficance of socio-cultural factors in 
determining organizational behavior. This I have done by empirically observing, in depth, 
native organizations in countries of the sub-continent and the Middle East, and those 
managed by Asians in Britain, and comparing them against the Western (studied through 
secondary, literature based sources). The main aim is to see how, and in what ways, 
organizational behavior is differentiated, in the said three cultures[l], by virtue of their 
dissimilar social and familial structures, values, norms, beliefs, and much of what the term 
'culture' encompasses. 
A description of the methodology that I have followed, and a justification for using 
qualitative and 'grounded theory' methods, have been given in chapter one. 
A shift of mv theoretical orientation from a 'class' perspective to a 'culture' perspective 
In my early évaluations of several possible research designs for this work, I tried to 
formulate ways of seeing socio-organizational control and conflict in terms of the nature and 
kinds of the socio-economie classes of the said three cultures. I tried to work out if it was 
empirically possible to measure the extent of social development in terms of falling class 
barriers, reduced inter-class conflict, the nature and extent of upper-class control over lower 
classes, and the nature of motivation in différent classes. 
My said theoretical preconceptions were based on extensive readings of Marxism in 
my youth. Marxist extrapolations over very long periods of socio-economie history, whereby 
exceptional events are ignored, show that in certain régions of the world, societies progressed 
from primitive-communistic-tribal towards slave-owning ones in which slaves and masters, 
for example, constituted two distinct classes in general despite the fact that examples maybe 
found of slaves who managed to become kings themselves through clever manipulation and 
intrigue (for example the slave kingdom in Egypt). In the latter periods of history, several 
societies managed to abolish slavery and a feudal system evolved in which serfs/peasants and 
the landlords formed two distinct classes in general. One must, however, see the différences 
in such class Systems in various cultures; for example, when serfs in Russia were not legally 
[1]I do not know of a work that has particularly aimed at comparing socio-
organizational behavior in the said three cultures though I have found relevant insights in 
works such as Patai's 'The Arab Mind ' , Galbraith's 'The Nature of Mass Poverty', Myrdal's 
'Asian Drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations', and many others mentioned later. 
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free to leave their masters, in Britain they were not bound to stay with their masters, and, 
during the same period, in the Middle East, a fugitive slave could be killed by his master 
with no ensuing social/legai reprisais. In my early 'theoretical spéculations', I often used 
logicai extrapolations of the kind as follows: If we link the aforementioned three historical 
antécédents with their following subséquent events in each région, that; (l)there were violent 
révolutions in Russia; (2)in Britain there was a comparatively peaceful passage of a share of 
power from the landed aristocracy to the emerging bourgeoisie, latter, an extension of 
franchise in the form of vote to skilled workers (male householders in towns), still latter, to 
all propertied adult maies, and finally, to ali adult persons, and; (3)there has been little 
significant transformation in the Middle Eastern cognitive culture; then we may logically 
extrapolate from the Russian situation that high controls may lead to violent transformation; 
from the British situation that moderate controls may resuit in graduai transformation in 
socio-political power sharing; and from the Middle Eastern situation that extreme controls 
can curb social transformation. However, although the said déductions seem plausible and 
intellectually justifiable, logicai extrapolation is often not recommended in theory 
construction, and, one also must add other relevant variables to the analysis. 
However, as I gathered my empirical data, I discovered that people in the sub-
continent and the Middle East do not form social-action/protest groups on the basis of their 
economie class membership but on the basis of common profession, caste, région, language, 
religion, tribe and ethnie background. In the Middle East, in addition to class barriers, we 
also find tribal barriers so that some tribes and certain socio-cultural groups are barred from 
rights to jobs that bestow high authority and power in the society; people from some tribes 
and certain socio-cultural groups may not be accepted as equals, in many ways, by the other 
usually dominant tribes. I found that while the objective empirical referents of an economie 
class are not difficult to define, empirical studies on the theoretical bases of economic classes 
are hard if not impossible to conduct in safety from the ever présent risk of running into 
conjectures. More over, the empiricist may refuse to accept the class-based approach to 
social analyses on grounds of observations whereby members of a certain economie class 
^ exhibit behavior patterns which class theorists would normally expect from members of 
another class; for example, in a revolution supposed to be led by the working classes, some 
members of the aristocracy would be found participating against their supposed class interests 
thus showing the significance of Cognition more than that of class membership. I found that 
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the subjective and complex nature of structures of the said societies necessitated seeing 
conflict (whether at interpersonal, group or organizational level) in the context of groups 
formed on the basìs of similar cognitive cultures rather than on the basis of economie class 
membership. Many cultural factors were found to cut across economie classes: Tribal-
religious values for example, are common among workers and the upper classes so that the 
control patterns learned from the said values are often applied as much by workers on each 
other as by employers. Likewise, the approach of the economic-political elite towards social 
conflict and control was found to have parallels in the attitude of managers towards 
organizational conflict and control both in the Middle East and the sub-continent. 
Therefore, it maybe said that the nature of progress of societies towards reducing 
class barriers and less control and conflict has been différent in various régions depending 
upon several cultural, circumstantial, social, religious, historical and economie factors. 
Historical-cultural conditions can either support or hamper organizational functions and social 
development. Marx (in Edwards, R. 1979: 17) noted the same about socio-economie 
development: "People moke their own history... but under circumstances directly found, 
given, and transmitted from the past. ". For example, in Britain, there were cultural reasons 
(in addition to economie), such as the Protestant ethics, for granting manual workers an 
acceptable socio-economie status which is in stark contrast to the negative status most often 
and commonly attributed to manual work in the sub-continent and the Middle East: If 
economie prosperity was the basic causal factor for uplifting the status of manual work, then 
we would not find tremendous dégradation of manual workers in, for example, Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf States which are among the richest countries of the world. 
The significance of a holistic approach 
It might seem to my reader that I have incorporated too many variables, related to 
many fields of knowledge, to be able to do justice to in one work. However, although 
involving many variables makes data collection and analysis difficult, a holistic understanding 
of the situation requires the incorporation of as many relevant variables as possible: 
".. .acceptable ethnographie work... should deal with the totality ofall social, cultural, 
and psychological aspects of community for they are so interwoven that no one can be 
understood without taking into considération ali the others..." (Malinowski, 1922: xvi). 
The functional or dysfunctional state of organizations reflects many aspects of the 
whole society. Participants in the organizational processes bring with them ali the socio-
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cultural learning and conditioning so that many analyses of organizational effectiveness 
isolated from the broader socio-cultural context lack essential profundity and predictive 
validity in the long term. The more one investigates, the more it is revealed that in the sub-
continent and the Middle East, organizations cannot be profoundly studied in isolation from 
the broader socio-cultural structure, norms and values. Organizations, in fact, are very 
cultural institutions and the reason that they have been studied by Western researchers as 
significantly independent units is again a characteristic of the Western culture where system 
boundaries are much more clearly defmed than is the case in many underdeveloped cultures. 
The following pages contain chapters on my research methods and descriptions of 
empirical investigations, fìndings, the evidence used in generating various theses, and 
recommended solutions regarding the issues raised in this work. 
Notes and Explanations 
[l]For example, Inkson et al (1970), showed more document formalization in 
American than in English firms. Graves (1972) found differences between British and French 
managers regarding concepts of authority and communication; French managers were more 
concerned with role authority whereas English managers were more concerned with personal 
authority; communication was shared more evenly with British managers and was therefore 
more complex, whereas the French managers had a greater commitment to individual 
autonomy within specified role constraints, and made greater use of formal communication. 
Tannenbaum (1974) found variations of management principles applied in five 
countries. He found that departmentalization, specialization, unity of command, and the 
scalar principle, were followed in all countries with modifications; in the US, the said 
principles were modified by equalitarian cultural values and informal human relations; in 
Austria there was more bureaucracy, and in Italy the said principles were applied in a more 
traditional personalized manner with patrimonial control. In terms of reward systems, in the 
US and Austria there were highly differentiated rewards and benefits according to rank; and 
in Italy there was a greater emphasis on status differentials. Tannenbaum's control graphs 
seem consistent with known structural and cultural differences among countries; Italy was 
the most hierarchical among the three capitalist countries, America the least, with Austria 
falling in between the two. American plants had a greater total amount of control with 
participation of employees in everyday decisions more than is true in Europe. Italy was found 
to be the most traditional, and reflected a rigid authoritarian, family-centred pattern with a 
paternalistic orientation of the business elite. Italian managers were reluctant to delegate 
authority and tended to think of their authority in terms of personal power rather than a 
necessary function within the enterprise. The enterprise was seen as some sort of personal 
kingdom. The Italian manager, compared to the American manager, was less supportive of 
a democratic ideology with respect to superior-subordinate relations. Labor unions in Italy 
were more radical than unions in the United States, but their thrust was more in the direction 
of future revolutionary change than with running the factory today and tomorrow. American 




followed in this work 
Chapter One: An Introduction to the Researcher and the Methodology Followed 
I have mainly used descriptive and qualitative methods because I aimed at examining 
socio-cultural-organizational relationships in the greatest existentialist depth possible. It is 
obvious that this kind of research does not usually allow the use of methods where strict 
operational définitions and measurements can be made. However, at places, I have used 
simple statistical comparisons. M y methods of data collection have been intensive (case 
studies, interviews) as well as systematic (regular observation over a long period, content 
analysis etc.). Because my studies in three cultures deal with broad ranging hypothèses and 
théories, I am unable to claim to have made the rigorous methods of qualitative coding 
obvious for other researchers to see with such détails as may be credited to many studies 
conducted in the context of one language and culture. The détails of each step that I took 
would be unmanageably complicated, lengthy, and too cumbersome to be readable, but I 
shall give essential détails where possible. 
I had learned the signifîcance of classification in research from my studies of biology 
and had been subconsciously following a method of social analysis that had much in common 
with the grounded theory method though I came to know about the latter only in 1993. I had 
been noting my observations ever since my graduation in physics. I taught experimental 
physics (1975-76) but my fascination with social sciences forced me to do my second 
graduation in psychology and take an internship at the Lahore Mental Hospital and the 
'Fountain House' (1977), an institution for the rehabilitation of mental patients. The high 
curiosity and the sober excitement of dealing with the 'mentally i l i ' at an early age urged me 
to keep writing *something'. In those days my notes were often vague but they helped me 
see a relationship of mental illness with social control when I noted that many people locked 
in there could not be called mentally i l i ; some were there simply because their relatives, for 
one or the other reasons, had convinced the generally laid back doctors that the persons were 
mentally sick. The head of the 'Fountain House', a psychiatrist of high repute in Pakistan, 
had even invented an "Islamic psychotherapy" which rested on the belief that religious rituals 
could rid one of mental illness, for mental illness was a divine curse in rétribution for one's 
sins. I, however, saw the reasons for many mental problems in abuse and poverty caused by 
o ver-population. My expérience with the Family Planning Association as a voluntary worker 
greatly helped me understand the cultural aspects in many forms of behaviour. 
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Later, I learned that in taking notes, one should be formal, systematic and 'scientific'; 
for example, that while taking notes, one should not express his opinions but simply 
'describe' behaviour. I used to make photocopies of my diaries, cut the photocopies into 
pieces containing 'common themes' and pack them in large envelopes or boxes one each for 
each category (an old form of computer cut-and-paste function). However, I did not use the 
paragraph numbering and file card method which Turner (1981) suggests and therefore, 
writing all observations in one diary, chronologically, meant a lot of perspiration in later 
classification, but it allowed me to be quick in writing the first notes: I have seen many who 
cannot overcome the first barrier of taking notes immediately when the memories of an 
observation or conversation are fresh. When I got a mini tape recorder, I realized that 
recording conservation of vital importance could put people off from conversation. However, 
noting in the diary too resulted in the suspicions of many of my colleagues at the University 
where I taught (1987-89), that I was writing about the 'bad' state of our institutions. 
My earlier notes were about events that I thought were somehow 'important'. After 
some years I realized that many of my observations had a common pattern, that some kind 
of events recurred frequently and could be seen as typical instances about certain socio-
economic groups of people. For example, the businessmen who dealt with the bank, where 
I worked as a credit analyst (1981-86), had many behavioral aspects in common and 
differentiable from their employees, and this 'fact' had implications for the nature of control 
in their organizations. Although my observations were not limited to specific activities and 
themes, the bulk of the data that I gathered, until I formally engaged in my doctoral work, 
was related to socio-organizational behaviour. I had not looked for specific types of 
organizations or activities because socio-cultural-organizational behaviour can be studied in 
any and all organizations and activities. 
Methods of data collection may depend on some cultural considerations: 
I was fortunate in getting enormous opportunities to enter in organizations: As a 
lecturer (1975-76 & 1987-89), I had access to several offices of the education department of 
our state. As said earlier, I had been an internee in a mental hospital and a rehabilitation 
center. During my student life at the Punjab University (1978-80), other than being on 
internship with Grindlays Bank (1979) and ICI (1980), I observed the political activities of 
various religious and students organizations. During my years as a bank's credit analyst, I 
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was able to secure intensive knowledge of our clients, more than thirty well known Pakistani 
and multinational companies[see endnote 1], which knowledge constitutes some of my 
detailed case studies. I later used these case studies in conjunction with interview based 
comparative studies to enhance the validity and reliability of my findings. When I resigned 
from the bank to work as a finance manager with a shoe manufacturing company (1986-87), 
I was able to add valuable information about the way most Pakistani business was run. 
During my said job at the bank, in the evenings, I often used to go to two hospitals 
where my sisters worked as doctors, and using their reference (a positive use of the sub-
continent nepotism), would study the various procedures, practices, and working conditions 
of doctors and nurses. Whilst lecturing in Pakistan, I had to arrange internships for our 
students in more than a hundred public/industrial/commercial organizations and made 
personal visits to many. Later, many of my students worked in several types of organizations 
in middle/ senior positions and were usually happy to let me carry investigations there (the 
advantages of the sub-continent life-long respect for liked teachers) and trust with information 
knowing that I shall be discrete in using it. I was lucky again in the Middle East to have, 
over a period of four years (1992-96), more than a thousand mature students most of whom 
were private or government officials in senior or middle levels and willing to share large 
amounts of information with me. But without this chance to learn about the natives through 
long-term student-teacher interaction, detailed conversation about the socio-cultural aspects 
of their lives, physical observation and informal interviews, I would not have been able to 
gather deeper information particularly through formal research methods, because, in the 
Middle East, the use of questionnaires or interviews for research purposes is seen with strong 
suspicion unless the aims of the research are strictly commercial or related to the propagation 
of the state or cultural/ religious supremacy of the Arabs. This has been reported by 
researchers from various Middle Eastern countriesfsee endnote 2]. Quite often, it is not only 
the authorities but one's colleagues too who suspect the motives behind a research survey 
because of many's fear that surveys might result in the discovery of some of their 
weaknesses; the idea that criticism may lead to improvement is alien to the Middle Eastern 
culture. Open criticism is often considered as tantamount to the critic's presumed disruptive 
intentions. More over, interviews and questionnaires which aim at straight deduction from 
'word of mouth' often produce misleading information because of the hyperbolic manner in 
which Arabic language is used among the Arabs[see endnote 3], the general Arab abstinence 
11 
from true self-critical expression (dramatic-unrealistic self-lampooning which makes people 
laugh is appreciated) and a proclivity for self-justification and self-glorification. 
When I was gathering data about Asians in Britain (1990-92 & summer 94) and 
wanted to know the working conditions and the working class culture deeply, I followed 
Malinowski's advice[see endnote 4] of living right among the subjects and found a job for 
myself for four months in an English factory (twelve hours a day and six days a week) 
among Asian workers and supervisors. I was able to get this job because the Asian supervisor 
and I had a common friend: Such informal methods of data collection may not be available 
in the Euroamerican contexts where the values of privacy and reservations imply that things 
must be done more formally, the advantage of which is that whatever information you get, 
can be trusted as more reliable than that obtained in the sub-continent and in the Middle East. 
However, this does not imply that all in Euroamerica can be taken at face value. 
The skills I had subconsciously developed over decades in communicating to people 
and using the right manners and approach to obtain deeper knowledge of phenomena were 
usable with respondents from the sub-continent but proved largely irrelevant in Britain where 
greater emphasis was placed on prior written requests and formal means of communication. 
I then realized that methods of data collection are, to a large extent, culture-bound and, to 
yield the most, should be designed in accordance with cultural requirements. For example, 
in the sub-continent it is not considered impolite, except among the very rich or the high 
ranking, if one (perceived 'educated', and 'properly' dressed) shows up at someone's door 
for an interview without prior appointment. On the other hand, such an attitude is not 
normally welcomed in Britain where most want to be interviewed at the workplace. Because, 
in Britain, social differences at the workplace are not as obvious as in the sub-continent and 
the Middle East, a foreign researcher may not easily know much about the subject's social 
class and patterns of familial behaviour. For such reasons, my findings about the British 
situation in this work have primarily come from secondary sources. 
Drawing conclusions from data is affected by cultural familiarity or lack of it: 
While the aforementioned 'informal' data collection may yield richer and deeper 
information, a prime requirement is that the researcher must have lived long enough in the 
particular culture to be able to discern reliable information from the other. Lack of 
experience in language and its meaning may make it difficult for researchers to correctly 
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categorize whilst conducting research in alien cultures. I may explain this point by an 
example: If a researcher were to ask a poor worker in the sub-continent, "why do you do 
this kind of work?", a customary traditional answer he would get is, "well, what else can 
'we' do?; this is what my father and his father have done for générations". Now, I know of 
a researcher from a prosperous country who interpreted the above answer as "the Eastern 
love for traditional professions" and hence entirely missed the point which is as follows: 
When a poor sub-continent man gives the above given answer, what he usually means is that, 
"we are a low income people and have been so for générations; we are low class and there 
are enormous barriers to our entry to upper income groups - hence we have been 'like this' 
for générations and shall continue to be 'like this'": A researcher who, (i)has lived in the 
native culture long enough, (ii)has acquired skills and sensitivity to interpret people's 
Cognition, and, (iii)knows of the reflections of objective circumstances behind the use of 
language, would see fatalism (the cognitive aspect) and material poverty (known through 
long-term observations of physical conditions) expressed in the given short answer. However, 
because our said foreign researcher from the developed country had presumably and most 
probably, (i)not experienced the limitations which a society without any form of social 
security but with a meanest form of exploitation imposes upon the lo wer classes, (ii)been 
brought up in 'free' (or indifferent) environment where sons are not bound to take up their 
father's profession, and, consequently, developed 'romantic' notions about the "Eastern 
family values whereby sons carry the father's profession", and, (iii)been brought up to trust 
people and take their word at face value, he therefore interpreted the given answer as 
" Eastern respect and love for family-traditional professions ". The given example 
demonstrates the importance of carrying out long term observations of, (i)the physical 
conditions, (ii)cognition, and, (iii)ways of using language, to be able to interpret the true 
meaning of words used by a certain people. To carry out such observations the researcher 
must have, (i)a regularly reflective and probing mind, and, (ii)skills in unearthing the exact 
realities by the use of repeated questions aimed at seeking the exactly intended meanings 
from people not well versed in the use of appropriate language. 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, at times, an outsider may be able to evaluate 
a situation or a system with greater objectivity than those who have grown too familiär with 
the culture to be able to see both its advantages and its dysfunctions. For example most 
Muslims and the Filipino Catholics, speli bound by religious indoctrination, cannot see the 
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social disintegration and human dégradation caused by their overpopulating family structure 
even though the évidence is overwhelming and obvious to many foreign agencies. Likewise, 
while it is obvious to many from other cultures, many British people, perhaps in their 
ideological commitment to place individuai différences at the core of éducation, overlook the 
fact that a child has first to acquire certain uniform/standardized linguistic, mathematical and 
conceptual skills before being able to express individuality in using these. Although it may 
easily be established by comparative studies that too little control at a young âge can be as 
alienative to learning as too much control, most British to whom I have talked, do not see 
an abandonment of 'active socialization' as a major cause of aliénation from learning, 
particularly in relatively difficult subjects such as mathematics and naturai sciences. 
Criticism of literature is affected bv cultural familiaritv or lack of it: 
It is not easy to criticize the conceptual schemes of authors whose empirical referents 
are not known to the critic. It is difficult to evaluate descriptions of socio-organizational 
situations one has never been in. There has to be a feeling of some kind of association, 
rivalry or animosity to generate thoughts and to motivate one to review or criticize. For 
example, I have frequently observed that the British often naively appreciate the values, 
norms, religions and expressions of certain non-Western societies which, to the one who has 
lived in and knows well, are full of obvious dysfunctions and hence easy to criticize. 
Likewise, I had to make great efforts to be able to evaluate théories and models of certain 
Euroamerican Systems and societies I had not personally experienced and, at times, I had 
only logicai extrapolation to rely on. 
A defence of usine idiographic data collection methods in this work: 
I have made greater use of the old fashioned idiographic methods than is in vogue in 
modem studies. I have found the said method particularly helpful because of its exclusion 
of many problems of finding équivalence for concepts and terms whose empirical referents 
are hard to fathom in various cultures. Case descriptions serve as a true empirical basis from 
which concepts are deduced, sharpened in définition, and clarified. I have tried to do so 
wherever I could, and the sensitivity for differentiating the typical from the atypical, acquired 
from using several kinds and methods of observations and analysis (détails in the following 
sections) over a long period, has been one safeguard against relying on 'anecdotal évidence' 
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and 'generalizing from the specific', risks often associated with the use of case studies. 
In the case studies mentioned below, one can see the real culture of the sub-continent 
organizations, the intrigue at the promotion of a rival contender, suspicion, mistrust, 
jealousy, rivalries, filling the ears of bosses with actual or false allegations of injustice or 
bribery against a 'culprit* to show one's loyalty to the organization (or to the perceived 
powerful superior), boasting of power and authority, guarding company's secrets with undue 
zeal and fervor, etc: Such behaviour forms the major bulk of organizational and social life 
in the sub-continent and the Middle East, but, expectedly, is not accounted for in Western 
organizational theories except for such references as 'informal organization' or 'grape vine' 
etc. For example, from the following cases of average real life situations[see endnote 5], I 
was able to gather support for my own observations of, for example, how easy it was for 
people in many cultures, compared to that in Europe, to rush to conflict with serious 
allegations against the contenders; such conflict-proneness is epitomized in the Ethiopian case 
of "The Promotion of Ato Desta" (Knudson, 1967); the embezzlement of low motivated 
employees in an Indian public transport system[see endnote 6] (my similar observations in 
Pakistan and the Middle East were helpful in deducing the link between low motivation, 
money motivation and corruption); recruitment and appointment of employees on the bases 
of affiliations with the winning political party in Ghana (see my analogous findings in the 
sub-continent and the Middle East), money motivation to the extent of seeking 'tea 
allowance' among poorly paid and exploited Indian semi-skilled workers[see endnote 7]; 
conflict in India between rival trade unions charging each other with misappropriation of 
union funds, ignoring the interests of workers, and accepting illegal favors from 
management, strikes and physical attacks on managers[see endnote 8] (similar situations 
abound in Pakistani industry); high money motivation of the employees of Trastos, S. A , who 
wanted to be fired only so that they could get the statutory one month's wages for every year 
of service upon discharge; (I found similarities among some Pakistan Armed Forces officers, 
and among the Middle Eastern workers where working conditions were harsh); the 
resentment of Indian workers at being asked to do janitorial work[see endnote 9], then-
reluctance to put complaints on paper for fear of annoying the superiors prior to coming up 
for promotion, and the meanness and petty squabbling over small sums of money. Case 
descriptions analogous to my own findings ensure me that my observations have not been 
inaccurate or misplaced. 
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The use of concepts as absolutes and quantifiable could be misleading: 
Over the years, interest in qualitative approaches to studying sociological phenomena 
has increased because of a growing disillusionment with the universal usefulness of 
quantitative research methods[see endnote 10], operationalization of sociological concepts, 
quantification of sociological entities, and measurements of psycho-sociological traits (Martin 
and Turner, 1986; Chapman, 1992). No matter how precise the measurements, the measured 
remains a quality. However, when data are sufficiently precise, statistical techniques can 
simplify understanding them (Goode and Hatt, 1981: 313-314). Manyfsee endnote 11] 
advocate multiple modes of research for single phenomenon (Pugh et al. , 1975: 65; Turner, 
1981: 243). 
However, many doctoral dissertations and researches on organizational behaviour, 
particularly those about the sub-continent, reveal the risks of using conceptual abstractions 
in absolute meanings. For example, see the scores of 'conclusions' about 'management 
philosophy and style in Indian industries', in the two volummes, 700 pages each, nearly half 
consisting of questionnaire obtained ticks, Yes, No, or grading in between, replete with 
monotonously meticulous statements; just two paragraphs from the said book should suffice: 
"Sectoral comparison shows the public sector management style to be less 
participative, more coercive, but less indeterminate than the private sector management style. 
The style in the public sector (64 percent responses) looks to be less participative than in the 
private sector (78 percent responses) in terms of the views 'to a large extent' and 'to some 
extent'. The former (36 percent responses) happens to be more coercive than the latter (8 
percent responses) in respect of the positions 'little' and 'very little'. And the former (nil) is 
found to be less indeterminate than the latter (14 percent responses) in relation to the view 
'no opinion'. The textile industry management style is a little less participative, more 
coercive, but less indeterminate than the engineering industry management style " (Tayal, 
1988: 575); "... age-wise analysis shows the philosophical orientation to be primarily 
normative in the younger and elderly age groups but to be indeterminate in the middle age 
group. Sector-wise, normative orientation is found to exist in both the sectors. Wfiereas no 
clear-cut pattern of philosophy is identifiable in the textile industry, there is predominance 
of normative philosophy in the engineering industry. Philosophical orientation in the case of 
paternalistic managers and qualified professionals is indeterminate, but there is presence of 
normative philosophy in the case of experienced professionals in the private sector. The 
orientation of the qualified professionals is indeterminate whereas we find the experienced 
professionals in the public sector to be normative in their philosophy. " (Tayal, 1988: 748). 
After reading scores of pages of statements as quoted above, one feels little improved 
in his understanding of the 'management philosophy and style in Indian industries'. One 
criticism that must be made here is the use of concepts in an absolute form whereby one gets 
a false impression that coercive or normative philosophy in India has much in common with 
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the same in Europe; this ignores the relativistic nature of meanings, that for example, 
'coercion' in Saudi Arabia is a very différent phenomenon from that in Europe. Much could 
be clarified by describing and elaborating the empirical referents of concepts and théories. 
An abstract of the methods of data collection used in this work: 
1- Field notes of long-term participant and non-participant observations of nearly a 
hundred sub-continent and Middle Eastern private and public industriai, commercial, 
financial, educational, health, politicai, religious and governmental organizations (1981-96). 
2- Field notes of medium/short-term participant/non-participant observations in two 
British and around twenty British-Asian private industriai, commercial, financial and 
educational organizations in Britain (1990-92 & summer 94). 
3- Secondary source observations that could be checked for reliance. For example, I 
have made use of the direct observations of my colleagues who were interested in observing 
organizational behaviour patterns in many organizations. 
4- Informal observation at the social level in assessing the poverty/ affluence levels and 
gaps among classes (observation is sharpened by reading and theorizing about observed 
facts); in analyzing familial patterns of behaviour among sub-continent working class families 
(where family life is not much of a secret and even Street brawls are not uncommon) whom 
I visited as a volunteer for the Family Planning Association, and in understanding the 
behaviour patterns of several middle and upper class families whom I used to visit in the 
capacity of a tutor to their children, as a friend to the family, or as a regulär and intimate 
visitor for one or the other reason. My observations were systematic where possible because 
I had learned the technique and was interested in seeing if some socio-psychological théories 
could be verified by observation. 
5- Physical évidence (slums, condition of housing, clothing, diet) has been valuable 
in imparting to me a sensitivity to determine social class membership of my interviewées and 
subjects. I have also gathered information about conflict patterns by physical évidence 
obtained by visiting the sites of work and conflict, witnessing property damage caused by 
industriai strikes, religious and politicai agitation, arson, violence, police action, etc. 
6- Case studies, for noting patterns of motivation and social control, of around forty 
individuate, including workers, managers, teachers, scientists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, 
psychologists, leaders, entrepreneurs, traders, a few high ranking dignitaries, known to me 
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in one or the other capacity and whose socio-organizational life I have followed for severa! 
years. In deducing from cases, I have sought to avoid the dangers of 'generalizing from the 
specific* by, (i)gathering a very large number of cases, (ii)gathering and following the cases 
for several years until it was possible to see what was typical, (iii)relying only on the typical 
for deductions and, (iv)combining case study based deductions with those from other sources 
of data collection mentioned in this section. 
7- Qualitative coding of transcriptions of around seventy intensive unstructured/semi-
structured interviews (1990-96). The interviewees were mostly past or present employees of 
various organizations, from similar occupational and social backgrounds as mentioned in item 
6 but most were related to business organizations in one or the other capacity. 
The sampling method for interviewing: In the beginning, I thought of having a sample 
of selected employees of some selected English firms and those of some comparable sub-
continent and Middle Eastern firms, but a comparison of a few industries was not enough for 
our purposes for, unless the sample was to be very large, interviewing was unlikely to lead 
to a valid analysis of behavioral patterns characteristic of a culture and society: Random 
intensive interviews of as many persons as possible, and of varied social backgrounds could 
genérate more representative information than those conducted in a selected few companies. 
A major problem lay in the difficulty of obtaining an unbiased sample, which 
difficulty I solved by conducting interviews for several years (1990-1996), in as many cities 
as possible, from a cross section of socio-economic classes, and from as many respondents 
as were willing to spare an hour or more. I stopped interviewing at a stage when I had 
obtained enough information to see the standard events so much so that the nature and 
contents of any further information often became predictable. As I have coupled the data 
from my long-term observations with interview-based information, I feel that this has almost 
solved the problem of having a representative sample for the said cultures. 
The method of interviewing: In the beginning I used structured interview questions 
but then moved on to unstructured ones as these were found to be more helpful in getting 
wider ranging information. I preferred the location of interviews to be in the household so 
that the interviewee could feel at ease and I could find about his socio-economic background 
by physical evidence of quality of living, without asking many cumbersome, possibly 
embarrassing questions. 
8- (a) Literature from various writers on the sub-continent and the Middle East, about 
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social, religious/cultural norms and values, the validity of which work was checked 
intermittently in intensive discussions in 'study circles' involving lecturers, intellectuals, 
srudents etc. (1975-1988). (b) In writing on the social and politicai contexts of conflict, I 
have made use of the several kinds of documents, such as government publications about the 
labor policies, industriai relations ordinances, employée union membership, economie 
reports, and, institutional records (bonuses, payroll, paid holidays given to employées etc.). 
9-Findings in the Middle East were derived largely from close interaction with more 
than a thousand mature Arab students, and interviews with around two dozen Indian, 
Pakistani and Western managers and around fifty workers and employées in various native 
organizations (1992-96). The findings are more validated by the fact that the said students 
were mostly adults who carne from ali sorts of socio-economie backgrounds, were employed 
in many government offices, the Amir's secrétariat, ministries (of health, éducation, civil 
planning and agriculture, télécommunications and petrol), in the army, police, courts, private 
commercial and industriai companies, banks, télécommunications and oil and gas compames, 
and therefore constitute a strongly représentative sample of the entire population of the Gulf 
states. Because many students carne from other states of the Middle East on exchange 
programs while the teachers carne from fi ve Middle Eastern countries, thèse provided a good 
sample for observation of common and general behaviour patterns in the Middle East. I have 
corroborated the findings with observations of many of my English and American colleagues 
who have worked at other Middle Eastern organizations and universities, with readings from 
relevant Arabie books, with literature regarding the Middle East, and with detailed 
discussions with my Arab colleagues, particularly from Egypt. The findings are also 
supported by the observations of many English teachers at the British Council who have 
worked in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Emirates and Egypt. The observations extend to 
motivation in general and at work, and the nature of control and conflict in the Middle East. 
Data analvsis and developing links between catégories: 
Though I used to write observations as soon as I could and reflect upon them, in the 
beginning I sought patterns only in thought, not on paper. When I felt that a category had 
taken a certain permanent shape, I then used to write it down. However, I produced a very 
large number of classifications only to realize that I should limit my observations to very 
relevant thèmes and confine the catégories to those about which fréquent observations were 
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made. I then became more formai in writing notes and focused on relevant thèmes in the 
subséquent data collection and analysis. 
In arriving at the catégories related to the socio-cultural context of organizations, I 
have also analyzed, where possible, the contents (in terms of the structure of the ideas and 
facts presented) of: (i)relevant books and documents on the society, culture and history of 
the three cultures; (ii)books and pamphlets for religious and nationalistic indoctrination (for 
social control), (iii)television programs and plays, news and articles in papers and Journals, 
(for motivation, status Symbols, social control and conflict), (iv)political and propaganda 
pamphlets (about social control and conflict), and (v)literature relevant to control, conflict 
and motivation. The détails of the 'content analysis' method are available in Goode and Hatt 
(1981: 330) who suggest that content analysis can be done by symbol count, item analysis, 
and by thematic analysis. Likewise, it is also possible to analyze the response to spoken and 
written materials. 
Düring the process of classification of events (obtained from observations and 
interview transcriptions) in the relevant catégories, I added and excluded incidents and 
recorded some in more than one category until it became clear that only the incidents truly 
illustrative of a category were included therein. To facilitate further addition, I gave numbers 
to the catégories and defined each in longer titles. Sometimes, I found that two catégories 
were in fact two aspects of one phenomena (e.g. non-work control and personal control were 
joined as one category) and, at other times, that a category in fact dealt with many distinct 
phenomena and could be spilt into several (e.g. non-work motivation was spilt into various 
kinds of motivation). However, there was considérable over-lap between catégories related 
to the three variables that are the focus of this work; the said over-lap only serves to show 
that there are strong relationships between the three and that ali three are joined by an 
underlying socio-cultural context in which the events occur. 
The interview based data forms one supportive and descriptive base of the various 
thèses of my theoretical formulations. M y primary aim in conducting thèse interviews was 
to specifically count the number of regulär narrations and see if they confirmed the validity 
of my previously acquired sensitivity to what was typical, a modification and confirmation 
of the various thèses that I had been constructing for the past several years. 
A word of camion is due here: Interview based data can be criticized as 
impressionistic assessment of interviewées. In the sub-continent and the Middle East, in 
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particular, interviewée Statements may not be true to reality. Hence interview data has to be 
used with caution and in conjunction with information obtained from alternative sources. 
However, the nature of my thèmes is such that misrepresentation of reality on the part of a 
few interviewées cannot significantly affect the conclusions drawn but reflect some further 
cultural phenomena, such as, 'cultural conditioning in cognitive distortions', and, 'the level 
and extent of subjective interprétation of commonplace realities of life, conditioned and 
reinforced by cultural rewards, sanctions, values and taboos'. 
Many social psychologists argue (Howard, 1994) that a comprendisi ve account of a 
social structure must include the actor's cognitive system (mental représentation and 
information manipulation translated into thought). Düring data collection and analysis, a 
cognitive approach to understanding patterns meant not only to observe behaviour but also 
inquire about the feelings and perceptions of the actors. The subjective and objective aspects 
of the situation were noted to supplément each other. Although the cognitive bases of 
behavior may or may not lie in objective/material circumstances, the two sets of observations 
(cognitive and material) are often interrelated if not causally connected, which, for the 
researcher, means shifting attention regularly from the subjective to the objective and this is 
the approach which we have followed in this work. For example, in studying conflict, 
observation of the circumstances which probably led to certain perceptions and feelings which 
in turn led to the observable conflict, were studied in entirety. Conflict, when understood in 
cognitive terms, can reveal itself long before it may happen and therefore the cognitive 
approach is richer in tracing potential conflict; the approach also has implications for 
conflict-prevention in that the existence of conflict-prone assumptions or préjudices in the 
populace that supplies the Organization with its manpower, points to a greater need for 
organizational socializing and incentives to refrain from conflict. A cognitive approach to 
conflict resolution, for example, stresses the need to borrow ideas from what is known in 
psychotherapy as cognitive therapy; for example, in certain cases, cognitive therapy would 
assume that the assumptions of a group about an "enemy group" could be changed. Likewise, 
in studying motivation, the stimulus from the subject's material needs was studied along with 
his Cognition about the status or value of various kinds of work. In studying control, I looked 
at the perceptions, rationalizations and justifications of people using various methods of 
control, the desirability and the material causes and conséquences of the said methods. 
The détails of classifying data in ways which facilitate arrangement of the material 
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to reveal patterns or properties are available in several books and articles on the grounded 
theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 1968, 1978). The methods of dealing with these 
problems have been highly idiosyncratic (Turner, 1981: 229) and maybe left to the judgement 
of the researcherfsee endnote 12] who should get the required knowledge of methods and 
their basic logic. 
On the level of complexity: 
Modern researchers often seem to possess an ability to narrow down their 
investigations to a limited and manageable number of variables and to look at phenomena at 
micro level. To me, variables usually seem to have relationships and cannot be studied in 
their own right, but in a macro-holistic perspective[see endnote 13]. Hence, my data became 
very large and complex[see endnote 14] with around twenty categories each for the three 
cultures and several core concepts (described in chapter seventeen pp. 257- 259, as structures 
and functions of socio-cultural institutions having analogies in organizations). However, I was 
able to reduce the complexity by; (a)analyzing intermittently and, (b)extending the period of 
data analysis to around four years (1992-1995) although I kept gathering more data during 
the same period. Longer periods help when the data is enormous; the nature of thought 
processes is such that we feel a need to get out in order to return after having absorbed and 
understood[see endnote 15]. Switching thoughts from one category to another without having 
resolved questions about the first often helps return with solutions in hand. 
The most common difficulty I faced was in keeping focus on workplace instances and 
not stray away to their social context: It was at a later stage that the frequent recurrence of 
the said difficulty turned out to be a major discovery of this work; that organizational 
boundaries in the sub-continent and in the Middle East are much less clearly defined than is 
the case in Europe and United States, and that what differentiates research in organizational 
behaviour in the said societies is the greater need for incorporating socio-cultural analysis 
into research in the former countries than in the West. 
In the earlier stages of data analysis, I was keen at attributing cause-effect properties 
to categories (e.g. between certain social values and coercive control) but I soon discovered 
the difficulties in proving causal properties (were social values the cause or the result of 
coercive control?) though it was relatively easy to show the relationships through logical 
extrapolation. I could only defer such theses for further data collection, remembering the 
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dangers of 'logicai élaboration' as exceeding the bounds of the data and building up 
speculative theoretical édifice upon a fragmentary empirical base (Glaser, 1978, in Turner, 
1981: 238). Glaser finds 'conceptual élaboration' désirable as against logicai élaboration but 
Turner suggests that whilst keeping in view Glaser's warning, the theorist must learn the skill 
of constructing a range of abstract variations upon a given concrete piece of évidence. 
After the initial formation of various thèses from the aforementioned methods of data 
collection and analyses, I nave kept submitting them for criticai évaluation to those 
interested, including a dozen intellectuals from the sub-continent, Middle East, and Britain. 
I have kept a vigil for information that affected the reliability of my findings and, in the light 
of such information, kept modifying the said thèses until convinced that thèse thèses, which 
are aspects of my theoretical formulations, are based on reliable and valid data, and that the 
said thèses do reflect the typical situations in the said three cultures. 
Considering conditions under which the links between the catégories hold: 
This to me was a very important stage of theory formulation because of my greater 
interest in the links and in the contexts in which such links seemed to hold. For example, in 
the Islamic countries, there is a link often made between the kind of dress one wears and his 
values, so that the imposition of a certain kind of dress code is often a means of social 
control. Dress codes in the Western culture are not likewise, and with such intensity, related 
to social control. Perhaps the best way to disprove causal effects of conditions under which 
links between catégories hold is to see if similar links are found in various conditions. If 
links are found to hold only in certain conditions, then this is a case for relating those 
conditions to the said links. For example, the finding that greater coercive control existed in 
the sub-continent and among the Middle Eastern migrant workers than among British Asian 
workers, enabled me to link coercive control with the absence of social security, but the fact 
that coercive control was exercised by financially secure people, and in the family as well, 
enabled me to add a cognitive-cultural dimension to the occurrence of coercive control. 
When the catégories for the three cultures were finally established, I saw several links 
between them emerging out of the data thèmes, particularly and especially in comparative 
terms; if I had catégories for one culture only, I would not have been able to see the links 
between them with such greater depth and ease as only the comparative data imparted to me. 
I could see a fascinating analogy here: A person who lives and thinks in terms of the 
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'catégories' of only one culture, and does not see those of another, is hindered in his capacity 
to see the links between the 'catégories' of his culture, and hence, either underestimate or 
overestimate the characteristic features or the structural-functional properties of his culture 
in providing the essential social base for harmony, cohésion, integration or the opposite. 
A preliminarv assessment of the résultant formulation: 
I was unsure whether I should cali the three résultant formulations (given in pages 
257, 258 and 259) 'models' or 'theoretical sub-systems' of 'socio-organizational behaviour 
in three cultures'. Although the terms 'theory' and 'model' are often used interchangeably, 
Rubenstein & Haberstroh[see endnote 16] see the main differentiation between a theory and 
a model as related to the model conclusions being 'logicai conséquences' of model premises, 
versus the theory conclusions being subject to 'empirical vérification'. The differentiation 
however, is dulled by Champion's (1975: 14-15) insertion about theoretical propositions too 
being la logicai explanatory and prédictive scheme from which testable hypothèses can be 
derived\ I believe that models, like théories, are subject to empirical vérification though in 
less complex ways than those used for the vérification of theoretical assertions. Regarding 
our three theoretical structures, summarized on pages 257-259 and representing analogies 
between organizational and broader socio-cultural behaviour, and some induced relationships 
between the discovered catégories in the three cultures, perhaps it would be appropriate to 
call them 'theoretical formulations' or 'theoretical sub-systems' which, joined together, 
provide évidence for 'a theory of socio-organizational behaviour' stating that organizational 
behaviour is primarily a derivative of the structures and functions of broader socio-cultural 
institutions. The évidence is to be seen in the analogies and relationships mentioned above. 
A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict, and motivation are strongly 
influenced by the structural-functional properties of a socio-cultural system, and hence, 
'intrinsic motivation' is a very rare phenomenon. 
In assessing the process of my research work, I may quote that the fundamental 
questions to ask about ail research techniques are related to the précision, reliability, and 
relevance of the data and their analysis; (l)how precise the observations are? (2)can other 
scientists repeat the observations? and (3)do the data actually demonstrate the conclusion? If 
the data do not satisfy a rigorous logie of proof, the conclusions remain doubtful (Goode & 
Hart, 1981: 313). However, Turner (1988: 111) states that because in qualitative enquiries, 
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the researcher relies on 'soft' data, very few conclusions can be justified solely by référence 
to the method used. Henee generalizations from such a study have to be self-justifying; the 
researcher using the grounded theory approach is exposed and cannot hide behind an array 
of techniques as is often the case with other forms of research. Any theory emerging will 
reflect the researcher's intellectual grasp, creativity, sensitivity and understanding, as well 
as the quality of his data-gathering methods[see endnote 17]. The evolved theory should have 
the attributes of (i)a closeness of fit with the area being studied and, (ii)a degree of 
complexity that should reflect the complexities of the world which has been studied (Turner, 
1981: 240). I believe that my theoretical formulations, presented in the later pages, do meet 
the above quoted criteria. Regarding the last step of the grounded theory, that is, making 
connections to other existing théories, we shall deal with it in the last chapter. 
In the following pages, findings from the empirical studies have been described and 
discussed in the forni of catégories arrived at through the above mentioned methods. 
Notes and Explanations 
1. This has been termed 'action research'; researcher's working in the organization 
helps getting data which outsiders may not have access to. 
2. An assistant professor from Alexandria reported the following: "When I was doing 
my dissertation for my M B A , the restrictions upon questionnaire and interview based surveys 
nearly brought me to tears. My topic was "workers attitudes towards non-financial 
incentives". In the organization where I did the research, the chief manager insisted upon 
seeing ali the questionnaires after they had been filled in by the employées and then he used 
whitener to delete what he thought was an inappropriate description of the company working 
and other conditions by the workers. It was Jamal Nasir's period and ali researches had to 
be approved by the government before they could begin. Even survey sites and questionnaires 
had to be approved by the authorities. When I finished my M B A dissertation, the professors 
refused to allow it to be published because it went against the "government line". I protested 
and finally a compromise was reached; the professors said that they would grant me a grade 
for my dissertation, equal to the average of the marks I had obtained in other subjects on 
condition that I will not publish the thesis in any forni. At that time we blamed it on the 
"communist government". But now that we have a democracy, the situation in Egypt is the 
same. For my Ph.D, I have to get the questionnaire approved by the authorities and don't 
know what would happen to the thesis but I have carefully selected a topic that has little 
politicai implications. I have my questionnaire brought from the university of Michigan; they 
might say I was not honest (originai) because I got my questionnaire from another researcher 
in America, but I have the authorization from the said university to use it. The Michigan 
questionnaire gives détails about its reliability and validity and so I can't be attacked on those 
grounds either. The doctoral candidates in the Egyptian universities are supposed to take an 
entrance test which tests how much they have read from various books. In Syria, you cannot 
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get admission to a Masters course unless you support the ruling party". 
3. On the nature of the use of language by the Arabs, see Patai, R. (1973: 41-72), 
chapter titled, "under the speli of the language" where he talks about the fundamental 
weaknesses of the Arabie language, its ancient ambiguities, rhetoric, exaggeration, over-
assertion, répétition, lack of proper time sensé and verb/tense structure, and the often 'black 
and white' vision so that H . Hourani called the Arabie language, 'theflawed mirror in which 
they [the Arabs] see the world'; Biblical Hebrew had similar weaknesses but it has since rid 
itself of them. Most Arabs claim that Arabie, being 'holy language' cannot be modified. 
4. The détails of the ethnographie method are available in Malinowski's works and 
in many others which it would be futile to reproduce in this work but a glimpse should 
suffice: Malinowski (1922: 1-25) explains his principles of methodology under three main 
titles: First, the Student must have real scientific aims and know the values and criteria of 
modern ethnography. Second, he should put himself in "good conditions of work", i.e live 
right among the natives. Finally, he has to apply a number of special methods of collecting, 
manipulating and fixing his évidence. Good training in theory and acquaintance with latest 
results is not identical with being burdened with preconeeived ideas which are pernicious in 
any systematic work, but the ability (the main endowment of a scientific thinker) to foresee 
Problems which are often revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies. Malinowski 
states that each phenomenon should be studied through the broadest range possible of its 
concrete manifestations, each studied by an exhaustive survey of detailed examples. If 
possible, the results should be tabulated to some sort of synoptic chart, both to be used as 
an instrument of study and to be presented as an ethnological document. However, 
Malinowski adds that there are numerous phenomena of great importance (the imponderabilia 
of actual life) which cannot possibly be assessed or recorded by questioning or computing 
documents, but have to be observed in their füll actuality. These are such things as the 
routine of a man's working day, the tone of conversation, social life, the existence of strong 
friendship or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people; all these 
have to be scientifically formulated and recorded by a trained observer. He stresses that from 
all points of sociological or psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the manner 
and type of behaviour observed in the performance of an act is of the highest importance. 
The détails and tone of behaviour ought to be given besides the bare outline of events, that 
behaviour is a fact, a relevant fact, and one that can be recorded (Malinowski, 1922: p.20). 
Finally, in a scientific field work, the native views, opinions and utterances must be 
recorded, for in every act of life, there is first the routine prescribed by custom and tradition, 
then there is the manner in which it is carried out and lastly, there is the explanation to it 
contained in the native mind. In short, behaviour and Cognition must both be recorded. 
Turner (1988: 112) has recommended ethnographie fieldwork for formulating 
grounded theory but describes the fieldwork method in the context of stages of grounded 
theory as that the fieldworker observes, looks, listens, interviews and records a continuous 
flow of expérience. He then divides and subdivides the enormous material into sections and 
subsections for manipulation. Agar (1986, in Turner, 1988: 112) has used the term 'strip' 
to refer to the units of data with which an ethnographer works: a strip he regards as 'any 
bounded phenomenon against which an ethnographer tests his or her understanding'. 
5. Some cases quoted here were prepared by the Administrative Staff College of 
India, and reproduced in Knudson, 1967. 
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6. The case of Manaland Road Transport Corporation was prepared by Jagannadharao 
S. Abburi, Osmania University, India, reproduced in Knudson, 1967. 
7. The case of Bhopil Limited, prepared by Francis A . Menezes, Training Officer, 
Voltas Limited, Bombay, India, reproduced in Knudson, 1967. 
8. The case of Precision Instruments Limited was prepared by Ashwini Kumar, 
reader, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India, and the case of Nadir A l i & Company, 
prepared by Abad Ahmed, Reader, University of Delhi; reproduced in Knudson, 1967. 
9. The cases of Baba Textile Mills and Coastal Works Limited, prepared by Mrs. 
Asha Chary, Instructor, University of Bombay; reproduced in Knudson, 1967. 
10. A study by Francis J. (1991) titled "When in Rome", about interactions of 
hypothetical Japanese managers with hypothetical American managers, uses no real 
information about any naturally occurring social event. Francis used a scenario-based written 
manipulation to operationalize the cultural behaviour of target individuals. She states that 
given "the difficulty of conducting research with real target individuals from different 
cultures", the success of her approach could contribute to "more efficient and effective 
research designs". Chapman (1992) deplores the intellectual bankruptcy of the said study 
which claims that research without any real subjects could be "more efficient and effective" 
and states that the indifference to real life is made all the more incongruous by the trappings 
of statistical analysis, hypothesis, levels of significance and the like. 
11. In providing directions for future research in organizational behavior, Pugh, 
Mansfield and Warner (1975: 64-65) stressed the need in studies to: 
(i) Integrate the different levels of analysis (individual, groups, organizations and 
organizational environments) within the compass of a single, interwoven theoretical 
framework. 
(ii) Attempt to increase links with psychology, sociology, industrial relations, public 
administration, political science and other originating disciplines of organizational behavior. 
Modern researchers of organizations seem no longer concerned whether their approach is 
sociological, psychological, economic or otherwise; for example, the study of organizations 
by Pugh and Hickson was carried out by a multidisciplinary team (Dunkerley, 1972: 89). 
(iii) Have the virtues of comparative research (factorial-statistical) whilst not losing 
those of idiographic, clinical and processual studies. 
(iv) Be more methodologically sophisticated and take account of larger numbers of 
variables at the same time suggesting a move from simple correlation analyses of the 
relationships between variables taken in pairs, to contingency types of analysis in which the 
relationship between a pair of variables is examined as it is affected by (contingent upon) a 
third variable. The methodological ability to treat several variables is critical to the future 
integrative development of organizational behavior. Systematization across a much wider 
conceptual range of variables is an important part of this necessary though difficult 
integrative process. Monolithic approaches (e.g., the postulation that 'job enrichment, 
democratic leadership, or system 4 management are good) are inadequate and need to be 
replaced by a contingency approach using wider conceptual schemes, e.g. the approaches of 
Lupton, Heller, and the Aston group. 
(v) Take account of the need to interrelate cross-sectional surveys and longitudinal 
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studies to supplement each other so that adequate theories of organizational behavior could 
emerge (Pugh, Mansfield and Warner, 1975: 17-18). 
Reformulation of problems in wider conceptual terms, as part of a continuous learning 
cycle of description, theory building, testing, refining, more adequate description, etc. is the 
only way to develop a valid, generalizable (usable) body of knowledge (Pugh, Mansfield and 
Warner, 1975: 56). 
12. It is now widely accepted that the researcher's cognitive processes (subconscious 
perceptual processes) and limited information handling capacity influence the handing of 
qualitative data and the nature and direction of his observations and analysis (Glaser, 1978 
& Bailyn, 1977 in Turner, 1981: 228). Subjectivism is characterized by a nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntarist and idiographic approach towards research while objectivism is 
characterized by a realist, positivistic, deterministic, and nomothetic approach. In social 
science theories, an intermediate position between objectivism and subjectivism is suggested. 
However, many writers go too far in stressing the subjective element in research, especially 
when they stress that even natural science research (Polariyi, 1958; Selye, 1964; Watson, 
1968; Ravetz, 1971 in Turner, 1981: 228) must be considered the product of an interaction 
between the researcher and the phenomena under study: While it is true that theory 
formulation in natural sciences at a high level of abstraction could be influenced by the 
personality and choices of the researcher, most writers do not mention that the basic natural 
science empirical research "is" safe from subjective conclusions because of the replicability 
of the findings by all well-trained researchers and even by students; I have taught 
experimental physics, and studied biology and chemistry, and I can quote hundreds of 
experiments in these sciences that lead to similar conclusions if adequate procedures are 
followed; were it not for the replicability of findings all over the world, natural sciences 
would not have made their progress in having a uniform and unified base of knowledge, and 
natural scientists in many fields in all countries of the world would not have been able to 
share knowledge with remarkable similarity in procedures, research methods, and findings. 
The high objectivity of natural scientific research can be seen in uniform calculations in 
mathematics, mechanics, electronics, nuclear physics, and aerospace sciences whether 
conducted by the Russians or the Americans. 
13. Such an approach has been recommended by several authors who criticize many 
studies for their focus on very small sections of the subject, with short-term practical ends 
in views and with little or no empirical attempt to relate these small areas to any other parts 
of the field (Pugh, Mansfield and Warner, 1975: 59). Many writers (Thompson, 1975: 1; 
Pugh et al, 1975: 57) have mentioned that the total research effort has been somewhat 
fragmented so that what we have is case studies, comparisons of small numbers of 
organizations, crude typologies, and broad ranging poorly substantiated theories. It seems 
that many empirical researchers have tried to overcome the problems of comparative analysis 
by selecting one or few levels of analysis. Selecting narrow levels of analysis could lead to 
the dangers of reductionism (Dunkerley, 1972, p.64). 
14. Bailyn (1977: 101, in Turner, 1988: 119 and Turner, 1981: 229) suggests that 
analysis of survey data needs to be pursued within an appropriate degree of complexity in 
the data: At too high degree of complexity, the analyst is overwhelmed while at too low a 
level of complexity, very little emerges in the theoretical propositions; dearth of interlinked 
conceptual relationships offers only a low level of analysis. "... Miller's (1956) long-
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established observation fis] that the maximum number of variables which can be held in 
short-term memory is 'seven plus or minus two '...a theoretical sub-system under analysis 
should have between five and nine major éléments in order to yield an interesting outcome... 
[But] discussion of scope, of focus and of levels of complexity arises as much, if not more, 
from the capabilities and limitations of the researcher as from the constraints of the area 
under investigation." (Tumer, 1988: 119). 
15. This happens in daily life as well; if you have forgotten a name, the more you 
stress your memory, the more the name may evade you but if you give up, you may 
suddenly fìnd one day, without any need or a clue, that the name pops up spontaneously in 
your memory when you were not expecting it and you wonder why, in the first place, you 
forgot it. It seems that the unconscious does not sleep but keeps thihking even when we are 
sleeping. Sometimes, we wake up and find that a riddle that we couldn't solve and had given 
up, has been solved by the unconscious when we were sleeping; it then, as if, wakes us up 
and présents us with the solution. Sometimes, rarely though, the solution appears in a dream 
albeit in a distorted fashion, and hence not usable. 
16. Rubenstein and Haberstroh (1966) differentiate between a model and a theory 
"théories are structured such that the conclusions derived from them can be placed into 
correspondence with empirical hypothèses and confirmed or refuted by experiments. Models, 
on the other hand, are Systems standing in the place of another, usually more complicated, 
system or object". The authors state that conclusions derived from models are the 'logicai 
conséquences* of the premises of model structures and that whilst a theory can be refuted by 
a 'single contradictory empirical finding', a model is not exposed to réfutation but can 
continue to be useful provided that it yields some correct or useful conclusions. A theory is 
expected to yield only true conclusions. Champion (1975: 14-15) defines a 'theory* as 
consisting of an " interrelated set of assumptions and propositions (arrangea so that a logicai 
explanatory and prédictive scheme is constituted) from which testable hypothèses can be 
derived", and a 'model' as a "set of organizational characteristics which permit portrayal of 
that organization from a particular viewpoint or dimension... Models act as classificatory 
schemes upon which théories can be construcîed... théories and models are very much related 
to one another but identical neither in form nor in function. 
17. The act of knowing includes an appraisal and this personal coefficient, which 
shapes ail factual knowledge, serves as a bridge between subjectivity and objectivity (Polanyi, 
1958: 16 in Turner, 1988: 115). "A conséquence... of encouraging investigators to 
participate in the act of knowing and to develop skill and connoisseurship in knowing is that 
they are likely to supplément their analytic understanding with what Polanyi variously calls 
'personal knowledge ', 'tacit knowledge ' or 'craft knowledge ' of that which they seek to 
understand. In its nature, the essence of this 'personal knowledge ' is difpcult to express 
articulately: as Polanyi comments, "We know more than we can say. ' But personal knowledge 
nonetheless provides a background of expérience and expertise which enables us to appraise 
that information which we wish to absorb and employ explicitty. In the light of this tacit 
knowledge, we treat, as Polanyi puts it, 'the expérience of our sensés as eues ' to an array 






Chapter Two: The Rôle of the Perceptions of Socio-Economie Status, in Motivation and 
Control in the Sub-continent and the Middle East 
(a)Perceptions of status have implications for motivation 
In the sub-continent[l], various kinds of ideas of status are openly manifested, 
stressed, preoccupy the minds of most organizational participants, and extend even to the 
most commonplace aspects of life. For example, even in prestigious organizations such as 
Pakistan Petroleum Limited, there are segregated dining rooms; there is an 'officers' mess' 
and, on another floor in the same building, there is a 'staff canteen'. There is an easily 
noticeable and large différence in the quality of food, seats, tables and Utensils that are used 
in the officers' mess and in the staff canteen. There are three divisions in the toilets, 
ironically, in one hall, hearing plaques saying, 'Staff, 'Junior Officers' and 'Senior 
Officers'. In most industries, there are no toilets for manual workers so that they are 
supposed to go out in time of need. I have not seen such divisions in Britain. 
The status Symbols for white-collar employées in most organizations in the sub-
continent were found to be air-conditioners (air-conditioners are only for top managers except 
for banks and companies that are centrally air-conditioned); téléphones and the number of 
téléphones on one's table (having one's own téléphone is often a status symbol; public 
téléphones are rare and even if one finds one, it may not be usable); the size and quality of 
the office table; the quality of chairs and office equipment; the location of one's office in the 
company premises; whether one's office is private or shared (in companies and banks that 
cannot afford larger premises, managers separate their offices by partitions not always for 
functional reasons but for a manifestation of prestige as well); the number of subordinates 
one has; having a private secretary and a company car. 
The status symbols in the society were described by most respondents as, having a 
car, type of house one lives in, where the house is located, one's station in community such 
as who one is related to or linked to, what type of social interaction one has, what type of 
society one comes from, what one's father used to do, what one's brothers and cousins are 
and do, what one's family is; for example, if one's father is the président of a large multi-
[l]As noted in the 'Introduction', most of ourempirical observations are equally valid 
in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India because, being parts of one country in the past, the three 
share remarkable similarities in social and organizational cultures. 
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national company, or a wealthy businessman, or has his own servants and a large house, 
membership of various clubs, life style, if one has been abroad, where one went for holidays, 
what kind of furniture one has etc. People talk about these things in order to assess each 
other's status. Evaluating each other's worth was reponed to be the most common point of 
conversation between newly met people in urban social gatherings. The purpose of such 
'évaluation' is often to decide if further social relations with the person should be pursued 
or not. One is often brought to repute or disrepute by where he lives, what type of parties 
he attends, what type of people he mixes around with etc. 
The status symbols described above affect the possibility of one getting a job. Most 
interviewées reported that people who are better placed in life, that is, people who belong 
to the upper section of the society in terms of their station and position, nave far better 
chances of getting better paid jobs and more powers. But then these people are likely to have 
more éducation as well because of their money irrespective of their performance in the 
schools, even if they were average performers they would have an additional support of their 
parents to go to a better college or university particularly with the newer éducation system 
whereby a monetary donation to an académie establishment may secure a place for a student 
regardless of his lo wer than average performance. Education is not free for all in the sub-
continent and everi if the under-resourced sections of society get éducation, there are many 
other social hurdles that they may not be able to cross; for example, practically, they may 
not be able to provide a good référence which is a major factor when one applies for a job. 
Because of one's social condition, because his father was a minor clerk or a junior officiai, 
one may not be able to put up an impressive bio-data irrespective of high qualifications. 
Although there is a certain amount of merit-based employment in the system, and one with 
a lower ascribed status may not be turned away from ali jobs, the one with high status 
contacts is often reported to have greater chances. This finding is commonly reported in news 
papers and other mass media, and is supported by cases reported in daily life. 
Social bargaining power: The concept of social bargaining power is linked with non-
work control attitudes, authoritarianism, motivation patterns, and is not as deep rooted in the 
Western culture as in the Asian. It is hard to define this concept in sociological terms and 
therefore I would try to explain it by examples. I might give here one example from real life: 
I was once attending the annual management meeting that was to decide on how much 
incréments should be granted to the staff of a certain Asian-Arab bank. There was one 
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officer, who happened to be the nephew of the governor of that province, and another senior 
officer, more qualified and more suitable for the job, from a not well known family 
background. The general manager, whilst granting to the nephew of the governor, double 
the amount of increment than that granted to the senior officer of humble origins, gave the 
following reasoning, 
"he [the nephew] has a Mercedes and would probably be spending half his salary on 
petrol - [the other] doesn't have a car, so give him [the nephew] about double". 
The social background of a person in the sub-continent is many times more relevant, 
in determining one's prerogatives and privileges at work, than work-related factors such as 
qualifications and job-related skills, not to mention several other socio-economic privileges 
available in the society. 
A short reference to the role of dress would not be out of place here to stress the 
significance of the extent to which status and prestige plays a very strong role in the sub-
continent. In fact, a whole treatise could be written about the ways in which various kinds 
of dress and clothing can show a man's social, economic, ethnic, linguistic, provincial and 
religious background. A common and simple example is that one can usually tell a poor 
worker from a middle class or rich man by his dress. Most upper class people in Pakistan 
wear shalwar-kameez to show their nationalism, but they expect their bankers and their 
managers to wear Western suits and tie and be well dressed: The affluent client may talk to 
the latter in Punjabi (a symbol of being carefree and informal) but he wants the latter to look 
and behave polite and civil . The affluent client expects that people worthy of his status, 
shown firstly by dress, should come to visit him. 
Having provided an introduction to the kinds and types of status symbols and the way 
they influence the psychology of organizational participants, I proceed to my case studies in 
some sub-continent organizations to show how work is 'sectionalized' into categories of 
'prestigious, less prestigious, and manual/physical-centered occupations' at the level of 
workers who are at the lowest rung of the organizational hierarchical ladder. We shall then 
move on to the next hierarchical level and see the resentment and grudges, between 'the 
ranker clerks and the junior managers', on the basis of social and economic status symbols, 
in a large Indian finance company. Finally, we shall see the role of status symbols and socio-
economic power at the highest level of organizational hierarchy in the Ministerial 
Departments of a provincial Civi l Secretariat in Pakistan. 
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(b)The cultural préjudice against manual/phvsical-centered trades & occupations 
The findings in the empirical studies conducted for this work often revealed people's 
perceptions of the worthiness of types of trades, occupations and professions. Manual or 
physical-centered occupations are placed at the lowest end of the spectrum of worthiness[2]. 
We may begin with the cultural perception of the worth of manual occupations and pass on 
to the perceptions of 'higher' occupations, jobs, ranks and departments: 
(i) The historical nature of the phenomenon: The concepts of 'worthiness' of work 
have been transmitted historically from the feudal and tribal past whereby members of higher 
feudal classes and the tribal chiefs, did not engage in manual trades. In the caste system, only 
the lowest castes, the 'shudras' and the 'kamis' performed manual/physical tasks. Among 
Muslims, the higher classes mostly engaged themselves in the conquest of other régions, in 
running the affairs of the régions under their control, and in patronizing those with religious-
philosophical or literary merits. Manual occupations were left for the lower classes. 
Agriculture was considered an inferior profession; in Islamic history, we find that the peasant 
Ansars in Medina were considered inferior to the Meccan Quraish who were the religious 
leaders [see the collection of Islamic aphorisms by Imam Bukhari]. Several idioms in the sub-
continent reflect the lowliness of 'Araeens', the farmers. 
(ii) The non-work content of the Iowlv perception of manual occupations: Detailed 
analysis of the contents of interviewée statements shows that the perception of the lowliness 
of manual occupations is subjective and cultural in nature and hence has little to do with the 
nature of the work itself. For example, when the interviewées used the terms ' lowly' , 'base', 
and 'inferior' for works such as sweeping and cleaning or washing dishes, they could not 
substantiate why thèse jobs were so perceived. Hence, in this kind of évaluation and ranking 
of various occupations and trades, it is not the work content of the professions but the 
historical attitude towards those who engage into such professions that counts for the 
évaluation of the worthiness of the work. 
(iii) The relationship of reward not with actual work: The relationship of reward with 
the perception of the lowliness of the trade, and not with work per se, becomes obvious when 
we see enormous différence in the wages of workers in the sub-continent and the Middle East 
[2]Culture creates sentiments regarding the appropriate type of economie enterprise for 
an individuai and has a strong influence upon the way in which work at lower levels of 
organization is viewed (Whyte, 1961: 31-35). 
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compared to the same in the West. Wages for manual work are much lower than even the 
social security payments to the unemployed in the West. But the said relationship does not 
supplant the labor market conditions of demand and supply because in cases of scarcity, 
manual workers may ask for comparatively higher wages which again would be a minor 
fraction of the wages for similar work in the West. 
(c)The conséquent psvchology of motivation 
We may begin a description of the motivation situation in the sub-continent by looking 
at the way in which manual/physical-centered trades are demeaned and point to people's 
desires to raise their social status by finding non-menial jobs. The non-monetary (and henee 
the cultural) aspect of the demeaning of manual/ physical-centered occupations becomes 
obvious from the finding that one who does non-manual work within the same income group 
is perceived to be of a higher social status. For example, many office assistants and clerks 
earn less than what some workers do but the former would stili be perceived as having a 
higher status than the latter and, other factors being same, given préférence in socialization 
or say, in an arranged marriage proposai. A n occupation that involves sitting on a chair and 
having a table for doing paper work is considered worthier than a manual-centered 
occupation. An Indian manager reported that work which involved reading and writing was 
considered so high in status by female workers that they quarrelled amongst themselves to 
get it though this did not entail higher wages. 
Within the category of manual work, the most low perceived is sweeping/cleaning 
which, in homes where there are no servants, is considered to be the job of women. Men, 
perceived 'higher sex', would consider it an insuit to sweep/clean which jobs, in Pakistan, 
are done either by Christian minorities or women wherever Muslim men can find other jobs. 
The problem of 'manual versus dignified work' shows in Pakistan International 
Airlines where it was reported that when, for example, a technician is promoted to a higher 
grade and called an 'officer', he comes the next day and says, "because I am an offìcer now, 
I will sit on a chair in front of a table as it is below my status now to work on the shop 
floor". The said technician has worked ali his life on the shop floor, and he is not fit for the 
work of an officer, but he refuses to work on the shop floor considering a technician's job, 
which he has done well for years, as below his newly acquired dignity. He is a skilled 
technician, but he can get more money only if his désignation is changed to an 'officer' 
which change reduces his usefulness for the organization. 
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As a finance manager in a large company, I once received a consignment of stationary 
at an odd hour when no peón was available and so I decided to lift the packages myself to 
the office, but my accounts assistant refused to carry packages because he thought it was 
below his status to lift things. In a certain área, I observed that the local shop assistants 
refrained from sitting with construction workers in one lunch room even in evenings when 
the workers had taken a bath and wore as clean clothes as the shop assistants did. 
Those who have been engaged into 'low jobs' such as sweeping, cleaning, breaking 
stones, lifting baggage, carrying bricks and other construction material, etc. would not 
normally be welcomed as a guest in the homes of same-income people engaged in non-
manual trades such as office clerks, government employees, bank júnior employees and 
companies employees in júnior non-manual categories. One in the latter kind of jobs would 
normally consider it a humiliation to engage into 'low jobs' of the former kinds. 
The 'shame and humiliation' associated with manual/physical-centered occupations 
was also found in the statements of my British-Asians interviewees who carne from non-
manual occupational background in home countries but had to work in British factories 
despite their prejudice against physical-centered occupations: When Asians from non-manual 
occupational backgrounds carne to Britain, many accepted working in factories because of 
the enormously high wages that British companies offered to them compared to what they 
could make in any kind of work in home countries. In terms of their earnings, Asian workers 
in Britain rose to become at par with very high income groups in home countries; groups 
such as medium-size business owners and very highly paid company managers. British Asian 
workers earn many times more in Western factories than what most Asian doctors, lawyers, 
lecturers, engineers and bank and company managers earn in home countries and this fact 
has served as an Ímpetus to British Asian workers to engage into factory jobs and bid 
farewell to the cultural prejudice against the said occupations, but only to an extent: Among 
Asians in Britain, the same cultural divide of manual versus higher jobs is still shown when 
it comes to marriage and socialization; manual workers would not be as welcomed as others 
into the homes of those who run businesses or are employed in office-related jobs. 
Giving up the cultural prejudice against manual occupations, particularly against 
cleaning and sweeping, was by no means easy especially for those whose "forefathers had 
had higher status" and who carne from families that had for long seen manual/physical jobs 
with disdain and contempt. The 'humiliation' that these people had to go through after 
35 
accepting the jobs of factory workers is reflected in the narrations from many interviewées. 
One interviewée, a graduate from Pakistan, cornes from a large tribe-family in which some 
relatives have reached higher ranks and could be placed among the upper middle classes, but 
some live in poverty; henee the belligerence as well as the pride of the poor in the family 
because the "relatives are high placed". The said interviewée was lucky in that he got a very 
highly paid job in a decent working environment but the 'shame' of sometimes having to 
sweep the factory floor, with others, was so great, especially "in front of the female 
workers", that after having several quarrels with the supervisor, he finally gave up his job: 
Note that a man in the sub-continent is not supposed to perform tasks that are culturally 
supposed to be women's. Domestic cleaning, especially in the présence of women, is 
considered to be one of the 'unmanly' tasks, which aspect becomes clearer when we observe 
that even manual workers would not do many domestic chores in their homes (other than 
those tasks which require physical strength beyond the capacity of women in which case the 
male members of a family may take pride in displaying their physical strength by doing the 
particular job). In rural áreas, collecting cow dung to be'used as fuel, lifting pales of water 
from wells, sweeping and cleaning in homes, cooking and washing clothes and utensils are 
tasks under-taken usually by women. In the cities, cooking, cleaning, sweeping, washing and 
ironing clothes are supposed to be women's jobs inside homes. But in hôtels and restaurants 
and at business and public places, thèse jobs would be done by men because women are 
neither allowed ñor safe working at many business and public places. However, women of 
some very poor nomadic tribes engage themselves in poorly paid construction and kiln jobs. 
Ironically, a male cook in a restaurant would consider it a disgrâce to cook at home in front 
of his female kin. 
Although the respondent mentioned above denied that he refused to sweep for reasons 
of a 'cultural conditioning' and gave alternative reasons for refusing to sweep, his reasons, 
that he wanted to learn 'higher things', were obviously invalid because he stood better 
chances of 'higher learning' by retaining his job and saving enough money to go for higher 
studies; more over, the véhémence, the anger and the use of words like "bloody cleaning", 
his statement, "not in front of women as well", and the use of words, "hate", and "self-
respect", and his subséquent denunciation of other Asian workers who did sweep as being 
"sycophants" (because the other Asian workers had long been in Britain and adjusted to the 
work requirements, the interviewée thinks that they had lost self-respect and were flattering 
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the Whites: "they downed themselves; they are bloody working here for twenty-five years 
but they are always like that [i.e. stayed at the level of a factory worker]", make it obvious 
that he held the common sub-continent perception of the baseness of manual/physical tasks. 
As the interview progressed, it became clearer that he had not only considered manual tasks 
as inferior but, after having spend more time in Britain and finding it impossible to evade 
manual jobs, was becoming increasingly aware of the vanity of his cultural prejudice so that 
by the end of the interview he admitted that he regretted giving up his high paid job for a 
trivial reason. That he refused to sweep for reasons of culturally instilled prejudice is also 
evident from his refusal to wash dishes in another job which he thought would be working 
on a counter (paper work and public dealing) perceived to have a relatively higher status. In 
the latter parts of the interview, he accepted that he should have changed his attitude earlier, 
but the change carne too late to keep the good job. 
Another reason often observed for the lowly self-concept associated with manual work 
is the demeaning ways in which manual workers are addressed to by those engaged in higher 
esteemed trades and professions - owners of large prívate businesses being held at the top of 
public esteem. One example of the said manner of addressing is that in the Urdu language 
there are three versions of the pronoun 'you' (like the Germán du and zie) and the use of 
either versión correlates with the difference between the social and economic status of the 
addresser and the addressee. The use of the lowliest form of ' you \ which is 'tu', for a man 
of non-manual and higher social back-ground (if he is not a cióse friend) could lead to 
serious reaction and insults in response. For a man of some respect, only the highest form 
of 'you', that is, 'aap', could be safely used. From among numerous events narrated by 
interviewees showing the lowly attitude towards manual workers, see the following: 
'I realized that one could sit and trim, found a chair, sat on it and began trirnming. 
After a few hours, I went to the toilet. When I carne back, I found that the owner had taken 
my chair away. After a while, he shouted at me, "hey you! come here!". I said in a calm 
way, "I told you my ñame, you can cali me by my ñame, my ñame is not hey you". He said, 
"well that is how I cali my workers and that is how I shall cali you"'. 
(d)'Prestigious. less prestigious'. and manual/phvsical-centered occupations 
A case study of a large Indian industry reveáis the extent to which a cultural prejudice 
against manual/physical-centered occupations may motívate people to seek either non-manual 
jobs or jobs where the 'knowledge content' over-rides the manual content of work, henee 
uplifting the self-esteem and the social status of the job oceupant. The organizational 
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structure in this kind of companies is a very long hierarchical one, created apparently to 
satisfy the promotion-related status desires of the management staff. There are chances for 
the operators to become supervisors but not executives. In this pharmaceutical industry, 
working in the sterile area does not require much manual labor but careful monitoring of 
weights, measurements and ratios of medicines, that is, it requires some knowledge and 
expertise. If the wages in the sterile area would have been higher, we might have been 
inclined to attribute the reasons, for the strong desire to work in the sterile area, to higher 
wages there, but, as reported, working in the sterile area does not in itself ensure higher 
wages; hence the reduction in the manual work-content and the increase in the knowledge 
content of the job was a significant motivation, other than the chances of promotion to higher 
ranks, for the operators to work in the sterile area, and this led to conflicts in the industry: 
"It was a very burning issue and sometimes it could blast off and some worker would 
refuse to work. They wanted to work in the sterile area and not everybody could be sent in 
there, we, the managers decided that these guys should be shifted around all the other units 
of the company. But they used to get frustrated and angry and one of them would bang the 
executive in his face". 
Note the similarity in attitude towards manual work between the above mentioned 
workers in India and that of our aforementioned interviewee in Britain, and the dissimilarity 
in that while the interviewee in Britain could live on social security, the workers in India 
were bound to stay because there is no social security system in the sub-continent, and this 
dead-end increased their frustration leading to aggression. Many such cases show an intricate 
relationship between motivation and conflict. 
(e)Cultural/monetarv degradation of manual workers in the Middle East 
Disdain for those engaged in physical-manual crafts is a common element of the 
Middle Eastern culture. The oil rich Gulf states, U A E , Qatar, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia 
have for long resorted to import of labor and domestic servants from poorer countries 
because of the local disdain for such jobs. Refusal to accept manual work at high wages but 
acceptance of clerical work at low wages has been reported by many authors (Darity, 1965). 
Another author notes that the low status of manual work in Egypt fosters class consciousness 
and inhibits cooperation, communication, and opportunities for advancement (Langenderfer, 
1965). Patai (1973: 113-117) has described the general Arab aversion to physical work, and 
its effects upon their socio-economic development in great detail. He traces the roots of this 
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aversión right to the biblical curse of Adam pronounced by God, 
"Cursed is the groundfor thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days ofthy Ufe. 
In the sweat ofthy brow shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground, for out ofit 
wast thou taken; for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return" (Génesis 3: 17-19), 
and finds this attitude diametrically opposite to the Protestant ethic, which considers work 
as something that ennobles man. 
(DSocio-economic classes correspond to organizational hierarchv 
During the period I worked for a large bank, we had a subtle kind of conflict betweén 
the experienced rankers and the fresh M B A s who had been taken in higher positions despite 
having no experience in banking. The rankers resented having the M B A s in sénior positions 
and used to say, 
"these MBAs are a new kind of bureaucracy that has been imposed upon us though 
we know more about banking than these fresh university out-put and still they have been 
taken in at higher posts and at higher salaries". 
A typical situation of various socio-economic classes coming together at workplace 
but staying aloof from each other, occasionally resenting each other's social power, and 
showing class antipathy in apparently non-class disputes, comes from the description of a 
large Indian prívate finance firm in which the lowest layer of management was supervisors 
who were basically rankers, had been taken for clerical jobs, and their growth was just an 
annual increment in their salary package not based on further promotions but linked to 
inflation. A typical person in this category would be 40 plus, with a secondary education, 
who has put in around 15 to 20 years of service in the organization. In due course some had 
been promoted to the supervisory category but that was the upper limit for them; they could 
not expect to rise to higher levéis of management and, to their vexation, there was a large 
influx of young new managers, squeezed in between the upper management and the said 
lower, resistant clerks. A n average period of service which a new young manager would put 
in this type of organization was three years after which he was likely to leave for a better 
opportunity elsewhere. These júnior managers, who were academically more qualified but 
at the early stages of their work Uves, were mostly unsuccessful in managing the resistant 
rankers who had served longer with the company. The subtle conflict between 'rankers' and 
'qualified professionals' was an issue which used to surface almost daily; the rankers used 
to comment and observe, 
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"these youngsters come with their high flashing qualifications, stay for a couple of 
years with the organization and use it as a launching pad to land into a better position 
elsewhere while we are the people who nave given our Ufe and blood to this organization but 
we are made to sit in the basement pushing papers around. We are not given any say in the 
decisión making, we have been reduced to clerks because we do not have the degrees though 
we actually do all the jobs while the young managers keep coming and going". 
The young managers' contribution could not be seen because by the time they could 
claim to have achieved something for the company, they were poised to leave. Note that, as 
reported, there was no such resentment between the júnior, middle and the upper 
management; the three levéis of managers normally come from compatible social, economic 
and henee educational backgrounds and therefore, despite confliets among individual 
managers, there is little such group-antipathy between layers of management as is seen 
between the lower staff and the júnior managers. Besides, the three layers of management 
do socialize with each other and share many similarities in life styles such as the way they 
dress up, the papers and journals they read, topics of conversation, the clubs they attend etc. 
One was in the middle or the upper management because of experience and what they had 
in common with the júnior management was similar level of academic qualifications. 
On the other hand, there was little social interaction between the júnior managers and 
the clerical workers. In the Indian context, the two positions under discussion would also be 
linked with one's economic status (the status of one's family) because people who get higher 
education, invariably come from a more affluent set-up of the society. They had a privilege 
over the lower educated clerical people which used to be obvious; for example, the managers 
would have a higher standard of living, they took annual holidays to go to places, they 
usually had dual sources of income when they had working professional wives. Then there 
was always an age-gap between a young manager and his ranker subordínales; often the gap 
was that between a son and a father. The subordinates carne by public transpon but the 
young managers had cars - a high status symbol. 
The clerks and the supervisors come from the lower social and economic sections of 
the society, while young officers and above ranking officers/managers normally come from 
the middle or upper income groups even in merit based organizations. This needs 
explanation: Merit, in the sub-continent, is mostly seen as either experience (not excluding 
the socio-economic status of the person) or education: For a higher position in an 
organization, much greater emphasis is placed, during selection, on educational qualifications 
as against the British situation where experience often leads to superior positions in 
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businesses[3]. But in the sub-continent, while the upper classes may get higher jobs even 
without proper education, for the middle and lower majority, education is the main key to 
hope for any sénior rank or a non-manual job, and because education, especially higher 
education, is not free for all, the lower income groups are systematically excluded from 
being able to join an organization as officers. The situation is best reflected in the Armed 
forces where the JCOs (Júnior Commissioned Officers) and the COs (Commissioned 
Officers) constitute two distinct, largely class based divisions with different attitudes and 
outlooks towards various aspects of life styles and living conditions so that if a JCO gets his 
commission after hard work and after getting educational qualifications by studying in his 
spare time, he has to change his life style considerably in order to be socially accepted 
among the commissioned officers. A certain JCO, who got his commission through hard 
work and studies, and henee retired as a colonel, once told me that he knew only three JCOs 
in his regiment who got their commissions; all three subsequently divorced their peasant 
wives in order to remarry educated and 'modern' women so that they could attend the social 
gatherings of commissioned officers. 
The aforementioned issue of 'júnior managers being resisted by rankers', was not 
resolved. No one in the firm thought that there was a solution to it. Not only the said 
company but all other established companies of this kind have similar kind of hierarchical 
structures, and all have the problems of two or more socio-economic groups resenting each 
other. The 'two levéis' situation is also seen in the civil service and in government jobs 
where we have gazetted officers on one hand, and non-gazetted staff on the other, so that one 
in the former category is more likely to have a middle/upper class background while one in 
the latter category is more likely to have a lower class background. It may therefore be safely 
deduced that the hierarchical levéis of a typical organization in the sub-continent have a direct 
correlation with the socio-economic class structure of the society. That the older subordinates 
resent the young managers being placed above them, implies that the British system of 
promoting those who work better for the company, despite their socio-economic status or 
education, is better for harmony in organizational relationships, and to give opportunity to 
[3]"At a receru British Institute of Management Conference, Lord Young, the Employment 
Secretary, deplored the fact that 40 percent of the three and a half million managers and 
Supervisors in Britain had no qualifications at all, and 80 percent had no qualifications 
relevant to managemenf (Cowling et al., 1988: 211). 
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the lower classes rise in the hierarchy. 
However, there are other types of organizations controlied by families who nave their 
say in every décision. These companies are less education-centered and more performance-
centered in the way they reward personnel: If one performs well towards the profits of the 
company, he would rise in the hierarchy whatever his académie level. 
(g)The nature of motivation in the Ministerial Departments at a Civil Secrétariat 
From below in the hierarchy of ranks in the Ministerial Departments, there are section 
officers, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, additional secretaries and then the secretary. 
With every secretary there is his department but there is also another department attached to 
it headed by the director. The functions of an attached department are the implementation of 
the orders or instructions that are issued by the secretary's department after being received 
from the Minister. Almost all ministries nave a similar organizational structure. Work 
distribution is done by the secretary, on the basis of which section a certain additional 
secretary is dealing with, and has implications for motivation and related conflicts. The 
common issues of conflict at the Services and General Administration Department are of 
various types. Some conflicts, as reported by the interviewées, are "personality clashes"; 
some conflicts arise out of the way work has been distributed. As reported by the 
interviewées, distribution of work is related to who has got more socio-political powers and 
authority. When distribution of work is done on the basis of who has greater clout, it results 
in unequal division of work. At the Services and General Administration Department, some 
sections are considered 'important' and some are considered 'unimportant' and therefore 
there is resentment as one thinks he has been given 'unimportant' sections while another has 
been given 'important' sections. One might feel that he is being ignored by the superiors. 
Also, some get assignments that are deemed 'important' while another may get work that is 
not particularly considered important: Dealing with cases that involve public contact is 
considered 'important work' because such work normally results in building relationships and 
contacts which the dealing officer could exploit in future to his advantage. Jobs that do not 
involve public contact are not considered of much importance. Officers generally want work 
that could wield them certain powers. They usually want cases or assignments where there 
is greater public contact, public relations, where they can enhance their importance and 
value. For examples, there is a section called, 'Non-Gazetted Employées Affairs'. An officer 
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dealing with the non-gazetted employées of the Secrétariat, in the course of his duties, would 
normally come into contact with Iower ranking functionaries - those on grade 15 or below: 
A n officer dealing with low ranking staff would be just listening to their problems ali the 
time - problems of unfair recruitment, or problems of transfer, etc. and therefore may not 
feel himself to be an important person. Likewise, if an officer is dealing with the service 
matters of school teachers who are teaching in far flung areas and are less likely to visit him 
in his office, then he would feel ignored because he would be dealing with routine matters 
of leave sanctions or pensions etc. Similarly, dealing with the cases of very senior officiais 
too does not pay off because thèse officiais would normally get their jobs done by calling in 
on the Secretary or the Minister of Services & General Administration, on phone, or in 
person; they would not normally come to see section officers or deputy secretaries because 
they would consider such an act as falling below their status. Hence, dealing in cases of very 
high officiais does not make the staff being discussed feel self-important. But, on the other 
hand, there are cases of, say, the Health Department: One dealing in Health Department 
cases would get good contacts established with the officiais of the locai Health Department 
and this could lead to great help in return; if he or his family is sick, they would nave access 
to doctors and free medicine that otherwise might not be available. There is little monetary 
gain involved here but if one may establish good relations with equi-status people in other 
departments, it could pay off sometime. A doctor would be more considerate to the one with 
whom his file, for promotion or transfer, is lying. Likewise, although the Electricity 
Department is a separate and independent department and have their own secrétariat, their 
files and cases related to service matters come to the Services & General Administration 
Department. If an officer in the Services and General Administration has an electricity 
problem in his house, a fault in the circuit, or he wants a three phase connection for his air-
conditioner, he need not go to the Electricity Department and wait to get the problem 
rectified; he would just cali them, introduce who he is, and they would help him much 
quicker than they would somebody else who is not of much significance to them. 
Then there are, known in the locai slang, *effective/ineffective[4] departments', and 
[4]Note the altogether incorrect meaning of the words 'effective ' and ' ineffective', used 
here by personnel, quite thoughtlessly; the meaning of 'effectiveness' conveyed here is not 
related to functional imperatives and goal achievement but to the power, money, and status 
that a department with a larger budget and high public contact offers to its officiai. 
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many officiais strive to get transferred from an 'ineffective' department to an 'effective' 
department where they can make more money. Some departments are called 'nominal 
departments', such as the Fisheries Department or the Archaeology Department: If someone 
is appointed the Director General of the Archaeology Department, he will not have as much 
power and influence as he will if he was transferred to the Education Department because 
the Education Department has got thirty thousand employées and a many times larger budget. 
There are two thousand educational institutions on which the Director of Education can 
exercise his control; it is a big rise in status, power and prestige as his administration would 
then include public dealing on a vast scale. Such departments are called, 'effective 
departments'; the Health Department being one of thèse. There are large sums involved in 
managing thèse departments and many officiais strive to get into thèse. 
(h)Perceptions of social class and respect worthiness have implications for control 
Most factory managers reported that, on an average, once a month, there was a verbal 
or physical conflict among the foremen and the workers, but such conflict between a manager 
and a worker/supervisor was very rare. I found a consensus[5] among the managers 
interviewed both from India and Pakistan, about the différence in the level of respect which 
workers expressed for their Supervisors, whom they considered as one of their own (coarser) 
social class, and that which they expressed for their managers, whom they considered coming 
from a higher (polite) social class. Thus when Supervisors, who are in direct contact with 
workers on a daily basis, cannot handle a situation of conflict, they cali in the senior 
managers and usually a compromise is reached. In one large Indian factory, the décisions 
regarding the promotion of workers were taken at very senior levéis, often at the level of the 
managing director (this would be very unusual in Western companies) in order to prevent 
conflict between direct supervisors/executives and workers on the question of promotions: 
"The top management wanted to take the responsibility on its Shoulders so that there 
[5]It is not uncommon to find many interviewées sharing similar kinds of observations 
and drawing similar conclusions about certain cultural phenomena. Consensus among 
interviewées reassures the researcher that his conclusions are sound. If the researcher has 
done sufficient observation prior to conducting empirical studies, he would not find many 
interviewées who disagree with his own déductions. It is nevertheless a pleasant surprise to 
find interviewées in différent countries sharing remarkably similar déductions about some 
cultural phenomena. 
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should not be fights going on the shop floor between supervisore and the operators; 
supervisors in contact with workers could say that it was the high-ups who had decided 
whether one should be promoted or not." 
Some reasons, for the aforementioned différent levéis of respect, that I nave picked 
from interviewée narrations, are the following: 
(i) The power to reward and punish: The workers felt that the managers had greater 
authority than the foremen had, to sack a person. If a foreman threatens a worker that the 
latter would be sacked, the workers have in mind that the issue could always be settled at a 
higher level of management, that a manager would listen and be the judge. 
(ii) The role of language: In the sub-continent, the language and the manner of speech 
is linked to the addressee's socio-economie background and level of éducation. The manner 
of use of language also shows the respect or déférence one has for the other. For example, 
one can get more attention from policemen in Punjab if one is well dressed and talks to them 
in Urdù. In Pakistan, the higher managers usually talk in Urdù (the équivalent of which in 
Northern India would be Hindi) which is more polite than the coarser vernacular. The 
foremen promoted from lower ranks speak in the coarse workers' vernacular and therefore 
they are perceived by workers to be at a lower social level; workers do listen to them too but 
when they reply, they do so in the way as they would to their fellow workers. Polite 
language usually créâtes a distance between the workers/foremen on one side and the 
manager as a respectable person on the other side. If one wants to give greater respect to an 
educated man, or seek greater respect from others, he might talk in English, more so in India 
where almost ail educated people can speak English. The manner of speech plays an 
important role in relationships and this is true probably of ali countries in the world[6]. 
(iiOSocial/economic class: Most foremen and workers come from the same social 
class and though this makes them more at home with each other, it also becomes a barrier 
[6]Dostoyevsky has talked about this in many of his novels where many characters from 
the Russian nobility seek prestige by speaking in German or French, considering Russian a 
comparatively 'low' language. In 'Crime and Punishment', a bankrupt and demented wife 
of a Russian General seeks the sympathies of a crowd by exhorting her children to speak in 
French. In the sub-continent and the Middle East, many scholars (except when they cannot 
find proper translation of English terms in local languages) seek greater attention and prestige 
by inserting English or French phrases in their diction or in writings. Such use of another 
language is related to the perceptions of the 'greatness' of the civilization whose language 
is used. 
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in accepting the superior authority of a man from the same, so-perceived, lower background. 
However, most managers are from among the middle classes and get more respect than do 
the foremen, provided the former do behave as one from a 'better' social background. About 
the foremen, as one manager said, "the workers are less likely to be controlied by him 
because he is with them and from them and at their social level". Less regard for a superior 
who "was one like us", is not peculiar to workers only because many managers and 
Professionals too have reported similar lack of regard for a superior who was "one from us". 
Henee the cross-cutting among hierarchical levéis of a cultural phenomena that maybe 
described as follows: In several interview narrations, we see this very important cultural 
élément of societies that are patriarchal, authoritarian and sectionalized on the bases of 
social/economie class or tribe, whereby control power over others in organizations is related 
less to rank, désignation and officiai position in the Organization, and more to the social and 
economie status. This cultural element is most clearly shown in most Arab controlied 
organizations where the member of an 'inferior tribe* would not be exactly obeyed, even in 
the armed forces, by the members of 'superior tribes' even when the former holds a higher 
rank than the latter in the Organization. The above mentioned cultural element is also shown 
in cases of an attitude of 'not taking Orders' from a senior who has the same salary and 
désignation as the others but has been placed as a team leader because of his high 
performance. Henee the relation of control power more with social/economie position and 
less with officiai désignation. 
(iv) The role of éducation: Educated foremen were found to be in better control of 
workers. Managers, who are more educated and have greater expertise and knowledge of the 
work, get more respect from skilled staff, technicians, and Professionals. 
(v) The role of distance: Many Statements show that regular direct contact lowers 
esteem especially for one in a work-allocating role so that the daily grudge gets accumulated. 
But among a technically skilled workforce, the présence of expert and knowledgeable 
managers raised the morale of the workforce (skilled workers identify themselves more with 
the management than with the unskilled workers). In a high-tech Organization, it was reported 
that the skilled workforce resented the staying away of a higher manager from the workplace. 
Henee it maybe concluded that while production managers may leave the daily contact with 
unskilled workers to the Supervisors, and intervene only when the latter cannot handle a 
situation, with a skilled workforce, their fréquent présence is recommended. 
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Summary and contributions of chapter 2 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed 
(A) In the sub-continent motivation to work is shaped by the following socio-cultural factors: 
(1) There are very wide income and consequently culture-symbolic differences between socio-
economic classes. 
(2) One's position in the organizational hierarchy corresponds to one's socio-economic class 
membership (upper classes in the top ranks, lower classes in the lower ranks); this is obvious 
not particularly in the armed forces and the civil service but in the private sector as well. 
(3) In addition to merit-based considerations, one's socio-economic background affects, 
positively or negatively, one's opportunity to get higher education, job and related powers. 
(4) Jobs are categorized with respect to associated status symbols in terms of (in order of 
worth or value attached) 'prestigious, less prestigious, and manual/physical'. Jobs are also 
classified in sexist terms as 'manly and feminine' among the traditional majority. 
(5) There is a historically transmitted cultural and monetary degradation of manual jobs. 
Hence, the less the manual content of a job, the higher the associated motivation and value. 
(6) The above mentioned factors lead to a system of rewards that is not exactly linked to the 
nature and amount of work done. Hence manual workers get wages that are a small fraction 
of that for similar jobs in the West, but business profit margins are many times higher than 
that for comparable businesses in the West. (Finding 6 explains finding 1). 
(7) People are generally motivated by the desire to achieve high social status symbolized by 
several kinds of material possessions, life styles, and the use of dress and language. 
(8) In sub-continent organizations, in addition to work-related considerations, the prerogatives 
and privileges of an employee are also affected by his social class background. 
(9) In white-collar jobs, people seek posts and positions that could grant them more contacts, 
authority, and socio-political and financial powers. 
(B) Organizational control is affected by the following socio-cultural factors: 
(10) A person's power to control (indicated by compliance to his decisions) is enhanced if he, 
(a) belongs to a perceived higher social class, 
(b) belongs to a higher hierarchical level, 
(c) uses a kind of language associated with a higher social class, 
(d) has higher education, knowledge and skills and is able to relate them to work, 
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(e)keeps an adequate distance from subordinates, that is, (i)does not frequently 
ìnteract with, in case of, unskilled workers who are accustomed to rough language, 
(ii)interacts frequently with skilled and qualified personnel. 
(C)The above findings were found valid in the Middle East as well, with a qualification that 
'tribal membership' compounds the effects of 'socio-economie class membership*. 
The findings explain the rôle of 'socio-economic classes' and 'tribal memberships' in 
general, in motivation and organizational control. Due to acute class différences, barriers, 
and associated prérogatives and privilèges, we find a strong motivation for 'social mobility ' 
both in the sub-continent and the Middle East as people strive to join the next higher social 
class. 
The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that, 
(i) orietnation and motivation to work is determined by socio-cultural learning and prévalent 
attitudes towards the perceived value of work; 
(ii) organizational control is facilitated or hampered by the subordinates' culture-based 
perceptions of the social class of the one delegated with the functions of control. 
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Chapter Three: The Role of the Sub-continent. British Asian and Middle Eastern Family in 
Determining Patterns of Behavior. Differentiated from that of the Western Family 
The family situation is of relevance to this work because the Eastern[l] businesses are 
more dominated by family and kinship structures of the owners than are the Western. The 
aims and objectives of most Eastern businesses are exclusively determined by the owning 
family, partly because the Eastern lower classes are demonstrably more obsequious of 
authority than are the Western lower classes and also because of the differing patterns of 
motivation between the said societies[2]. In the interviews for this work it was found that not 
only do the owner family members occupy key roles and are the only major decision makers 
in most Eastern businesses, they also undertake supervisory activities even if the business is 
a fairly large one. There are comparatively few examples of partnerships where partners 
determine the goals and controls of business. 
A detailed study of the family is beyond the scope of this work but the family system, 
family values and the nature of family relationships is of relevance to the extent the family 
situation influences control, conflict and motivation patterns in organizations. This is 
supported by observations regarding analogous behavior in the family and in organizations: 
In the traditional sub-continent and the Middle East, where the only socially acceptable mode 
of life is based on a closed family and kinship structure, control and conflict-resolution 
methods of the family/tribe are subconsciously learned and repeated in the work-place. As 
family ownership (overt or covert) of business remains the most common form of control of 
resources of production, family politics of the owners is often replayed in the workplace. 
More over, patterns of motivation, control and conflict have a lot to do with the values and 
ideals that one's family persuades one into in early life. In other words, familial behavior 
patterns have parallels in organizational behavior: For example, the behavior of children in 
Europe is not as much subject to parental control as it is in the sub-continent; this is 
analogous to the observation that the behavior of workers in Europe is not as much controlled 
by managers/employers as it is in the sub-continent; hence the often observed sub-continent 
[l]We shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern' for convenience sake, to refer to findings 
that are applicable to the sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle Eastern culture and 
organizations. The later three terms have been defined in the introductory chapter. 
[2]For a description of the sub-continent motivation patterns, see chapters 2 and 4. 
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employee's view of the top manager/owner as the 'mai-baap' which literally means, 'mother-
father' and the idiomatic translation of which is 'a patron' or a 'father-figure'. It has been 
noted by several authors on the sociology of family that family is the first and foremost 
institution where patterns of behavior are learned[3]. Engels has gone as far as to suggest that 
the emergence and the nature of private property and the state are strongly linked to the 
emergence of patriarchal society, monogamy and the family[4]. 
The family situation is relevant also because of the fact that the Eastern family system 
has demonstrably shown greater success in conditioning the younger generation into set 
patterns of motivation (money, status, authority, education, religion, dogmatism), control 
(segregation, authoritarianism and power) and conflict (exclusive family, groups/ sub-groups, 
in-groups and out-groups, racism, regionalism, etc.[5]), than has the Western family. This 
is partly because family, arranged marriages, and prohibition of inter-communal marriages 
(excluding a few major urban industrial cities) is the only mode of social life accepted in the 
Eastern societies. Rare exceptions maybe tolerated but not without strong social disapproval. 
Some differentiating factors between Eastern and Western family systems: 
(a) The imposition/significance of the exclusive/closed family in the former: 
As a consequence of a society which legitimizes no other mode of social life than the 
one based on large kinship family [khandan in India and Pakistan, and Aaila in the Middle 
East] and clan [bradari in India and Pakistan, and Qabila in the Middle East], there is many 
times more family involvement in the ownership of businesses in Eastern enterprises than it 
is in Western companies; family members are usually the first to be trusted and relied upon 
[3]"...the family is that group within which the most fondamental appréciation of 
human qualities and values takes place... the qualities oftruth and honesty, offalsehood and 
deceit, of kindness and sympathy, of indifférence and cruelty, of co-operation and 
forbearance, ofegotism and antagonism, of justice and impartiality, ofbias, dogmatism and 
obstinacy, of generous concern for the freedom and fulftllment ofothers, ofthe mean désire 
to dominate - whether in overt bullying or in psychologically more subtle ways". 
(Fletcher, R., in Morgan D.H.J . , 1980: 92) 
[4]Engels, Frederick, The Origin of Family, Private Propertv and the State. Progress 
Publishers, Moscow. 
[5]For a description of thèse aspects of endogamous family-based divisions, see 
chapter 5. 
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(blood is thicker..) and this has cultural reasons and significance often expressed in the values 
of the sub-continent and Middle Eastern societies[6]. Deviations are penalized by various 
sanctions and means of control: In the sub-continent one who does not marry and produce 
children would find it very hard to retain self-confidence because of the perpetual and strong 
criticism from relatives, friends and colleagues. In many major Muslim sects, it is forbidden 
to say the funeral prayers for the lifetime celibate because celibacy is regarded as a sin: 
"Family is an institution outside which life is unthinkable. Allah has commanded that 
one should not stay unmarried, for marriage is a shield against sin. Wives and children are 
the beauty of this life. Whatever we earn is for our families, parents, relatives, and their 
children" (A commonly expressed value). 
These social values have not changed for centuries and their net effect on people's 
capacity to act as socially responsible individuals is demonstrably less than benevolent. 
However, the concept of clan is blurring in larger cities partly due to the effects of increasing 
industrialization and the emphasis is now on a larger form of the semi-Western kind of 
'nuclear family*. At the least, sons and their families are usually kept in close contact if not 
staying together, and share the parents' business and wealth. Under the Islamic law of 
inheritance, when the parents die, the daughters are given only one fifth share in parents 
wealth but this is often denied because of the sub-continent cultural claims that daughters 
receive their share in the form of dowry when they are wedded. In business, these values are 
often seen in the form of ownership patterns and titles such as 'Khwaja and Sons', 'Baber 
[6]Patai (1973: 93-94) notes that even in thoroughly Westernized upper-class urban 
Arab families, the claim of kinship is still much stronger than anything known in the West. 
Arab culture can still be termed "kinship culture" and is still characterized by "familism" as 
it has been in the past. He defines familism as the centrality of the family in social 
organization, its primacy in the loyalty scale, and its supremacy over individual life. The 
traditional Arab family (as well as the Muslim family in the non-Arab parts of the Middle 
East) is characterized by six features, each of which supports and strengthens the dominance 
of familism in Arab life: it is extended, patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, endogamous, and 
occasionally polygynous. Familism has been so deeply embedded in the Arab mind that 
larger social aggregates have traditionally been conceived as mere extensions of families. The 
lineage is but an enlarged super-family; an entire tribe, even if numbering thousands, is 
considered the offspring of one single, mythical or eponymous ancestor. By a maximal 
extension of this kinship principle, all Arabs are considered or believed to be descendants of 
either of the two primal fathers; all inter-Arab conflicts are merely "family quarrels". The 
extension of the principle of familism in another direction results in the participation of the 
individual in all larger social groupings, not on an individual basis but through his family. 
Political parties, wherever they have developed, are similarly the outgrowths of families and 
of the family-based relationship (Patai, 1973: 282-283). 
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Brothers', but female ownership or sharing is not observable in Muslim owned businesses 
though in the ownership documents of many businesses, one fmds shares of wives, mothers 
and daughters added primarily in order to increase the number of profit sharing partners. 
(b) Greater familial influence over children: 
Greater control is exercised by Eastern parents over children; e.g. almost no freedom 
is allowed to children in choosing life styles, religión, ideology and marriage partners and 
comparatively less freedom in choosing professions. Control may be exercised by all three 
means; normative, utilitarian and coercive[7]. In propertied classes, a son who does not 
marry in accordance with parent's wishes, may be disinherited from family property. Over-
feeding, pampering and spoiling children is but one kind of creating perpetual dependence 
of the children on parents. People with enough means not only make their sons totally 
dependant on the parents, they also get them married to parents' choice and then also look 
[7]See; 1 - Edwin T. Prothro, Child Rearing in Lebanon, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Middle Eastern Monograph Series VIII, 1961; 2-Hilma Granqvist, Birth and Childhood 
Among the Arabs, Helsingfors: Soderstorm, 1947; 3-Hamed Ammar, Growing up in an 
Egyptian Village, RKP, London, 1954; 4-Horace M . Miner and George de Vos, Oasis and 
Casbah: Algerian Culture and Personality in Change, Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of 
Michigan, 1960. 
'All those who have made first-hand observations ofArab family life agree that the 
incidence and severity of corporal punishment administered to Arab children is much greater 
than is the case in the Western world. Local and individual variations aside, the general 
situation in the Arab family is thaï it is the father who is severe, stern, and authoritarian, 
while the mother is, by contrast, loving and compassionate. Reports from various parts ofthe 
Arab world make explicit mention ofthe mother's attempts to prevent undue severity on the 
part ofthe father. However, a study ofLebanese mothers found that they 'were more likely 
to approve of the [disciplinary] actions of a severe father than those of the non-severe 
fathers*. (Patai, 1973: 26-27). 
'Since the Arabs are convinced that it is primarily the early childhood influences that 
form character and personality, and since subordination ofone's ego to the authority ofthe 
father (and/or the actual head of the family) is a cornerstone ofthe Arab social édifice, the 
children are disciplined, ifnecessary severely, to subordinate their own personal interests to 
those of the family as represented by the father or grandfather. The feeling of shame is 
inculcated into the young generation by shaming techniques, for example, by comparing one 
child with another '(p. 106). 7/i childhood, those who exercise control over the individuai 
are father, mother, aunts, úneles, siblings, cousins, and other members of the extended 
family. Later, the control group becomes co-extensive with the functioning social unit. 
Everybody is personally known to everybody else, and this in itself makes for very effective 
social control, which is reinforced by the age hierarchy. The older a person gets, the smaller 
the number of those to whose judgement he must defer, and the larger the number of those 
who must defer to his '(p. 78-79). 
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after the grand children in which case, many a rich men's sons do little more than extend 
their parental life styles, values and beliefs. 
Among the lower and working classes, where means of utilitarian control are not 
available, the use of coercive control over children is not uncommon. Hence many poor 
coerce their sons to work as soon as they are six or seven in which case the children must 
give almost all their wages to the parents. Many examples of desperate parents living off 
their daughters wages are also observed. Note that the total absence of any form of social 
security system enables many kinds of family dependence to persist and prevail; there is little 
alternative available to those caught in the familism dependence trap. 
In the West, family values often refer to one's duty towards one's spouse and children 
first, and to one's parents to some extent. But in the sub-continent, a son is supposed to value 
his parental family more than his nuclear family, while women are generally supposed to 
serve their husband's will as a first priority. This is an outcome of a social value which 
stresses a son's duty to his parents more than to his wife, and is often a source of resentment 
on the part of many modern Indian wives. Perhaps the idea could be explained by an 
apparently trivial example but one which reveals a very deep element of the sub-continent 
family values: An Indian worker in a Gulf country was given a visa to bring one family 
member. I heard him asking his fellow workers if he should bring his mother or his wife to 
live with him, and they recommended that he should bring his mother, saying, "you can get 
ten wives but you can have only one mother". Family values in the sub-continent primarily 
mean adhering to the religion, beliefs, values and the culture (including such trivial things 
as cooking methods) of the parents and any deviation from parental style of living is strongly 
criticized and unapproved by the society - except when the nuclear family migrates to another 
city or town where its parental culture is not known to the immediate social contacts. But 
even for such a nuclear family, if it does not conform to parental culture, there would be 
social disapproval back home. 
Most interviewees, when asked to point out certain differentiating traits between 
Indians and Europeans, noted that an Indian was likely to be far more under the influence 
of his relatives and parents than a European would be. Indian parents play a key role in 
teaching children that they should look for money above many other things, like for example, 
one interviewee was sent by his parents to work for more money in the Gulf where he lives 
a lonely and painful life under strict control of his employer despite that he comes from a 
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well-off family in India. Many interviewées, whilst agreeing that parents play a big role in 
imparting money motivation (for détails, see chapter four), added that the average Indian 
parents, in old age and with enough money, are less likely to be as materialistic as younger 
Indian parents would be. Family influence on an individuai, or parents' influence on 
children, is strong particularly because of one's economie bondage to the family, and because 
outside the family, the society does not provide an équivalent either in terms of social 
security guarantees or approvai. One may have been rebellious in youth, but when in old 
age, he is more likely to follow the established norms and do with his kids what he faced as 
a child. More over, in most cases, there is a very large and significant contribution of one's 
parents in getting éducation, a good job, a proper place in the society, and in getting a life 
partner and so a typical Indian feels obliged and when the time comes for.him to repay, he 
does [the observation is supported by Singhal and Misra's (1994) study of 80 students in 
India finding that expectations held by parents, teachers and peers are the most powerful 
déterminants of the perceived importance of achievement goals]. 
However, there are significant variations in family values within India. For example, 
the Goans (Goa was formerly a Portuguese colony) behave more like the happy-go-lucky kind 
of Europeans and so do the Anglo-Indians. Goans and the Anglo-Indians, despite having 
some éléments of the Indian mainstream culture, are a sub-culture and a separate distinct 
group, with their own value system. Anglo-Indians, being a cross-breed between the British 
and the Indians, have inherited certain values from their British part of héritage. Anglo-
Indians exercise less control over their children because they have learnt it from their British 
forefathers and passed it on generation by generation. Parsees too are more like the Anglo-
Indians in terms of control over children and are more likely to have a Western life style than 
a traditional Indian one. The Parsees and the Anglo-Indians, both have lesser controls over 
their children compared to the other Indians but while the former has been a community of 
high achievers, the latter mostly live average Uves though in a European life-style. Henee the 
relationship of control over children, to achievements of various kinds, needs the inclusion 
of several other factors into the situation. What is clear, however, is that a lot of values, 
norms, and préjudices are learned at the family level and passed on to the progeny. 
Regarding how family can condition a child into sheer money motivation, many say 
that the basic problem is that of very high gaps in standards of living in Indian 
neighborhoods. Unlike Britain, where a neighborhood usually consists of people of a 
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comparable economic class, in the sub-continent, one finds very high economic differences 
in one neighborhood, which créate high inferiority-superiority feelings, reinforced by daily 
interaction and unequal treatment among neighbors. Inferiority/superiority complexes have 
been noted as a major factor behind obsessive money motivation. The British take for granted 
the similar design and size of houses in one locality, and many would not be aware of how 
good it is to have neighbors who are not 'very rich' or 'very poor\ Contrary to the general 
impression of the goodness of the Eastern joint family, the greed among members of one 
family could often lead to family ruin. Feuds and disputes o ver ancestral property, between 
brothers and sisters are not uncommon. 
(c) Greater control over women than o ver men: 
In most Muslim societies and, generally, in the sub-continent, women must always 
marry to the one selected by their kin. The preference for endogamy is also found in the 
Middle East but while an Arab man is free to marry a non-Arab woman, an Arab woman is 
not normally allowed to marry a non-Arab man. At times, economically independent women 
in the cities take their fate in their own hand though not without social disapproval and 
criticism. Murders of women who decide on their own to marry the one not approved by 
their family are reported in newspapers. At the workplace, greater non-work control is 
extended to female workers, and the incidence of sexual harassment is not uncommon. 
(d) Extensión of family relations to relations at workplace: 
This is often shown in the sub-continent and in the Middle East, where many cióse 
relatives of sénior state offícials, ministers, members of Parliament and owners of prívate 
business and industry enjoy almost the same prerogatives and privileges as the office bearers 
do. In the more primitive Afghanistan[8], a newly appointed minister, in the cabinet formed 
[8] Afghanistan has never been a colony of a developed country and henee retains the 
primitive tribal-feudal characteristics in almost entire purity: In many ways, imperialism, so 
often denounced as unethical conquests, has been a blessing for many countries which got 
benefíted from the cross-cultural transference of the developed consciousness and efficient 
state/judicial practice of the governing nations. Indira Gandhi once said that the British left 
in India a bureaucracy, and the English language, without which it would be impossible to 
unité and develop an India where most régions with différent languages found a common 
means of communication J>nlY_in English language and where the uniformity of_state 
bureaucratie procédures laid a common foundation for the development of a democracy and 
an acceptable civilization. The British influence also enabled many Indian Muslims to give 
up polygamy, endogamy, and marriage in childhood. 
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by the so-called President Burhan-ud-din Rabbani, sent his brother to the ministry saying, 
"my brother deserves the honor of being the minister as much as I do". 
We have discussed the nature and effects of nepotism in thesub-continent, in chapter 
nine. In Britain, where hiring and firing is in the hands of British-Asians, nepotism in not 
uncommon but white being a relative could entitle one to get a job and some privilèges, 
family quarreis may also be taken to the workplace. In a certain British factory, a Pakistani 
Supervisor was the brother-in-law of a worker. After dismissal from his job, the said worker 
reported to the Industriai Tribunal that he was victimized by his brother-in-law on the basis 
of certain family quarreis that had nothing to do with his performance at work. 
(e) More use of coercive control but excessive freedom in upper classes: 
Regarding means of control, it is safe to conclude that there is comparatively more 
use of coercive control in Eastern families than it is in the Western. Most Eastern eiders 
exercise rather personal control over the younger ones, quite excessively at times; 
socialization through snubbing and criticism and emotional black-mail or psychological 
control are quite common among all Eastern classes, particularly among the working and the 
middle classes. However the effectiveness of control is likely to be greater when the parents 
have significant property which is to be transferred to the children on condition that they 
have pleased their parents during the latter's life-time. 
At the workplace, where family members play the role of Supervisors, and events of 
injustice of some kind occur, they cannot be effectively complained against. In the interviews 
it was found that the typical means of control which Eastern family members employ at 
workplace are coercive and utilitarian. Criticism in front of others has cultural roots; in many 
Eastern families where the child is routinely criticized in front of those présent on the 
occasion, and often in front of his friends and class-fellows, he may feel humiliated. 
However, it has been observed that children often repeat parent's behavior when they grow 
up and parallels to this may be drawn in the psychology of abuse where the victim, having 
suffered from abuse and oppression, may at the same time be learning patterns of abuse 
which he could repeat on others in future; this partially explains the reasons for the 
perpétuation of authoritarian cultures. In the upper class families, there is also a reverse 
observation in that male children are allowed so much freedom that they may turn out to be 
tóìally'insensitivé to human rights. Hence the Óft-reported sexual abuse of poor peasant and 
worker girls by the feudal lords and the employers. 
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(f) The general exclusion of social, ethical. legal and governmental concerns: 
The Eastern family interests are generally and comparatively exclusive of social, 
governmental, national and non-religious yet ethical and moral human interests. Greater 
loyalty is shown towards kin[9] than towards the society, government, nation and mankind 
as a whole; for example, where a family member is involved in crimes that lead to family 
profits (embezzlement, illegai transactions, unfair deals etc.) the Eastern family is more 
likely to support him/her than is a Western family. Apart from the common observations in 
this respect, a number of religious and traditional quotes and commands are available to 
support the priority of kin over others (Awal khuvaish baad darvesh: First relatives, then the 
poor) in terms of rights and duties many of which corne into conflict with common and social 
justice[10] as understood in the West. Close family control over business provides ease in 
the maneuvering of resources and assets, greater share of profits for the kith and kin, and 
secrecy which is essential for tax évasion, for seeking governmental and bank loans, and for 
immunity from various Employment and Industrial Relations Legislation. Henee the 
préférence for family ownership of business over other kinds of ownership. While I could 
not find examples in Eastern businesses of non-family employée prosperity, through hard and 
honest work alone, interviews with British-Asians reveal that many British-Asians of humble 
origins, who worked for Western businesses, rose to higher ranks and prosperity[ll]. 
[9]nThe obligation to support one's kinsman in a quarrel with an outsider exists ail 
over the Arab world, irrespective of the question of right or wrong. "(Patai, R., 1973: 231). 
"The question ofrightness ofone claim over the other is not a paramount issue so far 
as one's obligation to support is concerned. Thus, if différent 'ahls' [lineages] quarrel, each 
can expect support (or neutrality at the very least) in his own kin group. " (Ayoub, 1965: 13). 
Aune & Waters (1994) have shown that the familial Samoans are more likely to 
deceive for the sake of group/family or authority based concerns while the individualist US 
Americans are more likely to lie to protect their privacy or the feelings of the target person. 
[10]See the rights of parents and spouses in Islam whereby elders have more rights 
than the young, men have greater rights than women, but the ideas of common weal, society, 
and state are not the least developed when compared to the European practice. 
[11]A Pakistani engineer in a Western company, at the age of thirty-five, owns two 
houses and earns around £35,000 per annum though his parents in Pakistan were very poor. 
Another interviewée came to Britain as a fourteen year old and began working in a brick 
kiln.^He is now an assistant production manager in an English owned factory and makes 
more than £30,000" per annum. Twenty years ago, his parental family in Pakistan could 
hardly meet the ends and his relatives who stayed behind, are still poor peasants who live 
in mud houses in a village where there is no electricity and no roads. 
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While in the West, in general, the family system includes respect for social, legal, 
government and collective concerns of the community, the Eastern family system is exclusive 
of such concerns to an extent large enough to breed extreme selfishness, jealousies, intrigue 
and mutuai hatred. Divisions between family and non-family in the sub-continent and most 
Muslim societies are too sharp to allow for a true social mixing and harmony to prevail. 
Examples may be seen often in such behavior as employing poor children to be the servants 
of one's own children: one may commonly see rieh people pampering their own children 
and, at the same time, scolding the servant children for petty mistakes. Keeping servant 
children at food and clothing only, is not uncommon. 
In the sub-continent, most private business is owned by large kinship families so that 
in the seventies, there were only twenty-two families owning the vast majority of private 
industry in Pakistan[12]. Over the years, many other families have joined the list of the 
twenty-two and the interests of many of these kinship clans have extended to having a public 
limited façade to a family dominated business. Cases of apparent public limited companies 
but in fact being run mainly for the interests of a family are becoming common in the sub-
continent. In such cases, one family holds the majority shares and most directors belong to 
the family. Düring its inception, a public limited company needs big names to be able to float 
shares in public. To win people's trust, the names of influential and known people are added 
to the list of the Board of Directors; the influential allow their names to be used for one or 
the other interest. But once the shares have been sold and the company gets the capital it 
requires, the family may get rid of unwanted directors. In many cases, even some family 
members leave the company after syphoning off large chunks of public money, so that in 
case of bankruptcy in future, someone else would get the blame. One advantage of issuing 
public shares is that the owning family has more capital to invest, henee more returns for 
themselves and, in case of losses or bankruptcy, they can salvage more of their own capital 
though at the cost of the share holders' money, many of whom are not well versed in 
business methods to be able to protest effectively or to detect embezzlement. 
In India also, family ownership, management and control of business (with or without 
a public-share façade) is a prédominant way of doing business. Most native private 
[12]Business International Corporation; Investine. Licensing and Trading Conditions 
Abroad. Confidential report supplied to multinational and interested investors in Pakistan, 
Sept. 1981. 
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organizations are controlled by large kinship families and family members are placed on key 
managerial posts because in such jobs trust is more important than performance (one could 
be working on the other side of Law, such as for tax évasion, manipulation of government 
policies and various déclarations), and because the said businesses have far better chances 
of controlling family members than others if they do anything against business interests. 
(g)The nature of British-Asian family business reflects much of the same at home: 
There is a strong patriarchal pattern of behavior exhibited by British-Asian families 
which own businesses in Britain[13]. The extreme form of patriarchy is one in which the 
patriarch is the sole power in his domain of patriarchy so that he has the powers also to make 
internai laws and to enforce them as well. The most notorious form of patriarchy is well 
known in the behavior of the Italian Mafia bosses, but British-Asian business owners avoid 
violence and physical crime to a very large extent. 
Summarv and contributions of chapter 3 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
We have seen in this chapter that the sub-continent and Middle Eastern family (referred to 
here as the Eastern family) is differentiated from the Western by the following factors: 
(1) Procreative family (extended family in the sub-continent and tribal family in the Middle 
East) is the only mode of social conjugation allowed in the two cultures save a tiny section 
of the few modernizing urban areas of the sub-continent. In the West, staying unmarried and 
other modes of conjugation are not legally or socially disapproved. 
(2) Family ownership, with or without a public façade, is the primary and most common 
mode of business ownership and control in the said cultures. 
(3) In family businesses, the owning family members occupy key managerial positions; non-
family managers are not the least as entrusted with décision making as those in the West. 
(4) Eastern family exercises greater control over children and women than does the Western. 
Freedom of choosing life style, marriage partner, religion, ideology, and profession is 
severely limited in the former. Among lower classes, coercive control over children and 
women is not uncommon. Among upper classes, pampering is another means of binding the 
[13]For detailed case studies and interviewée reports of the way British Asian family 
business is managed, see pages 282 to 290 of this work. 
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child to parents. In addition to control through social sanctions (in both cultures), in the sub-
continent, absence of social security enables the family to have greater economie control over 
members. 
(5) Easterners are many times more likely to be influenced in their décisions by their relatives 
than are the Westerners. 
(6) Eastern family values mean adhering to parental life style, beliefs, values and culture, and 
being loyal to family interests even when thèse come into conflict with individuai, social, 
legal, governmental, ethical and human interests (exclusivity vs Western inclusiveness). 
(7) The Eastern family has shown much greater success in conditioning children to set 
patterns of control (sex-class ségrégation, authoritarianism) motivation (money, status, 
power, prestige, éducation, religion, dogmatism), and conflict (exclusivity of familial 
interests and endogamy leads to narrow based grouping and subgrouping, in-group/out-group 
psychology, racism, regionalism, sectarianism, described in following chapters) than has the 
Western family. 
(8) In India there are significant variations in family values between communities; the Goans 
and the Anglo-Indians, for example, give more freedom to their children and have many 
values in common with their half-ancestors namely the Portuguese and the British, 
respectively, while the Muslim Indians take part of their culture from the Arabs (the Indian 
Islam is a hybrid of Hindu traditions and the Arab Islam). 
(9) During empirical studies in Britain, it was found that the nature of British-Asian family 
system and business reflects much of the same in home countries. 
These findings explain the rôle of family in shaping patterns of control, conflict, and 
motivation in general during the formative years. Finding (1) explains the reasonsfor over-
population, over-supply of labor, and the consequential poverty in the sub-continent which, 
in conjunction with the absence of any universal state social security system créâtes 
vulnerability to coercive control, economie dependency over family, mass neurosis and the 
consequential communal wars and obsessive money motivation that we shall discuss in the 
following chapters. 
The findings shall be taken on to our Grounded Theory in the last chapters to support 
our notion of family planning and a liberalization ofthe 'Eastern ' cognitive culture (al least 
to allow exogamy), as primary solutions to mitigating coercive control, communal conflict 
and obsessive money motivation. 
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Chapter Four: The Key Motivation in the Sub-continent. Middle East. and for British Asians 
It is safe to generalize that the vast majority of Easterners[l] considers money as its 
main, and most often, the only motivation to work. It maybe argued that money could be a 
key to other motives such as increasing the feeling of security, raising family, acquiring high 
status and luxury, etc. albeit none of which could be job-specific; money motivation alone 
maybe fulfilled through any kind of work that yields money. From the interviews, it was 
possible to deduce that Easterners pursue money with greater vigour and often at the cost of 
many other aspects of life[2]; ail interviewées stated this in clear terms[3]. For example, 
whereas English workers like to socialize in the evenings, Asian[4] workers in Britain want 
more work; night shifts are their favourite where thèse offer extra rates, and over-time work 
is relished; in many British factories where the Asians work for twelve hours a day and six 
or seven days a week, the English workers work eight hours a day and five days a week. 
There were numerous interviewée Statements supporting the aforementioned conclusion, 
though at times money motivation was coupled with other factors such as liking the company 
of friends at work, liking the work, and job security etc. Even when the respondents mention 
motivation other than money, there were some answers to other questions that showed the 
links to money motivation. For example, one interviewée told about non-monetary motivation 
but then said she left the job because the wages were reduced. Because of some 
embarrassment that is normally associated with the admission to money motivation, an 
interviewée would say that, for example, "quick money was not the criteria but I wanted 
some change", but in a longer conversation, having forgotten the inhibitions, the same 
[l]As explained earlier, we shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern' for convenience sake, 
to refer to findings that are applicable to the Indian sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle 
Eastern culture and organizations. 
[2]Simmel and Mark (1991), while relating the évolution of money-based economy 
(from the times of barter exchange) to the fragmentation of social forms and the growth of 
individualism, show that money connects more and diverse groups of people now than has 
e ver happened in history. But while money provides a continuing motivation for productive 
activity, it also promotes stress, anxiety and the risk of becoming an end in itself. 
[3]See excerpts from interviews on pages 290 to 293: "Typical Statements " 
[4]'Asian' in this work means 'British-Asian', and a person whose origins are in the 
sub-continent, countries, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, as defîned on page 1. 
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respondent may become more candid and henee admit to money motivation. 
Immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s were welcomed in the British industry 
because there was a huge surplus labour demand but little surplus demand in clerical and 
white-collar jobs on which the local people were happy to work. Thus there was little 
incentive for one to study[5] or develop skills for white-collar jobs. Moreover, working 
conditions in the English faetones, (at that time there were mostly only English faetones) 
were a kind of blessing for many immigrants who carne out of the stifling capitalist/feudal 
exploitation in the sub-continent where they were usually hired at a pittance and fired at a 
whim. The better working conditions in English companies offered the least compulsión for 
workers to look for a replacement of factory work and this was clearly observable in the 
interviewee statements. As Karl Marx once wrote, "without necessity and compulsión there 
is no revolution", most workers in English factories stay there longer [see chapter 13] 
because, despite routine problems, there is little necessity or compulsión to move away and 
the only motivation they have to work, namely money, is reasonably fuífilled in English 
firms. This again supports our conclusión of money being the major Asian motivator. More 
evidence comes from that all interviewees stated that more money was the only cause for 
Asian workers in Britain to go on strikes (note here the relation between conflict and 
motivation; details in chapter 13). 
The factors that influence Easterners to pursue and spend money in a way dissimilar 
to the Western way of pursuing and spending money[6], maybe classified as follows: 
(a)Differences in familial/social structure and obligations 
Money seems to be of importance to people all over the world but there is a 
difference in that the Eastern familial commitments and social structural obligations place 
[5]Among factors explaining low school achievement of minority students, Erickson 
(1987) listed pessimism regarding chances of employment. 
[6]Handy (1981: 45) recognizes the signifícance of money as motivating agent and 
appropriately mentions the cultural bias against talking about money. Although the vast 
majority in most countries seeks money as an instrument to other needs and talks about what 
accompanies money, i.e. status, success, independence, security etc., cultural differences are 
quite sharp in the way money is made, pursued, spent and flaunted. Cowling et al. (1988: 
93), after listing a number of characteristics of monetary rewards (association of money with 
valued objeets, its instrumentality in satisfying other needs, its symbolism, etc.), state that 
very little research has been carried out about what meaning money has for different people. 
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much greater emphasis on making money than do the Western: Eastern men are culturally 
pressured to provide for parents, wife and children for a much longer period than Westerners 
are. Women are not allowed to work in a 'promiscuous' (as most traditional Eastern men 
perceive the workplace particularly when domiciled in the West) environment though some 
may work from home if such work is available, or in the company of a number of Eastern 
women. Maie children must be supported financially until they are on job. Girls have to be 
brought up and, in the sub-continent, huge expenses are required to marry them and only 
then the father maybe exonerated from responsibility towards his daughters[7]. Thus most 
British Asian workers prefer to spend almost ail of their time (other than that essential for 
sleeping and eating) at work, until it becomes a compulsive habit. Many in Britain are 
strongly motivated to find loop-holes in the social security system [see chapter 13], and in 
the sub-continent, seek bribes to increase earnings in order to fulfil familial commitments. 
To add to this compulsion, they are culturally oppressed to get married, have large families, 
and lead a rainer expensive life in that a lot of money is wasted in showing off the wealth, 
on wedding dresses, jewellery, over-eating of rich food, owning property, and keeping 
relatives happy, not to mention the health and psychological problems arising out of the said 
life style. It may be noted here that in most Eastern families, even if they are not well-off, 
eating simpler food is seen as debasement and a low-class activity. In the sub-continent, 
offering only lentils, vegetables, or plain rice (without mutton and/or chicken) to a guest 
could jeopardize the relations between the host and the guest; beef is considered the diet of 
the poor and not offered to guests of higher status. 
There are many examples to show that parents in the sub-continent raise their children 
and socialize them with obvious expectations that the latter would help them financially, 
particularly in their old âge; this becomes one motivation (at times negative) to work, 
particularly for sons in low property-owning and property-less classes. Note that in the sub-
continent there is no welfare system and no old-age pension for the vast majority, and 
therefore parents have to be looked after by working children. However, this attitude of 
[7] While in the sub-continent and among British Asians, the burden of paying a dowry 
is on the bride's father, among the Arabs and tribal Pathans, it is the bridegroom who is 
obliged to pay a sum (équivalent to £ 20,000 or more in the Gulf states) to the bride's father. 
Hence while daughters in the sub-continent carry the stigma of being a burden on their 
parents, among the traditional Arabs and Pathans, they are often seen as an investment. 
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expecting children to provide for parents persists even among those Asians who have spend 
decades in Britain and should be expected to feel secure, as a last resort, with the state old-
age pensión. Henee, many teenagers are forced by parents to work and bring in money. 
Many young men have to give up education in order to help finance the marriages of sisters 
for which their parents had done little or no planning. On the other hand, the English are not 
socially compelled to marry and have children, their wives and grown-up children may work 
and fend for themselves, and they do not have too many obligations towards their relatives. 
Sub-continent workers are keen to work abroad, away from their wives and children 
for years, because they can earn more by doing so. We may note here that, paradoxically, 
when the motivation is focused around money, people maybe willing to work for very low 
wages. Many Asian employers in Britain have been able to hire Asian workers at £1 an hour 
primarily because a large number are willing to work longer hours at low wages, because 
of money motivation alone. Many Asian women's motivation to work at wages cióse to or 
less than income support level [see chapter 13] reveáis a cultural factor, their generally 
known love for keeping gold and jewellery, a traditional security item in the household. A 
marriage is seldom accepted without gold as part of the dowry. 
(b)Money motivation due to the significance of economic status 
As noted in chapters two and three, socio-economic class distinctions are much more 
obviously observed in the sub-continent than in the Western world. Therefore, the associated 
inferiority complexes make the crossing of class barriers a compulsión for the majority. In 
the sub-continent, whether one has enough money or not (excluding the very poor and 
beggars who have nothing to gain from pretensions of being well-off), one would still have 
a strong desire to show to his relatives and his immediate community that he is 'well off . 
Such attitude is also observable in the Middle East where people frequently take unaffordable 
loans to buy new gadgets of technology, newer car models, newer furniture and decorations 
etc., and to spend on expensive weddings, only because often they feel jealous of others who 
have the said produets, or suffer from inferiority feelings if they cannot have them[see 
endnote 1]. Education becomes but one means of elevating one's social and economic status 
and thus great emphasis is placed by the middle classes on getting academic qualifications. 
Note that education, in this context, means little more than getting certificates and degrees 
because where these are obtained through illicit means, they carry almost equal de facto 
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value, and also because a learned person but without officiai accréditation is not valued equal 
to the òne who has an officially issued académie certificate. In the upper classes too, children 
are encouraged (and this often includes expensive private tuition) to get degrees mainly so 
that greater prestige can be claimed. One major factor, other than the possession of wealth 
and property, often considered in evaluating an arranged-marriage proposai, is having such 
académie qualifications as could assist in earning money; thus one having a degree in 
business, medicine or engineering is more likely to be preferred over another (keeping other 
évaluation points constant) who has a degree in, say, literature, politicai science, social 
sciences etc. Contrary to that in the West, a degree in law is not worth much for a property-
less person because most lawyers are not likely to earn much. 
(c)The flaunting of wealth makes others seek more money 
We have already mentioned the various ways in which money is wasted and flaunted 
among the Easterners so much so that those who have less, may feel marginalized unless they 
too are ' in the swim'. Many examples show how higher status colleagues in an Organization 
may flaunt their higher salaries in non-monetary ways, such as treating less earners as if they 
were base and low. There are deep cultural roots behind the money-grabbing motivation born 
out of the immense social power and prestige possessed by the upper classes. Social power 
also means being above the law[8], which makes it very luring to rise to the top. Hence the 
sub-continent expatriâtes' dream of returning to the home country as wealthy, high status 
people, is as observable during conversations as the sight of the immigrants showing off their 
possessions on Visits to home countries. A young British Asian interviewée told that his 
parents had been buying lands in Pakistan (to be seen as high status land-owners in home 
country), for décades, cultivated by peasants, but they themselves live on DSS benefits in 
Britain, saving money by ignoring their children's basic needs, forgetful that their children 
will never go back to, what to the younger British Asians is an alien and backward country: 
"they are sending it ali back, thinking, oh, we are always gona go back; they have 
\passionately] kids here who, Iike, I am not going to go back because that's not my country; 
even though I have got a clash of cultures". 
[8]In the Islamic law (the Sharia), a murderer can offer 'blood money' (Qasas) to the 
relatives of the victim, and if the relatives accept it, the killer may be set free. See the case 
of the two British nurses accused of killing a colleague in Saudi Arabia, Sept., 1997. 
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(d) Compensation for low manual-work status by money 
As discussed in chapter two, manual work is considered degrading and base. In 
certain circumstances, many try to conceal if they have been engaged in manual work. Many 
emigrants, when they return home after having made some money, in their efforts to be 
accepted in higher social class neighbours, try to disguise the nature of their employment 
abroad if they have been engaged in manual work of some kind (for example, a mechanic 
would say that he was an engineer, a hospital assistant would say that he was a doctor). But 
once a higher social status has been irrevocably acquired, one may proudly boast, in order 
to stress the value of his achievement, that he has progressed from a lower occupational 
background to a higher. Whilst interviewing, one may note cultural beliefs and assumptions 
reflected in people's words and tones, such as the following words of some interviewées 
illustrate: "I had to start right from the shop floor - with ail my qualifications, I had to start 
from sweeping floors. After a few months, I was lucky, that I got apprenticeship", or, "I was 
upset that I couldn't carry on with my éducation, that I could not achieve my ambitions in 
life and had to become a worker". The underlying assumption behind the above quoted 
statements is that doing manual work is degrading to an educated person. Having achieved 
a 'higher job', people take pride in talking about it: "At that lime, I was the only coloured 
or Pakistani who ever came to that position as an under-cadre. Prior to me there was no one 
in such position". Note in the last statement that the mentioned rank was a perceived 
achievement and acted as a motivation during the interviewée's life when most of his 
countrymen "could not rise above the level of a skilled worker". 
(e) Higher salarv in higher ranks in the sub-continent/Middle East compared to that in Britain 
People in the said two cultures are often seen in a relentless pursuit to rise to higher 
ranks because the gap between the average lowest paid and the average highest paid in a 
typical sub-continent/Middle Eastern organization is almost ten times larger than the same 
gap in Britain. In British Asian organizations too, promotion brings monetary benefits and 
hence the said pursuit is observed. However, the reverse of seeking higher ranks is observed 
in those English firms where différences in the salaries between workers and supervisore are 
not high; the majority of British Asian workers has been reported to shun the responsibility 
that cornes essentially in the Western organizations with a higher status. Many noted that 
Asian workers did not go for English classes since they did not want to be promoted beyond 
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operators of machines, and that if they were given extra work, some would even mess up 
their work deliberately, so that they should not be promoted. The reported reasons for not 
seeking higher positions are that most workers in Britain earn more than lecturers, teachers, 
doctors, government officers etc. and so most do not feel the need to study. That British 
Asians do not pursue education and promotion with such vigour as those in home countries, 
supports the finding that money is their major and primary motivation. 
(fiMoney Motivation in the Sub-continent: Combination of class, culture, religion and caste 
(i) The religious preaching factor: 
Hinduism stresses contentment and looks down upon most materialistic desires. But 
people differ in the way they are influenced by such doctrines, so only a few follow exactly 
what is preached. Contrary to Hindu doctrine, excessive money motivation is widespread 
among Indians, showing that religions may react by stressing the opposite of what is found 
in real life. The same is true about the preaching of Islam and Christianity in the sub-
continent and the Middle East. Moreover, a religion maybe preached differentially and have 
dissimilar effects: This is shown in that, on an average, the North Indian Hindus, as reported 
by many interviewees, are more materialistic than the South Indian Hindus, showing that 
religion is only one of the many factors that influence people's behaviour. The North-South 
difference exits among the Hindus because the treasured goals, or the factors influencing one, 
have been handled differentially; for example, a North Indian child, more than a South Indian 
child, is likely to spend his childhood in an environment where money is highly revered and 
pursued. On the other hand, a South Indian child is more likely to have a certain amount of 
spiritualism imparted to him; more importance is placed on contentment and non-monetary 
considerations. It therefore seems that the religion factor has to be qualified by observations 
whereby the effect of religion is diluted or intensified by other factors; for example, the 
European Christians are, demonstrably, not as money-oriented as are Christians in the Middle 
East and the sub-continent. 
(ii) The caste factor: 
In the Hindu system of castes, the Vishuas, the middle ranking caste, have 
traditionally been ordained to trade and be commercially oriented more than the others. This 
was observed by many Indian interviewees. About the Shudras, the lowest caste, most said 
that they were motivated more obsessively by money in reaction to their placement in the 
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lowest caste: If a lowest caste Hindu makes a lot of money and becomes rich, it does 
increase his status in society. But money does not offen entitle a rich Shudra to marry a 
Brahman's daughter; While a Shudra can get rid of a lot of limitations because of his wealth, 
the stigma or bürden of being born in lower caste will continue, depending upon the 
peculiarities of the individuate involved in the situation; a Brahmin, a highest caste Hindu, 
may choose not to be sensitive to caste différence and get married to a low caste but rich 
Shudra, but it would not be because of ignorance of caste différence but because he/she chose 
to be insensitive to this différence. Indira Gandhi, a Brahmin, married a Parsi, but still 
people kept voting for her. If Indira Gandhi was a common woman, her marriage to a man 
of a so perceived "low religion" would have been a serious bürden for her in the pursuit of 
her career. Generally, even if low caste people make lots of money, they would find it very 
difficult to gain social acceptance among the upper caste groups. This is reportedly true of 
all under-privileged persons in India. Indians are changing but, it is offen reported, one from 
a low background has to cross many hurdles, and some hurdles may not be crossed at all. 
On the other hand, if a Brahmin, a highest caste Hindu, is very poor, he would still 
get some respect but, it was often reported, material things are becoming more important 
than the other considérations so that the caste factor is becoming less and less important. 
More importance is now being placed on the possession of wealth, especially in urban India. 
(iiOThe socio-economie class factor: 
Some interviewées placed more emphasis on the effects of socio-economie class in 
one's money motivation[9]. They argued that an affluent European and an affluent Indian 
would not show much différence in their patterns of motivation, and so would a middle class 
Indian and a middle class European. In other words, an average European and an average 
Indian, in the same socio-economie class, would not show a significant différence in their 
needs because, after having fulfilled certain common needs, they would be looking forward 
to satisfy higher needs. The sum of such reasoning is that while there is a minor cultural 
dimension to money motivation, the underlying factors which drive individuate to money 
would be more or less the same the world over for people in the same socio-economie class. 
[9]In non-Marxist literature, motivation is often not linked to one's économie class 
though tacit hints have been given in some théories, for example, McGregor tacitly 
recognizes the differentiated manifestation of motivation among économie classes; 
"...motivation is différent under différent économie conditions" (McGregor, 1960-a: 120). 
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When questioned about the much greater and obsessive money motivation found in the sub-
continent than in Europe, thèse interviewées argued that in the sub-continent, the immense 
gap between the rich and the poor made the vast majority, i.e. the lower classes, very 
strongly motivated to rise up the social ladder. Once thus motivated in their early lives, even 
if they became affluent, the desire to make more persisted. Thèse interviewées argued that 
the obsessive money motivation among the lowest caste Hindus, was not a caste-characteristic 
but a conséquence of their having historically lived in circumstances of dire poverty. In the 
sub-continent, the most acceptable explanation for obsessive money-seeking was the big gap 
in the satisfaction of the basic needs of the vast majority. The said reasoning implies that if 
there was as immense a gap between rich and poor in Europe as in the sub-continent, and 
if the vast majority of Europeans too was poor, the same obsessive money motivation would 
appear in Europe as exists in the sub-continent. However, thèse interviewées seem to ignore 
the différent familial responsibility structure of Asians which, even when domiciled in the 
affluent Europe, drives them to make money with greater vigour than most Europeans do. 
(iv) The level of socio-economie development of a society: 
Some interviewées argued that cultural différences between societies were of little 
significance in money motivation, and that it was the level of socio-economie development 
of a society that decided the extent to which money motivation could be found in that society. 
Thèse interviewées observed that if we compare an average European with an average Indian, 
in terms of Maslow's need hierarchy, there was a vast gap in the level of need satisfaction 
of the two; an average man in Europe would be at a higher level of needs fulfìllment 
compared to an average Indian. Therefore, the reasons for money motivation have less to do 
with the placement of a person in India or in Europe, and more to do with what type of 
needs he had already satisfied. In other words, Indians and Europeans, being at différent 
levels of satisfaction of their needs, have differentiated money motivation which has little to' 
do with their respective cultures. When pointed to the fact that it was because of a cultural 
différence that the Europeans had managed to evolve a social security system which drove 
compulsion and dépravation out of motivation, some argued that the évolution of the social 
security was more of an accidentai nature reflecting the higher development level in Europe. 
(v) The sub-culture factor: 
Some interviewées argued that a sub-culture plays a strong role in the détermination 
of money motivation because individuate are deeply involved in their culture which has its 
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own goals and Systems of pursuing those goals. Hence people from various cultures act in 
dissimilar fashions. For example, despite being in the same cultural context of Europe, Jews 
have différent type of monetary goals than those of non-Jewish Europeans. Usually Jews are 
more commercially driven which can be seen in ail générations of Jews; Jews in the fifties 
were différent from non-Jews in the fifties and so on. The aforementioned North Indian-
South-Indian différence in the pursuit of money supports such reasoning. 
Asian motivation at higher levels 
When asked about motivation to work, most Asian entrepreneurs mention self-growth, 
business expansion, establishing more businesses, self-satisfaction and enhancing family 
prestige and social status as their motivators. It is obvious that during a formai interview, the 
above mentioned information is ail one can get. Thus, we shall be limited in our analysis of 
motivation at higher income levels by the difficulties in getting deeper information through 
formai interviews alone and therefore refrain from generalizations in this respect. However, 
it helps question the self-acclaimed motivators of Asian entrepreneurs, to présent some 
instances of Asian upper-class motivation which reveal the political and' social power gaining 
ambitions of many entrepreneurs. In some cases, political ambitions were fulfilled at the cost 
of the organizations and moral obligations to the country which provided the opportunity to 
amass fortunes. Such examples as given are not a unique and rare occurrence; there are 
numerous examples of a similar nature but because I am bound in this work to présent only 
recorded évidence, and abstain from presenting the greater mass of information obtained 
through unrecorded interviews, I shall stick to a few cases only. 
In talking about the deliberate and self-planned closure of a large and profitable Indian 
clothes manufacturing factory in Birmingham, a respondent revealed some very disconcerting 
information which shows that the dual nationality System may help those who want to avoid 
governmental intervention. The said factory was so successful that the Indian owners could 
get heavy loans from banks; they invested the borrowed money in India where they had 
senior positions and contacts with the Indian Congress Party and after abandoning the factory 
in Birmingham, they left for India in pursuit of political-economic goals. 
I had some idea of thèse transactions in my expérience as finance manager with a 
large shoe manufacturing concern in Pakistan where government loans granted for the import 
of new shoe manufacturing machinery from Britain were expropriated. Second-hand 
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machinery was purchased and a fake auditor verified the machines as new. Similarly, loans 
on building construction were also half expropriated and, after having invested the funds in 
British real estate, the factory in Pakistan was declared bankrupt only one year after the trial 
production; I could see many similarities between the two cases. 
It can be safely deduced from common observation and information that most sub-
continent entrepreneurs are not motivated by the same ideáis as many industrialists in the 
West have historically been: First, in terms of common weal, there are no likes of Robert 
Owen in the sub-continent and second, because almost ali organizational Systems, as well as 
manufacturing technology, are conveniently borrowed or purchased from the West (or from 
Russia, particularly in India), there is little concept of research, development, and initiative 
geared towards meeting indigenous socio-economic needs through creativity and invention. 
In thèse circumstances, organizations become little more than money-grabbing tools where 
participants struggle to grab a greater share of wealth at the cost of human relations and the 
long-term survival of the Organization. Not only do the workers feel little sense of belonging 
to the workplace, many entrepreneurs too see the factory or business as a means of achieving 
ideáis that rest elsewhere in the society. There are few industrialists in the sub-continent 
whose interests lie solely in industry but there are many whose real ambitions are to achieve 
politicai and social power through wealth accumulation which makes trade and industry little 
more than a means for achieving the said ambitions. The social and cultural system with its 
strict class distinctions determines that the industrialists and entrepreneurs would not see it 
as their right place to be in the company of lower-ranking employées; most workers in 
medium/large organizations do not even know who owns the business and would not be 
allowed to meet the owners. On the social side, ségrégation of sexes and arranged marriages 
within one's class, preserve class barriers in such a way that the participants in an 
Organization continue to live in segregated economie classes [see chapter 2]. Thus, motivation 
for the Asian entrepreneurs has little to do with the problems and prospects of their 
employées but is much more focused on keeping the family name in a prestigious position, 
preserving and enhancing social standing, and maintaining an upwardly mobile style of life, 
luxury, prosperity, and fame, often at the cost of moral and legai considérations. While a lot 
is written about the corruption in public sector, the corruption of private enterprise has been 
a taboo subject, mainly because criticism of private business in the sub-continent is quickly 
reprimanded by allégations at the critic being a communist (atheist in Muslim countries). 
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Summarv and contributions of chapter 4 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) In the Middle East, the sub-continent and among British-Asians, the vast majority 
considers money as its main, often the only, motivation to work. But money is a key to the 
satisfaction of motives such as increasing feeling of security, raising a family, acquiring high 
status and luxury, etc. 
(2) A majority is motivated to work for non-work related goals. 
(3) Asian workers in Britain are less interested in social life after work than in making money 
through over-time/work in night shifts. English workers want to socialize in the evenings. 
(4) Most Asian workers want to work twelve hours a day and almost seven days a week while 
English workers prefer an eight hour work day and five/six days a week. 
(5) When British-Asian workers did go on strikes, seeking more money was the prime reason. 
(6) The reasons for seeking more money among Easterners were given as follows: 
(a) Large families and the consequential greater familial economic commitment; for 
example, Eastern men are supposed to provide for wives, children, parents, and 
destitute relatives; 
(b) large networks of relatives and the consequential greater social obligations such as 
giving gifts on weddings and child births; 
(c) greater economic bürden on men because of ségrégation of sexes among Muslims, 
such as for example, wives and daughters are not allowed to work; 
(d) sons must be financially supported until they are on jobs, and daughters must be 
brought up until they are married of; 
(e) men in the sub-continent are obliged to provide huge dowry for daughters' 
weddings and pay for expensive célébrations on weddings, child births etc. On the 
contrary, Arabs and Pathans are obliged to pay to the bride's father. Easterners are 
supposed to pay for meals for hundreds of guests who arrive on funerals and other 
occasions of gloom or happiness; 
(f) a lot of money is spent on eating rich food (eating simple food is considered a 
debasement and low class activity) and on the consequential health problems, on 
jewelry (obsessions of segregated females), wedding dresses and dresses that must be 
bought on 'special occasions'; 
(g) as explained in chapter 2, status is very important to Easterners and money brings 
ali the material possessions that enhance perception of status; 
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(h) flaunting of wealth in several kind of 'jealousy generating occasions' which many 
Easterners enjoy, makes others seek more money; 
(i) most Asians who came to Britain were from poor, rural, and working class 
backgrounds and as such had inferiority feelings which they sought eradication 
through making money; 
(j)education in Britain does not bring as large difference in earnings as in the sub-
continent, hence lesser motivation among British Asians for education, than that found 
in their home countries. 
(7) Social security provisions in Britain have not mitigated the Asian drive to make money 
but visibly enhanced their drive to spend or waste it in the manner described above. Child 
benefit and family credits etc. have demonstrably increased the Asian drive to procreate. 
(8) A multi-causal explanation for the sub-continent/British Asian money motivation deduced 
from interviewee statements lists the following factors behind money motivation: the sub-
continent religions, caste, socio-economic class, level of socio-economic development of a 
society and sub-culture. 
(9) Among the sub-continent/British Asian upper classes, in addition to the above given 
reasons for money motivation, there are goals of socio-political power sought through money 
made in business. Political goals are often highly valued and attained at the cost of legal and 
moral obligations to society. Ownership of businesses is instrumental in seeking socio-
political goals; hence we find in organizations, lack of research, development, technological 
advancement and other such imperatives albeit where these are instrumental in seeking non-
organizational goals. 
(10) The above mentioned findings are also valid for the Middle East except that dowry is not 
paid by the bride's father but is paid to him by the bridegroom. The said custom shifts the 
expensive burden of marriage from the bride's family to the bridegroom. Hence men in the 
Middle East are hard pressed to seek large sums of money (and scores of goats to be 
slaughtered, etc.) in order to get married. 
These findings explain how the sub-continent and Middle Eastern cultural focus on a 
particular type of procreative familialism and family-centered social life, which glamorizes 
weddings, child births, familial festivities imitated from the mannerisms of various Royal 
families around the world, compounded by segregation of sexes, places incredible strain on 
people to seek money. For all the familial reasons given above, a lot of money, time and 
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energy is required which diverts attention of people from creative intrinsic motivation (if there 
is any). Work and organizations become instrumental in seeking money to satisfy the ever 
growing socio-familial demands. Among the upper classes, many business owners who want 
higher socio-political status see their organizations as instrumental in making money needed 
to spend in, say, ultra luxury living, election campaigns, intrigues etc., which leaves the 
question of organizational development largely unattended. 
The findings shall be taken on to our Grounded Theory in the last chapters to support 
our notions of family planning and a transformation of 'status oriented ' cognitive culture as 
primary solutions to mitigating obsessive money motivation and giving some respite to the 
sub-continent and Middle Eastern families in all socio-economic classes to think about work-
related motivation, or intrinsic motivation, or at the least, to spend some time in educating 
themselves about the seething environmental and social problems that threaten the very fabric 
of many societies because of the illusionary life styles mentioned above. 
Notes and Explanations 
1 .The significance of such perception/ cognition is relevant to Marketing. An example 
would clarify this point: In 1966, Lee (1966: 107) argued that "the cultures capable of 
designing and manufacturing new products select and design almost all of them on a self-
reference basis". He gave much statistics to argue that the Midget Motors of Ohio could 
manufacture and sell its low-priced, 80 miles a gallon "King Midget" to Pakistan but didn't 
do so because of the American SRC of big car luxury. He also showed that inexpensive, 
fibre-board and angle-iron houses could be sold to the poor who live in shanties and can 
afford such a house; in times of floods, the proposed house could be dismantled and moved 
elsewhere, unlike the shanties. Lee's native graduate students conducted a survey to show 
that the proposed business was attractive. With the benefit of hindsight now, I quote that the 
Bhutto government (1972-76) did both things; it built a cheap 'people's car' that was the 
equivalent of the 'King Midget' and, a 'people's house', the equivalent of Lee's suggestion. 
Both projects failed miserably. The reasons lay in the sub-continent attitude of 'keeping face'; 
the ownership of a 'people's car' or a 'people's house' was perceived as a deliberate placing 
oneself into the category of "those who cannot afford better" (and face the inferiority 
feelings), while not owning either could still be attributed to reasons other than being 
"branded low status". For the shanty dweller, it didn't matter whether he lived in a "straw 
and wood plus mud house" or an "angle iron plus fibre-board" one, particularly when the 
former could be made without any monetary cost. While Lee's approach in suggesting the 
cheaper car and house was functional, he had to give a logical mind to the Pakistani buyer 
to make his proposals succeed; the behaviour of an average person in the sub-continent or 
Middle East, unless forced by sheer poverty, is determined more by the "status" and 'face-
keeping' concepts than by logic or functionalism; most Indians noted the functional benefits 
of 800cc Suzuki cars only after observing that Suzukis were driven in affluent countries. 
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Chapter Five: Conflict and Favouritism in Organizations on the Basis of Regional, 
Linguistic. Religious. Caste. Tribal and Ethnie Background 
In the Indian sub-continent, most actual or potential non-work-related conflict in 
organizations reflects the actual or potential communal conflict existing in the society because 
the organizational participants bring their social learning along with them. The mentioned 
conflict is commonly observed in many sub-continent organizations, particularly in those 
working in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, socially and politically volatile régions. 
In Pakistan, the most politically volatile région is the province of Sindh where two 
major ethnic/linguistic communities, which call themselves 'nations', have for long been 
competing against each other for control of material resources, especially jobs, and hence for 
control over the organizations that provide thèse jobs, such as schools, collèges, hospitals, 
universities, and public and private businesses. These two major communities are the Sindhis, 
who are the ethnie inhabitants of the province of Sindh, and the Mahajars (meaning 'the 
immigrants') who migrated from India when Pakistan was made by dividing the Indian sub-
continent. The Sindhis speak Sindhi while the Mahajars speak Urdu and are therefore also 
called the 'Urdu-speaking'. There are many cultural dissimilarities between the two 
communities though they share the common religion, Islam[l], Intermarriage among Sindhis 
and Mahajars is rare, and the lower and middle classes of the two communities usually do 
not socialize with each other. 
When the Mahajars came to Pakistan, on the pretext that they were Muslims and 
wanted to live in the newly formed Islamic country, they mainly settled in Karachi, the 
largest Pakistani city, and Hyderabad where there were growing business and job 
opportunities. Karachi, a port city, was a commercial success and so thousands of job seekers 
[ljPakistan was formed under an idealist unitary belief about society that one religion 
makes for one nation but this has not stopped people from resorting to violent conflict on the 
basis of the aforementioned divisions. The imposition of one national language Urdu, is 
widely recognized to be an initializing factor behind the Bengali aliénation from Pakistan. 
This and a séries of factors led to the violent séparation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. 
Quoting an example of riots between Binari refugees (who speak Urdu) from India and native 
Bengalis (who speak Bengali), leading to a loss of 500 lives, in a Western mill in former 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Lee (1966, p. 112) states; "the error here was the confidence 
that the workers ' common Islamic religion would override status, language, economie and 
value différences. An American resuit of the same kind of SRC [self-reference criterio] was 
the mixing of Catholics - Irish and Italians - in early New England industry. " 
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from the provinces of Punjab and NWFP also carne and settled here so that its population 
swelled from 4 to 13 million in a period of 40 years. The Punjabis and the Pathans, all 
Muslims, see themselves as culturally and linguistically incompatible to each other as do the 
Sindhis and the Mahajars. Henee Karachi became a multicultural city with four major 
communities competing for jobs and resources. As the population out-grew (6% per annum) 
resources and jobs, the social scene of unemployment, under-employment and disappointment 
was set for communal mistrust, suspicion, hatred and violence[2]. During the last decade, 
many Sindhi movements claimed that Sindhis have been deprived of jobs in Sindh by alien 
Urdu-speakers and Punjabis who get jobs relatively easily as they started in officially 
required education much earlier than did the Sindhis. As a counter-measure, the said 
movements wanted a large number of Sindhis to have academic degrees so that they could 
get jobs and a larger economic share for the Sindhis. 
At present, the violence between Sindhis and Mahajars has ebbed but there is now 
more violence among sub-groups of Mahajars, Punjabis, Pathans and the peace-keeping army 
and pólice, and to add another dimensión to social conflict, between the religious divide of 
Shias and Sunnis that cuts through the aforementioned divisions. 
It is in this context that many stories of conflict in multi-ethnic organizations, such 
as Sindh University[3], become self-explicable. The Sindhis do not usually accept non-
[2]Some authors have argued that poverty breeds conflict situations. Marx saw the 
causes of conflict in the class society, but this does not explain greater intra-class pereeption-
based conflict. The signifleance of 'perception' in conflict behaviour is shown in that many 
groups whose objective circumstances demand a conflict, either do not enter into conflict (the 
power dimension) or have conflict with the wrong groups (e.g. intra-class conflict amongst 
badly exploited labour, bloodshed among religious sects, ). 
During the last three decades, I have lived amidst intermittent conflict situations and 
have personally observed police action, firing, deaths, Student protests, wild cat strikes, mass 
movements and démonstrations, communal riots, arson and destruction of public property. 
I have kept regular, direct and through news media, observation of several incessant conflicts 
and found that lessons learnt from socio-political conflicts may be applied to organizational 
conflict, because the human dement and needs are a common denominator. For example, in 
most conflicts, I have found a recurring common cognitive dement, which Pondy (1967) 
states as, "the perception that some otherperson or entity acts against one 's interests". Some 
Personalities could be conflict-prone with biological causes, as recent medical research (level 
of saratonium in blood) has tried to show. 
[3]For a detailed account of Sindhi-Punjabi-Mahajar conflict in the Sindh University 
see pages 294 to 296. 
76 
Sindhis at Sindh University. The students are accustomed to too much cheating and copying 
in the examinations and when a non-Sindhi teacher tried to stop it, most students began 
démonstrations and protests against him so that he had to resign. The work-related problems 
at Sindh University had to do with excessive student cheating and corruption, but the conflict 
based on regional background left little room for dealing with work-related problems. 
Although Karachi University has somehow managed to isolate itself from the communal 
conflict in Karachi and maintain a high standard of éducation, the Quaid-e-Azam University 
and the Punjab University, where the standard of éducation is comparatively high, are located 
in régions where communal conflict is almost non-visible. The provinces of Punjab, N W F P , 
and the Federal Area comprise a population mix that is not as culturally heterogeneous and 
over-populated as that in Karachi. Henee there is little regional/ethnic social conflict in thèse 
areas. It is therefore relatively easy for Quaid-e-Azam University and Punjab University to 
maintain standards of éducation, and for many organizations in thèse régions to stay out of 
ethnie conflict. A marketing manager in a British multinational in Pakistan reported that 
problems of intra-organizational conflict mostly arose in their Head Office at Karachi (a 
multi-ethnic city) while in their Lahore (a comparatively culturally homogeneous city) office 
they did not have thèse conflicts, except for minor ethnicist comments by the regional 
managers, and the same was the case with their workers unions. 
Organizations manned by culturally homogeneous people do not face open conflicts 
of the kind mentioned above. Also, the higher the social and economie status of a person, 
the less likely he is to engage in ethnic/community based conflicts unless he has enough to 
gain from such conflict. A higher level of secular éducation could also create more tolérance 
for différent cultures. Thus, company managers at a higher level of social status are less 
likely to engage in open conflict on a regional/ethnic basis. Though there may be subtle hints 
thrown at managers from a différent caste or regional background, it happens only when 
other différences are sharp, when positions are taken, and when there has to be a tug of 
power, precipitated by other conflicts, then some may attribute a man's shorteomings to his 
caste or his regional background. In other words, regionalism was found to be exploited only 
when there was a need for it in the organizational politics and ambitions of the managers[4]. 
[4]Dahrendorff (1958) held that there is, "built-in conflict associateci with the 
dichotomy of positive and negative dominance... produced by the necessary authority 
structure", but this does not explain conflict within one hierarchical level. 
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Regional and ethnic conflict may show itself at higher social status levels in subtle forms and 
be felt at times of recruitment, inter-departmental transfers and promotions. At the Oil and 
Gas Development Corporation of Pakistan, an Urdu-speaker geophysicist reported that he 
was transferred many times from one geological division to another because his Punjabi 
seniors wanted him to keep starting from scratch in terms of organizational relations, so that 
they could get their favourite persons promoted. A production manager in a high-tech defence 
industry reported that the higher management had taken away his powers to hire because they 
thought that, being a Mahajar, he would probably hire most from among the Mahajars. 
Examples of lack of tolerance for other communities are common in Muslim 
organizations. At the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI), there was a common feeling 
that the first to be hired and promoted were usually the Luckhnow Shias, then the other 
Shias, and then the Sunnis and Ahmadees. Entrepreneurs belonging to one religious sect 
would be more willing to do business with entrepreneurs of their own sect than with those 
belonging to another. Even in sales, a sales manager may find a client with a different value 
structure not willing to deal with him though he would buy the same product of the same 
company from a sales manager with the same faith as his own: Having values and beliefs 
similar to the client's, implies greater possibility of getting business. 
Many reported about the regionalism of Pakistani management in the MNCs operating 
in Pakistan. In a British multinational, personality clashes took place for reasons such as the 
marketing manager being Punjabi while the finance manager was a Bihari. 
Interviews with Indian managers also reveal conflicts based on one's regional, 
linguistic and caste backgrounds in the Indian organizations. A production manager in a very 
large Indian pharmaceutical industry reported several incidents of favouritism. His colleague 
from the state of Karanataka used to favour some candidates from Karanataka and this led 
to a conflict because the others began to say, "this guy is favouring those". In Bangalore 
there is a mix of people coming from many Indian states to work; many from the other states 
have settled there for a long time. Those who could speak the local language did not face 
much discrimination but people from the North or Andhra could not speak the local language 
and interact with the locals. Conflicts arose between speakers of different languages; 
"sometimes, it used to go to such a state of agitation that one would spit on the floor, 
swear, and shout vulgar words about the other groups." 
Group membership based on region, religion, caste, and ethnic background, becomes 
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one base for favouritism in hiring, sélection and promotions. It was often reported that in 
India it is not only the question of regionalism but also the question of caste; for example, 
Brahmins, the highest caste, even if they are from différent régions and speak différent 
languages, form one community and support each other[5]. Likewise, if the lowest caste, the 
Shudras, corne from différent régions and speak différent languages, they would stili support 
each other. It maybe said that caste membership over-rules regional and language différences. 
However, many interviewées added that in India, to some extent, merit does count in cases 
of promotion, but the définition of merit again involves social considérations discussed in 
chapter two (socio-economie class and educational background). 
While inquiring about possible reasons for the aforementioned conflict, I found the 
main reasons in over-population which leads to a rat race for dwindling resources, jobs and 
security, and the conséquent psychology of suspicion, mistrust, neurosis and paranoia [see 
endnote 1]. Experiments in psychology on the effects of over-population on rats show that 
they become increasing violent as their population out-grows resources in a controlied 
residential environment. Other than over-population, reasons maybe seen in the strictly closed 
family and kinship system described earlier. The reason for kinship Systems being so 
dominant is often reported to be the high sectionalization of Indian society in aforementioned 
terms. Determining whether the kinship system or sectionalization is the cause of the other, 
puts one in the 'chicken and egg' situation as to which came first. More over, within one 
religion, there are further divisions on the basis of régions: A North-Indian Hindu would 
\5~\A Note of Caution: Note that the incidents reported by the interviewées and quoted 
in mis section may not fulfil ail criteria of veracity and fairness of judgement. For example, 
the incident of many Brahmins being promoted by the Brahmin top management in an Indian 
organization, narrated by a father (a deputy general manager in a large Indian company) to 
his son (a production manager and our interviewée), may not have happened exactly as 
described: There are times when fathers in the sub-continent tell taies to their sons, in order 
to win the sons' respect and loyalty, and to boast that they have done a lot for the family 
against many odds. It is not impossible that the father in this case could be rationalizing his 
own reaction to some frustration at not being able to rise to the level to which many of his 
colleagues rose. Only by following the lengthy procédures of jurisprudence it may be 
determined whether someone was discriminated against and whether considérations of merit 
were ignored. But this does not invalidate our point in this chapter, that there is friction 
among people on the basis of région, language, caste, tribe and ethnie background and that 
the affiliations based on same région, caste, or ethnie background could wield certain powers 
to some or serve as a drawback to some others, and that this form of group formation is not 
known to exist in Western organizations with such explicitness as it does in the subcontinent. 
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prefer to work with a North-Indian Hindu; then there would be their ancestral background 
added; a Hindu from Punjab is likely to prefer to work with a Punjabi-Hindu who speaks the 
same language comes from the same area; this becomes a cultural group in itself. 
A suitable explanation of the Indian way of group formation commonly offered is that 
people generally find it easy to work with their own kind so that even if one's own kind 
brings some disadvantage, one is prepared to put up with it. Sometimes, one is able to place 
more confidence in one's own kind and there are certain jobs in which trust is more 
important than performance. Thus, we find a strong cohesion among likes and a strong 
tendency not to employ groups who are unknown. There is an active discrimination as people 
promote their own cultural group. In the interviews, many statements were found supporting 
the above given explanation: "we are a bit scared of taking people with whom we are less 
familiar"; "it is the culture, and the management culture is a part of it, that people feel safe 
with their own kind". The conflict-related consequences of favouring one's own kind were 
obvious in many statements: For example, in Pakistan International Airlines, it was reported 
that favouritism led to non-work conflict and inequitable treatment. Those who receive 
inequitable treatment from the managers tend to quarrel with each other and follow the 
favoured if the favoured ones tend not to work and do what was called "look busy do 
nothing". Inequitable treatment was often reported to have led to a loss of motivation. 
The relationship of community membership to achievement; the effects of favouritism and 
discrimination; some groups prosper, others suffer 
It maybe shown statistically that certain communities, when compared to certain other 
communities, have a higher percentage of achievers. But whether achievement motivation 
came first or the control of business, commerce, and hence the resources required for being 
high achievers, came first is debatable. For example, Muslims in India have a strong general 
feeling that they are discriminated against because of their minority status. But then, literacy 
rate among Muslims in India is far lower than the average literacy rate in India and so most 
Muslims are not well prepared for the job market. The literacy rate among Anglo-Indians and 
Parsees is almost one hundred percent and they do not feel discriminated against. The 
Parsees have been a community of high achievers and control a lot of the commerce. Their 
achievement in terms of literature, commerce, arts, finance and education seem far higher 
when the percentage of achievers among Parsees is compared with similar percentages from 
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among other groups. Parsees are a small but cohesive community[6], very well provided for 
and much looked after by members of the same community and free from certain problems 
which inhibit many other Indian communities from achieving as much. For example, among 
the Parsees there is no institutionalized ségrégation of sexes and both men and women are 
free to take employment or do business which means that the fìnancial bürden of supporting 
a family rests on the Shoulders of all adults and not just on the men. More over, Parsees and 
Anglo-Indians do not have a cultural préjudice against family planning and thus they do not 
let their family size go out of hand as most other Indians do, particularly the Muslims (not 
only in India) whose plight is an obvious support to the population theory of Reverend 
Malthus. It may therefore be deduced that aspects of a group culture either inhibit or foster 
traits essential for motivation, social development, prosperity and conséquent group harmony. 
It may be said that the high achievements of the Parsees[7] give them a "halo effect", 
but this only shows the significance of religious and social grouping in India: Because the 
Parsees own a lot of businesses, they are more likely to give and find jobs for a Parsi man. 
If we see the ratio of job applicants among Parsees and the jobs available in Parsi businesses, 
the result works out to be very favourable to the Parsi job applicant. This works in a cycle; 
because one is assured of a good job at the end, he would put more effort in éducation, get 
a job and then prepare his off-spring for a better future. This pattern of behaviour is 
observed in the Parsees but not in the Muslims or in lower caste Hindus because, firstly, 
[6]Parsees in Pakistan are a closed society. They seldom reveal their worship places 
and social customs to others, usually socialize and stay within their community, and normally 
forbid their children from interacting with other groups. But then in Pakistan, Parsees feel 
threatened from Muslim fundamentalism and need to protect themselves as do many other 
religious minorities such as the Ahmadees and the Christians. In India, the Parsi culture is 
not threatened and therefore, like the other Indians, the Parsis have réservations for out-
groups only in giving jobs, and in marriages. 
[7]Common motivation théories do not link motivation to the individuar s membership 
of a social group though in many works, not directly dealing with motivation, strong links 
of motivation to membership of a social group have been recorded. For example, Weber 
(1976) noted that many of the 19th century nouveau-riche entrepreneurs were either Jewish 
or Protestant, and that their minority status in society urged them to further accumulation of 
capital and wealth in order to obtain an entry into 'society'. We obtained similar findings 
whereby Asian workers in Britain showed much greater money motivation than did the White 
workers; likewise, in India, the minority Parsees, and in Pakistan, the Ahmadees (prior to 
the officiai déclaration of Ahmadees being 'non-Muslim') and the early Mahajars, were 
reported to have made more money than have members of the majority social groups. 
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there are no existing leads in commerce, business etc. and not enough role models. Muslims 
are ten percent of the Indian population, but we do not see that ten percent of Academicians 
or top businessmen etc. are Muslims. There are also regional discrepancies; for example, 
Muslims in the province of Bihar are reported to be the most under-privileged when 
compared to Muslims in other Indian régions. 
The sub-continent culture of divisions shown in conflict among Asians in Britain 
Düring my empirical investigations in Britain, I found that most British Asians live 
within their own cultural bounds. Not only do they resisi learning many ne wer patterns, but 
actively strive to keep their children from being influenced by éléments of other cultures, 
even if the learning of such éléments could be highly désirable in terms of inter-community 
relations and for the good of British Asians themselves. For example, while many regional, 
ethnie, linguistic and cultural barriers may be broken down by inter-cultural marriages, many 
groups actively attempt to stop inter-marriages so that even organizations employing Asians 
only, show conflicts among Asians. Numerous instances of conflict between people following 
différent religions or having dissimilar cultures, were reported. One such conflict took place 
in Manchester. In a large Indian textile company, a love affair between the Hindu production 
manager and a Muslim girl worker resulted in the production manager Converting to Islam 
and marrying the Muslim girl but, simply because of the affair between the two, the Muslim 
workers in the factory caused a lot of trouble. Because the majority of workers there were 
Muslims, the conflict became serious. The Muslim workers refused to cooperate with the 
manager, refused to obey his orders and worked as they Iiked; when there was an emergency 
order to be shipped, the workers would not stay to work. They also approached the girl's 
family and put pressure to an extent that she left her parents and took up residence 
elsewhere. We may note here that because the conflict took place in Britain, the most the 
resenting workers could do was to disobey the manager and harass the girl. But many 
instances of intermarriage in the sub-continent have led to riots and issues of law and 
order[8]. In Britain, some Asian fathers are reported to have killed their daughters for going 
out with men of a différent religion [for conflict based on racial grounds see chapter 14]. 
[8]Where the causes of conflict are primarily cognitive, they may not be directly 
traceable in the objective situation of the actors. When questioned about the rationality of 
conflict, people often produce arguments that bear little logical relevance to their situations. 
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Tribal conflict in Middle Eastern organizations 
Observations implying aforementioned déductions were also reported by many 
immigrant employées in the Middle East. Intra-organizational conflict among nationality 
based groups was frequently reported. At a certain university in the Gulf, staff from several 
nations intrigued against each other, each nationality forming a cultural group. The English 
lecturers felt that the 'Egyptian Mafia' was controlling the university resources and 
administration so that when a certain English teacher was fired, the reasons for dismissal 
were attributed to the said teacher having a skirmish with an Egyptian Dean. 
The équivalent of the sub-continent non-work intra-organizational communal conflict, 
in the Middle East, is non-work intra-organizational tribal conflict. For example, some 
prominent tribes in the Gulf with attributes of 'worth' (or lack of it), are the Al-Saud, A l -
Thani, Al-Quari, Al-Haajri, Al-Muhanadi, Al-Mari , Al-Suadee, and many others. There are 
jokes and opinions about the so-perceived 'lower' tribes. Personnel from one tribe are 
reported to support men from their tribes and have subtle clashes with personnel from the 
other tribes. Some clashes, leading to insubordination, occur even in the armed forces; an 
army officer reported that among his seniors, there is a Major who is an Al-Quari, and there 
are two officers in the immediate lower rank who are from the Al-Haajri tribe. The A l -
Haajris sometimes do not attend the meetings called in by their senior, the Al-Quari, and at 
times refuse to obey his orders. The said interviewée is lower in rank to ail of thèse and if 
he goes to the Al-Quari Major with an application for a leave which the latter does not 
approve, the Al-Haajris may approve his leave in reaction to the Al-Quari's décision. On the 
other hand, if the Al-Haajris refuse his leave application first, he can go to the Al-Quari and 
get the leave sanctioned in reaction to the décision of the Al-Haajris. 
Great détails about the Arab tribal group formation, lineages, moieties (dual descent 
traditions), etc. are available in anthropological literature. The conflict proneness as an 
outstanding character of the Arab tribal mind is admitted both by Arab and non-Arab 
historians. But we are not concerned here with the détails of historical nature of Arab 
divisiveness except where such divisions show in organizational conflict and modes of 
conflict resolution. At the moment, an artificial wave of oil-based prosperity has kept the 
level of social conflict low but there are genuine fears in many states that any ebb of the 
artificial prosperity tide could bring the hibernating germs of extrême control and violent 
conflict back into the foreground. This has already begin to show in Bahrain. One perceptual 
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source of conflict between various population elements lies in the insulting anecdotes and 
proverbs which groups have about each other; this reminds me of the derision of my students 
for the Bedouins. One student in particular evoked laughter from the city dwellers. When I 
inquired about why they laughed at him, they said, "he is a Bedu - has no manners". In 
Afghanistan, much bloodshed has reportedly been triggered by insulting jokes between the 
Pathans and the Persian-speaking residents of Kabul. 
Tribal identification patterns have been maintained by most Arabs and carried into the 
modern world by patrilineal descent which has resulted in greater alienation between tribes. 
Affluence of the oil rich states has enabled them to avoid internecine wars but rivalries 
continue in many subtle forms and may show suddenly to the amazement of an outsider. In 
a Gulf hospital, a woman of the Al-Quaris was moaning in pain in her private ward when 
a curious woman of the Al-Mari tribe peeped in. The two began to quarrel and both phoned 
home asking for their husbands' help. In half an hour, about two dozen cars (a Rolls Royce 
among a lot of Mercedes) carrying men from both tribes, arrived in the hospital compound. 
However, upon finding that it was a 'women's squabble' they went back. 
Patai (1973: 218-226) summarizes such conflict proneness at all social levels as that 
the tradition of fighting, of one's own group being arrayed over and against another group 
occupying a parallel position within the social structure, of the incessant pressure to promote 
and prove the superiority of one's group, is a major contributing factor to the conflict-
proneness which still characterizes Arab relations on all levels of kinship, social, and political 
organization. Internal fighting is so abundantly attested in all parts of the Arab world that one 
must accept the truth of the general situation described. Strife has its historical antecedent 
and underpinning in the age-old Arab virtues of manliness, courage, aggressiveness, bravery, 
heroism and vengefulness, which have been extolled by poets for more than thirteen centuries 
and survive in the Arab's consciousness. Those interested in the psychological formation of 
conflict-proneness would find Patai very revealing. Patai (1973: 218-226) quotes numerous 
examples from Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq and Jerusalem to describe the child rearing 
practices whereby the competitiveness and sibling rivalry instilled by Arab mothers into their 
children results in a keen sense of rivalry in the adult Arab mind. The closer the two groups 
(spatial proximity), the greater the hostility. The proximity between a pair of "favourite 
enemies" maybe as close as two sections or quarters in one village or town. Occasionally, 
the leading families of the antagonistic factions manage to transform their followers into 
84 
politicai parties, which situation is similar to what I observed in Pakistani rural areas and 
among the tribal Pathans of Pakistan, and the Afghans. The same is reported about the 
African tribes (for example, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi) so much so that it 
maybe regarded as the hallmark of the primitive tribal societies to form rival groups around 
tribal membership, the modem tribal form of which is tribal politicai parties. In Pakistan, 
the notable families often build their politicai power base from among their owned villages. 
In 1988, as the presiding officer of a polling station for two neighbouring villages, I found 
the villagers making two separate queues for casting their votes. Upon inquiry, they told me 
that for a Provincial Assembly seat, each village had its own candidate who had the support 
of the entire village. Dwellers of the two tribal villages would not stand in one queue to cast 
their votes. Düring the polling, a tribal fight broke out between the two queues which took 
one hour of hot negotiations to subside. After the polling was done, I checked the adult 
population figures for each village and found that we might as well have compared the 
number of adults in one village against that of the other village to déclare the results of the 
élections. After the vote count, we (the staff) were brought to the headquarters by an armed 
police escort. At the next polling station, four men got killed in a similar tribal-political 
violence that led to exchange of fire (note the limitations of 'democracy' in tribal-feudalism). 
In Iran (Loffler, 1971: 1077-1091) and Afghanistan, among the tribal Pathans and in 
the rural areas of the sub-continent, socio-economically influential mediators are used for 
conflict resolution [see endnote 2]. The Arabs mostly rely on either médiation by a higher 
status third party, or calling conférences in conflict situations and pay little attention to 
whether the method is a success or not (Patai, 1973: 228-246). Patai satires the Arab 
proclivity to calling conférences as "conferentitis". In the sub-continent as well, when rural 
people settle in cities and towns, they carry on the tradition of conflict resolution through 
médiation. The 'bradarV system which is the modem form of sub-continent tribalism (diluted 
by the geographica! spread of clan members), uses médiation for conflict resolution[9]. 
[9]Black (1989) has argued that because culture is deeply implicated in the constitution 
of ail human expérience, a culture-free approach to studying conflict and conflict-resolution 
is unprofitable, and that researchers in conflict resolution should take into account their own 
cultural assumptions. 
85 
Prospects of change are greater in non-segregated societies 
There is some hope that the social situation of divisions, favouritism and 
discrimination might give way to simple merit considérations in the Indian urban areas, 
because of industrialization, and the increasingly strong influence of Western civilization. 
The rural/urban divide in India is very obvious; people with same caste, religion, language, 
and economie class would behave differentially in the two sectors because urbanization has 
broken some age-old barriers so that people are far more socially mobile and more concerned 
with one's présent position than with his caste. Rural areas are still very segregated societies 
in terms of castes. Young couples in urban India tend to have less children and follow a 
Western oriented life style and, as offen reported by interviewées, most urban India now falls 
in this category. In this social change, India has an advantage that it is not institutionally 
segregated in terms of sexes and hence there is greater possibility of arranged marriages 
based on religion, région, caste, and ethnie considérations, giving way to marriages based 
on freedom of choice. In India, co-education and non-segregated workplaces are allowed. 
Boys and girls can meet and have friendships in which the social institutions do not object. 
But in Pakistan, non-related boys and girls are not normally allowed to see each other 
regularly on any pretext. We can therefore say that Indians do not follow an institutionalized 
social policy of ségrégation; although many Indian Muslims have some restrictive moral 
standards for women, they are not in a majority and do not reflect the Indian society as a 
whole. On the other hand, in most Muslim countries, because of the institutionalized 
ségrégation of sexes, and marriages based on elders' décisions, there is little hope that the 
said group barriers will break. 
Summarv and contributions of chapter 5 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
We have seen in this chapter that, 
(1) Most actual or potential non-work conflict in the sub-continent organizations reflects that 
in the society at large. Conflict based on regional, linguistic, religious, caste, and ethnie 
background is more visible in organizations located in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and socio-
politically volatile régions. 
(2) Organizations suffering from the mentioned non-work conflict are severely handicapped 
in the performance of their criticai operating tasks and may turn into pseudo organizations. 
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(3) Countries which seek repression of régional conflict by the imposition of an idealistic 
unitary view of nation-state, religion etc. are mostly unsuccessful because of a lack of a 
materialistic integration of poorer régions and classes. This has parallels in managers 
imposing an idealistic unitary view of organization but without attempts to material or social 
integration of lower ranks. 
(4) Population in the city of Karachi, as in scores of other large cities, has almost quadrupled 
in the last fifty years due to over-procreation and immigration from other régions. As the 
population has out-grown resources and jobs, the social stage of unemployment, 
underemployment and disappointment has served as a bedrock for communal mistrust, 
suspicion, hatred and intermittent violence. 
(5) Finding 4 is supported by the findings that people in higher economie classes, or with 
stable livelihoods, are not found directly involved in the aforementioned kind of conflict. 
However, even higher level employées, managers, scientists, professors etc. have been 
reported to have subtle non-work conflicts on the aforementioned grounds for organizational 
politics and as unhealthy compétition for higher posts. 
(6) Formation of informai non-work groups in organizations is also based on the same 
grounds as those used for conflict. Membership of a certain communal group could increase 
or decrease one's prérogatives and privilèges at work. Hence allégations of favoritism or 
discrimination in hiring, sélection, and promotions are not uncommon in the sub-continent 
and Middle Eastern organizations. Even in sales, having similar beliefs and values as the 
client's has been reported to help getting orders. However, the said considérations do not 
always override merit based considérations. 
(7) Certain communities in India are generally prosperous yet certain others are generally 
poor. Prosperous communities are in a better position to look after their members. However, 
reasons for the prosperity of a certain community cannot always be attributed to favoritism. 
For example, Muslims in India usually claim to be discriminated against but they also have 
one of the highest population growth and the least literacy rate. The relatively prosperous 
communities, Parsees and Anglo-Indians, do not let their family size go out of hand. 
(8) Asians in Britain have similar prohibitions for inter-communal marriages and, to a lesser 
extent, similar inclinations to communal mistrust as in home countries. 
(9) Similar conflict as mentioned is found in the poverty stricken régions of the Middle East 
but the formation of groups, even politicai parties, is based on either religious or tribal 
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grounds. In the oil rich régions of the Middle East, informai group formation is based on 
tribal and national (Egyptian, Tunisian, Palestinian etc.) identities often reported to favour 
or discriminate on the said bases at the cost of organizational efficiency and effectiveness. 
(10) Methods of conflict resolution in the Middle East are; (a)use of intermediaries, and, 
(b)calling conférences of senior members at organizational level, and tribal elders at social 
and politicai level. 
(1 l)There is évidence suggesting that in the urban areas of India, because of industrialization 
and growing influence of 'modera culture', ségrégation and communal divisions are 
diminishing as more and more inter-marriages are becoming acceptable. 
Thèse findings show how conflict based on régional, linguistic, religious, tribal, caste, 
and ethnie background can be brought into organizations from the society at large, to the 
détriment of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The chapter explains how the sub-
continent and Middle Eastern overpopulating closed familialism, coupled with prohibition of 
inter-communal or inter-tribal marriages has preserved communal-tribal identities and, in 
conditions ofsearce jobs and resources, led to a common psychology of communal suspicion 
and mistrust reflected in; 
(i)non-work communal conflict and, 
(11) allegations of favoritism and discrimination in hiring and promotion as people seek to 
promote their own cultural group at the cost of other groups. 
Imposition of an idealistic unitary view of national-state or organization has been 
ineffective in solving the problems which are essentially materialistic in nature. 
The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory in the last chapter to suggest that 
communal-tribal suspicion could be reduced by, 
(i)people voluntarily reducing their family size to a manageable level; 
(ii) transformation of the conflict prone cognitive culture through literature and mass media 
propagating social harmony and liberalization of attitudes; 
(iii) greater acceptance of inter-communal, inter-faith marriages etc. 
Hope cornes from examples of less segregated urban régions in India where 
industrialization and growing influence of 'modem culture', have diminished communal 
divisions as family planning and inter-communal marriages are becoming acceptable. 
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Notes and Explanations 
l.The significance of cognitive states in studving conflict and the limitations of 
operational définitions 
"Conflict has been defined as the condition of objective incompatibility between values 
or goals, as the behaviour of deliberately interfering with another's goal achievement, and 
emotionally in terms of hostility. Descriptive theorists have explained conflict behaviour in 
terms of objective conflict of interest, personal styles, reactions to threats, and cognitive 
distortions." (Kilmann & Thomas, 1978: 386). Coser's (1958) définition of conflict as,"a 
struggle... in which the aims ofthe conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values 
but also to neutralité, injure, or eliminate their rivais...", seems to cover most aspects and 
variations in différent situations and cultures. Pondy (1967) gives four usages of the term 
"conflict", as antécédent conditions to some evident struggle, affective states (e.g. 
animosity), cognitive states, and conflictful behaviour ranging from passive résistance to 
aggression. However, Katz and Kahn (1978: 613) take the operational définition of conflict 
as the "collision of actors", and ignore Pondy's above mentioned first three usages of the 
term, saying that thèse are "appropriate questions to understanding conflict but not to 
defining it" : Reducing définitions to operational ones could be useful in empirical studies with 
narrow focus, and game théories (where the objective is to find the basic éléments or 
"atoms" of conflict process by studying its dynamics in simplified situations), but has 
limitations if the objective is to attain a comprehensive knowledge of conflict as it happens 
in real life, to understand potential conflict and the socio-cultural (cognitive and material) 
origins of conflict. A n operational définition of conflict as the 'collision of actors' may help 
in understanding the behavioristic dynamics of a conflict in process but would offer little help 
in conflict resolution where the causes have strong cognitive dimensions. More over, narrow 
définitions limit our observations of conflict in its many forms; for example, the quoted 
définition of conflict (as "collision of actors") sees it as necessarily involving interaction, but 
in real life, one actor may not reciprocate the aggression of the other and yet conflict be 
carried on. Examples where conflict was one sided and its causes were primarily cognitive, 
have been quoted in my study of British Asian workers (see chapters 12, 14, and 15). In 
intra-individual conflict (neurosis) there are no visible actors but symbolic-cognitive 
understanding is required. Hence, most conflicts can be better understood by looking at the 
cognitive states of the actors, animosity, and the extent to which thèse are culture bound. 
I have observed conflict between groups with largely compatible aims (e.g. non-
synergy business takeover bids, conflict between religious and politicai parties) . There are 
cultures in which the possibility of conflict will be less if rival businesses/groups hold equal 
level of power and means at their disposai, in which case, instead of conflict, there would 
be greater likelihood of "collusion" if the parties know that none can "win the war" and more 
can be gained by collusion (e.g. price fixing and creating barriers of various sorts for weaker 
rivais). In the sub-continent, private businesses are more likely to take conflictual stance and 
damaging attitudes against rivais and coveted businesses if the latter are in weaker retaliatory 
positions. While a powerful rivai would be invited to form a collusion, a weaker competitor 
would be pushed out by the use of many possible means. This brings us to our recurring 
thème; the holistic approach whereby conflict maybe better understood in relation with 
control (power) and motivation, and in terms of cultural learning of the participants. 
89 
2.Tribal Methóds of Conflict Resolution: 
In the Arab world, médiation on the tribal and village level has for centuries been the 
traditional method of settling disputes, and the same method has, in modem times, been 
adapted for settling politicai and military issues within and between Arab States. The greater 
the prestige of the mediator and the deeper the respect he commands, the better the chances 
that his efforts àt mediating a dispute will be successful. For mis reason, the rôle of mediator 
is traditionally assigned to members of special descent groups, who have a high ascribed 
status. The mediator must be a person whose impartiality is beyond question, who enjoys 
such a high status that neither of the two disputants can in any way exert pressure on him. 
Preferably, he should be a wealthy men, so as to preclude any suspicion of being accessible 
to bribery. In sum, the ideal mediator is one in a position, because of his personality, status, 
respect, wealth, influence, and so on to create in the litigants the desire to conform with his 
wishes. While the efforts of the mediator usually begin in the form of separate meetings with 
the two litigants, they culminate in one or more joint sessions attended by both parties, as 
well as by their kinsmen and other supporters. The décision of the elders is accepted by the 
disputants and their kinsmen, without any légal means of enforcement, simply because the 
judgement, once pronounced, represents an ethical and moral imperative. It is in this manner 
that the folk mores serve as a solid basis for social control (Antoun, 1965: 7). 
The mediators are neither expressly interested in determining the guilt or innocence 
of any party in the dispute nor the rightness or wrongness of one claim over the other. They 
do not judge. Thus, even if a case has been brought before the court - in ail Arab countries 
there are government-appointed and police-backed courts of justice - and the court hands 
down its verdict, this does not eliminate the need for médiation. A court verdict does not lead 
to a reconciliation; in order to restore peace in the community and maintain the solidarity of 
the group, médiation must continue until reconciliation is achieved. Of course, once a court 
judgement has been issued, reconciliation is more difficult to achieve. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that there is considérable résistance to the use of courts (Ayoub, 1965: 13). 
Another important traditional Arab social institution, sometimes used for conflict 
resolution is délibération in the council of elders of the area in which the weight of each 
man's opinion dépends on his age, the size of his family, his réputation, éloquence, and 
personality. The tribal council never votes; it only délibérâtes and discusses. The shaykh of 
the tribe is not a chairman of a meeting but rather a host. Once thé shaykh feels that a 
definite majority of the council inclines to a certain view (in which of course, they may well 
be influenced by the shaykh's own opinion), he will summarize the prevailing views, and at 
this point, without any formai vote, ali know what décision has been reached. The lack of 
success in resolving a conflict at any one particular conférence merely means that an 
additional conférence has to be convened (Patai, 1973: 239-240). 
One needs an intermediary in order not to be cheated in the market place, in locating 
and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and legai litigation, in winning a court décision, in 
speeding government action and bureaucratie procédures, in establishing and maintaining 
politicai influence, in finding a bride, and in fact, for the social scientist to locate and 
convince respondents to give an interview. In both village and town, the Zaim - the powerful 
leader of a major family - has the important fonction of mediating thereby keeping disputes 
out of government courts (Farsoun & Meyer in Patai, 1973: 232). 
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Chapter Six: Authoritarian Values. Coercive Control and Interpersonal Conflict 
In the sub-continent and Middle Eastern industry, Supervisors, foremen, managers or 
owners often use coercive control[l] over workers who too have authoritarian psychology 
(though without significant powers). Many production managers reported that when their 
foremen supervise the workers, they usually instil a fear of punishment, that the latter may 
be sacked. Serious warnings precede the sacking of a person; normally a charge sheet is 
issued, but if the issue is serious, one may be fired on spot. Moreover, at the workplace, as 
elsewhere in society, typical cases of interpersonal physical conflict reflect éléments of the 
authoritarian/ autocratie culture. Through qualitative analysis, one can pick out from the 
events described in such cases[2], the reflections of a culturally instilled concept of a certain 
type of masculinity which includes haughtiness, dominance over others, desire to be seen in 
positions of total authority, a mixture of inferiority and superiority complexes, use of 
personal authority, and similar related traits. One significant and commonly observable trait 
of an authoritarian/autocratic personality, often found among the Arabs though not exclusive 
to them, may be mentioned here: In general, it can be defined as one behaving in a 
submissive manner to the one perceived powerful, but being domineering to those perceived 
weak. The trait can be placed on a spectrum of intensity of its expression, the extreme form 
of which is shown in a combination of sycophancy or flattery for those perceived strong and 
rich, but in what amounts almost to cruelty for those perceived as weaker and poor. In some 
cultures, we see many taking undue advantage of the considerate and polite, but they turn 
docile and meek for the strong and domineering if the later enjoy a high socio-economie 
[l]Unlike that in the sub-continent and Middle East, in Western industry and religious 
organizations, coercion is not normally used. Hence Etzioni (1961-a-b-c) suggested three 
major types of organizations and compliance methods; total organizations use coercive power 
and resuit in alienative involvement; work organizations (industry) use remunerative power 
and generate calculative involvement; normative organizations (religious, educational, social 
service) use normative power for moral involvement: "organizations that have similar 
compliance structures tend to have similar goals, and organizations that have similar goals 
tend to have similar compliance structures" (Etzioni 1961-c: 147): While this could be true 
in the West, there are many work, religious, and educational organizations in many 'Eastern' 
countries which use coercive power either alone or as a factor. Hickson & McCullough 
(1980: 49) suggest that in most cases a mixture of the three types of power is used. 
[2]For cases and excerpts from interviewée Statements regarding authoritarian values, 
coercive control and inter-personal conflict in the sub-continent, see pages 296 to 300. 
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status[3]. There is a very large différence between the concepts of personal strength and 
manliness prévalent in most Western countries and those in the Eastern countries. It is 
beyond the scope of this work to describe thèse concepts in detail but we may refer here to 
some prévalent values which affect business and organisations and must be understood by 
managers; for example, a sales manager reported that he had to keep a moustache only 
because, without one, he looked younger and people did not pay attention to what he said; 
a manifestation of the kind of authoritarianism whereby a slim man, a weak man, one 
without a moustache, may not be paid as much attention as a burly, strong man would be. 
Therefore, most managers, Supervisors, foremen, police and security men, must have a 
strong body and preferably a moustache. Lean men in the police departments are normally 
placed on office duties. Talking loudly is often essential for getting listened to. If, for 
example, one is trying to make a sale to a traditional sub-continent man by speaking in soft 
tones, the prospective buyer might dismiss ail that is said. 
In chapter two we mentioned certain aspects of maie stereotypical expectations 
whereby certain tasks, such as domestic cooking, cleaning and washing clothes and Utensils 
are considered unmanly. Using polite language in many situations is also considered 
unmanly. Crying, except in the event of the death of a close relative or friend, and on 
religious and national sentimental occasions, is also considered unmanly. On the other hand, 
the female stereotypical traits, deduced from informai conversations and interviews, are that 
where men must express anger and combative behaviour, women should succumb to weaker 
manifestations such as crying. An aggressive female would be tolerated only if she belongs 
[3]Dr. Animar ('Fi Bina al-Bashaf [On the Building of Man], in Patai, 1973: 108-
110) notes Egyptian modal personality traits as follows: 
(1) Ready adaptability as either a genuine flexibility or a readiness to express 
superficial agreement and fleeting amiability which is meant to conceal the situation and hide 
the true feelings - the second aspect bred by cruel rulers; the refusai to accept authority or 
leadership and its disapprovai from the depths of the consciousness, and this despite the 
external veneer which people display toward the leaders and which consists of rites of respect 
when it implants fear and dread in their soûls. 
(2) Self-assertion as an exaggerated assertion of the personality, and the persistent 
tendency to demónstrate one's superior powers, to dominate things, and show scorn for 
others. This is not the kind of self-assurance which results from self-confidence and the 
proper understanding of the relationship between personal capabilities and external situations. 
It is, rather, the resuit of a loss of confidence and a lack of desire to assess situations 
objectively. By means of removing responsibility from himself to others, it becomes easy to 
justify any embarrassing situation or dereliction of social responsibilities. 
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to the upper classes, or has enough economie means to be able to live independently, or if 
her husband has a lesser economie/social status than hers, or if she has little to lose from 
social disapprovai. Likewise, men with meager means of survival, dépendent upon others for 
their livelihood, may succumb to such weaker behaviour as is considered more typical of 
women in the sub-continent. Hence, house boys, drivers, cooks, gardeners, and other menial 
servants, dépendent upon the charity of a rich and domineering employer, and with little 
alternative employment opportunity, may become too obsequious and submissive to be seen 
as typical male stéréotypes. 
Favourable attitude towards what may be called an 'Eastern style of manliness', is not 
reserved for men alone: Women in the sub-continent and the Middle East often subscribe to 
this view by wanting men to be authoritarian, by ridiculing men who do not want to dominate 
women, and by being authoritative themselves whenever they can. In fact many middle and 
upper class women in typically Eastern societies support male dominance primarily because 
of the easy life (however vegetative, thoughtless and vain) it provides them when ali 
decision-making powers are left in the hands of men. Because resourceful Eastern men would 
not allow women to do more than stay at home and indulge in fancy clothes, jewelry, 
perfumes and controlling the servants, women in turn find it easy to exonerate themselves 
of responsibilities that involve the pain of thought, action and the worries of possible failure. 
Some différences in the attitudes of female workers compared to those of the male 
workers, were expressed by Indian managers as follow; women were différent in their 
reactions to not getting a promotion in that they would become very touchy, especially if they 
got low marks in promotion tests, they would start crying, and if one was strict with them, 
they would cry ali the more, so that it became difficult for a manager to handle the situation; 
while men were given more manual work, heavy work such as lifting things, women would 
normally do packing or other work that requires less physical effort. In terms of confliet, it 
was reported that the situation, in non-segregated factories, between men and women, was 
good in that men tried to refrain from confliets and work faster. But in segregated sections, 
there were many confliets between workers. Because of less effective protest from women 
when faced with less than expected rewards, and women being more amenable to control 
than are men, most Asian employers prefer female workers and children where such 
recruitment is possible. 
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Authoritative or Democratic Management?: Situational Demands 
Managers in high-tech industries reported that if they were rough and authoritative 
with their staff, they could have a number of conflicts and insubordination at hand. However, 
being democratic in authoritative environment is not easy; whilst trying Theory Y and 
participative style of management, one must be vigilant in getting feed-back about the results 
of experiments in changing the style of management: In an authoritative environment where 
a workforce has long been accustomed to strict discipline and coercion, the newer styles of 
management, especially when applied by one or a few managers and not by a majority, may 
be interpreted as signs of weakness, lack of managerial skills and knowledge ("he is new and 
doesn't know how things are done") and even suspicion from those who have been totally 
accustomed to traditional management styles. Quite often, workers take advantage of a 
lenient manager if they see that only through him they can gain privileges and benefits (hit 
the wall where it is weaker[4]), hence jeopardizing their benefactor's job. An Indian manager 
observed that with a strong union backing, workers could press on with unreasonable 
demands. In 1976-77, the Bhutto government in Pakistan was paralysed by agitators; amongst 
them were hundreds of thousands of workers who did not realize how much Bhutto had done 
for the lower classes and could still do if allowed to stay in power. The subsequent Zia's 
Martial Law regime took most of workers' privileges back and was nevertheless supported 
by millions from the working classes who approved of Islamic autocracy (for details of the 
relationship of protest to authoritarianism, see chapter 15). Several interviewees reported that 
employees may take the instructions of democratic managers lightly if the former are 
[4]Conflict proneness playing a role in organizational ideology was shown by Thomas 
(1976) who found that supervisors who emphasize peace and cooperation tend to evoke such 
behaviour from their subordinates. However, if the causes of conflict were present in the 
socio-economic, cultural or motivation circumstances among the subordinates, then the 
supervisors would be limited in their ability to evoke peace and cooperation: In my study of 
low paid Indian workers in a large Indian pharmaceutical industry, it was reported that the 
cooperative supervisor was perceived by the workers as "soft and vulnerable to pressure" and 
hence more pressure was put on him to get undue advantages; likewise, in a Gulf university, 
wealthy mature students who wanted their degrees the easy way, pestered the cooperative 
teachers to teach the least and pass them without doing enough work; attempts of the teachers 
to bring some standards to education were strongly resisted through pressures aimed at 
making it difficult for the teachers to stay in jobs. But in my study of Pakistan International 
Airlines manufacturing units with reasonably well-paid technical staff, I found Thomas's 
aforementioned thesis valid. 
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accustomed to working under an authoritative style[5]. Even among managers, the work may 
be distributed such that docile managers are over-loaded while others take a free ride. 
However, skilled workers perceive their status as being higher than other workers, 
identify themselves with the upper levéis, and want to particípate so that their self-esteem 
should remain high. Thus, a production manager can be democratic with a skilled workforce. 
We may deduce from descriptions during processes of change of operative methods and 
techniques in many organizations, that the management of technological change becomes 
easier if all concerned staff are taken into confidence and the necessity and benefits of change 
are explained before undertaking the process. Management of change also requires creativity 
on the part of those involved. During this process it sometimes becomes necessary to depart 
from the established procedures and norms of doing a job. Only by persistent efforts at 
creating newer methods, staff participation, discussions and explanations, can the arduous 
task of change be accomplished[6]. A Theory X style of management is not as likely to bring 
[5]Gouldner (1954) showed that while the use of impersonal rules decreases the 
visibility of power relations and, in the American culture of egalitarian norms, decreases in 
power visibility increase the legitimacy of the supervisory position and therefore decrease 
tension within the group, there was an unintended consequence: "Rules increase knowledge 
about minimum acceptable behavior", thus depressing behavior to the minimum level; this 
leads to closeness of supervision which in turn increases the visibility of power relations, 
raises the tension level in the work group thereby upsetting the initial balance based on the 
institution of rules. March and Simon (1958: 37) criticized the Gouldner model as leaving 
a puzzle unexplained; "why is increased supervision the supervisory response to low 
performance?", and sought the answer to the puzzle in the authoritarianism and punitivity of 
supervisory role perception. However, their suggestion, that "appropriate manipulation of 
equality norms, perceived commonality of interest, and the needs of supervisors will restrict 
the operation of the dysfunctional features of the system", would not work in societies where 
organizational levels directly correspond to sharply differentiated socio-economic classes, 
equality norms are not effective and there is a low perception of commonality of interest. 
Hence, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, close supervision and coercive control for 
the lower classes is widespread. 
[6]Katz and Kahn (1978: 327-330) propose that the hierarchical organizational 
structure is suitable only when individual tasks are minimal in creative requirements, 
compliance is enough, identification with organizational goals not required, speed in decision-
making is more important than participation, and minimal change is required by the 
environment. On the other hand, the advantages of democratic organizational structure are 
shown in an opposite set of conditions when appropriateness of organizational change are 
more important than the speed of adaptive decision making, when individual roles require 
creative efforts and broad understanding of organizational functions, and motivation has to 
come from identification of one's goals with those of the organization. 
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about the necessary changes in operative methods in a high-tech environment as is a 
participative style of management. 
In order to find out what kind of management style would be the most appropriate in 
a given situation, the following factors may be considered; 
(a) the length of period during which the workforce has worked under domineering/ 
authoritative management; 
(b) employees' level of intelligence, self-esteem, self-confidence, education, training, 
and skills; 
(c) employee perceptions of the 'weaknesses and strengths' of the manager, and 
(d) prevalent valúes and norms regarding authoritarianism. 
The last factor is of prime importance because in some cultures, authoritarianism is 
so deeply ingrained that a quick departure from it may not always bring the desired results 
in the short term. 
Summarv and contributions of chapter 6 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) Coercive-utilitarian control is often employed in sub-continent and Middle Eastern industry 
which may lead to interpersonal conflict between supervisors and workers. 
(2) The culture-instilled nature of authoritarianism is evident from the observations that it is 
employed not only by those in authority over the lower ranks but also among the workers 
themselves. Moreover, the male head of the family, particularly among the lower classes, 
exercises dominating behavior over women and children. 
(3) A modal concept of masculinity in the sub-continent and the Middle East includes traits 
such as haughtiness, seeking dominance over others, and a desire to be in positions of power 
and authority for the latter's own sake. 
(4) The authoritarian personality seeks dominance over those perceived to be in weaker social 
or hierarchical position in the organization, but behaves submissively to those perceived 
stronger in social status or higher in the organizational hierarchy. 
(5) Perceptions of one's physical strength are often important in the job of a supervisor, 
foreman and pólice; a soft tone is usually not paid attention as much as a commanding voice. 
(6) Favourable attitude to the said 'Eastern male authoritarianism' is shown not only by men 
but most women too subscribe to it. 
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(7) Male and female stereotypical expectations are still prévalent in the traditional majority 
of the sub-continent and the Middle East and have implications for organizational control. 
(8) Because of less effective protest from women and children when faced with less than 
expected rewards, Eastern employers prefer female workers and children where possible. 
(9) Non-segregated workplaces show less incidence of interpersonal conflict than do 
segregated ones; i.e. there is less interpersonal conflict when men and women work together. 
(10) Managers in high-tech industries reponed that skilled personnel do not succumb to 
authoritarian control and henee participative management was préférable. With unskilled 
workers long accustomed to authoritarian control, démocratie management could be construed 
as 'lack of managerial knowledge' or signs of weakness. 
Thèsefindings show that management styles reflect attitudes towards authoritarianism 
in society at large. An authoritarian society fosters authoritarian traits which then show in 
organizations in the form ofeoercive control. Authoritarianism is not spécifie to men for most 
women also subscribe to it by favouring the domineering traits of 'Eastern authoritarianism'. 
Authoritarianism may resuit in interpersonal conflict. 
Authoritarianism often recèdes when people acquire éducation and skills. Henee, 
skilled workers prefer participative management style. 
Managers who want to shift to participative and 'theory Y' style of management should 
take the following factors into considération; 
(a)the length ofperiod during which the workforce has worked under domineering/ 
authoritative management; 
inemployées'level of intelligence, self-esteem, self-confidence, éducation, training, 
and skills; 
(c) employee perceptions of the 'weaknesses and strengths' of the manager, and 
(d) prevalent values and norms regarding authoritarianism. 
However, a profound organizational development towards participative management 
requires cognitive cultural transformation at the social level. 
The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that coercive control 
exists because of vulnerability of workers to such control, caused by mass poverty and 
oversupply of labour. Later, we shall présent some solutions to reduce such vulnerability to 
coerción. 
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Chapter Seven: Pressure Group Conflict in Tribal-Feudal Authoritarianism 
The Indian sub-continent consists of régions where there exist primitive tribal societies 
(such as the Tribal Areas, and much of NWFP in Pakistan), feudal societies (the rural areas 
of the provinces) and capitalist societies (the major cities). But the transition from one form 
of society to another does not mean that old attitudes are always substituted by those 
commensurate with the ethos of the new society. India is commonly regarded as the largest 
democracy in the world but the vast majority of its population lives in primitive tribal-feudal 
conditions within which capitalist values are exercised only in their crudest form. 
The essence of tribal and feudal attitudes was patriarchal behaviour where the tribal 
chief, feudal lord or the local village chaudhary were the patriarchs who had the power to 
reward conformism and punish non-conformism to tribal-feudal ethics as a way of keeping 
power and control in their hands. One significant dement of tribal ethics was the loyalty of 
the people to the patriarch. In classical Marxist theory, it was propounded that différent 
economic classes behaved in dissimilar fashion but it is also observed that différent economic 
classes in one country share aspects of a similar culture and consequently have similar 
psychological traits. Uniform traits in a patriarchal society are shown in the followers of a 
patriarch learning how to be a patriarch, fostering désires and struggling actively not to get 
rid of a patriarch but to be mini-patriarchs themselves even if, among the lower classes, they 
can do so only in their families. 
Some aspects of patriarchal cultures have been noted by authors such as Robert 
Cunningham (1988: 119-127). Among Cunningham's observations applicable to the sub-
continent is the dislike of superiors of challenges from subordinates. In authoritarian cultures, 
such a dislike may extend even to those challenges that concern organizational effectiveness 
and moral issues. Because of the patriarchal désires of many superiors to be seen as more 
capable than others in 'Controlling' the Organization, they show dislike for subordinates who 
criticize something in the way the Organization is run; dislike may result in getting the 
subordinate transferred or writing adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports (ACRs). 
This happens even in scientific research organizations and with Professionals; events 
supporting the significance of loyalty were narrated by interviewées from various 
organizations. Examples of victimization for less than obedient behaviour came even from 
Professors and head masters (for détails see chapter 8). 
Cunningham defines "Patriarchal" as "a condition ofobeisance, loving concern, and 
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responsibility between the male head ofafamily unit and a less significant relative", but this 
définition limits patriarchy to family unit and replaces the power seeking and Controlling 
aspects of patriarchy with "loving concern" which, though true in certain situations at the 
family level, is not visible to a significant extent at the social level of patriarchy. 
Cunningham has observed patriarchy in Middle Eastern organisations but he does not seem 
to be aware of the punishments inflicted upon non-conformers: First, patriarchy is not limited 
to family affairs though it is true that the family head is a patriarch at the family level and 
that patriarchal behaviour is learned first of ali at the family level. But patriarchy also exists 
at tribal and feudal social level and it also shows itself in the behaviour of the heads of 
organizations in patriarchal societies; the head master of a school, the director of a 
government department, the manager of a factory or a bank, and even a Minister of state in 
the Middle East and the sub-continent show behavioral aspects characteristic of patriarchy: 
A patriarch may chose to be benevolent to its subordinates, or domineering at times. In terms 
of power-seeking attitudes, we observe that many Asian and Middle Eastern owners and top 
managers do their best to centralize authority and use several tactics to achieve greater 
control over décision making and organizational practices. In the sub-continent, having 
"pocket unions"[l] is one such tactics of centralizing control and this enables top 
management or owners to have greater control over organizational affairs. Many owners and 
managers argue that sometimes it becomes necessary in faetones to have pocket unions so 
that politicai parties could not infiltrate into unions, hooligans could not create trouble, and 
unnecessary disputes could be avoided. There are some organizations where the workers are 
illiterate and passive and give in to greater control but equally, there are other organizations 
where the subordinates have their own pressure groups, politicai and influential contacts, and 
unions through which they resist attempts at greater downward control, and seek a share in 
the control of the Organization. The managers or heads of organizations who want to stay in 
full control, have their own means to resist pressure groups and deny the subordinates a 
share in décision making. Henee the potential for conflict. 
[l]The slang term "pocket unions" is commonly used for workers unions created by 
the employers themselves so that no alternative or genuine union could be formed in the 
Organization. Pocket unions enable the employers to have their own décisions accepted by 
the employées. At times, the leaders of a genuine workers' union are "bought" so as to turn 
the said union into a "pocket union". 
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Various sections of the sub-continent population in large cities and towns are showing 
signs of a shift from 'obeisance to patriarch' towards an exercise of self-acclaimed rights 
through pressure groups and unions[2]. Though the modem patriarchal rôle of many 
capitalists is highly accepted, in state departments and in many public and private companies, 
pressure groups and unions contest for greater control over organizational affairs and 
resources. Düring my empirical investigations, I found that in a large tanning factory, and 
in a very large shoe manufacturing factory (both highly profitable), the illiterate and docile 
peasants from nearby villages come to work and show no ambitions to go beyond a pocket 
union. These workers live in a feudal society where the traditional way of life teaches them 
to believe in fate, and accept their station whatever it is. One could believe that thèse 
workers are complacent because they have no issues at the factory, but further inquiry 
revealed that they did have several problems; they were low paid and faced humiliation at 
the hands of the Supervisors, as the production manager reported, 
"Our workers know well that the factory is not the sole supplier of their bread. They 
have to do sométhing else to supplément their incomes, their wages are never enough to meet 
their basic needs. They have low levels of motivation and they have no hopes that their plight 
will get better." 
Hence a strong case for attributing docility, despite occasionai outbursts of inter-
personal conflict, to the feudal regard for patriarchs - in this case the patriarchs being the 
managers/owners of the factory. However, in contrast to the mentioned peasant-workers' 
docility, in a nearby Education Department and the Provincial Civi l Secrétariat, rival 
pressure groups of seniors and subordinates battle to take charge of the organizational affairs. 
In the major industriai areas of the sub-continent, feudal values are dying away and 
industriai strife is not uncommon. A detailed study of pocket unions, genuine unions, strikes 
and disputes in the sub-continent often crosses the realm of organizational behaviour and runs 
into the social psychology of poverty, violence, and criminology which is beyond the scope 
of this work. Therefore, in order to elaborate the subtle, and hence less obvious, aspects of 
control-centralization, power seeking, and the ensuing conflict between unions and higher 
[2]In terms of 'cultural borrowing' or 'diffusion', note that the said transition does 
not seem to be taking place, at least with much visibility, in the countries that were not 
colonized by European powers for an effectively longer period. Hence, the Gulf countries, 
Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, show the least signs of the mentioned transition which is very 
visible in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and to some extent, in Egypt. 
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management, I have chosen to describe comparatively 'polite' organizations such as 
Ministerial Departments in the Civil Secretariat, schools, universities, and organizations that 
hire professionals such as the Oil and Gas Development Corporation, Pakistán International 
Airlines, some multinationals in Pakistán, and some prestigious private businesses. 
The equivalent of private industry pocket unions, in state departments such as the 
Ministerial Departments in the Civi l Secretariat, is to have a pressure group of patronized 
employees. The process of creating pressure groups by sénior officials to get support is 
known as "lobbying", a very familiar term in the said organizations. Keeping informal 
supporting groups on the basis of loyalty to the sénior is a typical remnant of patriarchal 
behaviour. In the Ministry of Services & General Administration, I was told, there is conflict 
at various levéis between informal groups. One group has loyalties with one 'additional-
secretary', and the other group is loyal to the other. There is little direct contact between the 
subordinate staff and the secretary and hence little direct loyalties of the subordinate staff to 
the secretary who deals with them indirectly only through his 'additional-secretaries'. The 
lower staff is divided in its loyalties to either of the three additional-secretaries who are 
usually contenders for the post of the secretary if the latter is to be transferred or retired for 
which a possibility, however small, always exists. 
From the narrated events of conflict, reasons for conflict, the process of conflict and 
its resolution, I have picked several typical traits of authoritarian-patriarchal organizational 
cultures, and studied the role of unions and informal groups in organizational conflict. For 
example, from the study of a certain school[3] where the head master had created an 
informal group of favourite teachers whom he used to favour while the others said that he 
should treat all in an equitable manner, it was possible to see the head master as a patriarch 
who, (i)used his powers to please the loyal subordínales and punish the disloyal, (ii)sought 
to enhance his control by creating supporting groups and by disrupting the control-seeking 
activities, democratic though, of the others, in one way or another, and, (iii)disliked 
challenges from subordinates and punished the challengers where he could. 
In several other case studies, we note that, (i)the seniors want to behave as patriarchs 
and have pressure groups at their disposal; (ii)employees who are supported by their own 
influential pressure groups, stand better chances of saving their jobs, promotions and 
[3]For detailed case studies, see pages 300 to 303. 
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transfers; (iii)not well-connected employées cannot afford to challenge their seniors for 
indecorous acts, for the former risk being punished in that their promotions would be 
delayed, they could be demoted, transferred to undesirable places, or even dismissed from 
the job; (iv)well-connected employées and strong pressure groups can counter the authority 
of a senior who is not a member of a strong pressure group, or not as well-connected as his 
subordinates are, in which case, the subordinates have greater politicai power than the senior 
has. Thus a head of department may not be able to exercise authority over his subordinates 
unless he too is well-connected, or has the support of a stronger pressure group. 
More observation of pressure group politics cornes from descriptions by the staff at 
a Provincial Civi l Secrétariat: There used to be a révérence for, or fear of, the heads of 
departments among the subordinates a decade or so ago, but now it is diminishing because 
of the spread of politicai power. In the past, the secretaries could threaten one with dismissal 
but now some subordinates have greater politicai influence so that they may even get a 
secretary transferred from his ministry. The power base of these well-connected subordinates 
is their relationships with prominent politicians and employées' unions. The Secrétariat has 
a union of the non-gazetted staff. The gazetted officers have their respective associations. The 
unions have powers as pressure groups and there have been strikes on issues of salaries, 
allowances, promotions, against price rises and inflation, if employée files are stuck up 
somewhere in some department, if their promotion cases are stuck up in a bottle neck in the 
processing pipe line, for example, in the Sélection and Promotion Board's procédures. The 
initial stage of a strike usually takes the form of protest by tying up black bands around 
arms. The next stage, if demands are not met, is a 'pens down strike'; employées on this 
kind of strike appear in the offices but do not do any work and consequently, the suffering 
public builds up a pressure on the government to end the strike, to give in to the employées' 
demands, or to use some other methods to end the strike. The third stage is to leave offices 
and march in a procession towards the Chief Minister's or the Governor's Secrétariat or 
towards the office of a Minister or a certain head of department, depending upon who the 
target of the strike is, or who is deemed responsible for the grievance that is the cause of the 
strike. Slogans are raised and speeches are delivered. Sometimes there is hooliganism. 
When the government is informed about a certain strike or a notice to strike, the 
senior officiais concerned, usually the secretaries, cali meetings. Negotiations are made with 
the union officiais who have called the strike. The Minister or the Chief Minister could be 
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informed depending upon who has the décision making powers regarding the demands of the 
employées. Usually the demands of the employées are within the powers of the Ministers to 
meet and strikes ha ve been called off within day s, at the most, a week. 
The secrétariat unions were not reported to ha ve called for strikes against government 
corruption, abuse of powers, unfair allotment of land or other social problems but they have 
been on strikes only on issues concerned with their employment privilèges and such demands 
as mentioned earlier. They may also go on strike, though rarely, against a particular 
department if that department has been ineffective in providing its services; once there was 
a strike against the electricity department because of a prolonged power breakdown. 
In the public sector industries, some unions are quite powerful and have what is 
commonly known as 'nuisance value' in that, through hooliganism, they may thwart the 
attempts of management to improve productivity or take certain measures for increasing the 
profitability of the company. In Pakistan International Airlines, a manager stated that if they 
followed the progress reports of employées strictly, they might have union problems of 
various kinds at hand. The unions of lower ranks and manual workers have greater nuisance 
value in that, because of the nomadic life style of many, they have little to lose in terms of 
personal belongings and community respect, if they resort to destruction of property and 
violence (usually public transport busses are burned; private property has seldom been 
touched in démonstrations and protests). On the other hand, white collar workers, Clerks and 
officers, whose permanent addresses are easily traceable, and who have some respect in the 
local community, cannot easily resort to hooliganism for fear of being traced, and also 
because they do not want to lose community respect, very important in the sub-continent in 
order to have some kind of de facto citizenship rights. Henee the most they can do in protest 
is to have peaceful marches to the offices of the authorities concerned or to go on no-work 
strikes. Another reason for the lower staff unions having more powers was given by 
respondents as possessing the power of being the collective bargaining agent. The staff 
unions are recognized by the ILO and have certain contraets with them renewable after every 
two years. Their rights are, by law, protected by the ILO charters, but this does not mean 
that the said unions have de facto rights too, because, in most cases, the unions have little 
recourse to the relevant authorities if the ILO charters are violated. In the sub-continent and 
Middle Eastern private industry, the ILO charters are hardly paid attention to. 
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The influence of pressure groups on appointments. transfers and promotions 
The bureaucratie model of control has shown a tremendous potential for cross-cultural 
application. Some form of bureaucracy with stated aims to implement policies and programs 
through standardized/impersonal procédures, to serve the masses with equity, exists in almost 
ali countries, but Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is not empirically found (Dunkerley, 
1972: 26; March & Simon, 1958: 28). Although in their appearance, the sub-continent 
bureaucratie Systems and functions are little more than modified European bureaucratie 
Systems, the two are not the same in their effeets. While the European procédural patterns 
are imitated and sometimes modified in the sub-continent, the European bureaucratie 
principles of equity in treatment, impersonality in functions, and merit based hiring and 
promotions are often reported to be influenced by the inequality norms of a class and caste 
based society, personal power-seeking desires of officiais, and the familial nepotism of a 
family-centred society. There is strong évidence, from tax collection, land allotment, national 
development corporations loans of various sorts, sale of public companies, sanction of 
government loans, operating methods and range of services of city municipalities and 
developmental organizations etc. that bureaucracy in the sub-continent, largely, does not 
follow the European moral principles of citizenship and equity: Pressure groups and 
hooligans use the bureaucratie procédures to obtain privilèges not available to all Citizens. 
The British legacy of merit based Sélection Boards, Civ i l Service Examinations and 
Promotion Commissions have made a hybrid with the primitive patriarchy so that the result 
is a chaotic interplay of pressure groups, patriarchal favouritism and some merit based 
considerations[4]: Unlike the developed countries, societies in transition from tribal/feudal 
to nascent democracies stili retain a very important aspect of tribal-feudal patriarchalism 
whereby rewards (employment and promotion are but modem forms of rewards) are seen as 
patriarchal prérogatives little linked to the merit and functional needs of the organizations. 
This is shown in the role of pressure groups in the government employment practices. For 
example, the C T A (College Teachers Association) had reportedly got its men inserted into 
the Ministry of Education because they wanted to have control over transfers, promotions, 
appointments and grade-fixations etc. of the politicai allies of the ruling group of C T A . The 
College Teachers Association was reported to be under the control of the fundamentalist 
[4]See detailed cases in pages 300 to 303. 
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party, the Jamaat-e-Islami which, through its pressure-group politics and threats of using the 
strike weapon as well as violence, has, over the last twenty years, got several of its 
fiindamentalist members appointed as lecturers. Henee, one incentive for many to join 
influential politicai parties is the possibility of getting jobs through pressure group politics. 
In some Pakistani universities, getting some members of Islamic Party appointed as lecturers 
was an annual practice during the late seventies and early eighties. Pressure group politics 
to get employment is also seen in Britain in local Council employment where the Asian 
minorities have a major say in the sélection process. 
The office bearers of C T A can influence major government décisions such as who 
should be appointed Director of Education, but only to an extent: The bureaucrats and the 
politicians have their own vested interests. When they appoint an undeserving (therefore 
weak in his own conscience) candidate (such appointments do not fulfill the regulatory 
criteria), to a top position, he can then be asked to do what the government requires, that is, 
get the relatives and allies of officiais and politicians appointed to new vacancies on an ad-
hoc basis, to be turned permanent later through further intrigue in the Public Service 
Commission. The C T A and unions of this kind, are supposed to protest against such illegal 
appointments but C T A in fact supports the government, because its président also gets his 
men appointed on an ad-hoc basis. The net resuit is a coalition of corrupt unions and corrupt 
government. The elected party cannot effect the said practices unless it has the support of 
functionaries in the bureaucracy and in the unions. In such an organizational culture, the 
ability of an individual to stay honest is severely limited, which itself has implications for 
motivation (for détails see chapter 9). 
In 1995 a Provincial High Court[5] declared the employment of 487 officiais as null 
[5]The sub-continent courts of justice, a legacy of the British period, conduct their 
business predominantly in English and use the same or modified versions of the British 
designed Indian Penal Codes. It is not uncommon to see the courts showing impartiality and 
fairness especially- when presided by fair-minded judges whose numbers in Pakistan are 
dwindling partly due to the increasing régression into primitive Islamic penai system. 
Upholding the law by resisting pressures from the patriarchs on one hand and the pressure 
groups on the other, is by no means easy. During the Zia regime, Islamic Courts were 
formed to work parallel to the British system but the Islamic courts have Jurisdiction mostly 
in criminal offenses. The vast majority of civil suits and those related to the rules and 
régulations of government and private business, are still dealt with by the British system of 
jurisprudence because there is little in the Fiqha or the Sharia (Islamic Law) that could 
address the problems of modern business and society. 
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and void because thèse people were appointed without proper sélection procédures being 
followed. The High Court décision explains the ways in which pressure politics had been 
rampant in the government appointments of lecturers, teachers and civil servants. When the 
Ad-Hoc Appointments Act was abrogated by the High Court and the ruling was being 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the elected government transferred some relatives of the 
Judges of the Supreme Court to the best positions in governmental departments with larger 
budgets and more powers, in order to influence the décision of the judges. 
The extension of conflict between politicai parties to trade/students unions 
Fréquent examples of non-work conflict in organizations come from observations of 
personnel dividing themselves into groups based on their affiliations with national politicai 
parties and, instead of debating on issues related to their organizations, involving themselves 
in conflict on the basis of politicai affiliations. Many trade unions, employées associations, 
and students unions in the sub-continent frequently stray away from their organization-related 
and work-related objectives because of the affiliations of the employées to the major politicai 
parties, and the infiltration of politicai party agents into almost ail unions that matter in 
gaining populär support for the parties. The sympathies of union members with différent 
politicai groups arise also out of the need to obtain and secure employment in organizations 
controlied by thèse powerful politicai groups. For example, during the Zia regime, Pakistan 
International Airlines Employées Union was dominated by the Mahajars and the Jamaat-e-
Islami and therefore, it was mostly Mahajars and the nominees of the Jamaat-e-Islami who 
could get jobs in PIA. When the Peoples' Party took over, nominees of Peoples' Party were 
able to get jobs in PIA and so the présent PIA Union is dominated by supporters of the 
Peoples' Party. Often, the reasons for conflict, basically, are non-work related politicai 
issues. For example, there are two groups in the PIA Employées Union; one group supports 
the Peoples' Party while members of the second group, called the 'Anti-Group', support 
either the Jamaat-e-Islami or the Muslim League, and therefore they criticize the policies of 
the 'Ruling Group' which is the Collective Bargaining Agent. Members of the C B A group 
try to stop members of the 'Anti-Group' from doing many things, which hinderance is a 
usuai cause of conflict. 
In most sub-continent universities and collèges, students' parties are funded by 
national politicai parties to further the causes of the latter. A typical situation in educational 
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institutions in Pakistan is that students' parties are branches of the political parties which 
finance the students to keep them available for demonstrations and strikes for political 
purposes. Hence, conflict among students parties is often an extension of the conflict among 
political parties[6]. In most educational institutions, students' union activities have little to 
do with education, let alone improving the standards of education. I see the primary cause 
for a predominantly irrational conflict behaviour among Pakistani students in the culturally 
instilled desire to express strength, power, and high emotion as substitutes for academic hard 
work and a struggle based on long-term rationality. 
Summary and contributions of chapter 7 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed 
(1) Tribal-feudal patriarchalism is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern societies 
some of which are progressing towards being capitalist-democratic. Patriarchal attitude is 
expressed in organizations by father-figure seniors who seek to enhance control by, 
(a) directing rewards towards the loyal, and penalizing the disloyal subordinates, 
(b) creating supportive groups among staff, 
(c) disrupting control seeking activities of others, and 
(d) curbing challenges from equals or subordinates. 
Where there are more than one patriarchal seniors contending for higher posts or 
resources, the subordinates may face 'conflict of loyalties'. 
(2) Patriarchalism is related to desires for centralizing control/power self-justified by seniors 
on account of curbing hooliganism, unnecessary disputes, and politicization among staff. 
(3) In most public/governmental organizations, subordinates resist centralization of control by 
creating pressure groups, unions, and building contacts with political and influential persons. 
The heads of such organizations fight back by doing the same. Hence a potential for conflict. 
(4) In public and private industry, seniors seek power and control by creating 'pocket unions' 
or 'lobbies' of loyal employees to counter the activities of genuine or other unions if any. 
(5) In the sub-continent, modes of conflict resolution are patriarchal (mediation or decision-
making by the influential seniors) influenced by pressure group politics and lobbying 
(creating supportive groups). The patriarchs are amenable to pressure from well-connected 
[6]The Peoples Students Federation is a branch of the Peoples Party; Islami Jamiat-
Tulba is a branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami; Anjuman Tulba-e-Islam is a branch of Jamiat 
Ullama-e-Islam, and the Muslim Students Federation is an off-shoot of the Muslim League. 
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employées or unions possessing, at the least, a 'nuisance value'. Strikes are a means of 
getting demands accepted. 
(6) Employees, subordinates or seniors, who are supported by influential pressure groups, 
stand better chances of saving their jobs and transfers, and getting promotions. Subordinates 
can counter the authority of a senior if he is not as well-connected as they are to a strong 
pressure group. Not well-connected subordinates cannot challenge a senior for indecorous 
acts, if any, for the former risk being demoted, transferred to undesirable places or even 
dismissed from jobs. 
(7) Unions having a 'nuisance value' can thwart managerial attempts to raise productivity. 
(8) Pressure groups have strong influence on appointments, transfers and promotions and are 
used by many as vehicles for nepotism and other forms of corruption. 
(9) Many trade/students unions stray away from their true objectives because of affiliations 
with politicai parties. Such affiliations arise out of a need to obtain employment through 
politicai contacts. Politicai parties finance thèse unions to use them in démonstrations. Hence 
conflict between rival trade/students unions is often a 'proxy war' on behalf of their patrons. 
(10) In the Middle East, unions and associations are totally banned, except perhaps in Egypt. 
In the sub-continent, a hybrid between, (a)the British legacy ofmerit based Sélection 
Boards, Civil Service Examinations, and Promotion Commissions, etc.,(b)the primitive 
patriarchalism, and, (c)the émergence of 'démocratie freedom ', has resulted in a chaotic 
interplay ofmerit considérations, patriarchal favoritism and the influence of pressure groups. 
Those supported by influential patriarchs and pressure groups stand better chances of gaining 
employment, promotion, and control over organizational resources. Those who want to be 
selected/promoted on merit but face discrimination, may use the British left rules and 
régulations in courts. 
The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that, 
(i)a culture créâtes, in its own historically specific way, specific patterns of control, conflict, 
conflict resolution, and motivation, and, 
(11) the type of a democracy is 'culture-specific': In circumstances of over-population, scarce 
resources and absence of basic livelihood security, people moke frantic attempts to use 
institutions of democracy to self-advantage in a Machiavellian sort of manner. 
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Chapter Eight: The Relationship of the Formation and Existence of Pseudo Organizations 
with the Cultural Nature of Control and Motivation 
I have abstracted the term 'pseudo organizations' from a large number of participant 
and non-participant observations, interviewee statements, case studies, and informal reports 
about organizations wherein the employee behaviour is directed at keeping an appearance of 
work which, in fact, lacks purpose and rationale tied to the stated objectives of the said 
organizations. It is not possible to produce all the said empirical observations here but a few 
examples of pseudo organizations or pseudo functions therein should suffice: 
(1) Many prominent trading and manufacturing concerns, and state offices, in the sub-
continent and the Middle East, have insufficient arrangements for proper accounting so that 
the owners/managers cannot even tell if they are making a profit or a loss. One observes 
unreliable procedures for stock taking, hence of detecting embezzlement, and incorrect 
accounting procedures used by employees who have little knowledge of accounting. One 
reason for the existence of such private businesses was found to be the desires of non-
business people, who happen to be in possession of large sums of money for one or the other 
reason (oil money, inheritance, possession of land that has increased in value, long term 
savings etc.), to run businesses just because of the associated status and prestige. 
(2) Armed forces in the Middle East, with modern weapons and systems, but whose 
senior-most officers show not the least interest in the basics of military strategy and warfare 
tactics. Among the lower ranks, one listens to such reports as, that during certain military 
exercises, the soldiers didn't dig trenches because "it was too hot". 
(3) Ministries and distinct international councils (such as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council) with departmental offices full of files, papers, computers, and employees, but no 
one seems to be able to explain why many unnecessary procedures are being followed. One 
meets high officials who do not know of vital principles of control directly related to their 
organizations; principles such as that non-enforceable and vague laws put the legal system 
to question, and that resolutions and laws passed by higher political bodies must be 
implemented through certain procedures, etc. Many senior officers see their jobs as 
meticulously checking papers, signatures, and putting stamps for authentication but cannot 
offer appropriate reasons for doing so. 
(4) Islamic courts where the qazees hand down subjective and inequitable sentences 
which the police does not always carry out exactly as stated in the verdict [details in ch. 15]. 
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(5) Custom officiais following policies and procédures that have little rationale, such 
as meticulous examination of goods and trade papers for lorries, when using the country in 
question only for transit but being kept at bay for days if not a week, thus creating 
unnecessary difficultés for businesses in other countries. 
(6) The civil services in many third world countries often rely on imitation. It does not 
need much investigation to show that ideas and practices in the relevant departments of the 
Western governments, often reappear later in the ideas, procédures and practices of many 
third world civil services. In Pakistan, the imitation of British post-war nationalisations and 
the recent imitation of its opening of financial markets and privatisation of state industry are 
but two well known examples. Third world bureaucrats who go for éducation and training 
to Western universities and administration institutions, often return with photocopies of plans 
designed by Western experts. The plans, with few altérations, sooner or later appear in the 
native organisations, while much that needs sensitivity to native conditions is left unattended. 
(7) Several cases of failure of U N bodies/World Bank developmental programs in 
achieving their objectives in many under-developed countries (see page 308), and the wastage 
of huge sums for development, highlight the culture confusion problem whereby experts from 
one culture were unable to understand the human imperatives of another culture. Thèse 
imperatives were the main cause whereby organizational practices successful in one culture 
failed to achieve objectives when used in another. Many development economists now 
suggest giving funds to native NGO's, to avoid managers of one culture managing projects 
in another, but this (as explained in pages 135 to 137) would aggravate the problem further. 
(8) The private sector is not far behind in the création of pseudo organisations for the 
sake of personal gain. The case of a large Birmingham Asian factory has been quoted in 
chapter 4; the said factory was run successfully only to borrow money from banks. Once a 
large amount of loan funds was available, the owners escaped with it to India and the factory 
was closed. In the sub-continent, where governments are keen to boost investment in the 
private sector, a very large number of politicians, feudal lords and other dignitaries, borrow 
heavily from state developmental finance agencies on pretext of building a new large-scale 
factory, plant or trading business, and then misappropriate the sums by channeling them into 
personal assets. Once the total amount of the sanctioned loan is received over a period of a 
few years, the fake organisation on which basis the loan was secured, is declared bankrupt 
and sold, often bought back, at a price which is a fraction of the misappropriated loan. Thèse 
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matters have become too well known in the sub-continent to require elaboration in this work 
but the noteworthy point is that the motivation of the owners of such organizations is not 
usually derived from good business management or quality production but from political 
ambitions or seeking positions that bestow power and status in community. Many spend the 
misappropriated sums on election campaigns and get elected. 
Characteristics of Pseudo Organizations: (a)Misplaced controls 
The line-hierarchical organizational pattern is still the most favored in the Middle 
East[l]. Even hospitals, universities and schools are run as centralized, line-hierarchical 
organizations in which those in the middle and lower ranks are not supposed to do beyond 
their strictly specified duties, responsibilities, and instructions. A suggestion of a change in 
something which was designed by another, or which falls in someone else's decision-making 
powers, is often considered a challenge to the 'intelligence' of the decision-maker and could 
lead to inter-personal conflict. Hence, in most organizations about which interviewee reports 
could be obtained, quite often, ineffective and misplaced control procedures were followed 
with a ritualistic diligence and scrupulosity. This happens most often in organizations where 
the effectiveness of their operations is either hard to determine in the short-term, or where 
no attempts are made to measure the said effectiveness. However, where the effectiveness 
of operations was immediately determinable, misplaced controls were not visible, such as, 
for example, in the banks, though some current information shows that even some central 
banks' financial statements cannot be relied upon. The following examples may suffice to 
show misplaced controls in Middle Eastern organizations: 
(i)The Departments for Immigration: Despite immigration controls and penalties as 
strict as for serious crimes in Europe (the immigration control procedure involves finger-
printing of all those who come to stay, legally, for three or more months), the number of 
illegal immigrants in all Gulf states is very large. In Saudi Arabia, where the passport of the 
immigrant always stays with the employer, the requirement of an 'exit permit' before leaving 
[1]A random sample of two hundred officials in the Arabian Gulf private business and 
government departments was asked about which organizational model would they prefer for 
their organization. Eighty percent answered in favour of the line-hierarchical organization. 
When asked why they preferred this model, eighty percent said, "because it is employed in 
the military and works more 'effectively' than the other types of organizations". 
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the country has kept thousands of illégal immigrants, who do want to go back home, trapped 
in the country. Thèse illégal immigrants cannot ask the authorities to issue them exit permits 
because of the horrible penalties instore for illégal immigrants. In 1996, the Emirates 
Immigration Authorities allowed ali illégal immigrants to leave the country without having 
to require an exit permit before a three month dead-line; the number of people who availed 
this opportunity was so large that the dead-line had to be extended by more than a month to 
enable ali to get seats in the airplanes, and even then thousands could not leave in time. 
(ii) The Privine License Issuing Authorities: The Authorities claim to be so stringent 
in driving tests that even a British license is not acceptable to some, and yet the common 
observation of driver behaviour on roads leaves little doubt that a large number subscribes 
to the 'courage, not caution' kind of driving. Hence a high accidents per vehicle ratio. 
(iii) Ministries of Finance: Although the vast oil revenues keep many ineffective 
controls of the Gulf Ministries of Finance from showing, improper accounting/auditing and 
excessive wastage of funds is commonly reported so that comparatively minor crises in many 
states have resulted in unsustainable cash flows even for as short-term periods as one year. 
(iv) The Police Departments and the Courts: In Saudi Arabia and in many Gulf states, 
because of terrible punishments for drinking and sexual relations, many drink and have sex 
in dead secrecy, but the death penalty for rape and amputation for theft is dysfunctional in 
that it has reportedly often lead to the greater crime of murder to prevent identification. 
(b")Control by subtle coercion 
The procrustean methods of familial control on the child, reported elsewhere in this 
work, are paralleled in organizational control on the subordinates albeit in milder forms. In 
many Arab and sub-continent organizations, subtle and under-hand ways of coercion have 
been reported as methods that are hard to point at or prove as acts of wrong-doing, 
reportedly designed to keep the subordinates tense, in a sort of fix, and in extrême forms, 
neurotic. The ways of subtle coercion in the Arab organizations were found to be as follow: 
(i) the boss would keep the subordinate(s) unnecessarily and obviously waiting for hours; 
(ii) the boss would enigmatically refuse to meet the subordinate(s) for days and weeks; (iii)the 
boss would cali the subordinate(s) for a meeting and postpone or be absent without providing 
a reasonable or even understandable excuse; (iv)the boss would send orders and refuse to 
invite any participation of the subordinates in decision-making, planning etc. thus putting 
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pressure on the subordinates to fit their work to his plans; (v)the boss would withhold vital 
information regarding organizational/operational affairs, or, rarely though, provide incorrect 
information, thus keeping the subordinate(s) in a fíx, and because they cannot work without 
the right information, they would stay in anxiety and keep guessing if they are to be 
transferred or sacked; (vi)the boss would instruct subordinates not to cooperate with a new 
subordínate who was sent in by a higher office without consultation with the boss. The boss 
would strictly instruct that the subordinates should not guide, convey necessary information, 
or induct the new-comer in any way that could facilítate the adjustment of the latter in the 
department. The purpose behind such behaviour, reportedly, is to frústrate the new entrant 
to resign by himself, thus saving the need on the part of the boss to directly confront the 
higher authorities and keep his relationship, with the later, unmarred by possibly telling, 'I 
tried my best to adjust your nominee but he was not "up to the mark"\ 
(c-IControl on personal beliefs and activities 
A major difference between Western organizations and the Muslim owned is that in 
the latter, the focus of control is often misplaced from work-related objectives to the 
employees valúes and beliefs[2]. In Western organizations, personal behaviour is not subject 
to control unless it threatens company objectives. 
In most Muslim countries, including Pakistán which is an electoral democracy, 
oppression of freedom of expression is institutionally ingrained at the level of family, 
schools, colleges, universities and nearly all public and prívate organizations. Individual 
freedom in the Western sense does not exist in these societies and henee in their 
organizations. Fundamentalists in many Muslim countries are usually vigilant in finding non-
conformers and taking several measures to expose them and, at least, get them expelled, 
particularly from educational establishments. The only way a skeptic can survive in such an 
organization is by pretending that he does believe; staying in a job is essential because there 
is no social security system to fall back on. Regrading personal control in Islamic countries, 
enormous data is available but I have picked examples only from those on higher professional' 
and management jobs [see endnote 1] as these show the subtle, and henee less obvious, forms 
of control rather than the blatant control exercised on the lower ranks. 
[2]For detailed case studies, see pages 304 to 308. 
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The social control structure in most Muslim countries is such that mostly those people 
who cannot have ideas in conformity with the prevailing idéologies, stay in a perpetuai fear 
that sooner or later they are going to get fired[3]. Fear becomes a strong impediment to their 
creativity: A professor in an Egyptian university was murdered for taking part in a debate 
against fundamentalism. One interviewée said, 
"when I recali my nineteen years of lectureship, I feel that ali this time, in real terms, 
I have just been saving my job. The point is, if we have to spent our énergies in preserving 
our jobs, running after files in the offices of government functionaries, then the whole point 
of the development of students' potentials, the prime objective of our Jobs, is lost." 
In Pakistan, when the members of the Public Service Commission hold interviews for 
candidates for civil service appointments, they usually want one to be able to recite dua-e-
qanooî and ayat-al-kursi (prayer verses). Ten percent marks are reserved for recital of 
prayers, ten for knowledge about the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, thirty for the relevant 
subject, ten for knowledge about international affairs, and forty percent for the grades the 
candidate secured in his académie qualifications. That there are only 10 percent marks for 
recital of prayers and 10 percent for the ideology of the Islamic State does not mean that a 
candidate stands a good chance of employment if he is otherwise good, for if he cannot recite 
the prayers or does not show enough knowledge of Islamic rituals, he would usually be asked 
to go home and memorize the rituals. Placing emphasis on the strength of a candidate's 
knowledge of Islamic rituals while evaluating him for a job that has nothing to do with such 
knowledge, is but one example of the non-work and cultural factors of control playing a 
dominating role in Pakistani organizations. In addition to this, each candidate for a 
government or semi-government job has to sign an affidavit stating that he does not belong 
to the Ahmadia minority sect. Non-Muslims do not stand any significant chance of getting 
jobs or being promoted outside the small quota reserved for them. The practice of religious 
control is not peculiar to government organizations only but is common in private businesses 
as well, except for a few employers who are liberal enough to ignore the religious side of 
their employées. A marketing manager reported about a private sector firm that he was asked 
to recite dua-e-qanoot in an interview condueted for a managerial post. One job applicant got 
[3]"...we have no scientific centers and no research institutes, and those which do 
exist are lifeless and do notfiinction... we oppress the talentedpeople and drive them away". 
(Dr. Salah al-Din, "The Pillars of the Disaster: A scientific inquiry into the reasons of the 
defeat of June 5th'; excerpts translated from Arabic, quoted in Patai, R., 1973: 263-264). 
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impatient and said, T have come nere for the job of a finance manager - not for the post of 
an Imam", at which he was instructed to leave immediately. Such things are happening in 
the private sector which does not need to follow the government line. For example, R.P. is 
a purely commercial Organization but they too ask candidates for jobs to recite dua-e-qanoot. 
Most often, survival of non-conformists dépends upon the values and belief structures of the 
employers. While in the state departments and public companies there is some chance for 
non-conforming employées to stay on job by using rules, régulations and courts as means of 
support, in private organizations they can only rely upon the owners' sympathies, if any. A 
finance manager was reminded time and again by the owners to pray in the afternoon, and 
an accountant was fired for not praying. A Pakistani production manager said: 
"Since our General Manager returned from umra (a pilgrimage to Mecca), he has 
been praying five times a day and so are many among the lower management. Many 
deliberately stand close to the General Manager in prayers so that he could see that they are 
praying. Once he is transferred, many would stop praying". 
Some Japanese experts were called in by P. Polyesters for the érection of their new 
plant and machinery. After the completion of the project, the Japanese celebrated by having 
champagne. A Pakistani engineer joined the Japanese and drank some champagne. After the 
party was over, the owners of the company called the production manager imo their office 
and instructed him to sack the said engineer. The production manager requested the owners 
to give the man a month so that he could find another job to which they conceded. There are 
many instances where the owners have sent employées to prison for certain non-work 
personal activities. In a Gulf state, a technician and a Filipino maid, both non-Muslims, were 
sent to prison by her employer on charges of drinking[4]. 
People reared in strict Muslim cultures often develop intrinsic desires to control 
others' behaviors where they can. In fact control over others is the leitmotif of Muslim and 
many Eastern cultures; this is observable in everyday organizational life where the seniors 
try to be seen, "in full control of the situation". There are several possible reasons for such 
a Controlling behaviour: Mostly it has to do with the early teachings in which the role models 
[4]Many Muslim writers find justification, in strongly disguised language, for control 
on personal values and beliefs; for example, see Rahman & Al-Buraey (1992) who use terms 
such as "spiritual rewards and spiritual advancement" to demand that Islamic organizations 
as compared to secular organizations should consider a new order of performance évaluation 
that corresponds to Islamic faith and belief at the individual, organizational and social levels. 
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are domineering, ruling, and conquering patriarchs who (tacitly) won't listen to reason but 
impose the supremacy of their creeds by physical power, exhortations, or by cunning 
manipulation of others. When subjected to such teachings in a solemn and glorified manner 
in early childhood, many begin to foster desires to be 'mini-kings' wherever they can. 
(d)Very low internal motivation, lack of personnel initiative and creativity 
The aforementioned culture of penalistic authoritarianism leaves scant room for job-
related creativity and initiative for most managers. At the societal level, the emphasis on 
'thought and action control' by the 'patriarchs' (fathers, teachers, relatives, authorities, 
capitalists, feudal-lords, employers etc.) in the family, educational establishments, workplace 
and private and state organizations, in Order to preempt in securing their high-up positions, 
demands that creativity and initiative in subordinates be substituted by loyalty and obédience. 
On the other side the collective religious-cultural emphasis on carrying on with the fossilized-
dysfunctional life styles closes many doors of expérimentation and progress. 
People with domineering psychology, if they have the essential background of a high-
social class or family, often end up as higher managers. When faced with a colleague or a 
subordinate who has better ideas about how to run the Organization, they may feel threatened 
or react to the inferiority feelings generated by someone else's brilliance, and thus may result 
what is often called 'a personality clash' which are one common form of managerial conflict 
in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations. Many cases, obtained during my 
empirical investigations, reveal the extent to which creativity and challenge from subordinates 
is curbed and punished in organizations. In thèse cases, we discover intricate networks of 
organizational politics, personality clashes, 'control by penalizing' attitudes of state and 
private functionaries, conflict at various levels of organizational hierarchy, and the way in 
which creativity and the desire to do good for the Organization and society (related to 
motivation among professional) is hampered by dogmatism and préjudice. Many in their 
youth are more prone to show initiative for organizational development but as time goes by, 
they learn that staying in a job is more important than coming into conflict with others even 
for the sake of organizational development. Economie status becomes relevant here, in that 
managers from upper class reported that they could afford to quit jobs when faced with 
barriers to the expression of their ideas, but many lower and middle class Professionals and 
managers reported that they have to give up initiative in order to stay in jobs. 
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(e)The relationship of rewards with patriarchal generositv more than with work 
Among the tribal Arabs, rewards and incentives for the natives are linked with a 
certain 'patriarchal generosity [or anger] ' more than with the quality and amount of work per 
se. The said relationship between rewards and patriarchal generosity is visible in salary 
détermination in the Gulf states offices; the amount of salary a native gets is related to, in 
addition to one's job position, the social status of one's tribe (members of the ruling tribe get 
the highest amounts and even a large monthly allowance from the day they are born), one's 
maritai status, the number of one's children, and the extent of one's familial commitments. 
In addition to regular monthly salaries, house building allowance, and marriage allowance 
to pay for the bride, most native officiais keep sending applications for more financial help 
from the rulers, through the Ministries of Public Welfare, to travel abroad for medicai 
reasons, to repay their loans for expensive cars or mobile phones, or because they have a 
large family and cannot fulfil ali commitments. In such an environment, motivation to work 
is largely replaced by learning the tactics to extract more from the patriarchs. 
Whv do Pseudo Organisations Exist? 
Hard intellectual work and serious thinking often entail a challenge to one's position 
at home, at workplace, and in society, and imply some kind of conflict with the traditionalist 
majority in the sub-continent and an even greater and more stubborn majority in the Middle 
East. The conséquences of the said conflict could be disastrous for the individuai as he risks 
being socially isolated, and even putting his physical survival in danger. Therefore, most 
individuate learn and resort to outward conformity for long until they get shaped to perform 
even those organizational fonctions whose teleologie substance is almost absent[5]. For the 
lower and middle classes in the sub-continent, staying in job is important because there is no 
other recourse to basic livelihood. Hence, a major characteristic of a pseudo organisation is 
that the objectives of its personnel stray away from the intended objectives of the 
organisation and become almost entirely self-related so that, in most cases, survival in the 
[5]'Fahlawi personality' flourishes in societies focused on old and deeply entrenched 
traditions, disinclined to seek new solutions to old problems. Such a society assigns certain 
rights to people without taking actual qualifications into account. The great force of 'face' 
and shame concepts channel people of a weak and conforming character into the direction 
of 'Fahlawism'. When the individual's attention is focused on the externals of his behaviour, 
true values are apt to be pushed into background (abridged from Patai, 1973: 112). 
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job or self-prosperity is the only objective the said personnel achieve. Even intellectuals and 
professionals succumb to the said behaviour, for, there is no social security (DSS) system[6]; 
henee many native 'experts' often use a reliance upon foreign systems and borrowed ideas 
as a means for survival or prosperity even if the foreign systems do not work in native 
conditions. Bernard Shaw once referred to such intellectuals as 'prostitute intellectuals'. 
An Elaboration of Pseudo Organizations from some Middle Eastern Ministries of Education 
In the Middle East (and to some extent in the sub-continent) the creation of 
professional and technical knowledge has long been reduced to translating Western books and 
anieles into Arabic. The subjeets related to business and management, forexample, have for 
long been simply Arabic translations of popular American and British texts[see endnote 2] 
with little related to the native conditions, and little added by the 'authors' themselves; 
because the majority of people know only the Arabic language, most believe that the books 
are the genuine produets of Arab scholars. However, the tragedy does not lie in translations 
but in that the Western design is copied only in its appearance and not in its spirit. The fact 
is that there would have been great progress in intellectual improvement if the entire spirit 
of the Western intellectual world had been imitated. The Western design is in fact 
implemented after being maimed by the native spirit; the phenomenon is obvious in the 
following example: In several Gulf Ministries of Education, some experts saw that in the said 
countries, the entire secretarial, sub-engineering, laboratory assistance, office management, 
accounting and computer operating jobs were done by foreigners because the natives had no 
skills required to do these jobs. In a simple, logical manner, they recommended that the 
countries needed technical colleges where natives should learn the skills to do the mentioned 
jobs. Because in Arabic there is no clarification of terms such as the difference between 'a 
certifícate, a diploma and a degree', or 'a college, a faculty, and a polytechnic[7], many of 
[6]Bernard's (1938) 'inducement-contribution equilibrium', states that an individual 
participâtes in the Organization only as long as the contributions he makes to the Organization 
are equal or less than the inducements he receives. However, in a no alternative situation, 
the individuai is forced to stay even if he receives very little compared to his efforts. 
[7]In Arabic, their is little distinction between a certificate, a diploma, and a degree 
shown in that the words 'shahada' and 'sanad' interchangeably denote ali the three. 
Likewise, the word 'kulia' meaning 'completely, entirely, or fully' is now used to denote a 
school, faculty, college, or academy. 
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these 'technical colleges' were called 'faculties of the universities' and their running was 
supposed to be managed and supervised by university syndicates called the 'Majlis' (see the 
desire for centralization of control). These 'faculties of technology', or 'technical colleges', 
taught, as parts of a single curriculum and to the same students, on the one hand, courses 
related to higher management, such as; principies of management; human resource 
management; auditing and accounting, project management, commercial law etc., and on the 
other hand, courses such as, Arabic typing and shorthand, English typing and shorthand, etc, 
that is, courses supposed to be required by typists and stenos. The students getting a Diploma 
in Office Management are given 'higher jobs' or promotions on the merits of having obtained 
the said diploma, because the relationship between certain academic qualifications and the 
job contents or speciñcations is not well established in the native mind. 
Using their Western cultural experience as a subconscious background, the said 
experts included 'English shorthand' in the syllabus for a specialism in 'office management'. 
The said experts could not know that the natives considered it an insult to be in júnior 
secretarial jobs which, the natives had learnt to believe, were meant for manual workers from 
'poor countries', and henee a negative status was ascribed to the said jobs. For more than 
ten years, scores of mature students (already in 'higher' jobs) have been registering each year 
for the said course. For more than ten years, teachers have been teaching 'English shorthand' 
to students who do not know English language and yet the students are somehow getting their 
certificates and promotions to 'higher jobs' while secretaries still come from abroad. 
When I wrote to the concerned authorities about the impossibility of teaching English 
shorthand to students who do not know English language, they replied that a change in 
syllabus was not possible because this required the approval of the University Syndicate 
members who do not take advises from the 'field staff but from 'higher experts' (the word 
'field staff had all the negative connotations, attached to it, of the teachers being 'low 
ranks'). Furthermore, the said authorities pointed that because the students were being taught 
English language as well, the question of 'not knowing English' did not arise. The said 
authorities failed to note, (i)that after passing out, let alone the use of shorthand, the vast 
majority of students could not answer very basic questions in English; (ii)that English 
shorthand can be taught only after the students have acquired listening and comprehension 
skills in English high enough to be able to pick up dictation; (iii)that the invention of 
dictaphone had made the arduous learning of shorthand superfluous even in English-speaking 
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countries, and, (iv)that, in addition to the mentioned problems, because the students were 
learning Arabie shorthand (which was a confusing adaptation of Pitman's English shorthand) 
as well, the usage of similar symbols to represent différent sounds in the two languages had 
rendered them too confused to be able to acquire a lowest acceptable level of skill in either 
of the two shorthand languages. To add to the impossibility of reforming that 'mock 
éducation system', I was advised to refrain from bypassing formai channels of the hierarchy. 
Such a situation would be unimaginable to arise in a Western éducation system. 
Many Arab rulers, in their love for Arab nationalism, decided that éducation be given 
in Arabie, but students were also supposed to learn English as a compulsory subject. While 
ali the courses on offer were translated from English to Arabie, English-speaking teachers 
were also brought in to teach the English language related to the said courses. The latter 
often admitted that they had been unsuccessful in making most of the local students learn to 
a least acceptable level of fluency because, in the secondary schools, where the students are 
supposed to learn basic English, ail is taught in Arabie with lip service paid to the teaching 
of English language. The translations of various subjects into Arabie could not convey the 
true spirit of the knowledge because the said knowledge was created in a culture which had 
requirements and a vocabulary the acceptable équivalent of which does not exist in Arab 
culture or language. The Arab scholars' desires not to accept foreign words in the so-claimed 
'pure and holy' Arabie, often results in inappropriate and humorous translations for such 
minor objects as car, railway station, typist, employer, etc., let alone complicated concepts. 
The purpose of the technical collèges, that employées with skills be provided from 
among the natives was never achieved because the culture-bred superiority feelings of the 
students did not allow them to take 'lower jobs'. Most of them were already on high jobs and 
had been sent in by their employers because of a rule that they should have a university 
'shahada' to be promoted. The subjects were taught in a manner that gave an appearance to 
the technical collèges of being vocational institutions, but in fact they often taught the wrong 
subjects to private and public high officiais (such as an army or a police captain, or a civil 
servant) to enable them get a promotion. The vocational jobs are stili manned by foreigners. 
The said technical collèges are thus an obvious example of pseudo organizations. 
A clearer understanding of why pseudo organizations exist, cornes from my five years 
of observations of the type of motivation and the nature of controls among people who man 
such organizations; the following describes misplaced controls in the Gulf Ministries of 
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Education, and the nature of motivation in more than a thousand officials (our mature 
students) from various state organizations, the civil service, and private business. 
(i)Very low motivation among the mature students to study and work 
The students do not pay fees but are paid, by the state, a sum of £100 per month to 
attend and study. A n estimated ten percent of those admitted to the university, took the 
stipend for the term but did not show up in classrooms. As for the rest of the students, the 
common attendance pattern was that most did not attend classes in the first week and during 
the month of Ramadan. In other weeks they were usually late by an average of a quarter of 
an hour in a two-hour class and wanted to leave around half an hour before the finishing 
time. More over, the 'mid-day prayers' and the 'evening prayers', for which the time fell 
during lecture hours, took away at least another fifteen minutes each from the teaching time. 
At times of unusual events, such as if the air-conditioners were not working 
effectively, or if there was a special football match taking place, most male students would 
not attend classes. Many customarily asked to be given leave because of certain domestic or 
personal "urgencies". In large classes (exceeding thirty) almost half never stopped talking 
despite requests or warnings. Many brought their pagers and mobile phones to have excuses 
to go out to answer incoming calls. They would express great annoyance if marked absent 
or given less than desired marks in class assignments. Some would come just before the 
class-end, interrupt the lecture, and demand straight away that the teacher show them the 
attendance register and mark them present. During a lecture, many students kept entering and 
leaving the lecture room. To make them time-conscious[8], the teachers were instructed to 
take attendance after every hour, which activity further reduced the teaching time but proved 
ineffective. The students were told that more than 25% hours of absence would disqualify 
them from taking tests. The limit was then raised to 33%. But instead of being punctual, a 
very large number began haggling with the teachers to be marked present, as if it was the 
teacher who was at fault for marking them absent. A further significant part of the lecture 
time was wasted in the students' protestations and procrastination about their attendance 
[8]Precision is a phenomenon of industrial society; you must be on time for work. In 
preindustrial cultures, when people have more leisure, they fill their time with long 
discussions, long greetings, and exaggerations which is a cultural phenomenon with socio-
economic foundations. As anybody who has lived among Arabs can testify, they are much 
less concerned with time than are Westerners (abridged from Patai, R., 1973: 65). 
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records. The desire to try newer and newer methods to make them realize the significance 
of time, and sensitivity for the lecturer, exasperated me, until I learned to deliver a lecture 
while the students frequently entered and left the classroom. I even learned to ignore each 
new entrant's loud greetings to the class; at times I would continue whilst two relatives or 
friends gave each other their traditional kisses and hugs in the middle of the lecture room. 
From the very first lecture, many students began asking what questions were 
important for the examination that was supposed to take place after one and a half months. 
The focus of attention of most was not on what was being taught but to wriggle out 'vital 
information' from the teacher about the examinations. Whatever attention the students paid 
to the teacher, the subject or to the hand-outs, was strictly examination-oriented. Once, in 
reply to their question if the topic I was teaching was important for the examination, I said, 
"no", only to find that they immediately began to chat among themselves. After realizing that 
this happened each time I said "no", I, in order to keep them as attentive as possible, would 
say that the topic was "very important" for the examinations. Close to the examinations, the 
students almost pestered the teacher to give them only a few questions that were to appear 
in the test papers. The situation was further aggravated by the cultural learning of the 
students to press on and on until 'success* without doing the least workfsee endnote 3]. 
Each attempt of the teacher to begin a new topic was met with protests and 
exclamations 'oh! ' in such a somber and serious manner that startled me in the beginning and 
never fails to upset me even after four years: Because, in the semester system, a lecturer is 
responsible for preparing the syllabus, delivering lectures, preparing examinations and 
marking the papers, the students knew that by checking the teachers' advances towards newer 
topics, they would get less material to read for the examinations. Hence they kept a pressure 
on the lecturer to get the least number of hand-outs and least amount of knowledge. If the 
teacher was stubborn, they would resort to other means of 'bringing him down'. During my 
first week, when I insisted on proper conduct, the entire fourth semester went to the Head 
of the department and demanded that I should be replaced by another teacher. 
Before the examinations, the pestering, flattery, and téléphone inquiries went far to 
get information about the question papers. Hence an average situation was that if the students 
were to answer fi ve questions, they had already got between ten to fifteen on which they 
were to concentrate. The entire amount of knowledge that they got in a fourteen week 
duration semester, for one subject, could be averaged out, at best, as around ten A4 typed 
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pages. Despite all this, on average, half in the first semester, and one third of the students 
in the second and third semesters failed. Those who failed were given endless chances to pass 
their failed courses. Hence, there was a second round of examinations after which the 
students could register again with the new same semester class. In the fourth and fifth 
semesters, the teachers tried their best to pass around 90% of their students for it was not 
possible to carry a large number of 'old students' along with the new ones. A student could 
not be asked to leave the university without a degree, unless he himself wanted to do so. 
If the students were made to do honest work, there was immediately a conflict at hand, but 
if their demands were met and they were allowed to do what they wanted to do, the situation 
would become very friendly and cooperative though not oriented towards good work but 
towards a good interrelationship. I often used to ask my students what they wanted to become 
in life. Many would not reply. Those who replied, almost always said that they wanted to 
be a 'mudif (an in-charge or a manager of a department or a company) or work for well 
paying and prestigious organizations such as oil and gas companies, the telecommunications 
organization, the Ministries, or the Amir's office[9]. Despite the fact that vacancies for 
teachers were filled from foreign countries, most students were averse to being a teacher. As 
most were already on jobs, their main objective in coming to the university, as they often 
said, was to get the certificate and the promotion that came with it. Some aimed at taking up 
their fathers' businesses but did almost nothing to prepare them for running a business. 
The effects of "thought control" in the Arabic schools appear later in the university 
students, a vast majority of whom could memorize from the hand-outs and write, not without 
difficulty, the answer in short memorable points, but would not write a line from their own 
experiences. Before the examinations, the students tirelessly asked time and again, "will you 
not fail us if we write things in our own words?", showing that in the schools they had been 
totally discouraged even from using their own words; many reported that they had been told 
in the schools to write exactly as was written in the books. They would come time and again, 
"where in the hand-out, is the answer to this question?", and if I would tell them that a 
[9]In trying to find possible causes of low motivation among my Arab students, I 
found help in Malinowski's observation about the Kiriwinian that the Trobriand worker is 
guided by a very complex setup of traditional duties and obligations, beliefs in magie, social 
ambitions and vanities: "It is important to réalité that a Kiriwinian... must beprompted by 
some duty imposed by tribal standards, or he must be lured by ambitions and values also 
dictated by custom and tradition." (Malinowski, 1922: 156). 
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certain two or three pages was the answer, they would say, "this is too much, can't you give 
us two or three Unes which are the right answer to a question?". A vast majority is averse 
to explanation of terms and concepts, and to quoting examples, but happy with a rote copy 
of what is in the hand-out. Items of somewhat higher complexity are beyond their 
compréhension, for which I see the reasons in a prohibition of creativity enjoined upon the 
Muslims by strong beliefs in fatalism: The ritualistic and too fréquent use of the word 'Insha-
AllaK (Allah Willing) not only reflects fatalism but is often used as an excuse for one's own 
inactivity[10] by laying the blâme on divine determinismfsee endnote 4]. 
However, note that those Arab students who are sent to Western schools at an early 
age, turn out to be comparable, in their motivation to learn and in their IQ level, to their 
Western schoolmates. Henee the significance of early socialization and good schooling. 
(ii)The relationship of rewards with patriarchal generositv more than with work 
I was able to see the aforementioned relationship of reward distribution with the 
traditional concept of Arab 'patriarchal generosity' (or anger) in that, in many cases, students 
who had not even answered the questions in the tests requested to be passed. One student 
went to his teacher and said, "my sister and wife took the same test; you have passed my 
wife but you have not passed my sister". The teacher explained that marks depended upon 
the correct answering of the questions. The student, like many others, either failed to 
understand this commonplace logie or pretended that he did not, and said, "alright, if you 
want to pass only one of them, then pass my sister because she has yet to marry and, with 
a university certificate, she would get a better husband". Another student who had not come 
[lOJOne student, Abdullah, an officiai in a certain ministry, used to attend the class 
for, say, a quarter of an hour, and then, on pretext of going to the toilet, would not return. 
He would later claim to be marked présent because, as he said, "I was in the class". When 
he had done so for four or five times, the next time when he asked if he could go to the 
toilet, I said to him, "please come back in ten minutes". He said, "insha-Allah". For a 
moment I forgot that I, because my passport said I was a Muslim, could be persecuted for 
challenging divine determinism and said, "don't say, insha-Allah, say insha-Abdullah". The 
whole class suddenly stopped their usual chatting and got attentive. Abdullah returned with 
a perplexed face and said in a somber tone, "teacher, what was it that you said?". I hastily 
made a point, "what I mean is that Allah does the 'big things' and He has given you the 
authority to do the 'small things'; such as going to the toilet and coming back is in your 
power and you need not refer to Allah for such a petty thing". Abdullah was not pacified, 
he said, "what if I die in the toilet? how can I come back if Allah does not want me to?". 
Before the debate could result in an unpleasant situation, I said, "I understand your point". 
He then left and, as was customary of him, did not return for the rest of the two hours. 
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to the classes for an entire semester period of fourteen weeks, turned up an hour before the 
examination was to take place and tried to evoke the sympathy of the teacher by saying 
"teacher, I have got no hand-outs, no sample questions, could you help me?". The family 
of a certain student died in a car accident and so she requested that she be passed in the 
examinations on account of the death of her family. Many requested to be passed because 
they had children to look after and could not spare time for studies. 
(iii) The Middle Eastern form of individualism 
One aspect of life in primitive cultures was that socio-economic transactions took 
place more on a personal basis as there was little concept of an objective-impersonal way of 
conducting social and economie affairs on a community basis. This primitive cognitive 
culture survives in many materially modem societies. For example, the aforementioned 
students often took the student-teacher relationship as a one-to-one relationship portrayed in 
the context of their own personal needs, and not as a teacher-to-group relationship with 
concepts of uniformity, equity, and standardization: this was shown in that; (i)many students 
would ask a question which many had asked before in the same session; this happened so 
often that I wondered if they were listening when I had answered the first inquiry; (ii)many 
would corne and ask for a spécifie date of a test to be set for them individually; when told 
that the examination time-table was the same for ail "as a group", they would say, "but I 
cannot prepare for the given date", and offer an excuse. Some would come after having taken 
their test and say, "I was tired and couldn't do well. Why don't you give me another test-
date". A student of some influence went as far as the Diwan-al-Amiri (the ruler's office) and 
brought instructions that a special test be arranged for him, when the other students had 
already taken the tests, and he could have appeared in the second round, but a special one-
student-examination was arranged for him; (iii)many students would come to the teacher and 
want the lesson, already given in the class room, to be repeated to them individually; after 
the examinations, they would phone and ask for their marks. If told that the teacher could 
not remember the marks of a hundred or so students and that the marks lists would soon be 
placed on the notice board, they would express amazement, "don't you remember only my 
marks?". Similar individualism is shown in the aforementioned individualized distribution of 
public welfare sums for marriages, house building, travel abroad, family commitments, etc. 
(iv) Misplaced controls in the Ministries of Education 
The focus of control often strays away from where it should be. For example, the 
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main issue for the Ministries of Education, namely the very low standards of education, is 
never formally discussed. The level of motivation in students in the schools and universities 
is appallingly low, and foreign teachers from poorer countries are often reported to take 
bribes to pass the native rich students, but a formal discussion on motivation improvement 
never takes place in any department of the said Ministries; the matter is not even formally 
reported. Despite huge funds spent on spurious causes, there are insufficient instruments and 
equipment to raise the level of vocational skills among students. Most teachers and officials 
normally refuse to talk about academic and other real issues and yet, at times, show an 
almost paranoia about certain petty aspects of office procedures; for example, an English 
teacher who wanted to tell the names of computer parts in English to her students, went to 
take a photograph of an ordinary computer lying in the computer section, but faced incredible 
suspicion and resistance from the Tunisian teachers in the section. 
Because the said Ministries of Education, and the universities, like most organizations 
in the Gulf, employ an authority and command structure where hierarchical channels cannot 
be bypassed for communication, the focus of control is on preserving the status quo, but in 
the frequent meetings between Heads of departments and organizations, nothing comes out 
in real terms of suggestions and tangible results. A student once made a 'mistake' of directly 
complaining to the President of the University about one of the teachers. The Head of 
department took it as a personal insult that the student had bypassed his authority (the proper 
channel), by going directly to the President. He wanted to punish the student and so he went 
on insisting every now and then and putting pressure on teachers to teach only in English, 
despite the knowledge that this was impossible because the students could not write a line in 
proper English. Finally, he went on a tour of the classes telling the students about the 'proper 
channels of communication'; "if you have any complaints, you first come to me". 
The oral examination for the final undergraduate project used to be conducted by at 
least six teachers; grammatical errors, typing mistakes and petty omissions should have been 
corrected by the supervisors of the project before the printing of the report, but most 
'questions' during the oral examination were of the type, "please open page ~ of your report; 
why have you misspelled this word?"; there were frequent laughters and jokes at the expense 
of the student. It often became obvious that the aims of the teachers were as much the 
evaluation of the reports as self-expression among colleagues. Standing in front of six or 
more questioning teachers sometimes made the students nervous; a female student burst into 
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tears and a male student was caught in a frenzy of repeating the same thing again and again. 
However, despite many suggestions, the number of 'examiners' was not reduced from six. 
For ali the ease made for the students to pass, on many occasions, around half the 
male students brought miniature photocopies of hand-outs (not more than ten pages per 
course) to an examination. The teachers, if they saw such a miniature photocopy, usually 
took it and threw it in the dust bin. Making a case against a student was rare. Through tacit 
assumptions of a cultural nature, reported by many authors[see endnote 5], most avoided 
talking about such 'shameful' affairs as cheating: A European teacher, in his first year, took 
several cheating cases to the Dean. The Dean told him that the students had filed a counter 
claim that the said teacher encouraged them to cheat, and advised that the case be dropped. 
However, during four years, three cases were filed against students of weaker social 
backgrounds; the penalty for copying, as declared, was only that, "their papers should be 
marked with extra strictness", which, in practical terms, meant almost nothing, 
Because one had to pass at least half the students, and none could pass if courses were 
taught and examinations were conducted in the Western way (or even in the way most 
collèges and universities in the Indian sub-continent pursue académie tasks), most question 
papers were little more than a formality that had to be fulfilled to keep a record to show 
some semblance to the procédures of an académie institution. However, hair splitting 
exactitude was demanded in the counts and 'ticks' in 'absent lists' that had already been 
tempered and changed several times because of students' pestering that they should be 
marked présent. While the teachers would de facto ignore the low standards and cheating at 
various académie stages and in research, they spent hours discussing cases such as if a 
student with 30% absence record should be allowed to sit in the tests. In the design of 
examination papers and in the marking of answer sheets, certain formats were to be strictly 
observed. During the tests, the teachers were instructed to remain présent to guide the 
students who 'could not understand the questions'; and this despite that the question most 
often asked by students during the two hour test period, was, "I have answered this question 
like this, is it correct?". Many Arab teachers in the examination hall, went to great lengths 
to very politely explain to the students how they were supposed to answer the questions. 
Each time I prepared the 'présent/absent' records for the students, question papers, 
marked the papers, made lists of marks, or went through the lengthy file-work for the 
courses, knowing that the end resuit was an output of students who were not, even by the 
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Iowest reasonable standards, qualified for their jobs, I couldn't help recalling Dostoyevsky 
in his 'Memories from the House of the Dead'; "one of the worst penalties inflicted upon an 
inmate was to make him carry a load somewhere and then bring it back tinte and again". 
Summarv and contributions of chapter 8 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) Pseudo organizations are those which keep appearance of work that, in fact, lacks purpose 
and rationale tied to their stated or supposed objectives. Most obvious examples of ineffective 
organizations are the armed forces of many countries and scores of Ministerial Departments, 
government bodies, universities and almost entire éducation Systems in many Middle Eastern 
states. To a lesser extent, pseudo organizations are also found in the sub-continent. 
(2) In the sub-continent private sector, some pseudo organizations have been created to 
expropriate government developmental loans and funds granted by international aid agencies. 
(3) Pseudo organizations are usually found in imitative cultures which borrow organizational 
concepts from the West but apply them in conditions where people are not ready, and are not 
prepared, to benefit from them positively and constructively. Offen, the imitated institutions 
and ideas are not helpful in the native conditions but are applied by native bureaucrats who 
either know little about their countries or seek a personal gain in promoting Western interests 
or in seeking international developmental funds. 
(4) Where a needed Organization turns into a pseudo one, the reasons were found in, 
(a) misplaced controls, non-work control but little or no work-related control; 
(b) a line hierarchical vertical command Organization where the seniors cannot be challenged 
even when the personnel know that the Organization is not working as it should; 
(c) subordinates come from a culture in which, (i)emphasis is placed on form with little or 
no content, on obédience, loyalty and conformism, (ii)conflict is seen as an antithesis of 
order and hence repressed, (iii)rewards are related to patriarchal generosity/anger rather than 
work, (iv)rituals are a key social focus so that it becomes easy for personnel to see 
organizations as another ritualistic addition. Hence they perform unnecessary tasks 
unquestioningly with ritualistic diligence. 
(5) Autocratic control and 'subtle coercion' are means of conflict repression and imposition 
of the seniors' plans in most Middle Eastern organizations. Such attitudes are shaped by the 
procrustean methods of familial control on child, and 'thought control' in traditional schools. 
128 
(6) Control on personal beliefs and values is exercised in ail Muslim organizations in varying 
degree and in one or the other form. 
(7) Whereever high personal non-work control and penalistic authoritarianism was found in 
organizations, it was found along with fatalistic creeds, very low motivation, lack of initiative 
and creativity, intra-level conflict, and 'personality clashes' among equi-status employées. 
(8) Despite very low motivation and the least efforts, the high reward expectation is culturally 
conditioned among most for reasons mentioned in point 4-b-iii. Hence, despite incompétence, 
people may aspire to take high posts through the use of wasta (nepotism). 
Pseudo organizations are in fact the extreme manifestation ofextrinsic motivation that 
makes organization an instrumentai facade in achieving socio-cultural goals of participants. 
The findings shall he taken towards our Grounded Theory to suggest that, (a)motivation is 
a learned phenomenon in which socio-cultural factors are often a greaterforce than intrinsic 
motivation so that the absence of basic livelihood security forces even intellectuals to accept 
meaningless work; (b)high personal control is related to low internai motivation far genuine 
work, intra-level conflict, repressed inter-level conflict, and fatatisi creeds; (c)organizational 
control methods have parallels in methods offamilial, social, politicai, and religious control 
We shall suggest that because ofthe above mentioned links established in this chapter, 
control and cultural learning dimensions be added to the expectancy theory of motivation. 
Notes and Explanations 
1. In a Pakistani university, we had various government orders coming in, instructing 
us to follow religious practices. Once there was an order saying that ali teachers and 
employées should wear shalwar-kameez, believed to be an Tslamic dress'. A certain teacher 
came to a meeting, with the Governor of the province, wearing a suit and tie, and was 
ordered to go home and reappear in shalwar-kameez. Another order stated that on Thursdays, 
the lecturers at the university should compulsorily attend a 'daras* (sermon by a mullah). 
In a certain school, a conflict arose between a teacher and the head master who 
wanted the former to pray during the time he was in the school. Upon the head master's 
recommendation, the teacher was suspended from his duties. 
In a Middle Eastern university, a remark on the annual confidential report by a 
senior, saying 'he argues frequently', kept the subject teacher worried for weeks. 
A production manager in a high-tech state company reported that a lot of control was 
exercised over personal beliefs and personal activities. If one does not fast during the month 
of Ramadan, he must prétend that he does. During the said month, eating in public is a 
criminal offense punishable by incarcération. 
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A lecturer at a certain college held a position in the College Teachers Union. During 
the Martial Law regime of General Zia, the said lecturer issued a press release saying that 
the dismissal of a number of teachers, without proper dismissal procédures (i.e., charging 
them with allégations, and consulting the Efficiency and Discipline Rules), was gross 
injustice. He was suspended for five years, and when reinstated, not given his wage arrears. 
Another lecturer at the University of the Punjab took a group of students to a trip to 
Karachi where, on a beach, he sat on a carnei with a female colleague and some students 
took pictures of them. The fundamentalist students used the picture to launch a campaign 
against him claiming that being on one carnei with a female was not Islamic. The said 
lecturer was forced to resign; afterwards, he used to laugh at the incident by saying, "neither 
my wife nor the husband of my colleague had any objection on us two being on one carnei 
but the fundamentalist became a third party to be jealous". 
At a certain Arab university, a brilliant lecturer, who had a doctorate in politicai 
science from Edinburgh University, was expelled just for talking about démocratie ideas. 
2. A serious obstacle toward economie independence is the spécifie Arab form of the 
general Mediterranean inclination of "taking it easy", the Arabie "buqra" (tomorrow). The 
combination of thèse traits créâtes a mental climate which is not favorable for 
industrialization. Among other things, industrialization requires conscientious attention to 
maintenance, from small, incidental repairs to major overhauls; the traits referred to, militate 
against regular maintenance and cause many problems in trying to operate industriai plants 
and machines efficiently. The Swiss Arabist Hans E. Tutsch observed that the Arabs are 
conscious of the fact that the technology which dominâtes their life to an almost unlimited 
degree is the technology of alien nations. In the entire Arab world there is practically no 
mechanical production which is not dépendent on the great production centers of the Western 
[or Asian] world. This technological retardation, Tutsch finds, is related to the static world 
view of Islam to which Western thirst for knowledge and théories of cognition are alien. The 
Arab world, and the Middle East as a whole, holds that it already has the answers to ali the 
questions of a simple life. This is why in the Arab countries there are no "men who ponder 
the mysteries of their visible and invisible surroundings," no "do it yourself" fans, "no 
laboratories, and no philosophical schools which are not hedged in by the barriers of 
dogma'" (Hans E. Tutsch, 'Arab Unity and Arab Dissensions', in Walter Z. Laqueur (éd.), 
The Middle East in Transition, N . Y . : Praeger, 1958, abridged from Patai, 1973: 276-77). 
3. See the following statements by two prominent academicians abridged from Patai, 
R., 1973: 108-111: 
The Fahlawi student is interested only in formai success in connection with his 
studies, in the external impression, and will often resort to illicit means to achieve it. He will 
flatter his teacher or try to bribe him, will cheat in his exams, will try to find out in advance 
what the questions will be, and his great dream is to be able to lay his hands on a copy of 
the test material. When such a student becomes a high officiai he will continue to use his 
Fahlawi methods in his new responsibilities. Because of thèse traditional traits, the Arab 
people are unable to accept facts with the speed and flexibility required by serious situations, 
but are forced to hide shorteomings and failures in order to preserve appearances and save 
their self-respect. The Fahlawi personality is inflated, always ready to demonstrate his 
superior knowledge and mastery accompamed by a contempt for those who really make an 
effort to work hard and to produce a well-finished job. (Dr. Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, lecturer in 
Philosophy at the American University of Beirut and the University of Amman). 
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What motivâtes the Fahlawi is not dedication to duty, nor a wish for self-realization, 
but rather the desire for reward or the fear of punishments. Search for quick and easy 
achievement is characteristic of many Egyptian students: instead of seriously studying for 
their examinations, they try to succeed without the necessary toil. 
(Dr. Ammar, Fi Bina al-Bashar [On the Building of Man]). 
4. Toynbee recognized the rigidity of the Muslim mind in many aspects of life, 
including the prohibition of using Arabie language in forms other than the established manner 
of the madressah [school] as he states: 'there is a catholic indifférence to anything that is not 
directly of moment for his life in this world or the next which is enjoined upon every pious 
Muslim by the precepts of orthodox Islamic theology... this is not simply theological; it is 
in the very texture of the Muslim mind... Even curiosity, in the highest and fìnest sense, we 
cannot render [in Arabie]... The free, self-determining, self developing soul may not walk 
its own patti, however innocently, but must fit itself to the scheme and pattern of schools'. 
However, Toynbee seems to contradict himself later by stating; 'the thinking faculty played 
a more responsible part in Islam than in Christianity'. (Toynbee, in Patai, R., 1973: 322). 
Spengler notes the determinism of Islamic cultures that curb creativity as: 'The first 
thing that the man of this culture, from the poorest slave and porter to prophet and Caliph, 
feels over him as kismet [fate] is... a beginning and an end of "these days" which are 
immutably fìxed and ordained and between which human existence takes its place 
foreordained ever since the beginning... and from this follows an inner, truly magian 
certainty: everything has "a time", from the Saviour's advent whose hour was stated in 
ancient texts, to the smallest everyday activities, in which the Faustian haste becomes 
senseless and unintelligible...' (Spengler, in Patai, R., 1973: 316-317). 
5. '"Shame" has been defined as a matter between a person and his society, while 
"guilt" is primarily a matter between a person and his conscience. A hermit in a desert can 
feel guilt; he cannot feel shame. One of the important différences between the Arab and the 
Western personality is that in the Arab culture, shame is more pronounced than guilt...' 
(Ausubel, 1955: 379-389). 'Self-respect dépends entirely on the respect from others. Their 
Systems of virtues are predominantly other-determined which means that motives, intentions, 
feelings, attitudes, and so on are of no importance as long as one's outward behaviour 
conforms to expectations. Because of this overriding motivation, the Arabs are largely 
conforming: they accept the ethics of their society to a high degree. The Arabie noun wajh, 
while it means face, outer side, outward appearance, surface, and the like, has also the 
further meanings of first place, place of honor, advantage, pre-eminence, personal 
satisfaction, outstanding personality, prince, nobleman, person of honor, intention, purpose... 
while this long list of meaning maybe somewhat confusing, it certainly indicates, even to the 
non-Arabist, that for an Arab to "save one's face" is a much weightier matter than for an 
English-speaking person. "Face" is one example of the other determined, outward-oriented 
character of the Arab personality. "What would people say" is the main criterion for his 
choice' (abridged from Patai, R., 1973: 101-4-6). 
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Chapter Nine: Significant Factors in Managerial Motivation in the Sub-continent 
(a) Variations in motivational patterns between government and private organizations 
In the sub-continent a lot of debate takes place, among job seeking managers, about 
whether they should work for the government or the private sector. There is a remarkable 
similarity in the findings from Indian and Pakistani managers and there is little doubt in that 
the motivation patterns offered by state and private companies are dissimilar: Young and 
ambitious graduâtes, who want quick promotions and to make more money, normally want 
to work in the private sector where it is believed that higher rewards for higher performance 
are offered though often at the cost of job security. If the company has not enough work 
generated by demand, job security dépends upon the generosity of owners. 
There is a consensus among respondents that jobs in government or state owned 
companies are secure and, therefore, a man for whom job security is more important than 
the amount of salary, would like to work in a state company where even the jobs of below 
average employées are usually safe. It is commonly said that if you work for the government, 
people would be willing to let you marry their daughters, but if you are in a private 
company, they would be worried about your job security. However, the said objection is not 
raised against those in higher positions in the private sector because, people in higher level 
jobs would normally come from upper/middle classes and are thus expected to have enough 
means to support their families in the event of a dismissal. Another advantage in government 
organizations is their well-established employment législation, rules, régulations and 
procédures which provide a stable environment in which the "rules of the game" are obvious 
to the participants so that those who cannot live without a certain amount of predictability 
and control over their fates would prefer government jobs. The risk-aversive want to know 
that when they retire, they will get a pension in old âge or some provident fund benefits. 
Moreover, because of the régulations, it is not easy to sack employées; the state companies 
have to form a committee, put a charge sheet, conduct interviews and inquiries, ail of which 
takes a lot of time and after which probably little would happen. However, very large private 
companies with a considérable number of employées have to make policies, rules, and 
régulations in order to evaluate performance with enough objectivity. 
There is a general impression among the educated that private companies pay more 
than do government companies, but, a lot of qualifications need to be stipulated to this 
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impression. First, there is a much greater gap between the salaries of high ranks and low 
ranks in private companies than is the case in government companies. Top managers get a 
lot more in private companies than in state organizations, both in terms of salaries, and 
allowances and fringe benefits, but workers in state companies generally get higher wages 
than workers in private companies. However, multinationals do pay lower ranks well too. 
Some state companies (e.g. Hindustan Antibiotics Limited), pay much more to workers than 
do many native private companies in the same business. For some kind of jobs in government 
or semi-government organizations, many interviewees stated, the salaries paid are greater 
compared to the efforts people put in there. 
In fact, in the private sector, there is simply a shift of money from the lower ranks 
to the higher ranks and henee private companies seem more attractive to the ambitious who 
want to join the higher ranks in the shortest possible time. It was often reported that people 
are made to work too hard in the private sector and that even those who get high salaries 
think that they work more than they are paid for. 
A culture based paradox in the public/private situation 
There is a well established myth that a state company cannot be as good as a 
comparable private company in the same kind of operative tasks. There is little doubt that 
productivity [out-put per person] is greater in private companies because they would not hire 
more than the absolute minimum staff, but the Western observation that private organizations 
are normally better than public in socio-economic development, does not hold true in the sub-
continent in many ways. First, government organizations are subject to public scrutiny and 
pressure and to unión pressures which, in the conditions of a general totalitarian psychology 
of private entrepreneurs in the sub-continent, is a very important and much needed 
democratic necessity that could lead to a rise in wages to a level whereby jobs in the West 
would not be threatened by the cheap slave labor of many underdeveloped countries. In fact, 
by forcing the underdeveloped countries to privatize, institutions such as the IMF, World 
Bank, and USAID have created not only greater misery for the underdeveloped labor but also 
placed an increasingly larger workforce in the West out of jobs as many Western capitalists 
shift investment from the West to the East. The said world institutions are managed primarily 
by professionals who have observed that in the West, private enterprise is more efficient, and 
henee they stress that the underdeveloped countries follow suit but, unfortunately, they ignore 
a lot many variables of the development matrix that are taken for granted in the West but do 
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not exist in most underdeveloped countries. Henee, the privatization of industry in the sub-
continent has led to the substitution of proper management by autocratic private management. 
Despite over-staffing, low productivity, inefficieney, and the so-claimed waste of 
many state enterprises in under-developed countries, their costs still remain a fraction of 
many efficient Western private enterprises: Because there is no general social security system 
in the sub-continent, sacking an employee is not as free from moral considerations as it 
maybe in the West. Moreover, most salaries in the sub-continent, including those of doctors, 
engineers, lecturers and middle managers, are often less than the social security payments 
in Europe and therefore, over-staffing, in real terms, means just paying dolé money to 
employees by keeping them on job. The reasons for massive resistance to privatization in the 
sub-continent lie in that in the public sector, unión pressures and government emphasis on 
proper managerial training and fairer rules of doing business have led to the establishment 
of a style of running organizations with appropriate management gtiidelines that are taken for 
granted in the Western organizations whether private or public. The efforts which many state 
sector managers put in to be seen fair and objective in workers' promotions, because of 
either unión pressures or state management guides for justice, are hard to find in the private 
sector. Proper management of industries carne, first of all, in state organizations because 
when the private sector was busy in driving labor to squeeze máximum profits that went 
mostly into the princely Ufe styles of the sub-continent entrepreneurs, it was mostly the sub-
continent governments that were sending managers for training to Western management 
institutions. Henee, despite all the typical mismanagement charges, many native state 
companies compete successfully even against Western private companies. 
(b) The effeets of nepotism on motivationfll 
The question of nepotism and similar considerations is of vital importance to the 
motivation of talented and able people discouraged when denied the opportunity to serve 
when someone else gets the job because of relations, contaets, or wealth. It would be of 
some consequence to note the kind of organizations where nepotism and similar 
considerations override merit-based considerations in hiring and promotion: There is a 
general impression that MNCs hire and promote people strictly on merit considerations but, 
[l]For interviewée description of cases of nepotism in detail, see pages 308 to 312. 
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increasingly, multinationals in the sub-continent are replacing their top management with 
native managers and directors so that in many of these multi-nationals, I was told, instances 
of nepotism, regionalism and other considerations, more typical of the native companies, 
have already become apparent. Because of different social and familial obligations in their 
respective cultures, there is little doubt in that most native managers and directors would not 
resort to merit based considerations to the extent that Western or Japanese managers would. 
Another general impression among the public is that nepotism and similar 
considerations are more likely to take place in state organizations than in the private sector 
but the distinction between state and the private sector is rapidly becoming irrelevant because 
of the increasingly stronger hold of private entrepreneurs on state institutions, because of the 
transfer of many of the state powers to the private sector, and because of the influence which 
modern capitalists have on those who run state institutions. In many cases, the state 
functionaries cannot stay in their jobs if they do not serve the due or undue wishes of the rich 
and influential private entrepreneurs who have been able to exercise their influence in getting 
their relatives placed on higher posts in state organizations. However, in the federal and 
provincial civil services, there is a strong chance for brilliant people to be selected because 
of the strict recruitment and selection procedures followed by the Public Service 
Commission, and it is a common observation that talented persons of humble backgrounds 
have been able to get civil service posts through competitive examinations, but, whether they 
rise in the hierarchy, solely on merit basis, is another story; it is rare to find one of humble 
origins, in a higher post. 
There are many examples of nepotism in the local projects of such prestigious 
organizations as the U N D P , UNICEF and the World Bank. This happens when these 
organizations undertake projects which must be manned by the bureaucracy or the private 
sector in the developing countries. The effects of nepotism, in terms of organizational 
effectiveness, were reported to be that when people are hired without following the required 
and recommended criteria, and proper selection procedures, the required results cannot be 
produced, the objectives are achieved only on paper. In Pakistán International Airlines, the 
following was reported; 
"when we take in employees, probably only 30 to 35 percent are hired on merit basis. 
The rest are hired on the basis of nepotism. There are some who have to be carried along, 
and once they are taken in, there is no tradition of one being fired." 
However, it is obvious that organizations cannot run successfully without, at least, 
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some members having the required merits. Therefore, where we find personnel hired on the 
basis of nepotism, there are many other employées who work hard to make the organizations 
work. Those hired on merit, and those who work hard, have little to fear about their job 
security because they are always needed to make the Organization survive, and also to carry 
the bürden of the incompétent. 
(ci The effects of various forms of corruption on motivationr21 
Various kinds of corruption at middle and upper levéis of social and organizational 
life are such an integral part of everyday life in the sub-continent that most people have to 
decide what role they should play when faced, in one or the other capacity, with a situation 
of corruption; only the 'very naive, young and immature' would resign from their jobs 
because of the corruption therein, and even then only if they have alternative means of 
income. In this work we are not concerned with the legal or moral aspects of corruption of 
various kinds but only with its effects upon the motivation level of managers and employées 
who want to serve in a conscientious manner. Many such managers contemplate opening their 
own businesses but know that they cannot run a private business successfully if they stick to 
a reasonable form of morality and ethics. A section officer in the Ministry of Social Welfare 
reported that the Members of the Provincial Assembly, authorized to distribute charity 
money, used to send recommendations where it was difficult to find if the nominee deserved 
the money. He feared that the money was going to affluent people and that proper accounts 
were not being kept. 
Common examples of illegal behaviour come from public limited companies. 
Although the share holders can scrutinize the accounts, and henee thèse companies have to 
be strictly correct in book-keeping, many try their best to wriggle out of payments that have 
to be made to the Social Security and Old Age Benefit Department, Tax Department etc. On 
the said évasions, the share holders would not object because the said corruption leads to 
increase in profits. For example, social security payments for the regular employées of a 
public limited company are compulsory, but to evade this, because the law is valid only if 
the number of regular workers in a company is more than 25, most native companies show 
a large part of their permanent employées as temporary workers hired on daily wages. Where 
[2]For interviewée narrations see pages 314 to 316. 
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the number of workers is too large to hide, the company may show half or less as regular 
employees on the books. 
In the state departments, corruption and embezzlement is often over-looked partly 
because many motivational techniques to fíght corruption cannot be implemented for lack of 
fúnds. For example, the salaries of policemen, clerks and júnior officers in state departments 
are so low that it is generally agreed that they cannot survive without regular bribes which, 
in any case, consist of petty amounts compared to the embezzlements of top officials and 
private entrepreneurs who evade taxes and form cariéis to hoard and raise the prices of their 
producís with no proper economic justification. In the private sector, the embezzlement of 
employees is strictly punished, and henee, is almost non-existent. Although the private sector 
is in a better position, compared to the state sector, to deter employee corruption, 
embezzlement and excessive profiteering by the owner's themselves is the real issue, 
nevertheless, an issue that may never be dealt with because of the sub-continent de facto 
cultural valúes whereby the rich are always right. 
(d) Unhealthv competition and higher positions despite incompetenceI31 
In organizations where the measurement of performance is not usually objective, 
where numerous non-work factors intervene, and where status and privilege has little 
association with better and hard work, unhealthy competition and intrigue for promotions is 
widespread. A familiar term in native organizations is 'leg-pulling', denoting unfair means 
to bring others down in order to promote oneself. Numerous examples of this kind of 
behaviour were quoted by the interviewees. In a research organization, for example, many 
scientists, doing research work in which sharing data is essential, were trying to hide their 
data from each other in order to promote themselves. In a large leather tanning industry, an 
attempt was made to put a manager's job at risk while he was attending a seminar in 
Germany. In a very large marketing company, the sales forcé was divided into groups which 
competed to show higher performance and each tried to undermine the other's efforts by fair 
means or foul. 
The desire to be in a higher position is often culturally conditioned as far as the nature 
[3]For interviewée narrations regarding unhealthy competition and the effeets of 
incompétence, see pages 308, 312, 314, 318, 319 and 321. 
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and extent of such desire and the aims behind getting a higher rank are concerned: One's 
aims behind the desire to get a higher rank could be functional, that is, one may seek a 
higher position in order to be able to serve the Organization and society better (when one has 
the abilities and skills required to do so at a higher position). However, a person who in 
reality can do little for the Organization and for society in a higher rank may be culturally 
conditioned to seek high positions only for the sake of raising his public-esteem, boosting his 
ego or getting the respect and adoration of family, friends and others. In the sub-continent, 
parents and elders often bombard children with comments and criticisms pushing them to 'be 
something' so much so that 'being something' in itself becomes a very important goal in 
many people's lives. Ambitious people may lose touch with the fact that 'being something' 
is inextricably linked with real and genuine potential and abilities. Hence, we find ministers, 
let alone managers, in the Middle East and the sub-continent who understand neither the 
significance of their portfolios nor the functions of their departments, and have to be propped 
up by their lower level staff. The rise of incompétent people up in the organizational ladder 
leads not only to problems at work, but is also de-motivating for compétent individuals. 
(e) Motivation related to promotions 
Managerial motivation in the sub-continent was found to be strongly related to 
promotions, monetary gains and the acquisition of culturally significant status symbols[4] but 
dissimilarities between most sub-continent companies and most Western companies appear 
in the way rewards and penalties are not solely performance related. In many organizations 
[4]Herzberg's (1959) study separated needs and wants into 'Hygiène Factors' and 
'Motivators'. Considering that the subjects of the study were two hundred engineers and 
accountants in Pittsburgh industry, the findings that achievement, récognition for any 
accomplishment, work itself, responsibility and advancement were associated with job 
satisfaction are hardly surprising. That the same people named dissatisfiers as company 
policy and administration, salary, supervision, interpersonal relations and working conditions 
is also expected in their particular situation where factors related to their job descriptions, 
being technical and specialized concerns, are within their powers and so they would want to 
have greater control over their working environment. A similar study with professionals in 
third world countries where higher éducation is obtained primarily to get more salary, is 
likely to lead to little distinction (if at ail) between 'hygiène' factors and 'motivators': As 
shown in chapter 2, 4, and 8, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, salary and social 
status are so often the main motivators for the vast majority that one motivated by 
advancement or récognition in professional achievements, but without higher hygiène factors, 
is regarded an anomaly. 
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many high performers were reported to lose motivation because of the policy of relating 
incentives not with high performance but with culturally engendered non-work considerations. 
There are several methods of performance evaluation in vogue in various kinds of 
organizations. Each method presents its advantages and disadvantages and none maybe seen 
as safe from the intervention of cultural factors, prejudices and favoritism on one or the other 
grounds. Whether the performance appraisal is done objectively and fairly or not, finally, 
boils down to the judgmental abilities of the evaluators, their training, sense of fairness and 
justice, and ability to free oneself from personal and culturally instilled prejudices. In many 
government departments, the traditional system of promotions on the basis of annual 
confidential reports is in vogue so that the annual increments and promotions of employees 
are affected by what their seniors write about them in the ACRs. As reported, the process 
is not free from politics, intrigue and culturally instilled considerations. In some other 
government and semi-government departments, promotion is period-related. Normally, top 
management promote officers to the next grade approximately every five years. But in many 
departments, it was reported that many have been stuck in their initial ranks for too long 
because the higher rank vacancies were filled in by people from outside, appointed either 
through 'sifarish' (contacts with influential persons) or on political considerations. However, 
it was also commonly reported in government departments that those who were not working 
hard, were below average and about whom it was generally assessed that they had worked 
less than due, all were promoted in the same way: Many high officials claim that if they 
follow the statistical logic of only two, in a batch of 10, being above average, then only two 
could possibly be promoted and this would cause enormous resentment and potential for 
conflict. A General Manager in PIA who tried to relate promotions to performance, was not 
supported by the General Managers of the other departments. The traditional top Managers 
equate the average evaluation with above average and rank none as below average, the 
disadvantage of which is that those who are genuinely above average get no extra rewards. 
Those who think they work more than others, want the pay to be related to performance. 
In the initial stages of service, one might be willing to accept time-related incentives 
and promotions because there are many senior posts available, but as one moves ahead in the 
organizational hierarchy, senior posts go on diminishing, and all cannot be promoted. 
Therefore, it becomes essential that only those who have put in extra effort, should be 
promoted. If the above average is treated the same as the others, his motivation would go 
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on diminishing. Many are reported to have got frustrated at slow promotions, resigned and 
left. Thus, there is a need to reward high performers if they are to be retained but, as found, 
where the policy of promoting ali is replaced by promoting some, it does not necessarily 
foliow that only high performers will be promoted; For example, the Oil and Gas 
Development Corporation employs a batch of geophysicists, ail doing similar kind of work 
and putting in virtually equal amount of efforts so that if one could be promoted to a senior 
position, so could the rest, and yet there were reportedly some cultural factors that played 
a rôle in one being promoted over the others. 
Where the jobs are similar in nature and lead to roughly equal results, but only some 
may be promoted because of fewer higher posts available, perhaps the best way would be to 
promote by tests and interviews so that ail participants have a fair chance of showing their 
abilities. Many companies follow this method but this too is not free from abuse. However, 
the method gives the employées an opportunity to put on record what their abilities are. 
Note that each of the above mentioned methods may only be used in certain types of 
organizations, and therefore, we suggest a contingent use of the said methods depending upon 
the skills/abilities of the employées, and the possibility of bias arising in certain situations[5]. 
(f) Variations in motivational patterns between the native companies and MNCs 
In Britain, I found that most Asian businesses, however large, were run and 
controlied by the owning families and it was rare to see them hiring professional managers. 
In the sub-continent however, medium and large companies, though predominantly owned 
by families, often employ managers, first, because it is many times cheaper to employ 
managers in the sub-continent than it is in Britain; a manager who would be paid £25,000 
per annum in Britain, would normally get between Rs. 120,000 and 300,000 (£2,500 to 
5,000) per annum, depending upon the type of owners, hence ten to five times cheaper, while 
[5]In terms of motivation, McGregor (1960-a: Ch. 7) stresses considérations for 
equity and équitable treatment, merit increases and group rewards in the administering of 
salaries and promotions. He notes that, "the principle of integration requires active and 
responsible participation of the individuai in décisions affecting his career" (p. 103). 
McGregor notes three practical purposes of performance appraisal ; administrative, 
informative and motivational. However, As found, the focus of appraisal in the traditional-
authoritative sub-continent and Middle East is on the administrative side with little attention 
paid to its informative and motivational aspects. 
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the profitability of a comparable business would be much greater in the sub-continent because 
of lower salaries, the common practice of false accounting to evade taxes, the formation of 
cartels, price fixing, and the deliberate enhancement of prices by businesses on one pretext 
or another. Moreover, in the sub-continent, where business owners possess enormous social 
and legai clout, it is easy for them to control their managers when the latter know about the 
owner's secrets, while in Britain it would be hard to check the actions of a whistle blower. 
Where there are several enterprises run by one family, control over major 
organizational affairs is done by close relative-directors in-charge of one or more enterprises, 
or by a few very trusted faithful managers who have been with the family for long and whose 
social background is well known to the owners; the faithful managers may be trusted with 
cash control involving bank accounts, cheques, identifying signatories, at times with certain 
décisions such as hiring and firing and making smaller business deals. Obsequiousness is 
always expected but a manager with high qualifications and high social and economie status 
may win some trust and less domination from private owners. In the state sector, however, 
qualified managers are supposed to be the major decisión makers, though considerable 
centralization is vested in the top levéis. 
However, most non-relative managers in private organizations are not trusted with 
much responsibility compared to those in the West: Most business planning and tasks, 
particularly activities involving cash transactions, must be done under the owners' strict 
control [6]. Most managers reported that the main différences in the work environment 
between Euroamerican and native companies were that in locai organizations, the managers 
do not have much authority when compared to that they hold in foreign companies. Native 
owners retain the decision-making powers and seldom transfer them to their managers. 
Native owners do not allow their managers to make many décisions independently, 
particularly crucial décisions. For example, during recruitment, the owners either send their 
men to be hired or set criteria for the type of man they want to be hired. In the 
multinationals, managers are not under owners' pressure when making décisions in their task-
[6]As an exports manager in one of Pakistan's largest textile industry, and later, as 
a finance manager in a large shoe manufacturing finn, I was not supposed to deal even with 
petty cash transactions. The owner directors (five brothers in the textile industry and a father 
and two sons in the shoe manufacturing firm), did ali the cash related work while I was there 
to keep accounting tracks of their transactions. A l i décisions were made by the owners. 
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related issues; they are given authority, independence, and make their own decisions. 
Multinationals encourage their managers to have their own ideas and to present them to the 
higher management where discussions are freely conducted. Almost all managers reported 
that working with a multi-national made them feel important, learn more, and that there was 
greater prestige and status attached. Most managers stated that non-work problems and non-
work control and conflict was much greater in native companies that in MNEs. A marketing 
manager in a Germán multinational, who was previously employed in a native industry, 
described the main difference between foreign and native companies as being that in foreign 
companies, one's professional potential is used but in native organizations, not only 
professional expertise but one's personal behaviour matters a lot; if one is successful as a 
professional but not very polite and pleasing to the 'saith* (the sub-continent term meaning 
'the owner'; the word is also used to allude to arrogance, such as, "he thinks he is a saith", 
or, "he has become a saith", meaning that, "he has become arrogant") he is not likely to 
succeed in that industry. Interviews with managers often reveal lack of trust and recognition 
by native prívate owners. The owners observe a strict status quo. With the managers, they 
mostly have a formal interaction typically reported to be a 'saith type' attitude, that is, they 
do not talk more than about assignments, and expect loyalty[7] as much to tasks as to the 
employers in person. Most native private managers reported that the "saiths" consider the 
staff their personal employees, and that even when the latter get good salaries, the manner 
in which the saiths treat them was authoritative, and, at times, insulting. 
Managers in multinationals frequently mention that a large part of their motivation 
to work comes from learning new things, getting more responsibility and authority, and 
having a variety of work. MNEs spend more on offices, salaries, and on entertaining clients 
than do native companies. MNEs pay far better than local companies, and therefore, the 
financial needs having been fülfilled, higher needs such as responsibility and job satisfaction 
begin to play a role in motivation. Compared to the local organizations, M N E workers are 
lavishly provided for; they are given several bonuses a year, conveyance allowance, clean 
uniforms, and good meáis at work. As regards the unions in MNEs, it was reported that 
because they are better-off than the unions and workers in native companies, they are not the 
usual aggressive or violent kind. Strikes in MNEs almost never happen. Although MNEs 
[7]See cases in pages 321 to 324. 
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incur greater expenditure[8] on workers, employees and clients than do comparable native 
companies, they still make greater profits and are more efficient than the latter. As regards 
organizational differences, most interviewees reported that M N C s were more results-oriented 
("interested more in what you do than in what you say") than were the local[9]. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, it is a common observation that people are much 
more strongly motivated to work for MNEs than for native companies. 
Recent changes in the organizational cultures of the MNEs in the sub-continentílOI 
It was found in the case studies of Germán and British MNEs, conducted for this 
work, that, increasingly, the MNEs are replacing their expensive foreign top managers with 
relatively cheaper native managers, which has brought about risks of changing the M N E 
culture towards: (a)increasing short-term profitability at the cost of long-term company 
interests; (b)non-work control and conflict, and nepotism; (c)increasing rewards for top 
managers or directors while reducing salaries of the middle and lower ranks, thus reflecting 
and moving towards the typical sub-continent wider income-difference culture, and, 
(d)unnecessarily frustratíng workers, and júnior and middle management. 
Though point (c) has now become a norm in many Western companies, it is not 
visible to such an extent in MNEs in Europe as in those in the sub-continent. There is strong 
[8]A personnel manager in the Honda Civic plant in Pakistan reported that the 
company decided to give its newly recruited engineers much more salary than the latter had 
asked for. This would be unthinkable in native companies where the salary negotiations 
almost always mean offering less than asked for. 
[9]More differences were found in the influence of technology on human behaviour: 
In Germany, for example, the MNEs use sophisticated production methods and office 
equipment; the efficiency and productivity of people working with the latest and most 
sophisticated equipment could not be compared with the efficiency or productivity of those 
working with comparatively obsolete machinery. However, while M N E productivity is higher 
in Europe, their profitability is higher in the sub-continent because operating costs are lesser. 
Operating costs are less because fewer environmental controls are imposed by the sub-
continent governments; in Europe, tremendous sums are spent on the treatment of industrial 
waste, the tax rate too is much higher, labor rules are tougher and the MNEs incur heavy 
expenses on safety and security at workplace, on national insurance, and on body insurance, 
and then, because high accident risk means high insurance costs, MNEs have to reduce the 
risk of accidents, as per insurance companies requirements, which means expenditure on 
good safety and security Systems. 
[lOJFor excerpts from interviewée Statements see pages 325 to 327. 
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evidence to suggest that when foreign companies are handed o ver to local managers, the local 
culture seeps into their organizational practice. For example, many M N E native managers 
have been hiring relatives of influential persons[ll]. In the near past, the CITI Bank in 
Pakistán had a policy to employ the top performing M B A students from good local 
universities. However, now that there is a large number of M B A s in Pakistán, it was found 
that some of them, employed by some MNEs, had begun a new kind of nepotism; the 
affiliations which many students had with some friends and class fellows have resulted in 
giving jobs to friends through pre-arranged settlements. For example, in some instances, 
applicants were told what questions the interviewer was going to ask. 
Summary and contributions of chapter 9 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1 )Government and private companies in the sub-continent appeal to differentiated 
motivation; the former to the risk aversive's long-term job security needs, the latter to the 
high performer's need for quicker and higher rewards. 
(2) Managers unequivocally prefer to work for M N C s than for native companies because 
MNCs , (a)grant greater decisión making powers to managers; (b)place greater trust in them; 
(c)give greater facilities; (d)exploit one's professional potential without seeking obedience; 
(e)accept challenges and encourage independence and creative thinking; and, (f)keep up 
employees'self-esteem. The mentioned factors are not usually present in native companies. 
(3) The desire to be in a higher position for other than functional/organizational reasons, is 
culturally conditioned in so far as the extent of status seeking in a higher rank are concerned. 
(4) As MNCs in the sub-continent replace their Western management with native, many native 
organizational cultural elements (such as non-work control and conflict, nepotism, 
regionalism, corruption, unhealthy competition, higher positions despite incompetence, tax 
and social security evasión, increasing short-term profitability at the cost of long-term 
company interests, and higher salary differentials between ranks) have begun to appear in the 
[11] A well known British chemical giant took the son of the Governor of a province 
on a high post at a salary far above the going rate for the M B A s , despite the fact that the son 
had obtained admission on the basis of nepotism and scored comparatively very low marks 
in his M B A course: In the university from where the said son had graduated, one admission 
seat had been reserved for the nominee of the Governor of the province, and another for the 
nominee of the Mayor of the city. The Mayor and the Governor had nominated each other's 
son in order to disguise the nepotism Hierein. 
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MNCs which are hitherto seen as much better management examples than the native 
companies. Examples of nepotism and embezzlement have been found in the native projects 
of U N D P , UNICEF and the World Bank. Many projects have failed because the hired people 
did not have the required qualifications. 
(5)The Western observation that private organizations are better than public ones in socio-
economic development does not hold true for most underdeveloped countries for the 
following reasons; (a)government organizations are subject to public scrutiny and union 
pressures which, in authoritarian cultures, is a much needed democratic necessity to raise 
wages to a level where jobs in the West will not be threatened by the cheap labor of the third 
world; (b)better management practice came from the West first in public enterprises because 
when the Eastern entrepreneurs were busy in driving labor to squeeze maximum profits that 
mostly went into the princely life styles of the former, it was mostly Eastern governments 
that were sending managers to the West for training; (c)dispite charges of over-staffing, low 
productivity, inefficiency and waste, the costs of many state enterprises still remain a fraction 
of those in the Western private sectors; (d)although private sector is better placed to deduct 
employee embezzlement than is the public, the embezzlement of the private owners is much 
higher than that in the public sector; (e)most salaries in the sub-continent, including those of 
doctors, engineers, lecturers and middle managers, are less than the social security payments 
in Europe and therefore, over-staffing, in real terms, means just paying dole money to keep 
people on jobs. Such low cost employment is a main strategy of many underdeveloped 
governments for socio-economic development which has been seriously threatened by 
privatization done under ill-advice from foreign experts. 
Managerial motivation is much higher in MNCs than in native companies but as MNCs 
transfer top managerial jobs to natives, many undesirable local cultural elements seep in. 
The Western observation that private enterprise is always better for development does 
not hold true in underdeveloped countries where a lot many variables of the development 
matrix, taken for granted in the West, do not exist. The findings shall be taken to our 
Grounded Theory to show differentiated patterns of motivation, which suggest that cultural 
factors should be considered by MNCs and international developmental agencies (IMF, World 
Bank, USAID etc.) whilst planning/ advising on, (i)personnet mix (foreign-native), and, 
(ii) structural mix (public-private) ratios, for their projects in underdeveloped countries. 
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Chapter Ten: Significant Factors in Workers Motivation in the Sub-continent/ Middle East 
Sources for this chapter 
From 1981 to 1989, I have personally observed working conditions in more than 
thirty factories in six cities of Pakistan, and obtained information about several others 
indirectly through conversations with employées and employers. For six years, as a bank 
officer, I was supposed to visit client's factories where I would spend days, sometimes 
weeks, for the sake of analyzing their operational and marketing stratégies. This we had to 
do before money could be lent to them. Because financial Statements of businesses could not 
be trusted, often we had to prepare financial Statements from our own estimâtes of the 
client's business factors such as the stocks in stores and the worth of the raw material used 
each month. Later, I worked as a finance manager with a large shoe manufacturing factory, 
and then, for two years, I taught at a local university during which period factory visits under 
a teacher's supervision were part of éducation and training of our students. Information about 
Indian, Bengali, and Middle Eastern[l] factories has been obtained from interviewées and 
workers in the Arabian Gulf states. Observation in the Gulf states were made for fi ve years. 
Findings and Analvsis 
In my informal discussions with several employers, managers and employées on the 
possible causes of industrial conflict, I found that while most industrialists attribute the causes 
to worker unrest, laziness and insolence, a vast majority of workers could be found barely 
surviving in abject poverty. Most workers found the reasons for conflict in the greed and 
embezzlement of the bureaucrats and capitalists. One could see that the Supervisors, 
managers, and the owners rule with almost unconstrained power that may not be restricted 
even by courts due to acute class barriers and the general support for the authority of the 
upper classes by the social system. Most organizations are little more than a family affair in 
a totally unregulated labour market. The vast majority of workers have very few de facto 
rights and protection. The distinction between workers and bosses is very sharp and clear; 
there is a less stratified but, ironically, the least class-conscious workforce. 
[l]Detailed information about workers' situation in the Middle East has been provided 
in chapter 15. More information about workers' unions and rights at workplace has also been 
given in chapter 15. 
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The vast majority of sub-continent and Middle Eastern workers lives in the conditions 
of 18th/19th century Britain that have been described by various authors such as Frederick 
Engels and Peter Lane. These conditions are similar enough throughout the country to allow 
a construction of typologies based on objective socio-economic circumstances of different 
classes. But there are various cultural, social, religious, and historic reasons for the non-
homogeneous subjective nature of the workers, and for their mutually belligerent attitudes. 
During conversations, the workers and trade union leaders brought in serious issues 
regarding the unethical behavior of native employers at all levels of trade and industry. Most 
workers considered it Utopian to have a sense of belonging to the workplace. A typical day 
at the workplace, extracted from workers' narrations, could be described as follows: 
"I get up at five in the morning and travel to the factory five to seven miles from my 
home on a bicycle or in an over-crowded rickety bus which I cannot always afford (despite 
significant recommendations in the labour laws for factories having workers' accommodation, 
such provisions are rare). I reach the factory at six. The first sight of the factory causes 
unpleasant sensations. The notice at the factory gate says, 'leave your personal belongings 
at the security post', and a thorough physical search takes place before entering and on 
leaving the factory compound. The security people check for harmful items while we enter, 
and for possible stolen factory items when we leave. The working conditions are appalling. 
The steel industry workers work in extreme heat and noise. The chemicals workers face 
hazards from out-dated boilers and unfamiliar chemicals. We bring our own food because 
the contractor at the factory canteen either charges very high, or if the meal is subsidized, 
the quality and quantity of the food is very low. Time for lunch break is half an hour but 
they start calling us back to work before it is due. The supervisors and foremen frequently 
resort to invective and abuse. Physical clashes are not uncommon. Even the fellow workers 
are hateful of each other for we have lost mutual respect. Expulsion of a fellow worker 
seldom evokes sympathy; the fewer the better. At the day end at six in the afternoon, we 
wait in queues for an hour to be paid. The cashier often tries to deduct as much as he can". 
It maybe noted here that similarities do exist in the working conditions in the sub-
continent/Middle East at present to those in 19th century British factories described as: 
"The first 'immigrants' into the new industrial towns were, in one sense, 'slaves' to 
the machines. From a very early age they worked very long hours and for low wages. Many 
of the first factories were overcrowded, badly-lit and poorly ventilated. Accidents were 
common, and the crippled or maimed child or adult was dismissed by his employer to become 
a beggar or an inmate of a workhouse... Oastler argued that the conditions in which children 
and adults had to work in a British factory were worse than conditions in which slaves lived 
and worked on plantations in the West Indies " (Peter Lane) [See endnote 2]. 
Peter Lane has quoted Edward Hodder's writing in his book, 'George Smith of Coalville': 
" When I was nine years old (in 1840) my work consisted of continually carrying about 
40 pounds of clay upon my head from the clay heap to the table where the bricks were made. 
This I had to do without stopping for thirteen hours a day. Sometimes I had to work all 
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through the night, carrying 1200 bricks from the makers to thefloors where they were placed 
to harden. Düring such a night I would walk about 14 miles ". 
But still there is a différence of culture and attitude between the people of the two 
societies under considération. In the above mentioned reports, while the description matches 
that in présent day sub-continent/Middle East Workshops, farms, factories, restaurants or any 
other workplace, there are no enquiries that would be listened to or supported by the upper 
classes or the bureaucrats, there are no Toor Laws', as were operative even in pre-industrial 
Britain, and there is no alternative to the parish system. The history of the parish system and 
the Poor Law authorities in Britain dates back as far as before 16th Century (admitting the 
corruption of some parish authorities) because of the concera of many for the poor. 
A notice of rule and régulations in a 19th Century British factory, quoted by Peter 
Lane, shows many Theory X type assumptions behind the management's attitude towards the 
workers. Although the document reveals many similarities in the 19th Century British 
working conditions to that which presently exist in Middle Eastem/sub-continent factories, 
there are stili some différences that show, surprisingly, that even in the 19th Century, control 
attitudes in British factories were better than those in most Middle Eastern/sub-continent 
factories at présent: Some rules/regulations in 19th Century British factories were as follows: 
"For Working Hours, the bell will ring at 6 o'clock in the Morning, and 6 o 'clock in 
the Evening, for a day's work... The Hour of Dinner to be from 12 to 1... the half hour for 
breakfast from halfpast 8to 9... Over-Time to be reckoned at the rate of8 hours for a day 's 
work both in and out ofthe Works... Each man to be accountable for his Tools, when leaving 
employment; and in case of loss, the amount to be deductedfrom his wages....". 
In these rules it is mentioned that a fine of Is be deducted from wages and deposited 
to the sick fund for the following misconduct: 
"Any man, either giving or taking out any board but his own [attendance]; neglecting 
to leave the key ofhis drawer in the office, on leaving work; leaving his candie burning, or 
neglecting to shut his gas-cock; opening the drawer of another, or taking his tools without 
leave; not returning tools to the person who has charge of them; making préparations for 
leaving work before the bell rings; smoking during working hours; taking strangers imo the 
works without leave or talking to such as may go in ". 
For using oil to clean hands and for giving in more time than worked, one was to be 
fined 2s. 6d. If one interfered or damaged any machinery or tools, he was to pay the cost 
of repairs and to be fined ls. 
The dissimilarities in many présent day Middle Eastern/sub-continent factories from 
the conditions mentioned above are that the lunch break is only half an hour as against the 
one hour mentioned above; there is usually no break for breakfast: Most workers work for 
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twelve hours but no overtime rate is allowed because most wages are paid on a fixed monthly 
basis. While this system of low wages at the end of month encourages workers to waste time 
if they can, the level of production is sought to be kept high through coercive control by 
foremen and supervisors who frequently resort to invective and abuse, at times physical 
forcé. Most managers and owners do not aim at changing the coercive control system 
because, at the end of the day, after all the abuse, hassle, and coerción, they seem to obtain 
higher production at lower wages; performance related rewards, many believe, unlike the 
current trend in British personnel management, would result in higher wages. 
While the above mentioned document shows that fines were to go towards the sick 
fund, in Pakistani faetones, the fines are added towards the profits because most often there 
are no sickness or welfare funds. In the case of negligence and damage to property, workers 
are either beaten or handed over to the pólice depending upon the extent of the damage done. 
Some work rights and conditions in the sub-continentf21 domestic prívate sector 
1- The present wage legislation is meant for companies employing 50 or more 
workers, and it is only for such companies that the labour department may inspect for 
inegularities. Bribes are a common substitute to inspections. For unskilled workers in 
establishments employing 50 or more, minimum wages plus cost of living allowance, as 
determined by the central government are too low even to buy basic necessities; 
"actual wages are... low even by Asían standards" [see endnote 1]. 
2- Statutory benefits such as profit sharing, one montiVs bonus, social security 
contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for workers' children and pensions 
are very rare in domestic companies. 
3- The legislation requires employers to provide housing facilities for 25% of their 
employees and land is available for this purpose at nominal prices. Employers are expected 
to contribute 5% of total payroll for housing but this rule has not been enforced. 
4- The concept of retirement and pensión for workers and júnior staff does not exist 
[2]Although there are minor variations in the Labour Legislation of India, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh (all three have origins in the British legislation that was the same for the 
three countries prior to independence), the net effect is the same as summed up in this 
chapter which relies heavily on the Labour Legislation (Industrial Relations Ordinance and 
Labour Policy) in Pakistan, obtainable from Government Printing Press, Islamabad. 
For details regarding Labour Legislation in the Middle East, see chapter 15. 
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in the domestic private sector though some companies may hand over a lump sum retirement 
provident fund or gratuity to very long serving officers and employees. For a manual worker, 
such a provision would be rare except in government organizations. 
5-A profit sharing plan applies to all industrial companies that employ 100 or more 
workers and whose paid-up capital is more than Rs. 2.0 million or whose fixed assets are 
worth 4.0 million or more. Payment of an annual bonus is compulsory. Employers must also 
provide free education for one child of each worker up to high school. A l l industrial 
enterprises are expected to furnish company canteens serving subsidized meals and provide 
medical treatment facilities for in-house accidents or routine medical problems but such 
facilities are seldom provided in domestic companies. 
Some work rights and conditions in foreign owned companies 
Better industrial relations exist at the multinationals in Pakistan where strikes, go-slow 
tactics, lock outs etc. are virtually never experienced: 
"Multinational corporations, with their relatively high pay scales and comprehensive 
benefits, remain the favoured employers among local workers. Strikes and agitation against 
foreign owned firms are rare" [see endnote 1]. 
The reasons for rare strikes and agitation are simply that foreign company managers 
not only try to abide by the labour legislation but even exceed the legal requirements in order 
to create better work relations: 
1- Although the Factories Act limits adults to a 9 hour day and a 48 hour week, many 
foreign companies observe a five day, 42-45 hour week. Even then, productivity and quality 
is higher than that at most domestic companies observing a 54-60 hour week. 
2- Foreign companies fulfil all mandated requirements such as the statutory benefits; 
profit sharing, one month bonus, social security contributions, annual vacations, educational 
allowances for workers' children and pensions: "Foreign owned companies provide more 
generous fringe benefits than locally owned firms" [see endnote 1]. 
3- Regarding dismissal of employees, the law demands that salaried employees must 
be given one month notice or one month salary. For workers the period is 15 days. Siemens 
(Pak) has a voluntary leave scheme with the following incentives; 
(i) one month notice with pay rather than two weeks notice; 
(ii) separation pay of one and a half month wages for every completed year of service with 
the company; 
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(iii) payment in cash of any balance of annual vacation; 
(iv) refund of the resigning workers' contribution to the provident fund and accumulated 
employer's contribution; 
(v) family medical allowance for the balance of the year, and 
(vi) payment of ail dues in the workers' participation fund. 
4-The mandated retirement age is 58 or after 30 years of service. But at E X X O N 
Chemicals (Pakistan) workers may retire at 48 or after 15 years of service. At Phillips 
Pakistan, retirement is at 55 or 24 years of service [see endnote 1]. 
Because productivity, quality and profitability are higher in the MNCs , there are ail 
the reasons for domestic companies to follow better management practice exemplified by 
MNCs . The native employers can certainly do better but it must be noted that the sub-
continent/Middle Eastern worker is often his own worst enemy for he, under the speli of 
superstition, producers many more children than do the middle and upper classes. Henee 
creating an oversupply of labour which drives the wages further down. 
Summarv and contributions of chanter 10 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) The vast majority of sub-continent/Middle Eastern workers lives in conditions of poverty 
similar to that of 18th/19th century Britain. The material-physical conditions of différent 
economie classes throughout the said régions are similar enough to allow for a construction 
of typologies based on objective socio-economie circumstances. However, there are various 
cultural, social, religious, historie, and nationalistic reasons for the non-homogeneous 
subjective nature of the workers' mutually belligerent attitudes. In other words, there is, 
objectively, a less stratifìed but, subjectively, the least class-conscious workforce. Henee, in 
most sub-continent/Middle Eastern factories, the managers and the owners enjoy a power not 
restricted even by courts, due to acute class barriers, the general support for upper-class 
authority by the social system, and a de facto unregulated labour market where the vast 
majority of workers have few, if any, rights and protection. 
(2) The domestic private enterprises practically exercise the righi to hire and fire and are not 
usually subject to any de facto regulatory controls. The présent labour législation is 
applicable for companies employing 50 or more workers, and it is only for such companies 
that the Labour Department may inspect for irregularities but bribes usually invalidate the 
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inspections. Statutory benefits such as profit sharing, one month's bonus, social security 
contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for workers' children, and pensions 
are rarely if ever given. 
(3) There is a difference of culture and attitude between the people of the Middle East/sub-
continent and the British towards poverty: In the present day Middle East/sub-continent 
workshops, farms, faetones, restaurants or any other workplace, there are no poverty 
enquiries that would be listened to or supported by the upper classes or the bureaucrats as 
against the pre-industrial Britain where there were 'Poor Laws'; the history of the parish 
system and the Poor Law authorities in Britain dates back as far as before 16th century. 
(4) Finding (3) is remarkably matched by the fact that better industrial relations exist in the 
multinationals (working in the Middle East/sub-continent) where strikes, go-slow tactics, lock 
outs etc. are virtually never experienced. The reasons are simply that foreign company 
managers not only abide by the labour legislation but even exceed the legal requirements in 
order to créate better work relations. Foreign companies fulfil all mandated requirements 
such as the statutory benefits, profit sharing, one month's bonus, social security 
contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for worker's children and pensions. 
Thefindings reveal our recurring theme in this work that poverty, coerción, intra-level 
conflict and over-supply of labour are linked to each other in the sub-continent/Middle East. 
Findings in this chapter shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that cultural 
factors determine not only people 's attitudes towards poverty, conflict, and coerción but also 
the possibility oftheir eradication. The said thesis is strongly supported by evidence showing, 
(i) that the British were sensitive about poverty and coerción even in 16th century and 
worked bit by bit to eradicate it, against the native attitude where issues of poverty and 
coerción are normally obscured and dismissed by the upper classes; 
(ii) when MNCs come to work in the Middle East/sub-continent, they not only abide 
by the native governmental labour legislation but in many cases exceed mandatory 
requirements, as against the native companies which ignore the labour legislation while the 
government does not nave enough means and will to enforce it. 
Despite better treatment of employees, MNCs in the sub-continent/Middle East still 
make more money than do the native companies and henee there are strong groundsfor our 
suggestion that native companies follow the better management practices of MNCs. 
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Notes and Explanations 
[l]Business International Corporation, U . S . A . , Sept. 1981, Investine. Licensing & 
Trading Conditions Abroad. 
[2]Clegg and Dunkerley (1980: 71) quote Benedix that the early capitalists based their 
activities on authoritarian 'ideology': Weber (1948: 261) stated, '...no special proof is 
necessary lo show that military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory'. 
Weber developed his theory of bureaucracy from the Prussian military forces; British 
railway companies used British Army kind of ranks. But in the West, methods of influence 
have shifted gradually from coercion because the "Catholic church" and "military" models 
suffered from the limitations of authority in view of new pressures, mobility, and législation 
brought by collective bargaining: 
"We can improve our ability to control only ifwe recognize that control consists in 
sélective adaptation to human nature rather than in attempting to make human nature 
conform to our wishes" (McGregor, 1960a: 11). 
McGregor's observation that a shift in the nature of control from coercive to adaptive 
has followed the reducing dependence of subordinates on the Controlling authority, supports 
our thesis, explained in chapter 16 that coercion in many countries will stay as long as the 
subordinates remain vulnerable. 
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Chapter Eleven: A Comparison of Control Attitudes in Asian and English Businesses 
There is a significant presence of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi businesses in 
Britain, which predominantly employ Asians. As these businesses operate in the British 
socio-cultural and legal environment, I was interested in seeing to what extent the British 
culture and social environment has influenced patterns of control, conflict and motivation 
therein, or if the said patterns in Asian organizations were similar to those found back home. 
In British Asian organizations, many instances of negative assumptions and Theory 
X type of beliefs are commonly reported to exist in the attitudes of owners, managers, 
supervisors, and among employees themselves. Numerous events quoted in this respect by 
nearly all respondents showed that employees are often not considered trustworthy, and much 
personal control is exercised by the owners, managers or supervisors. In fact the word 
'control' is often understood by employees as meaning 'keeping an eye on the employees' 
and so that when asked about control system in their organizations, most only tell about the 
owner family members, partners or managers/supervisors 'personally watching' the workers. 
While it is understandable that personal observation is at times necessary and is 
required, particularly during on-the-job training, this kind of instruction-based training 
requires skills, patience, tolerance, and understanding on the part of the instructor, especially 
when the trainee makes mistakes. The difference between training by watching, and personal 
control, seemed very clear to the respondents when they narrated events which show 
criticism made by seniors for the sake of criticism alone, and undue snubbing to fulfil one's 
desire to exercise power over others. The interviewees often expressed feelings of bitterness 
engendered by personal control. Although the speed of work and the amount produced in a 
given time should be dealt with in a properly designed control system, it was frequently 
reported that the employers wanted too much work to be done very fast, though the work 
maybe too hard. Task-oriented supervisors and managers are found in all organizations, 
Asian or English, but the difference lies in the extent of pressure and subjectivity with which 
they exhibit their task-orientation, and the extent to which control is either task-related, or 
a means to exhibit culturally engendered authoritarianism. 
Control issues related to conflict 
The relationship of conflict with the nature of control is shown in that while 
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answering to questions about conflict, the respondents often talked about those control 
methods which lead to conflict situations, and then it became hard to differentiate, during 
qualitative coding, if the situation being described was related to control or conflict[l]. For 
example, keeping informers (those entrusted with keeping an eye on workers) on payroll is 
a standard procedure in many Asian factories. Many times, the favoured workers or 
informers abuse their power over others, which may lead to conflict. In a certain Manchester 
Asian factory, there were two so-called Supervisors but they were not considered as 
Supervisors by the workers because they did many private services for the owners; for 
example one of them was their driver but during factory hours he was supposed to watch the 
machinists. Similar situations were reported by many interviewées. Because the owners or 
the managers have to rely on the word of the watchman for information about what happens 
on the shop floor, many, in their efforts to be in the employer's good books, struggle against 
each other, so that a whole network of rival informers, and a kind of Machiavellian politics 
emerges, at times leading to inter-personal conflict which can be violent. 
Control not related to work 
Examples of adequate Systems designs whereby authority, responsibility, and 
accountability are clearly delineated and designated, are not common in Asian businesses. 
Control should be done through impersonal Systems based on management or scientific/ 
Statistical principies. In properly designed control Systems, the focus of control is on factors 
that ensure that the right quantity and quality of a product is made. But the focus of attention 
was found to be on non-work control and personal inspection directed more at the worker 
than at the product; this could be because of a lack of proper éducation and training for the 
managers or Supervisors, and was reported by respondents in many forms such as; 
"the quality is checked only when the customer returns the goods. There is no 
designated quality control man" (Manchester). 
I have had several formal and informal conversations with Asian employers in the 
U . K . and counting on my own expérience of dealing with industrialists in Pakistan, I feel that 
the answers I recorded are typical of Asian industrialists (excluding examples of rare large 
companies where the complicated nature of Operations and the présence of well educated 
[l]For excerpts from interviews regarding control and related conflict attitudes in 
Asian firms, see pages 328 to 331. 
155 
management may lead to well designed Systems of control): There was little explanation in 
answers to the questions, and, as in the workers' view, the term control was considered 
synonymous to personal observation. Only one worker interviewée thought there could be 
some justification for the owners' negative attitude in so far as he had observed at a factory 
that workers were not well motivated to work and tried to avoid working in the absence of 
the manager. It maybe argued that negative attitudes exist on both sides and that employers' 
negative assumptions engender negative behaviour in the workers, or vice versa. But the 
point is that when personal inspection is the only means of determining worker's efficiency, 
then in the absence of an inspector, the workers may not work hard, especially when they 
are not well motivated, and not accountable for the amount of work in some better way, such 
as some impersonal means of control used in most English firms. 
A major distinguishing feature of Asian organizational control when compared to the 
Western one, was found to be the control over personal activities that are neither related to 
work nor a hinderance to one's performance at work. Such control was often reported as 
commonly exercised both from the top and among the workers themselves. A detailed 
description of non-work control in Muslim organizations has been given earlier (pages 113 
to 115, and 304 to 308). About the religious rights of Muslims being observed in English 
businesses, see the later sections in this chapter. However, similar respect for religious rights 
of the non-Muslims was not found in most Muslim organizations[2]. 
Coercive-utilitarian control on new and illegai immigrantsi31 
While in the sub-continent, the majority of workers, particularly the unskilled, are 
treated as an under-class with the least bargaining powers owing to a high supply of labour 
and a lack of support from the establishment in terms of employment rights, the équivalent 
of these in Britain are illegai workers, that is, those working without work-permits. As 
[2]Ahmadees, for example, if they are hired at ali, cannot ha ve prayer facilities in 
Muslim organizations, and Christians in many Muslim countries are not allowed Christmas 
holidays unless these coincide with some other holidays. One interview said, "you cannot 
even have a can of coke at work. If I listen to Ghazals [poems] they criticize; for example, 
during the month of Ramadan, we cannot listen to poems in which wine is mentioned; they 
think that listenìng to poems and drinking are similar" (Oldham). 
[3]For detailed case studies and excerpts from interviews, see pages 331 to 335, 
section titled: 'Typical cases of British Asian coercive control on new immigrants'. 
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mentioned in the later sections on illegal workers, there are many kinds of illegal 
employments in Asian industry, so that hiring people without work permits is only one of 
these. The illegal employees are paid off-books cash-in-hand, and the wages are very low. 
In many instance, the wages were reported to be just 50p an hour though some of these jobs 
were in large and very profitable faetones; the owners of two of such faetones are among 
the Asian millionaires in Britain. 
Working conditions for illegal workers in Britain show that their social status is 
equivalent to that of an average worker in the sub-continent in that both lend themselves to 
coercive control as a result of their basic poverty. Instances of new immigrant exploitation 
in Asian industry show that Asian culture contains some elements that lead to a relationship 
of control behaviour with the social status of the persons involved. This has a cultural 
background whereby weaknesses in people are often exploited to derive certain advantages. 
For example, a house owned by a man of high social position would fetch a far greater price 
than if the same house was owned by one in lower social position, particularly if the seller 
was in some kind of difficulty. Another example is the common observation that Asian girls 
whose parents have a higher social position are more likely to be treated better in the 
husband's family than those whose parents come from comparatively lower social back-
round. Even within a family or clan, less rich relatives may receive less favourable treatment 
than that extended to richer relatives; the base of salutary attitude is often not honesty or hard 
work but one's possessions, with little regard to how these are acquired. 
Control related to perceptions of status, and the consequent alienation from the workplace 
We have already noted that in the sub-continent, manual/physical trades are culturally 
perceived as inferior, and this is reflected in the humiliating attitude of business owners and 
non-manual employees towards manual workers. The treatment of peasants by landowners 
also reflects the feudal valúes whereby the peasants are treated so low that they are not 
allowed to sit on chairs in front of the land lords but must sit on the dusty ground[4]. The 
[4]An interviewee asked his peasants to sit on charpoys rather than on the dusty 
ground but his relatives complained that he was pampering them, which would turn them 
proud, and they would not work hard on the lands. Asians who have lived long enough in 
Britain to get aecustomed to comparatively high social equality among people, often criticize 
expressions of inherent inequality in the sub-continent, but most seldom bother to reform 
their own inherent altitudes. 
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relationship of attitude with the perception of the power of the subject, his social class or 
group, is one cause of many tensions, inferiorities, conflicts and divisions. In most Asian 
organizations, several tacit classifications (based on possession of property and means of 
production, caste and occupation in one's home country) exist and consequently, the tone of 
address and attitudes differ when the addressee belongs to lower/upper category. People in 
weaker positions maybe sensitive about their status while those in stronger positions could 
be aware of the power they nave over others and may ignore the weaker's self-esteem. 
However, a paradox is that it is usually among equi-status persons that friction and coercive 
control is more observable, probably because they cannot afford antagonism with a higher 
status person, though this too is not an impossibility (in a Gulf university, I found a female 
teacher at loggerheads with the head of department but discovered later that her being on 
very cióse terms with the deán, was a source of her perception of power over her boss). 
The principie of equality in treatment, as described by Fayol in his General and 
Industrial Management (by doing justice and sympathy to subordinates, we may raise their 
morale), is not applied in most Asian firms, and this was found to cause much resentment 
and demoralization among the employees. Inequitable treatment is related to conflict and 
motivation in that those treated as somehow inferior, may resent the power of those treated 
better, and may lose motivation to work honestly and diligently. In non-monetary ways of 
inequitable treatment, there are observable class distinctions maintained which are claimed 
to be essential to keep 'control over workers'. The extent of worker alienation (a Marxist 
term) from the workplace was very obvious in that most often, the interviewees in this study 
could not remember the ñames of the firms where they had worked for months and years; 
I see the reasons for not remembering the ñame of the workplace in the alienation of 
employees from the workplace and the unpleasant memories associated with it (Freud stated 
that people tend to repress the memories of unpleasant events). Most Asian employers too, 
do not see the workers as a part of the organization; when I asked a director of a firm to tell 
me about their organization structure, he mentioned none other than the three owner brothers. 
Control attitudes in English firms 
The aforementioned description of the personal and subjective means of control found 
in Asian organizations, emphasizes the need for work control in manners other than by 
personal observation, such as by setting reasonable targets for each employee's production, 
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self-filling in of forms for the quantity produced at the end of the day, raising motivation 
enough to lead to self-control, etc. Such impersonal means of control are often found in 
English owned firms: These reportedly include having quality control departments, trained 
inspectors, a discipline whereby workers are answerable to one foreman and not to many, 
and clearly defined, easy-to-follow job and duty lists. At times, personal checking is 
indispensable and is done in English firms as well, but in most English owned businesses, 
the comparative clarity of procedures and instructions, the general feeling of being trusted 
and milder control in person (where personal watching is essential) were greatly appreciated 
by those who have also worked in comparable Asian businesses. The significance of a polite 
and trusting management attitude in enhancing motivation was a recurring theme in the 
interviews[5]. One major reason for the interviewees' preference for English managed 
factories was the unopressive environment and polite attitude they had found there. Control 
issues in English firms were not linked by the respondents to conflict situations or potential 
conflict. In most cases, the English organizations have been successful in avoiding conflict 
situations related to control issues, by designing impersonal means of control. Even where 
White and Asian workers work side by side and there is some kind of resentment between 
the races, conflict does not arise when impersonal means of control are in effect. 
Events where one finds a hard attitude in a manager have been reponed but these, as 
the reports show, are either inconclusive on the part of respondent or they clearly mention 
that they see these as minor problems and not as a cause for conflict[6]. In most Western 
companies, some channels of protest are open to unhappy workers. For example, they can 
go to the personnel department, or to a sénior manager, something which is not likely to 
[5]For excerpts from interviews, see pages 349 to 353, section titled: 'Control 
attitudes in English firms...'. 
[6]One respondent (p. 352, statement 5) found himself and his brother, on occasions, 
pressed to work quicker in an English large departmental store. But the expériences of the 
two brothers must be viewed in the context that, being from a prosperous middle class 
family, one of them studying to become a solicitor, they were not as hard pressed to work 
as most interviewees in this study, and consequently a bit quick to quit; the events described 
do not reflect a significant conflict situation, for during Christmas, it is not surprising that 
the manager of wines and spirits department would be hard pressing his staff. In a small 
English business, an interviewée (p. 353, statement 6) found the speed of work very fast but 
then she said she was a new worker, and speed comes with expérience. Another interviewée 
(p. 353, statement 7) reported that in an English firm slow workers could be fired. 
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happen in most Asian businesses due to the de facto strictly maintained class barriers. About 
excessive speed of work and the amount of work required of workers in Western businesses, 
the interviewées expressed mixed feelings. Generally, the speed and amount of work was 
reported to be reasonable, but occasionally there could be excessively task-oriented managers. 
Non-work control has not been reported to exist in English owned businesses. 
Personal authority was not exercised. Many organizations went to great lengths to provide 
prayer facilities and time changes to accommodate their Muslim employées. This may have 
its origins in the culture-bred tolérance of the English compared to many other societies 
where minorities are not tolerated particularly when they are successful in making wealth or 
getting higher jobs (e.g. the persécution of Ahmadees in Pakistan). 
Summary and contributions of chapter 11 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) In most British-Asian organizations, instances of negative assumptions and Theory 
X type of beliefs are commonly reported to be found in the attitudes of owners, managers, 
Supervisors and among employées themselves. Numerous events were quoted in this respect 
by nearly all respondents complaining that they are not considered trustworthy and thus too 
much personal control is exercised by the owners, managers or Supervisors. In fact the word 
'control' is often understood by employées as meaning 'keeping an eye on the employées' 
and 'personal watching' so that when asked about control system in their Organization, most 
only teil about the owning family members, partners or managers/supervisors personally 
watching the workers. Unlike the European way, little attention is paid to the worker's seif 
esteem. There are patterns of personal control existing in Asian business and industry when 
impersonal means of control could be used. The use of Supervisors and selected workers as 
informers on other's work and non-work related activities breeds tension and resentments; 
rivais strive to be in the employers' good books and a net work of intrigue and politics may 
lead to various kind of conflict. Religious and cultural rights of non-Muslims are hardly 
respected in Muslim-owned and dominated organizations. 
(2) Task-oriented attitudes exist in native-British businesses but the nature of task-
orientation is not reported as somehow painful by the respondents because, most often, goals 
and procédures are made clear to the employées. The speed of work is reasonably set 
compared to Asian businesses. The feeling of trust exists in most cases and self-control is 
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facilitated by fewer inspections aimed at the work quality and quantity rather than the 
worker's personal arrangements of time spending. Flexi-time, if available, and better 
management attitude have been appreciated by many interviewees. The impersonal nature of 
work organization and control has been reported to ease tensions and resentments and thus 
avoid potential control-related conflict even among different races. There could be occasional 
strict management attitudes but the respondents do not see these as major problems or 
reasons for conflict. Unlike in Asian firms, non-work control and undue exercise of authority 
is not reported. Religious/cultural rights of people are observed and facilities provided even 
though it costs time and money to the firm. 
A study of Asian and native-British companies working in Britain provides ideal 
experimental conditions for comparison, because the broader cultural, social, and legal-
governmental climate is the same for both, The findings strongly support our thesis that 
authoritarianism (as indicated by unnecessarily domineering attitude, and direction of control 
more at the weaker social status people) is learned first in one's family and immediate 
culture. This supports our general 'culture and personality' approach taken in this work. 
The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that the structures and 
de facto functions ofthe institutions of a culture shape patterns ofbehaviour shown in that: 
(i) Asian view of control and motivation is more oriented towards Theory Xwhile the native-
British view is more oriented towards Theory Y; 
(ii) the greater incidence of control-related conflict in Asian companies shows that inter-
personal conflict is linked to non-work, personal, and authoritarian control; 
(iii) Asians show less tolerancefor one 'spersonal views/needs, Ufe style, ideology and religión 
than do the native British; 
(iv) The native British are very particular about equity in treatment of employees while the 
Asians show dijferentiated treatment on account of one 's socio-economic status; 
(v) Asian control is related to perceptions of status and power and is consequently alienating 
while the British control is impersonal, related to task and functions and imparts greater 
motivation; consequently we again find our recurring theme that, 
(vi) cultural factors strongly influence, if not determine, people 's attitudes towards control, 
conflict, and motivation. 
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Chapter Twelve: A Comparison of Conflict Attitudes in Asian and English Businesses 
Many interviewees reported incidents of physical conflict in the Asian organizations 
where they worked or had worked earlier[l]. Major causes of conflict in Asian factories were 
reported to be abuse of power and authority over those in weaker positions and over female 
workers, and religious or cultural divisions. A few instances of physical conflict between 
owners and workers were reported, and the causes were often found in the use of coercive 
control by the owners or intrigues by the supervisors who wanted 'to show their worth'. 
However, direct conflict between employers and workers was not observed as much as 
conflict among employees of more or less same status. This is in conformity with the 
findings in the sub-continent where managers were treated with greater deference than that 
shown for fellow workers/supervisors. Instances of worker's filling the ears of owner's 
against fellow workers, support the thesis that there are more divisions among workers than 
are among the higher income groups. In the sub-continent, this may ha ve its origins in the 
workers' insecurity about their future. This, presumably, is one reason that keeps them tense 
and may make them turn their frustration against each other. In Britain, however, where 
basic survival is guaranteed by the welfare system, acrimonious attitudes in the workplace 
show that class distinctions and oppressive control can frústrate the subject regardless of the 
presence of basic economic security. If conflict was only between employers and employees, 
the causes could be more safely related to objective conditions of employment (low wages, 
no paid holidays, job-insecurity etc.) but, it was found in the interviews that there was more 
incidence of conflict among workers than between workers and seniors. In search of possible 
causes of such intra-class conflict, we might refer to the culturally bred dominance-seeking 
attitudes that are often observable in Asian organizations, particularly in the sub-continent 
and often in Middle Eastern countries. Dominance seeking attitudes (I have borrowed this 
term from an interviewee as I found it quite appropriate in describing authoritarian 
behaviour) were usually described by the interviewees as follows; 
"when the boss scolds one, the latter takes it out on others. Its not a respectable 
environment. Each wants to put his foot on the other; we cali it 'dominance seeking' 
attitudes." (Oldham). 
Dominance seeking for the sake of itself is distinguished from functional authority 
[l]For statements about inter-personal conflict, see pages 328 to 330 and 340 to 342. 
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(task required dominance such as for example, in the military) in that first, while the latter 
is top-down, the former is often as much horizontal as vertical and second, the former is not 
a task-related necessity but a cultural phenomenon. Thus not only those who are in position 
of power, but almost everyone may seek dominance if the desire to do so is culturally 
instilled. Moreover, the subjective, culturally instilled authoritative attitude is often 
reciprocated and hence dysfunctional in achieving compliance. 
Conflict among employées of the same status is shown in Asian organizations, in its 
most subtle forni, in people trying to discourage each other in order to what is known as 
'increase one's score' and to show that one is better at knowing and doing one's work than 
are the others. We noted this kind of compétition among managers as well, in the sub-
continent. Such compétition often takes the shape of discouraging one from showing his 
abilities and skills in order to keep him from taking higher and more responsible jobs or 
because one's dexterity may make the others feel insecure of their positions in the 
organization. Unhealthy compétition is shown with more intensity among lower ranks than 
among senior ranks and hence maybe directly proportional to the sense of job security among 
rivai contenders, or to the ambitious nature of competing personnel. Many illiterate workers 
particularly deride those among them who have ambitions to get an éducation and to rise in 
social status. Illiterate relatives may snub those in the family who want to get an éducation. 
In one such case, a number of relatives of an interviewée long settled in Britain, who were 
making good money through factory work and considered éducation a waste of time, used 
to taunt that he had "delusions of grandeur". 
Workers may also fight with each other if the control system is not properly designed 
so that in the event of poor work performance, the person responsible and accountable for 
the wrongly done work could not be traced. Religious[2], cultural and politicai différences 
between workers, supervisore and employers were one reason behind many conflicts. In the 
sub-continent, such différences coupled with caste, language, clan and régional différences 
are known well to have lead to many violent clashes and riots (see chapter 5). The same 
culturally engendered conflicts exist among the immigrants in the U . K . but their intensity is 
watered down to some extent by certain common interests of the immigrants. 
[2]For detailed interviewée narrations see page 340 section titled: "Conflict related 
to religious divisions...". 
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In Britain I had interviews and conversations with many Asian employers and there 
are some common narrations which can safely be pointed at. Asian employers generally view 
conflict, in keeping with the traditions back home, as trouble-making which needs to be dealt 
with authoritatively. Conflict is often seen as "workers complaining against each other" 
(which is not far from reality in view of greater intra-class conflict observed in this study) 
and the task of conflict-resolution is usually entrusted to Supervisors. We may note that the 
employers' description of conflict-resolution is not différent from employées' descriptions: 
"if the workers quarrelled amongst themselves the owners would not be interested 
until it was beyond limits" (Oldham), and , 
"sometimes the bosses call them (those in conflict) into the office but often they try 
to résolve the conflict at the work station" (Manchester). 
Frustrated new immigrants and conflict 
Coercive control by the owners/supervisors over illegal workers is one source of 
conflict. It was reported about many Asian small and medium factories that the largest 
problem they had was that they had a lot of men who had come to Britain as spouses to 
Asians holding British nationality; many interviewées reported the frustrations of the new 
entrants, at being mistreated in the homes of their in-laws and in the workplace, as one cause 
of conflict[3]. The new immigrants typically, have regulär quarrels with their wives because 
the wives speak English which they cannot understand. They are not entitled to income 
support for a year, cannot speak English, and know nothing about the society, the offices and 
other things. If they stay at home, they are bullied by their in-laws where they must live 
because of total dependency on the latter. They keep searching for jobs but when they get 
one, they are not even allowed to talk at their workplace and have to work nearly double the 
hours of an average worker, at wages of just 50p an hour if the usuai rate is around £2 per 
hour, because they are new and, it is said, that, "they know nothing". The owners take 
advantage of their weaker immigration status in that they cali them whenever they need them 
- even on Sundays. These new-comers know that if they do not obey, they would rot as 
jobless people with absolutely no source of income. Quite often, the older immigrants tell 
the new immigrants, who do not know much about Britain, discouraging stories about the 
White people, in order to enjoy the conséquent demoralization in the latter, to make them 
[3]For interviewée Statements, see pages 331 to 335 section titled: 'Typical cases of 
British Asian coercive control... Frustrated new immigrants and inter-personal conflict'. 
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dépendent and tied to the former, and hence more vulnérable to exploitation. For example, 
a new immigrant, a young man who refused to sweep the factory floor, but later realized his 
mistake and tried to sweep, was made fun of for his volta face (not standing by one's beliefs 
is seen as a sign of weakness, and the one who changes himself is often derided as 'not a real 
man'). He was derided by fellow Asian workers and made to feel so embarrassed that he felt 
he could not stay on his job. A White supervisor who said to him, "I will eut your tfiroat", 
was certainly not serious because, as narrated by the interviewée, when he went outside, the 
said supervisor came after him and gave him another task, but the older Asian workers 
instilled fear in him by telling him, "he has stabbed someone before" (had he done so, he 
would not be in the job). One can see here the typical enjoyment which many draw by 
frightening those new corners who think rather high of themselves. Because the interviewée 
had recently come to Britain and knew nothing about the White people, when fear was 
instilled in him by the senior Asian workers, he took it seriously. 
Lesser challenge from traditional female workers in Asian factories 
Asian employers in the U . K . usually prefer female workers to maie workers, where 
the nature of the tasks will allow, (there were many times more female workers than maie, 
in ail Asian textile-related organizations reported about in thèse interviews) perhaps because 
female workers are less likely to question and develop a state of confrontation with the 
employers or amongst themselves, and are therefore comparatively easy to deal with. A 
female worker explained: 
'because the employer was a man, the female workers couldn't exactly go up and say, 
"look, I am fed up, you don't pay me enough, and I am having to work harder"; so they 
would go to the wife and complain to her, but she would just say, "yes, yes, yes", or if she 
wasn't in a very good mood, she would say, "well, that's it, go and get job at another 
place". The women never thought of taking a collective action like going to some 
government office - or finding a government régulation about work conditions because, I 
suspect that, first, they didn't know, and, second, it was beyond their imagination that they 
could do such a thing - collect together and demand. It was out of the world' (Leicester). 
Most Asian women are brought up in a social environment where it is difficult for 
them to question a maie. As they expect a male to have a greater say and authority in 
matters, they tend to take and accept much more controlling behavior from a man than a man 
would take. In the above mentioned example of the female workers complaining to the wife 
because they couldn't complain to the man, the wife too, being a female, couldn't possibly 
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talk about this to her husband, for this could be considered as moving beyond her station. 
Perhaps she too wanted her husband to make more profits for the family, and so, while she 
avoided the complaining women at times, she felt piqued at why the said women did not 
realize her incapacity in influencing her husband. 
Conflict related to sexual harassment 
Four out of ten respondents whose interviews were recorded in 1991-92 reported 
instances of sexual harassment leading to conflict situation in some Asian organizations^]. 
In the interviews recorded in 1994, the respondents were all male, and the questions about 
sexual harassment were not asked but one interviewee mentioned such an incidence of his 
own accord. It must be pointed out that sexual harassment is a Western term and the 
meanings it conveys are not a true measure of the gravity of discrimination and exploitation 
on sexual basis that is rampant in the sub-continent and in the Middle East, not particularly 
in the workplace. The difference lies in that while women in the West live with the assurance 
that in case of harassment or discrimination, the social and legal system (media, courts, 
police etc.) would help them, women in most Muslim countries must bear with the fact that 
the social system would protect them only if they stay within the pales of the rigid family 
system and within the instructions of their male kin. In particular, women from the lower 
classes, who are forced by the necessity of circumstances (death of husband, abandonment, 
or poverty etc.) to step outside the boundaries of the household, and go to work, often live 
under threats of rape and abuse because the common view about women held in most Muslim 
societies, is that they should not step outside their domestic duties and child rearing, and that 
a woman who does step out is perceived by many as of a promiscuous predisposition; thus 
many keep an eye on such hard pressed women to take advantage of their situational 
weaknesses. Numerous events of sexual black-mail are reported by working women's 
associations in the sub-continent, who demand change of attitudes. 
A deeper analysis here is beyond the scope of this work, but it maybe mentioned that 
segregation in most Muslim countries begins at the age of six or seven. Thus, boys and girls 
grow in an environment where elders keep a vigil on them to ensure separation between the 
[4]For detailed interviewee statements, see page 340, section titled: Tnter-personal 
conflict related to sexual harassment'. 
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two sexes. Because of the preemptive enforcement of segregation, and the penalties imposed 
upon violation, especially upon girls, most boys grow up with an image of girls primarily 
as sex objects while most girls grow with an image of men as fearsome and commanding. 
Because no relationship other than familial is allowed, the negative assumption that when 
non-related men and women meet, it would always lead to them having sex, sinks in the 
minds (this is shown in the Islamic aphorism, 'when a non-related man and woman meet, the 
third present at the occasion is the deviV): The whole practice is dysfunctional in that the 
consciousness in this respect develops all in sexist terms with such an intensity that a 
relationship between man and woman is perceived either in familial or in libidinal context; 
there is no third ground; a woman cannot be a colleague, a class-fellow, or a friend. 
The cultural nature of sexual harassment is shown in that the source of sexual 
harassment in Asian owned factories could be from any social class, not particularly from 
the owners though their positions enable them to have greater power over female workers. 
Having a lowly view of women and seeing them as objects of sex, pervades the lower classes 
as much as the upper though there is more opportunity in the upper classes to grow out of 
it. But the social power of upper class males over lower class females is known to be a major 
cause of sexual exploitation in the sub-continent and in most Muslim countries. One would 
expect a marked change of behaviour among Asians in Britain but, as the interviewees 
report, there is little difference from the behaviour back home, except for some of the 
younger generation who are conscious of the need for social progress. 
The important thing to note here is that when men in senior positions try to take 
advantage of subordinate women from a lower social background, the owners or others in 
authority, unlike what is expected in an English or Western environment, do not usually take 
action against the men; this was seen in many reported events: In one incident, the husband 
of a harassed girl was handed over to the police because he came to the factory and fought 
with the supervisor who had harassed his wife. No action however was taken against the 
supervisor. In yet another factory, it was alleged by many girls that a collusion existed 
between the owner and the supervisor who both sought vulnerable female workers. One old 
woman did not let me record her statement except for the following: "I have cut my tongue, 
there is so much corruption, any talk of honesty gets you nowhere" ('cutting one's tongue' 
is an idiom in Punjabi, which means, "I am no longer talking because I am too afraid"; 
another idiom which refers to outside pressure leading to silence is, "his tongue has been 
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cut"). Apparently, the said interviewee got afraid at my questions and refused to carry on. 
I then turned the tape recorder off and then, in passing, she told me about the incidence of 
sexual harassment of a certain female worker, and then left in a hurry. A more detailed 
account in this respect was provided by another interviewee who, having been brought up 
in Britain, was not shy and fearrul. 
Marriage in countries where the rights of women are culturally limited, and where 
economic and other power-bestowing means are concentrated in men's hands, has not 
succeeded in limiting many men, who come across opportunities, to their spouses. In many 
cases, marriage can be the best cover for a sexually exploitative man because his wife, for 
fear of divorce and the consequent social stigmatization inflicted upon a divorced women, 
may find it wiser to ignore her husband's flirtations as many examples show. What in the 
West is known as infidelity is often sanctioned for men under one or the other pretext in 
Muslims countries and in the sub-continent. Instances of abuse of female workers and 
children in the sub-continent, Gulf, and Middle East are widely reported on. 
Asian workers and conflict in English-owned firms 
Non-work conflict was not reported to occur in Western businesses. With the English 
managers, many said, minor disputes about work arrangement, design and targets of 
production, machine lay-out arrangements, etc. do arise but such disputes are not serious and 
almost always end up in a compromise. In most Western medium/large businesses there are 
formal procedures and channels available if there is a conflict situation, and complaints are 
not left without enquiry, but such a practice is largely absent in comparable Asian businesses. 
However, there have been conflicts related to unión activities and strikes by Asian workers 
against the management, always reported to be for wage increases. Many White managers, 
realizing the difficulties in communicating with Asians, hand-over charge of Asian affairs to 
Asian supervisors, but this often leads to an Asian sub-organization within a White one, and 
many commonplace elements of the Asian culture (mischief for competition, intolerance, 
nepotism, authoritarianism and ethnic/cultural conflict) spring up[5]. 
Many interviewees noted the differences between the behaviour of English and Asian 
[5]Note the similarity here to the events, quoted in chapter 9, in the German and 
British multinationals, where top management tasks were handed over to Pakistani managers 
and this lead to the creeping of some local cultural elements in the said multinationals. 
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workers, as being that Asian workers do not collectively stand up to authority but try to 
show, individually and secretly, to the authorities, that they are better than the rest. It was 
often reported that Asians individually betray their collectively taken decisions[6]. 
In an American factory in Britain, it was found that there were strong cultural 
éléments in why the team-leader method of work Organization caused a lot of resentment, and 
yet could not even be abandoned. The case study reveals that Asians build certain bonds and 
divisions among people that often render them unable to solve problems as would be solved 
relatively simply and easily among Europeans. In the said factory, the création of a 
seemingly unnecessary level of 'team-leaders'[7] in between the levels of machine Operators 
and setters/supervisors led to resentment and tensions among the Asian Operators. The White 
Operators did not express any such resentment: The élévation of some Operators to team 
leaders, and giving the latter 50p an hour more than the others, was taken by the White 
Operators in a différent spirit. Besides, the attitude of the White team leaders among White 
Operators was différent, but, as the descriptions reveal, the attitude of the Asian team leaders, 
after having acquired their newly 'elevated status', became authoritarian and rather 
indifferent to the state of their fellow Asian Operators. We may recali the cases from sub-
continent factories where authoritarianism was a major issue in control and conflict: The 
behaviour of Asian team leaders in the said American factory was not différent but limited 
only to the extent that the authority to hire and fire, détermination of wages, and granting 
promotions, was not in their hands. A newly recruited Operator was persuaded by the other 
Operators to take the issue to the White production manager, who called a meeting of ail 
Asian workers. The said workers, to the amazement of the one whom they themselves had 
persuaded to take up the issue, "took a U-turn", and said that they had absolutely no 
[6]For events of Asian workers in conflict in British firms, see pages 354 to 362, 
sections titled: 'Tensions among...'; and 'Asian workers attitudes towards unions in native 
British firms'. Also see chapter 15. 
[7]The method of work Organization in teams and team leaders has been reported to 
work well in high-tech manufacturing and research organizations where the team members 
have a chance to learn from the expertise of the team leader, and where the team leader can 
allocate work in accordance with the varying skills and aptitudes of the members, and 
coordinate their activities. However, the said method does not suit Organization where the 
nature of tasks is simple, répétitive, and uniform, where the workers feel better off by having 
equal ranks and levels, and a work distribution that is equal and fair among all, so that the 
need for team leaders does not arise. 
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problem: It was later discovered that the operators and the team leaders were either relatives 
or friends, and therefore, while the new-comer was secretly persuaded to take up the issue, 
the operators did not expect that the production manager would cali them to a meeting. Once 
in a meeting, the Asian operators could not offend their relative or friend team leaders. 
Summary and contributions of chapter 12 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(1) Inter-personal physical conflict is not common but reported more in Asian-British 
businesses than in the native-British. The reasons were found in personal control, abuse of 
powers, personality clash among rivais seeking employers' favours, organizational politics 
and intrigue, lower motivation resulting in greater tension, religious/regional différences and 
class-based attitudes. There is greater occurrence of intra-level than inter-level conflict. 
(2) Sexual harassment is a greater problem in Asian organizations than in the Western because 
the assumptions behind ségrégation make many men see women in sexist terms while many 
women grow fearful of men and thus more vulnérable to control and harassment. Conflict 
due to sexual harassment may sometimes lead to violence between the relatives of the 
harassed women and the perpetrator of such harassment. 
(3) There are seldom any formai conflict resolution procédures in Asian organizations and 
most issues are dealt with on ad-hoc and individuai basis. Persons of greater value to the 
owners may not be investigated against when events of injustice occur and hence 
circumstances may lead to oppression of the weaker by those in higher hierarchical positions. 
The cultural élément of ignoring the conflict or repressing it with authority plays a key rôle 
in the Asian way of conflict resolution. Examples of dismissal of workers on spot have been 
reported and the word of a favored supervisor is normally considered weightier than that of 
a worker. Even when the charges against a favoured man were as grave as sexual 
exploitation, little action was taken. Female workers are less likely to enter into conflict. 
(4) In most native-British medium/large companies, there are formai procédures and channels 
available for conflict resolution and issues are not let go without proper inquiry. 
(5) Non-work conflict was not reported in native-British businesses. With the 'White' 
managers, minor disputes about work arrangement, machine lay-out and design, and targets 
of production do arise but thèse are not serious and often resuit in a compromise. 
(6) However, greater collective action was taken by Asian workers in native-British companies 
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than in British Asian, almost always on demand of wage increases though wages (as reported 
in the following chapter) in native-British companies are many times higher than in Asian. 
(7)Strikes and collective protest action by Asian workers in native-British companies have 
almost always been ineffective because of the following reasons; (i)individual betrayal (to 
seek self-advantage from the management) of collectively taken decisions; (ii)a social bonding 
and división pattern that makes it difficult for Asians to solve problems as would be relatively 
easily solved among the Europeans; (iii)individualist status and money orientation that 
renders equi-status Asians unable to genérate cohesiveness in group. 
Finding (6) suggests that greater expectations are a greater stimulant to protest action 
than are bad working conditions. The findings such as that conflict is generally repressed in 
Asian firms but sought resolution in the native-British, shall be taken to our Grounded Theory 
to show that, 
(i) culturally engendered propensity to conflict does exist and therefore, British-Asians show 
many divisions found in home countries (mentioned in chapter 5); 
(ii) the greater incidence of control-related conflict in Asian companies shows that inter-
personal conflict is linked to non-work, personal, and authoritarian control; 
(iii) segregation ofsexes often produces sexism which leads to greater control and harassment 
ofwomen in workplace; and, 
(iv) greater individualism and a particular social bonding/divisions pattern renders collective 
action by Asian 's ineffective. 
The findings shall be used in chapter 16 to suggest ways of transforming a conflict 
prone cognitive culture and to suggest that the structure andfunctions ofthe institutions of 
a culture determine patterns of control and conflict. 
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Chapter Thirteen: A Comparison of Motivation and Working Conditions in British-Asian and 
Native British Businesses 
(a)The reasons for higher turnover in Asian firms 
In businesses which do not require skilled or highly trained workers, where training 
new workers does not take long, and where new workers are relatively easily available, high 
turnover is profitable to the employer in many ways. First, he does not have to bother about 
designing an elaborate system of recruitment, selection, evaluation, remuneration, increments 
and promotions etc. which is essential when long term employees are to be kept. Second, he 
can save on wages by hiring trainees at apprentice wages who, by the time they might expect 
to get a reasonable salary, may already be preparing to leave. It was commonly reported that 
leaving a job after a few months if not weeks is a common experience for most workers in 
Asian businesses, and more rarely in English businesses[see endnote 1]. 
Schedule of Comparison 
Average Duration in the 12 small Asian firms in the study: 5.67 months 
Average Duration in the 9 medium/large Asian firms: 17 months 
Net average for the 21 Asian firms in this study: 10.52 months 
Average Duration in the 7 small English firms in this study: 20.14 months 
Average Duration in the 31 medium/large English firms: 46.06 months 
Net Average for the 38 English firms in this study: 41.29 months 
Difference in Turnover between English and Asian firms: 30.77 months 
To do justice in determining causes of high turnover there is a need to take into 
account reasons other than bad working conditions. There could be reasons such as one's 
personal propensity to keep changing one's workplace. However, because the subjects in this 
study were selected at random, if the reasons for quitting or dismissal were employee-related 
and not organization-related, the bias arising out of this, in all probability, would be equal 
for Asian and English firms, and hence, would not bear negatively on the validity of the 
conclusions drawn. Though the data is limited and the analysis does not take into account all 
considerations such as factory closure and factory translocation, these factors were there 
mostly in the case of English businesses and so the bias, if any, only favours the Asian firms 
figures and therefore has no bearing on the conclusion drawn that turnover is higher in Asian 
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firms. Therefore, the data does serve well in imparting a fair idea that Asian organizations 
in particular, and some English organizations as well, are not keen on long-term employées. 
Unskilled workers quitting jobs mainly because of an employer's rough attitude is also 
common. Although numerous instances were reported to this effect, such résignations do not 
seem to bother the employers because of the easy availability of unskilled workers. While 
most Asian workers blamed exploitation by Asian owners as reasons for quitting jobs too 
soon, many employers attributed the causes of high turnover to workers' higher ideals. While 
many employers reported that a shortage of skilled workers makes them keep in touch with 
the job centers, the career offices, and the Y T S , many new workers reported that they had 
to leave a certain job after a few days because the employers were not willing to train them, 
or because the experienced workers there made fun of their inexpérience. Although, in many 
factories, it was reported, there was room for extra workers and there were facilities for 
training (the government departments were cooperative and sent school leavers on YTS 
schemes), most employers said that the YTS scheme is not very effective because the 
majority of young apprentices leave without completing their training. Most employers deny 
that the apprentices face any particular problems, but, they say, the school leavers have high 
ideals and do not want to be operators or machinists; most go back to the YTS to get jobs 
where they could be better adjusted. 
Most Asian employers state that they have no long-term agreements with any 
employées, and that even their regular employées do not stay longer than an average of two 
years. This is also supported by the data quoted above. In quoting reasons for not keeping 
long-term employées, the Asian employers often state that the government and the labour 
laws do not require them to keep long-term employées. And furthermore, particularly in the 
textile industry, they usually employ Asian girls many of whom want to leave after they get 
married, want to go to their home countries after about two years, or become pregnant and 
want to give up work. Very few resumé work after their maternity leave. Regarding the 
implementation of some motivation techniques to make people stay longer, almost ali 
employers were pessimistic, and claimed that it was the will of the workers that they got fed 
up after working for a while, looked for other jobs, and that even an increase in wages would 
not help. However, contrary to the pessimism expressed by Asian employers, most workers 
do stay when wages and working conditions are good, particularly in English businesses. 
Where workers do stay longer, the reasons most often reported were, incréments in wages, 
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job enlargement or enrichment, good relations with fellow workers, and polite behaviour. 
Flexi-time also was appreciated by many workers as a motivating factor. In many jobs where 
even though most work rights (paid holidays and overtime extra rate) were not available, 
flexi-time and polite employer behaviour kept the interviewees in their jobs. Even where the 
money earned was low, a kinder attitude, some freedom, especially that to talk to fellow 
workers, was widely appreciated as enhancing motivation. 
Most Asian companies, even large businesses, do not show enthusiasm for training 
workers. Many Asian organizations are reported to either ignore or provide little training, 
most often, on-the-job very short-period training. In most job advertisements, a minimum 
experience of two years is mentioned as required, hence of little encouragement to the 
beginner. However, in many large English firms, government schemes such as Industrial 
Training Boards and Y T S , have been a major stimulant in providing training to workers, 
despite many managers being reportedly not keen to release men to go for training, because 
of having to hire a replacement, or pay overtime, which increases the costs of operations. 
Where the companies can reclaim the cost of training from the government, some 'fiddling 
with figures' was reported in the case of a few companies. 
(b)Inequitv in remuneration 
In most Asian firms, wage and overtime payment is done on an ad-hoc basis in so far 
as each worker is assessed, subjectively, for what he/she is worth and what would be the 
least he/she would be willing to work for. Negotiations, carried out at an individual level, 
result in uneven wages for people on similar jobs, and, in much under-payment compared 
to what the law suggests, or what English firms would pay in a similar situation. The 
incidence of considerable inequity in wages, among Asian firms, was often reported by the 
interviewees[l]. Many Asian employees express resentment at unequal wages and spend 
considerable time in finding out how much the others get. In many factories, the curiosity 
to find how much the others get leads to squabbles, which is not different from the situation 
in the sub-continent/Middle East. Annual increments at a certain Arab-Asian bank were the 
preoccupation of nearly all employees for weeks after the increments had been granted. 
[l]For interviewee statements, see pages 335 -336, section titled: 'Low wages in 
Asian businesses....'. 
174 
Although the relationship of rewards to one's socio-economic status is also observable 
in the Western societies, such a situation is not as pervasive as to include persons on similar 
jobs within one organization. Among the several prerogatives of a properly designed 
organizational structure are equitable treatment for all participants, at least comparable pay 
scales between slightly different levéis of hierarchy, and the same pay for persons on similar 
jobs in terms of the amount of work done, the level of qualification and skills required, and 
the level of difficulty of the task. Determining how much one should get is, in theory, related 
to the amount of effort put in and the level of education and skills required. There is a basic 
Western business principie that those on the same jobs, at least in one firm, should get the 
same pay for an equal amount of work done. When Asian immigrants carne to Britain in the 
fifties and sixties, British employers could have hired them at a fraction of what they were 
paying to White workers (as is customary in the Middle East for immigrant workers, and in 
the sub-continent for workers from poorer regions) but they paid them as much as they paid 
to their White workers. However, the same justice is not seen in most other societies where 
remuneration is related to one's social and economic status. In the Arabian Gulf countries, 
on average, around 25% extra payment is made to the natives who have the same official 
capacity and tasks as foreigners have. Further divisions exist in that Egyptians, Filipinos, and 
South East Asians are paid much less than Europeans/Americans on equi-level or same jobs. 
(c) Lower wages in Asian firms 
In cases where there is a regular and uniform system of wage payment, it often does 
not take into account the remuneration legislation which is probably not in forcé. Out of 18 
Asian firms[see endnote 2] about which information was obtained, none was found to comply 
with minimum wage legislation, and only 3 paid as high wages as £2.5 an hour. Only 3 out 
of 23 firms paid overtime rate for more than 40 hours work. None paid double rate for 
Sundays, and only 2 allowed paid vacations. The sick pay was generally left to the DSS. For 
legally employed workers, the average wages come to only £1.69/hour. Out of 23 Asian 
businesses, 17 were reponed to employ a certain number of illegal and off-books workers 
at wage rates between 50p to £l/hour. 
(d) Wages in comparable English firms 
Contrary to the above mentioned conditions in Asian firms, the regular practice in 
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most English businesses is much doser to légal prescription[2]. Out of 27 English businesses 
about which information was obtained, only 4 paid wages less than £2.50/hour. Only in 3 
English firms was the wage rate as low as in the Asian firms, and in only two firms wages 
were given off-books. 28 out of 32 firms paid overtime (1.5% and above) for more than 40 
hours a week work, and even among the least paying firms, over-time was paid. Most firms 
allow 15 days paid leave at Christmas, plus one month paid leave a year, one and a quarter 
rate for overtime on working days, one and a half rate for Saturdays, and double rate for 
Sundays. The average wage for English firms in this study came to £3.69/hour, which is 
£2/hour higher than that for the Asian firms. 
Schedule of Comparison 
Asian English 
Average wage per hour £1.69/hour 
Overtime above 40 hour week 3 out of 23 
Sunday double rate none 
Paid vacation (1 month) 2 out of 23 
Off-books employment 17 out of 23 
Off-books wages 50p-£l/hour 
£3.69/hour 
28 out of 32 
28 out of 32 
32 out of 34 
2 out of 42 
£1.75/hour 
With such working conditions as mentioned, it is little wonder that many Asian 
entrepreneurs are now among the millionaires in Britain, while amongst the workers, there 
is low motivation and high turnover. 
Socio-cultural reasons for lower wages and poorer working conditions in Asian businesses 
AH interviewees said that, typically, wages in Asian firms were very low compared 
to those in English firms. One way to keep the wages very low is to employ more women 
and illegal workers, because Asian women have been reported as less likely to question, and 
illegai workers, by the very nature of their legai status, cannot complain about whatever they 
get. Sometimes even children are employed, as was confirmed about at least one factory in 
Bradford. Most respondents reported greater employment of women than of men because of 
[2]For interviewée statements, see pages 353-354 section titled 'Better wages and 
working conditions in English firms'. 
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lower wages being more acceptable to Asian women. 
Contrary to the feelings of workers in Asian firms, those in English firms seem 
relatively satisfied with regulär wages; most often, there is a rate-system for overtime, 
Saturday and Sunday work. Unfair déductions were not reported about English owned 
businesses. In non-monetary terms, friendly gestures such as a polite and welcoming attitude, 
Christmas hampers, and many small things (for example, payment of taxi fare if your car 
breaks down), mark a différence between the Asian and the Western attitude. 
There are many common observations related to the socio-cultural learning of the 
people of the sub-continent, and several other countries, that explain quibbles over pennies 
in markets, in the workplace, and wherever a transaction takes place between people, not 
only among the lower classes. If haggling was done only by the poor, the reasons could be 
attributed to their economie insecurity, but often, rich people quarrel over pennies with the 
poor and adopt a demeaning attitude which I had thought would dissipate in the 
comparatively secure environment of the British welfare state, but it seems that cultural 
patterns, learned in early life, do not disappear for at least one or two générations, even with 
a change in social environment. 
In Pakistan, as a bank's credit officer, I was once inspecting the imported stocks of 
a steel rerolling mills pledged against a working capital loan. It was six o' clock in the 
evening and the workers had just finished a twelve hour long shift of hard work in the 
moulding shop. The owner of the factory, a very rich man, said to his cashier, "where are 
those bundles of notes we were going to change at the bank? Bring them here and pay the 
wages from them". When the cashier brought the notes, I could see that the notes were badly 
worn and would not be acceptable to any but the State Bank to be exchanged for new ones. 
The owner began paying the wages from those notes. The first worker refused to take them, 
the second refused, and soon there was a regulär brawl brewing up. I said to the owner that 
he could easily get the notes changed at the State Bank, but the illiterate workers would have 
to spend a whole day Walking on foot, in the scorching heat, to find where the State Bank 
was. The owner gave a smile of amazement because it was unexpected of a middle class bank 
officer to *take sides with the workers against a rich factory owner'; such issues are not 
usually discussed in objective, problem-solving terms, but viewed in subjective, status-related 
terms. After a hot brawl that lasted an hour, he managed to force the rotten notes on the 
workers. 
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Other than the enjoyment which many high status people in the sub-continent receive 
from such power realizing games as mentioned above, the culture of the sub-continent 
conditions people in such a way that they indulge in a frustrating scrutiny, even where petty 
amounts of money are involved, depending again, on the lower social status of the person 
being paid, and many defend such an attitude on the basis of the 'principle of exactitude'. 
A friend of mine who had done his L . L . M , and M B A in investment banking at Harvard and 
is serving in a reputable law firm in New York, came on a short visit to see me. We went 
home by taxi, and when I had paid the fare and was about to enter the house, he asked me 
to stop and began haggling over the fare for an amount equal to ten U . S . cents. His haggling 
exasperated me so much that I left him and went inside. I couldn't understand why such a 
busy affluent man would haggle for ten cents. But then I realized that he had spent his 
childhood working in his father's retail store and had acquired this habit of petty haggling 
which he couldn't rid himself of, despite his education at Harvard. He came inside with the 
two rupees that he had managed to extract from the poor taxi driver, waved them proudly 
in front of my nose, and said, "you know why you could never become rich? you are not 
exact in principles!". In many such observable cases, the stress is laid on the 'principle of 
exactitude', but the effects are usually on gathering pennies from the poor to make a pound 
for oneself. The brutalization which such demeaning attitude causes, is seldom taken into 
account. Generosity is frequently directed towards those, however undeserving, from whom 
a future benefit is expected. 
In short, there are no Christmas hampers for workers in Asian firms, and despite 
there being no fair wage rate system, to add pennies to their profits, many Asian employers 
go to the extent of deducting, from already low wages, for such things as a piece of cloth 
which gets unwittingly damaged during work. In some factories, there is even a 'rate system 
for deductions from wages'. We may note here that in cost accounting procedures, the cost 
of waste is usually added on to the cost of the product, and therefore the customers pay for 
the waste, if any. And, because the price of a certain product in Britain would be the same 
whether it was made in an Asian firm or in an English firm, the Asian employers seem to 
be getting doubly paid for the wastage; on the one hand the customers pay for it, and on the 
other hand, deductions are made from workers' wages as well. Note that proper accounting 
is rare in Asian businesses; many interviewees reported that they were not paid for completed 
work, or their sick pay or other dues. 
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For a typical situation of working conditions in Asian restaurants, see pages 331-332, 
section titled: 'Typical cases of British-Asian coercive control on new immigrants' (12 to 14 
hours a day work, six days a week, with no holidays). A comparison may be made with 
working conditions in the Western equivalent of Asian restaurants, that is, fast food outlets: 
First, employment in fast food outlets is a legal employment. The wages at around £4 an 
hour are almost three times those in Asian restaurants. The minimum working hours are eight 
a day for five days a week, but one may work more in order to get more money. The fast 
food workers can take paid holidays for at least two weeks in an year, and the jobs are 
permanent and pensionable. 
While one reason for the comparatively better attitude of Western employers may be 
seen in the possible effects of a better upbringing and ethics, we may also note that better 
wages and treatment make economic sense in that they raise the purchasing ability and 
confidence of the working class majority which is one major prerequisite for industrial 
development. But this spiral of prosperity is impaired in the sub-continent by the miserly 
behaviour of most employers despite their capacity to treat better. The sub-continent attitude 
has, demonstrably, been preserved until now in most British Asian organizations. The 
concept of charity is either vague in the religions of the sub-continent or not paid much 
attention to. It is insignificant in the face of the more dominant cultural symbols of power 
and authority obtained through money hoarding. Such money is not however often invested 
for the benefit of the nation and is, commonly, wasted on ostentatious, jealousy generating 
occasions, over-eating and ultra-luxurious living for oneself or one's close family. Even life-
time servants and relatives are often ignored. 
Though we could gather mass of data about differences in wages and working 
conditions in Asian and British firms, most Asian employers said that there was no difference 
in wages or in working conditions between Asian and English factories. Where it was agreed 
that wages were low, the employers reasoned that it was because of their low profit margins. 
The issue of 'how much wages?' is a widespread source of conflict among employers and 
employees in the sub-continent, but in the Asian owned businesses in Britain it seems 
subdued. However, I found many traces of traditional cultural attitudes brought by Asians 
from their home countries. I shall try to summarize here not only my discussions with the 
employers and employees on the issue of determination of wages, both in Pakistan and 
Britain, but also reflect upon the possible causes of why and how the issue is kept from 
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expression except for frequent grudging remarks made by the two groups, usually behind 
each other's back, and occasionally in front of each other, particularly when the employee 
is certain that he has little to loose. The common argument in favour of low wages 
(employees' term) or 'just the right wages' (employers' term) by the employers is the 
common theme of market based wages, add to it the usual cultural pretensions of getting low 
profits, and divine providence being the final decision maker as to what each should get. It 
is not uncommon in the sub-continent, and among Muslims in general, to evade an 
unpleasant argument by attributing the causes of their actions to divine wisdom that makes 
all people but pawns working under a divine plan. Thus, any discussion which could result 
in some kind of compromise, is forbidden. The use of 'divinity' is not usually challenged by 
the aggrieved unless he himself possesses enough wit to mould the 'divinity' in his favour. 
Similarly, it is traditional among Muslims that the man of means has always been regarded 
as a better interpreter and defender of divinity than the one who is economically dependent 
on the former. Many sayings attributed to prophet Mohammed, for example, "the hand that 
gives is worthier than the hand that takes" (see Imam Bukhari's collection of the sayings of 
the prophet), as well as other learned habits form the basis of this traditional attitude. Other 
cultural attitudes of relevance here include the concept of 'exactitude' which is not always 
strictly followed. For example, if it serves the transient perceived purposes of a contender, 
he may seek to justify his arguments by exaggerating or undermining the figures involved, 
and derive a degree of self-satisfaction from having 'won the argument'. To be defeated in 
an argument is too hard to bear and the long term consequences of cheating are too intangible 
to be of much value. Thus many employers would not hesitate from pretending that their 
profits are too low to raise wages, and many employees would pretend that 'they are being 
paid well' to in fact hide their financial problems where 'it is a matter of honour to save 
face' and 'poverty is a curse' which must be hidden. Apart from cultural complexities, there 
are other material reasons for many Asian employees in Britain keeping their concern over 
wages from surfacing as an out-right conflict. As described in the following sections, many 
employees receive social security benefits (to which they are unentitled) as well as wages. 
It was found in the interviews that these employees were willing to work for a pound an hour 
because, in return, their employers had agreed not to inform the DSS and the Inland Revenue 
offices of their being in employment. 
Other than the violation of ethical/legal aspects that oils the business machine in a 
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large number of cases, many employees argue that the market rate argument is not always 
valid. For example, faced with the employers' argument that if wages are low in one factory 
or industry, and high in another, then workers would move from one to the other and thus 
force the low payer to raise wages, many employees conferred that this is not possible for 
many reasons one of which is that the market rate cannot remain the same even within an 
industry because the high payer soon gets the number of workers he needs and the rest have 
to work at lower wages. The animosity caused by some getting more than others in similar 
work and hours, keeps them from joint action. 
(e)Low wages and corruption: Let the state foot the bilU31 
In circumstances where the vast majority of citizens is law abider and honest, a social 
security system may help in raising wage rates above the basic minimum income support 
level which the DSS determines for the unemployed; it also enables the workers to demand 
better treatment at work, or to develop their social and economic situation further, as 
workers who consider themselves exploited can give up their jobs without facing starvation, 
and put pressure on exploitative employers. In the Asian countries discussed in this work, 
there is no welfare safety net for workers, and they are thus bound to work even if the 
reward be only a meal in return for a day's work. In Britain, workers have the option to fall 
back on the safety net, and withdraw from exploitative work. However it was found that the 
social security system is open to gross abuse. Among various illegal employment practice in 
the U . K . apart from the employment of illegal immigrants, there exists an even more 
horrendous situation whereby workers of British nationality and many political asylum 
seekers, work off-books and, at the same time, claim welfare benefits from the state. This 
situation is relevant to this study because it shows how low wages become acceptable to 
employees when both employers and employees collude to take part of their incomes from 
the state. Employees who work off-books at low wages, take a large part of their income 
(mortgage payments included) from the state, by claiming that they are unemployed or 
underemployed, and the employers benefit from the arrangement by saving on wages, NI 
contributions and tax deductions which would have to be paid if all workers' records were 
[3]For interviewee statements regarding off-the-books work, see pages 336 to 340, 
section titled: 'Off-the-books employment...'. 
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kept properly. Many interviewees reasoned that they were working off-books, and claiming 
social security at the same time, because their wages were too low, that they had mortgages 
to pay, and that living expenses were high. Off-books work was reported by nine out of ten 
interviewees who work, or have worked, for Asian businesses in London, Slough, Oldham, 
Bradford, Leicester, Manchester, Coventry, and Huddersfield. Considering that the 
interviewees were selected at random, one may estimate the extent of this kind of corruption. 
It was reported that many small business owners, let alone large business owners, were able 
to live in luxury and run expensive cars because their business was conducted largely off-
books. As regards some small businesses it may however in fact be true that they cannot 
break-even if they work honestly. The widespread use of off-books employment may be 
guessed at from the statement of an interviewee who spent seven years looking for legal 
employment but found none among British Asians - until he got a job in an American factory 
in the U . K . Note also that the said interviewee had worked as a manager in three large Asian 
businesses, which shows that even managers may be hired to work off-books. 
An illiterate worker was told that her tax and NI contributions were duly deducted, 
but it turned out later that no proper records had been kept. Being illiterate, she didn't 
understand employment legislation. The reasons for her employers not giving a P45, and 
filling in the wrong dates in the sick pay form, could be that her records as an employee 
were not properly kept, and when she kept pressing hard for the P45, her employers did 
somehow manage to give it to her. Regarding the question of her sick note, efforts were 
made to dissuade her; she was intimidated to drop claims to sick pay and not to ask for a 
P45, because giving these would mean that her employers would have to regularize her 
employment record and this could mean a back-dated payment of NI contributions and taxes 
for the period she had worked. But there is another side to this situation: I came to know 
later that some Asian doctors in various areas colluded with some in giving sick and 
disability notes, thus bringing about the misappropriation of various disability allowances: 
For example, during my two months of voluntary advisory service at High Fields Community 
Centre in Leicester, I found three healthy persons who had managed to be on permanent 
disability allowance of £400 a month. 
When interviewees told me about ex-VAT, unregistered and off-the-record businesses 
and several other forms of rampant illegalities, I was not surprised because, during my said 
voluntary advisory service, I came across many men who had been in full-time jobs for years 
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and yet managed to Uve in council houses and keep their wives and children on welfare 
benefits, at times by having fake divorce certificates issued from the local mosques. In Islam, 
a man can divorce his wife simply by going to the local mullan and giving a statement that 
he has divorced his wife; all he is supposed to do is utter the statement three times and sign 
an affidavit to the same effect. 
Some interviewees reponed that off-books employment status wields considerable 
powers to the employers, including the power to 'dock' due wages. If wages are not paid, 
the worker has no recourse to law because no records of his being in employment exist. 
According to the DSS means-tested benefits rules, working for more than 15 hours a week 
terminates the entitlement to single parent allowance. Many women were reponed to work 
off-books for more than 15 hours a week and this had enabled one factory owner to make 
them work at £5 a day. Otherwise, he said, he would divulge their off-books status to the 
DSS. The working women were afraid of him and continued to work at £5 a day believing 
that should they repon the employer to the authorities, they would be the bigger losers 
because they had themselves told the DSS that they were not working, or working for less 
than 15 hours a week. The cultural perception of working class people from the sub-
continent, that the law and the pólice always support the employer, the powerful, had been 
projected on the British social situation through ignorance. 
Even grants for religious causes have been misappropriated in many British towns. 
Although there is much religious activity among the Asians, the emphasis of religión is on 
rituals, checks on sexual behaviour, fasting etc., whilst embezzlement is tacitly encouraged. 
Henee, many who want to misappropriate state funds, strive hard to become members of 
mosque committees. Such struggles have often led to conflict between rival groups each 
seeking to take control of the mosque committee for personal gain. For example, see the oft-
reported events of clashes between rival mosque committee control seekers in Luton. The 
manifest reasons for such conflict are attributed to sectarian differences, but there are often 
latent economic interests behind the religious facade. 
A General Review of the Asian Wage Management Practice 
In order to describe what has lead Asian workers to work at very low wages, we shall 
look at the historical trends in wage management practice which Asian entrepreneurs have 
established where they could, in Britain, and in the Middle East. 
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In early sixties, when Asian workers came to work in Britain, they were paid as much 
as an Englishman in the same position would get, but because of currency exchange rates, 
Asian workers could purchase significantly more in their home countries for whatever they 
saved in Britain (or in the Middle East). Thus they lived extremely frugal in the country of 
work (for example, 15 men living in one house and sleeping in shifts) to get their millions 
in their home countries after having worked for between a décade or two. As regards the 
Arabs, most had acquired their wealth suddenly, directly or indirectly from oil, in a 
relatively short period of time and didn't know the 'going rate* for workers and staff in the 
sub-continent and other developing labour-source countries. Consequently, in the early years 
of their riches, the Arabs hired workers and other personnel at salaries even higher than 
those in the West. 
When entrepreneurs from the sub-continent turned their investment attentions to 
Britain, America, Gulf, and the Middle East (despite the mass poverty of the sub-continent, 
those who are very rich have ail the required capital to be able to invest in Europe, the USA 
or the Gulf), they did not like the way the Europeans, the Americans, and the Arabs were 
'wasting their resources' in paying 'ridiculously high wages'[4] to manual workers from the 
sub-continent because they had seen many workers returning to their home countries as 
millionaires (in native currency terms) after having worked in Britain and the Middle East 
for fifteen or twenty years. The entrepreneurs from the sub-continent were altogether 
différent from their Western and nouveau-riche Arab counterparts; the former were 
accustomed to hiring their men often at close to bread and clothing only. They were 
interested in investing in Europe and America because thèse offered idéal living conditions 
for the upper classes and were safe, comparatively, from the violence and bureaucratie 
inefficiency of the sub-continent. Some were interested in investing in the Gulf and the 
Middle East because near zéro taxation and nouveau-riche markets offered idéal opportunities 
to double or triple their wealth in a few years. Accustomed to becoming millionaires and 
multi-millionaires in a minimal number of years, they couldn't reconcile themselves to the 
Western idea of giving a fair share to the worker. Thus, before they could invest in the 
Middle East and the Gulf, they began their efforts in 'bringing some monetary sensé to the 
[4] The words in inverted comas in this section are those used by some top managers 
and entrepreneurs during interviews. 
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Arabs', and, before investing in Europe, most waited for the 'right circumstances', that is, 
they waited for a time when enough Asian workers were available in Europe to be hired at 
'the right wages'. 
In the Arabian Gulf states, the Pakistani and Indian general managers of many Arab 
banks and businesses, hired by the Arabs because management from the sub-continent carne 
cheaper than that from America and Europe, gave their first lessons to the Sheikhs, and a 
process of massive reductions in worker and staff salaries was launched. One major reason 
for the newly rich Arabs to prefer Indian, Pakistani and Egyptian managers for their banks 
and businesses (where Western high technology and sophistication was dispensable) was the 
cultural proximity whereby the Eastern managers knew how to flatter, entertain, and express 
utmost loyalty to the patriarchal and proud Arab Sheikhs. Under the guidance of the Eastern 
managers, salaries for most Asian staff and workers in the Gulf and the Middle East, 
according to several estimates by regional experts, during the past two decades, have gone 
down to as low as one sixth in real terms of what they used to be twenty years ago. For 
example, Pakistani doctors in Saudi Arabia in the sixties were paid a minimum of 15,000 
Riyals a month. They are now employed at only 2,500 Riyals. 
In the West, the Asian management could not succeed in wage reduction as such 
because, first, they could not reach the key decisión making positions in Western businesses, 
and second, wage determination was not entirely left to market forces; the unions and the 
government institutions had a big role to play. Besides, the Western abidance by the principie 
of equity of treatment could not lead to a situation like that in the Middle East where locáis 
are hired at higher wages than foreigners in similar positions. Moreover, wage determination 
for foreigners in the Middle East is also linked to the regional and social bargaining power 
which means than Americans and Europeans receive much higher pay than do Asians in 
similar jobs; this is justified by the governments and entrepreneurs on grounds that the 
Westerners need more money for their expensive way of living, while Indians, Pakistanis, 
Bengalis, Egyptians etc. can make do with less than half of what a Westerner in similar job 
would require. The said practice is in stark contrast to the Western practice of hiring Blacks 
and Whites, natives and foreigners, at same salaries for same positions within an 
organization. Most Middle Eastern organizations are suffering from inter-group political 
intrigues (Egyptians versus Tunisians, Pakistanis versus Indians, South Indians against North 
Indians, Bengalis against other Indians etc.), a major factor for which is the said inequitable 
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treatment even for similar positions in the organizational hierarchy. Seething resentments 
deviate the attention of employées from organizational objectives towards petty squabbling. 
The above paragraph throws light on the culture-bound limitations of the principle of 
equity of treatment, and on the way in which the 'market forces' concept is used or abused. 
Europe was safe from such culture-based perceptions of inequities in organizational practice 
and procédures, but the rather recent import of a sufficient number of Asian entrepreneurs 
and workers into Europe has now led to a situation in which a 'minority culture' has been 
able to take roots and flourish insulated, it seems, from the context of the broader host 
culture. There is a large number of Asian entrepreneurs carrying on Asian organizational 
practices, and there is a large population of Asian workers who are Willing to accept low 
wages, inéquitable treatment, and harsh working conditions for the aforementioned reasons. 
We can ignore the issue of Asian low wages on the pretext that low wages would 
reduce commodity prices and help Britain compete in export markets, but this is not the 
whole story: Low wages are made acceptable by means that themselves often lead to asocial 
and illegal practices. Low wages do not necessarily mean low prices because the business 
owners are there to intermediate between prices and wages (United Nations surveys show that 
the gap between the rich and the poor has widened many times since the eighties): Low 
wages also mean low spending power, low bargaining position and hence placing oneself in 
a position where greater control maybe exercised over one, and this leads to a whole lot of 
socio-economie issues. It also involves moral issues which too play a strong rôle in the 
détermination of the politicai and economie strength of a country. A large population living 
close to the poverty line is not likely to help a country, because détérioration in living 
standards is known to have a direct relationship with moral, social and economie chaos, as 
evident in most third world countries. 
"Low ceilings crush the soûls... " (Dostoyevsky). 
Summary and contributions of chapter 13 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(l)When entrepreneurs from the sub-continent turned their investment attention to the West 
and the Middle East, they couldn't reconcile to the Western idea of giving a fair share to the 
worker, because, in the sub-continent, they were accustomed to greater profits and shorter 
pay-back periods. In the Gulf, one major reason for the newly rieh Arabs to prefer sub-
continent/Egyptian managers for their businesses (where Western technological sophistication 
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was dispensable) was the cultural proximity whereby the 'Eastern' managers knew how to 
flatter, entertain, and express loyalty to the patriarchal Sheikhs. Hence, under the guidance 
of the Eastern managers, salaries for Asian staff and workers in the Gulf, during the past two 
decades, have gone down to as low as one sixth in real terms. Wage determination for 
expatriates in the Middle East is now linked to regional-social bargaining power which means 
than, for example, Americans and Europeans receive much higher pay than do Asians in 
similar jobs within one organization. As a consequence, seething resentments between various 
nationalities have rendered many organizations ineffective. The said practice is in stark 
contrast to the Western practice of hiring Blacks/Whites, natives and foreigners, at same 
salaries for same positions. Britain was safe from such culture-based inequities in 
organizations but the import of a sufficient number of Asian entrepreneurs and workers has 
now led to a 'minority culture' which is flourishing, insulated from the context of the broader 
host culture. Consequently, in Britain: 
(2) Out of 18 Asian firms about which information was obtained only 3 paid as high wages 
as £2.50 an hour. Only 3 out of 25 companies paid overtime for more than 40 hours week 
work and only 2 gave paid vacations. The sick pay was generally left to the DSS. The 
average wage comes to only £1.69/hour. Our comparative study shows that out of 27 native-
British businesses only in 3 firms the wage rate was as low as in Asian firms and 28 out of 
32 firms paid overtime (1.5% and above) for more than 40 hours a week work. Most English 
firms allow 15 days paid leave at Christmas, plus one month paid leave in a year. The 
average wage for comparable English firms comes to £3.69/hour which is £2/hour higher 
than that in the Asian firms. 
(3) In addition to very low pay, no overtime, and no paid holidays, many Asian employers 
adopt a demeaning attitude in deducting for waste and minor late arrivals. Thus workers in 
English firms report greater satisfaction but those in Asian firms feel demoralized. Hence: 
(4) There is remarkably high personnel turnover in British-Asian compames compared to the 
native-British. The average duration of stay in the former being only 11 months compared 
to 41 months in the latter. But high turnover is profitable for such businesses as do not 
require skilled and trained workers and where new workers are relatively easily available and 
trainable; the employers can save on wages by hiring trainees at apprentice wages and by the 
time they should expect to get a reasonable salary, they are already preparing to leave. 
(5) Low wages become acceptable to employees when both employers and employees collude 
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to take part of their incomes from the state: Out of 23 Asian businesses, 17 were reported 
to employ a certain number of off-books workers at wages between 50p to £1 an hour, but 
out of 27 native-British businesses, in only two firms wages were given off-books. Among 
various illegal business practice in the U . K . are: 
(i) employing illegal immigrants and political asylum seekers; 
(ii) employing workers with British nationalities who work off-books and take a large 
part of their income (mortgage payments included) from the state by claiming that 
they are unemployed or underemployed; the employers benefit from the arrangement 
by saving on wages, NI contributions and tax deductions which would have to be paid 
if workers' records were kept properly; 
(iii) ex-VAT, unregistered and off-the-record businesses; 
(iv) being in jobs but keeping wives and children on welfare benefits by having fake 
divorce certificates issued from the local mosques; 
(v) misappropriation of government grants for religious causes, by members of mosque 
committees; hence the oft-reported conflicts between rival groups seeking financial 
control of the mosques on the facade of sectarian differences, and the entailing police 
lock-up of mosques. 
(6) Illegal arrangements between employees and employers wield greater powers to the 
owners to exercise personal control over employees and suppress potential conflict. Various 
kind of corruption described here is neither condemned nor publicly admitted by employers 
and leaders in the Asian community, as is the case in home countries as well. 
(7) The common argument in favour of low wages is the populist theme of market based 
wages, add to it the usual cultural pretensions of getting low profits, and divine providence 
being the final decision maker as to what each should get. Some argue that British-Asian low 
wages would reduce commodity prices and help Britain compete in export markets, but low 
wages are made acceptable by robbing the DSS; low wages do not necessarily mean low 
prices because the business owners are there to intermediate between prices and wages 
(several United Nations surveys show that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened 
many times since the eighties). Low wages mean low spending power, low bargaining 
position, and hence placing workers in coercive control which is not likely to help a country, 
because deterioration in living standards is known to have a direct relationship with moral, 
social and economic chaos, as evident in the underdeveloped countries described earlier. 
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These findings show the culture-bound nature of the 'market forces' rule, for in the 
'Eastern' culture, each person can be hired at a different wage on a same job in one 
organization. The findings relate inequity in treatment to inter-group intrigues and conflict, 
corruption, and organizational ineffectiveness. Findings in British-Asian businesses show 
strong links between low wages, inequitable treatment, money motivation (indicated by 
embezzlement of state money), inter-group rivalries, low motivation (indicated by high turn-
over etc.), mystification of material issues in obscurantism and religious haze, all of which 
have been thriving in Britain in a minority culture insulated from the host cultural influence. 
Although better wages and equitable treatment make economic sense in that they 
reduce conflict and raise purchasing ability and confidence which is one major prerequisite 
for industrial development, the 'sub-continent attitude' has, demonstrably, been preserved 
until now in most British Asian companies. Hence, as before, many Asians organizations in 
Britain, are little more than instruments in achieving non-organizational socio-cuttural goals. 
The observations narrated in this chapter support our thesis that patterns of behaviour 
are determined by one's immediate culture which can change if it opens itself to external 
cognitive influences. We shall suggest some methods of improvement in chapter 16. 
A significant contribution of our studies of British Asians is the refutation of Marxist 
optimism for working class, in general and all across the world, as 'the vanguard of 
revolution' because, as found, after arriving in Britain, most of the poor exploited sub-
continent workers did not hail the liberating opportunities in Britain, did not even join the 
White workers unions (chapter 15), but sought to collude with their compatriot employers (the 
upper classes) to enrich themselves often at the cost of the state. The Marxist class 
consciousness did not show itself despite the proselytisation of many socialist parties. Hence 
the dominance of cultural influence over class membership in determining behaviour patterns. 
This is further supported by observations in the sub-continent where most workers in practice, 
do not seek to join hands to end exploitation but compete to under-cut wages. 
However, there are some cultures where the working classes have behaved as Marx 
expected. My proposition is therefore, that although Marxist analysis is very valid for the sub-
continent (class divisions are objectively and materially very sharp), it showed predictive 
validity not in superstitious, subjectivist, segregated and strongly familial cultures but only 
in some objectivist cultures in conditions of 'necessity and compulsion' as Marx had said. 
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Notes and Explanations 
1. Figures regarding average duration of stay in British firms are as follows: 
Asian Small Firms (months worked): 24, 1, 6, 1, 1, 3, 4, 1, 2, 17, 3, 5. 
Asian Medium/Large Firms: 2, 48, 24, 4, 1, 1, 1, 12, 60. 
English Small Firms: 48, 60, 18, 3, 3, 3, 6. 
English Medium/Large Firms: 3, 84, 48, 120, 16, 24, 1, 30, 12, 24, 72, 48, 84, 12, 36, 36, 
36, 6, 210, 1, 1, 12, 108, 36, 24, 12, 60, 120, 132, 2, 18. 
2. Wages and other working conditions for workers in Britain were found to be as follows: 
WAGES PER H O U R 
Asian Small Asian Medium/ English Small English Medium/ 
8 Firms Large 10 6 Firms Laree 21 Firms 
£2.50 1.30 1.69 2.50 2.63 
£1.50 1.75 4.00 2.50 4.50 
£2.00 1.75 2.85 3.25 6.00 
£1.35 1.75 3.25 3.25 4.25 
£1.50 1.50 3.65 3.25 2.17 
£1.50 2.50 3.65 3.53 3.25 
£2.88 1.25 5.00 5.00 
£1.07 1.25 5.00 4.25 
1.25 1.50 3.50 
1.74 6.00 7.69 
1.50 
Average wage in small Asian firms (8 in this study): £1.79/hour 
Average wage in medium/large Asian firms (10 in this study): £1.60/hour 
Net average for the 18 Asian firms in this study: £1.69/hour 
Abidance by overtime législation: 3 (partial abidance) out of 23 firms 
Sunday double rate: None 
Paid holidays allowed: 2 out of 23 firms 
Employment of off-books/illegal workers: 17 out of 23 firms 
Off-books/illegal workers wages: from 50p to £1 per hour 
Average wage in small English firms (6 in this study): £3.18/hour 
Average wage in medium/large English firms (21 firms): £3.83/hour 
Net average for the 27 firms in this study: £3.69/hour 
Abidance by overtime législation: 28 out of 32 firms (standard) 
Sunday double rate: 28 out of 32 firms (if work is available) 
Paid holiday allowed: 32 out of 34 firms 
Employment of off-books/illegal workers: 2 out of 42 firms 
Off-books/illegal workers wages: £1.75/hour 
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Chapter Fourteen: Issues of Racism in a Multi-Cultural Workforce 
Racial situation in Asian companies 
People from one particular race quite often hold positive or negative views about 
other races. It is almost impossible to make generalizations from the expression of such 
views but a fair knowledge of what different groups think about each other could be of 
importance to managers in multi-racial organizations. Even in an organization comprising 
people of one single culture or race, there could be different images construed about other 
races and cultures. Such views do contain parts of some realities. It is easy to classify people 
with respect to race, and some incidents have been reported where a certain race has been 
considered as possessing certain characteristics, more social power or less of it, and thus 
treated with inequity. For example, an Asian employee reported that his Asian employers 
gave better treatment to the White workers and were polite with them but not with the Asian 
workers. Similar observations were narrated by other interviewees in some detail[l] showing 
perturbing consequences of inequitable treatment that could, if widespread, lead to inter-
racial conflict of some kind. Many interviewees stated that in Asian factories, because of 
inequitable salaries and working hours between Whites and Asians, there was resentment 
projected on racial grounds: The Whites worked standard hours, i.e. 40 hours a week (they 
socialized in the evenings) at standard wages but the Asians worked more overtime often at 
lower and off-books wages (many could make up for the less wages through DSS income 
support and other benefits, see chapter 13). Some resentment among the two groups aróse 
from the fact that the Asian management told the White workers not to disclose their wages 
to the Asians. The reasons for such inequity were found to be mainly in off-books work. I 
have discussed earlier that the typical Asian workers* obsession with money (large families 
supported mainly by adult males; traditional women not allowed to work for socio-cultural 
reasons) makes them work twelve hours a day and, at times, se ven days a week (thus pushing 
many out of employment) a situation which would not be acceptable to their White co-
workers who want to socialize in the evenings. Some interviewees said that while Asians are 
prepared to work unsocial hours, in Asian factories, they are not as constant and reliable at 
work as the Whites are; many Asian workers compénsate for low wages and longer hours 
[l]For excerpts from interviewée statements, see pages 342, 343, section titled: 
'Racial situation in Asian factories; différences in work patterns and Ufe styles'. 
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by wasting some of the time, but quite often, Asian employers preferred Asian workers 
because they could get them to work off-books. To add to this, in most unskilled/semiskilled 
jobs which Asians are deemed fit to do, many White companies prefer Asians over Whites, 
one reason for such preference being the inaptitude of Asians to form effective workers 
unions (see chapter 15). Thus there exists a genuine cause for resentment by the Whites who 
see their whole lifestyle being challenged by Asian workers especially when the latter are 
preferred by many White employers as well, and because of the diminishing number of 
"White businesses" and the growing number of Asian businesses, factories, take-always, 
restaurants, etc. There is reportedly a growing feeling among the Whites that they are being 
discriminated against in many instances but there is visibly and demonstrably more street and 
media protest from the Asians to the contrary. While in many cases, the causes of resentment 
could be found in the aforementioned lack of uniformity in employment practice in Asian 
firms (similar resentment is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations 
among regional groups; see chapter 13, p. 185-186), there are other incidents of prejudice 
showing that the said reasons also have to do with 'in-group/out-group psychology'. 
Though there is resentment among races, and some signs of this resentment turning 
into conflict, no strong evidence exists that such conflict has already started to become 
openly manifest and it is certainly not evident in English-owned businesses where equitable 
treatment for Whites, blacks and Asians keeps such conflict from arising. Besides, such 
conflict may be avoided if uniformity in working patterns is guaranteed by the enforcement 
of the equal opportunities legislation in Asian businesses as well. 
Racial situation in English organizations 
Most interviewees reported that there was hardly any resentment or inequity on racial 
grounds in White-owned firms. There was no racial conflict except some verbal skirmishes 
about minor affairs, and friendly jokes exchanged about inter-race perceptions[2]. 
In most Western companies with a multi-cultural Workforce, great care is taken to 
provide equitable treatment to all employees and hence where discrimination on racial 
grounds was felt, as narrated by the interviewees, they also made it clear that proper action 
[2]For excerpts from interviewée statements, see pages 343 to 348 section titled: 
'Racial situation in English/Western businesses'. 
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was taken by the management. In one English organization, an Asian employee resigned 
from his job and then filed a complaint that he was racially harassed. The interviewee said 
that although the charges of racial harassment were not justified, the process of investigation 
went through. It was often discovered during the interviews for this work that typical charges 
of racism, levied against the White authorities or management, by some Asians, did not 
appear valid upon detailed analysis. One interviewee thought that the speed of machines for 
Asian workers in an American company was adjusted a bit faster than that for the White 
workers but the increase was not noted by his fellow Asian workers, and there were many 
in other factories who said that the Asians were supposed to produce only as much as the 
Whites had in the morning shifts. A supervisor mentioned that he was once sacked from his 
job because he left the job as he was feeling sick, and couldn't inform his manager. He 
believed that his sacking was undue because he had made sure that work went as usual in his 
absence. But then, later, he was offered a higher post at the same organization. Though he 
said that he should have been promoted further up, he mentioned many times during the 
interview that race or culture was not a barrier. Similarly, another interviewee claimed that 
he was not promoted because the management wanted to promote the son of a sénior 
employee, but then, after an year, the interviewee did get his promotion and henee any 
claims of prejudice may not hold. In another case, a White worker was dismissed on the 
grounds of a statement made by an Asian worker. In almost all such cases, the complaints 
of Asian employees were taken seriously and rectified. 
There were several cases which revealed that Asian allegations of racism most often 
are not tenable[3]. We shall therefore discuss some reasons why such charges are brought 
about by many British Asians. 
(i)Partisan description of events and in-group/out-group psychology 
One common reason for racial conflict is the partisan rather than judicious attitude 
towards events of conflict or potential conflict. Partisan claims are made for several 
culturally-learned reasons such as that, for the sake of group-solidarity, one's group expeets 
negative claims against other groups; in the sub-continent, people often learn to speak, often 
unfairly, in support of their community or the group they belong to, for fear lest the group 
[3]For two such cases among many see p. 346, statement 10, & p. 348, statement 11. 
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may disown them. They also learn, quite prejudicially, to charge rival, or assumed rival 
groups, of doing injustice, of being unfair, of having malicious aims, often as a preemptive 
defence or as a tactical manoeuvre in order to gain more privilèges and facilities (I have 
personal knowledge of various fake Claims by British Asians, of White racism, made in order 
to gain some benefits from state or private institutions), or under the influence of a belief in 
a religion, an ideology or a prejudicial theory[4]. Such a behaviour is very common in the 
sub-continent, in most Muslim countries, and is also manifested among British Muslims. 
Düring my stay in Britain from Sept. 1989 to August 1992, I interviewed more than thirty 
well informed members of the Asian community in several cities and towns. I also attended 
several mosque committee meetings, local Pakistani welfare associations meetings, Asian 
literature and poetry seminars, Workshops and festivals, and had conversations with dozens 
of Asian immigrants and English participants. I observed that while there are enlightened 
Asians who do not think in racist terms, among the fundamentalist British Muslims, typical 
perceptions about Whites are quite lopsided: Negative stereotypes [5] of Whites include traits 
such as, "swine-eaters, drinkers, having no sexual control, and hence not compatible for co-
existence with Muslims". The pig is considered a "shameless" animal and, it is believed 
among Muslims, that the one who eats pork will get the "disgrâce" of the said animal. Many 
old and middle-aged Muslims whip up a hysteria to "save their culture" and many younger 
[4]Gadlin (1994) has argued that racial and ethnie conflicts must be understood within 
the context of the "culture of racism", that is, in terms of intra-race and inter-race social 
relations, attitudes, beliefs and meanings through which conflict and antagonism are 
existentially structured. Likewise, Avruch and Black (1991) stress the local, indigenous, 
common sensé understandings of conflict (ethnoconflict theory), alongside techniques or 
processes of conflict resolution (ethnopraxis), because, they argue, at the heart of 
ethnoconflict théories and ethnopraxis are the local and indigenous ideas about human nature, 
personhood and self which must be studied through ethnographie case studies. Waters (1992) 
identified antécédent conditions and specific behaviors of social actors that can contribute to 
race-related interpersonal conflict. 
[5]Bodenhousen (1990) conducted experiments relating circadian variations in arousal 
levels to the subject's propensity to stereotype others. He showed that as a person's ability 
to systematically process information is diminished, the person increasing relies on the use 
of stereotypes and simplifications. The fmdings can be extended to show that the less 
educated and unprepared earlier générations of immigrants, when overwhelmed by fréquent 
culture-contrasting information in a new society, resorted to stereotypical explanations of new 
observations (such as White women moving about freely alongside men in non-segregated 
public and workplaces) in order to simplify the task of understanding a new society. 
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Asians follow the elders' line to maintain a tense stance towards the host community. 
Education is a continuai battle ground for this group of Asians. In January 1996, the Muslim 
community in Bradford boycotted local schools for having a syllabus of religious éducation 
which allegedly placed greater emphasis on Christianity. In conversations with seven 
Bradford Muslim children below the âge of eight, I was disappointed to see that they were 
told in the locai mosques, by the mullahs, to abstain from the company of White children 
because "most of them are illegitimate", not to pay attention to school éducation because 
"éducation at school is not directed towards what Allah wants us to do"[6]. One child was 
beaten by the mullah for attending the History Club at school because the mullah believed 
that the history written by the Whites was biased against Muslims. The said children showed 
hatred for the British police, and their ideals were characters of the type of Malcolm X . On 
the other hand, most White people with whom I had the opportunity to ask about what they 
thought of the Asians, generally had the perceptions that Asians were, "hard-working, 
family-oriented, keep their shops open until mid-night, we can get things when we want, we 
wish we had as much love and respect for family and elders as the Asians have". 
The use of the words 'haram' and 'kaffir' among the Arabs and Muslims provides a 
preconditioning for categorizing non-Muslims as unjust and unfair[7]. Examples of partisan 
preemptive strikes from world politics maybe seen in the Claims of Iranian mullahs and the 
various fundamentalist movements against the West. In fact in many societies, the psychology 
of divisions is so much institutionally ingrained that people normally think in dividing 
terminology. One such dividing institution is the Asian 'partisan closed family' whereby the 
interests of an Asian family are de facto exclusive of the interests of society (see chapter 3). 
Conflict-prone cultures[8] lend supportive beliefs which enable people to be aggressive 
[6]Erickson (1987) has explained his findings regarding low school achievement of 
minority students in terms of 'criticai social theory' and 'résistance theory'. 
[7]It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss a whole major part of the Islamic 
ideology whereby the non-believers are not to be trusted; a whole lot of negative traits are 
attributed to the non-believers as parts of the Islamic doctrine of dividing the world into three 
kinds, namely, the believers, the non-believers and the hypocrites: Ironically and very 
interestingly, when suspicion and preemptive mistrust against the non-Muslims is commanded 
upon Muslims by 'divine providence', many fall victims to mistrust among themselves, such 
as the inter-sectarian massacres in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bahrain etc. 
[8]Ballard (1991) has noted that cultural background affects the learning of hatred. 
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and less Willing to compromise. The importance of certain cultural norms, values, and 
religion in breeding conflict-proneness has been well documented in history and literature[9]. 
A common example is that most Muslim children are taught to hate Jews (and Hindus in 
Pakistan) in particular (the common phrase joining the two together in Pakistani Urdu 
newspapers and magazines is "yahood-o-hanood") and other non-Muslims in general, at a 
very early âge until it becomes part of their psyché. Furthermore, various Muslim sects 
(Shias, Sunnies, Whabbis) inculcate sectarian hatred in children at very young âge; hence the 
mutuai massacres in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and those of Ahmadees in 
Pakistan, Bhais in Iran, of libérais in Algeria etc. In 1992, I wrote about a potential one-
sided conflict being brewed by certain British Muslims in my pilot study. I was not surprised 
when this conflict showed up in the Bradford riots in June 1995. The riots showed how 
distorted inter-race perceptions could trigger conflict. There was no interaction in that the 
White community did not counteract (other than that the police tried to contain it) and the 
causes were primarily cognitive in nature[10], 
(ii)The projection of learning of divisions in home countries 
We noted several reasons, in chapter 5, for much higher ethnicism in the sub-
continent compared to that in Europe. Except for those who really try to understand 
European psychology, many Asians simply project their home-based perceptions on the host 
culture. Düring conversations with those British Asians who were brought up in Britain and 
had never been to their home countries, I found that they often retain the conflict and 
control-related beliefs and the in-group/out-group psychology engendered by parental and 
community socialization. Only a few[ll] think about the relevance of the ancient cultural 
[9]See Raphael Patai's (1973) detailed account of the conflict-proneness generated by 
the Arab Bédouin culture: Tua Hussain's "Dua-al-Karawan" (describing the relationship 
between violence and Arab honour related to sexual conduct), "Al-Fitna-tul-Kubra" and " A l i -
wa-Banua" (on the intermittent conflicts and bloodshed in the Islamic history). 
[10] Waters (1992) has offered a cognitive processual model to help managers 
understand race-based interpersonal conflicts in the workplace. 
[ l l ] In a study of intercultural learning that transcends the expérience of culture 
conflict, Hoffman (1990) has found two possible levels of such learning : (l)behavioral level 
change that does not penetrate to the depth of subjective self-concept; (2)a deeper 
transformation of behavior along with changes in values, meaning and inner-self identity. 
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traditions, beliefs, values, enmities and attitudes to their lives in Britain. This has much to 
do with the greater control Asian parents have over children (see chapter 3) of which one 
example may be quoted here: One interviewee, despite the fact that she had never been to 
Pakistan and that she had many Indian friends, retained the enmity of her Pakistani parents 
against India (internalization of beliefs). However, an apparent contradiction was found in 
that she was fairly liberal and English in many aspects of her behaviour and could not "even 
think of living in Pakistan". She had left her oppressive parents on the pretext of studying 
medicine at a university but was in fact living on odd jobs. She was afraid that if her parents 
found out the truth, they won't be very sparing. They had been trying to force her to marry 
a cousin back home but she had thwarted all attempts of the boy's coming to Britain by 
writing (unknown to her parents) to the Home Office asking them not to grant him a visa. 
Despite all this, she felt so guilty at deceiving her parents, that she occasionally sent them 
money, telling them that it was out of her student grant. Such a behaviour is not uncommon 
among young British Asians who find it very difficult to get rid of their parents' beliefs 
however irrelevant in the modern world and in their own lives. 
(iii)High Subjectivity 
I have invented the term 'high subjectivity' to denote a certain attitude towards life; 
it is an attitude of substituting profound objective observation and teleological behaviour with 
certain reactions[12] to a frustration resulting from not being able to achieve some high aims. 
As a consequence, some routine matters could be taken too seriously by a person who has 
developed a feeling of being victimized due to certain events in his personal life or in his 
work-related activities. High subjectivity may show itself in generalized opinions as a 
substitute for the exact narration of actual incidents, in short and curt replies as a substitute 
for detail, in obscure description of events, in over-vehement denials, and in too robust 
affirmations of one's opinions, showing the respondent's refusal to think, review or 
reconsider what he/she takes as an essential belief. I have seen such paranoia in a number 
of Asians; for example, at DPC, a whole group of workers refused to be interviewed on the 
[12]The reactions to frustration are given in many books on psychology, such as the 
following by Costello and Zalkind (1963); compensation; conversion; displacement; fantasy; 
identification; negativism; projection; rationalization; reaction-formation; régression; 
repression; fixation; résignation, apathy and boredom; flight or withdrawal. 
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presumption that I had some ulterior motive in interviewing them, that I had some interests 
and benefit to gain. One interviewée, in particular, showed that even when a person has been 
satisfied with a certain situation, he might try to dig up éléments of dissatisfaction for several 
of the reasons quoted above; the said interviewée talked about discrimination against Asian 
workers and favoritism for White workers when he had earlier stated that there were hardly 
any White workers in his workplace. When he was asked to narrate events to show 
discrimination and injustice on the part of the management, he said there were two events: 
In fact, thèse two events could not reasonably justify the claims of unfair treatment and both 
occurred in a three year period[13]. In most instances of a similar nature, I was compelled 
to think that any barrier faced in an English firm leads many Asians to jump quickly to 
making accusations of racism even though they cannot prove it. It was reported (see chapters 
12 and 15) that Asian workers took collective action for wage increase only in English 
faetones though they had much better wages there, but despite gross injustice, no collective 
action against Asian employers was reported. The reasons for this paradoxical behaviour of 
protest against White organizations but not against the Asian, show that a minority may adopt 
an aggressive stance against the majority and yet ignore the injustice within itself, so as to 
maintain ethnie solidarity. Many show generalized grudges and suspicions for which there 
is much less than sufficient ground. A presumptive and aggressive outlook towards others 
is often self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling. It has been shown to lead to no-win situations in 
the sub-continent, Middle East, and among British-Asians. If prejudicial claims are rewarded 
by the other groups giving-in to the demands of the 'victimized', such 'grudge bearers' may 
carry on with their préjudices (as shown in many 'successes' of people posing to be 
victimized) in order to continue their forward march towards further material gains. On the 
other hand, if the 'grudge bearers* are denied acceptance of their claims, there can be inter-
group conflict, a routine event and an integral part of life in the said societies. 
[13]See statement 11 on page 348. I found later from the interviewee's friends and 
relatives, known to me, that since he gave up work, he was living on a fake medical 
disability allowance and had a long record of securing Council and insurance money through 
fraudulent claims. I asked him why he was doing so when he was a healthy person and could 
work, at which he answered that he had two daughters and four brothers in Pakistan to look 
after. However, his daughters and wife were living on welfare benefits in Britain and, had 
he continued his job, he could have had more than enough money to meet his obligations. 
I discarded another whole interview of four hours on similar grounds. 
198 
Summary and contributions of chapter 14 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed 
(1) British-Asian factories predominantly employ Asians but where they do have native British 
workers, some resentment between races was reported. The interviewees saw the reasons in 
unequal salaries and working hours between Whites and Asians; the Whites worked standard 
hours at standard wages and socialized in the evenings but the Asians worked overtime 
(chapter 4) often at lower and off-books wages (see chapter 13). Some resentment arose when 
the Asian management told the White workers not to disclose their wages to the Asians 
(similar resentment is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations for 
reasons of inequitable treatment; see chapters 13 & 15). Typically, Asian workers' have large 
families supported mainly by adult males who want to work twelve hours a day and, at 
times, seven days a week (chapter 4), thus pushing many out of employment. Hence, many 
White workers see their whole lifestyle being threatened by Asian workers especially when 
the latter are preferred by many White employers as well (one reason for such preference 
being the inaptitude of Asians to form effective workers unions; see chapters 12 & 15), and 
because of the diminishing number of 'White businesses' and the growing number of Asian 
businesses in certain areas. 
(2) There is reportedly a growing feeling among the Whites that they are being discriminated 
against in many instances but there is visibly and demonstrably more street and media protest 
from the Asians to the contrary. However, charges of racism, levied against the White 
authorities or management by some Asians most often are not tenable; the reasons for false 
allegations were found to be the following: 
(i) Partisan description of events and injudicious claims made to create or maintain 
group-solidarity, or as a tactical manoeuvre in order to gain more privileges; 
(ii) the influence of a belief, a religion or an ideology that propagates negative 
stereotypes of other groups; 
(iii) the insecurity feelings of older Asians that the younger Asians will not follow the 
elders' line unless a tense stance is upheld against host community; 
(iv) the interests of an Asian family are de facto exclusive of the interests of society 
(see chapter 3) and so children are controlled by certain divisive themes; 
(v) adopting a general aggressive stance against the majority and ignoring the injustice 
within so as to maintain ethnic solidarity; 
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(vi) the projection of learaing of institutionalized divisions in home countries 
engendered by parental/community socialization (see chapter 5 for ethnicism in the 
sub-continent, and chapter 15 for instituionalized racism in the Middle East); 
(vii) lack of awareness of the irrelevance of the ancient traditions, enmities and 
attitudes to modem life; 
(viii) high subjectivity; an attitude of substituting profound objective observation and 
teleological behaviour with certain reactions to a frustration resulting from not being 
able to achieve some higher man justified aims. 
Findings in this chapter elaborate how a strong subjectivist familial culture can 
generate proclivity to conflict by substituting learning for objective observation with 
institutionalized divisions, stereotypes, prohibition ofexposure to other cognitive cultures, and 
aggressive closed-familial goal-seeking at the cost of other groups: The subjectivist cultures 
do so by strict ideological socialization of children, thus imposing, 
(i) a large family life style which cannot be sustained in a world ofscarce resources 
albeit at the cost of social harmony; 
(ii)personal-familial centredness thaï seeks refuge in its immediate community 
exclusive of wider human concerns. 
These findings support our theory that conflict-proneness is engendered by the 
particular structure and de facto functions of the social institutions of a culture and then 
imported into the Organization. 
In native-British businesses in general, équitable treatment for employées keeps racial 
conflict from showing. Such conflict can be avoided in British-Asian organizations if 
uniformity in employmentpatterns is guaranteed by the enforcement ofthe equal opportunities 
législation in Asian organizations as well, most of which hitherto employ only from particular 
groups of British-Asians. Conflict-proneness can also be reduced by British-Asian and sub-
continent familles reducing their family size, so that scare resources and jobs are available 
to ail at reasonable salaries. This in turn will diminish the material basis of conflict and have 
positive effect on people 's perceptions of other races and cultures. We shall discuss some 
solutions in chapter 16. 
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Chapter Fifteen: A Comparison of Attitude towards Unionism and Rights at Work in the 
Sub-continent. Middle East and amone British Asians 
Where there is a need for unions: The Sub-continent 
In the sub-continent, the exploitation of workers, and even white collar workers is too 
obvious to be emphasized. In addition to exploitation and unfair treatment, there are all kinds 
of other issues that make it essential for the employees to form organized unions but while 
many unions exist, their activities are far from teleological. Workers and employees 
associations have not been as successful in bringing about prosperity, to those they claim to 
serve, as similar organizations in the West have been. Trade unión movements and several 
other institutions in the sub-continent often have pseudo-leaders who are not really capable 
of leading but became leaders due to the possession of property or clout or what is known 
as a 'nuisance valué* [1], Even the attempts of genuine unión leaders are thwarted by the too 
frequent presence of pseudo-leaders. The excessive desire to be a leader (referred to in some 
work of literature as 'Napoleonomania') is so commonly observable in the sub-continent that 
it maybe seen as related to the early childhood teachings about great national heros, and to 
the exhortations of elders to the young to "be someone great" [2]. 
There are several cultural factors behind the general failure of unions in rasing the 
Iiving standards and job conditions of the majority of workers in the sub-continent: Among 
the major reasons for the said general failure are first, an obvious replacement of, in Marxist 
terms, class consciousness and class solidarity among workers by ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
and tribal groupings, second, an authoritarian-patriarchal respect for the rich whatever his 
moral character and his sources of wealth might be, and third, superstition, over-production 
of children, keeping women in virtual captivity and the consequent greater economic burden 
on the bread-winner's shoulders, makes most Uve in a neurotic-arrogant and irrational state 
of mind. This situation persists in the sub-continent. Many narrated that the lower and middle 
[l]In PIA, it was reported, that the union officiais did not work in their jobs, abused 
their positions and powers and, compared to other people, worked about a quarter of what 
they should. 
[2]I was once giving tuition to the son of the Minister of Education of my home state in 
Pakistan when the child's únele came in and asked the child, "son, what do y ou want to be 
in Ufe?", the child said, "I want to be a doctor". At this, the únele reprimanded him, "I am 
disappointed in you for you have such low aims; your father is a Minister and you want to 
be just a doctor?" 
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classes are exploited openly. But, because there is an électoral democracy, the grudge of the 
exploited is not against the system but against the individuai exploiter, and therefore, a few 
industrialists, on occasions, get beaten up by laborers. Many union leaders have been 
murdered over the years. Aggression also gets diverted towards communal wars such as 
those between Bengalis, Marwaris, Assamese, or in religious riots described earlier. 
Blau (1955) noted that group pressures, whereby conflict-prone members were 
punished helped in conflict avoidance. Blake and Mouton (1964) noted that systematic 
playing down of différences between organizational units helped in conflict avoidance. The 
opposite of above quoted suggestions, however, can be seen in the sub-continent where 
usually conflict-prone persons are chosen to represent groups in conflict in business, 
commerce, industry, government, politics and women's groups, under the belief that the 
conflict-prone représentative is more likely to grab more benefìts and privilèges during 
negotiatiòns, bargaining, and haggling. As narrated, the whole exercise is dystunctional in 
achieving long-term social harmony and collective prosperity. 
Where unions are banned: The Middle East 
In most countries of the Middle East, there are hard pressing reasons for the workers 
to protest, but there is no protest because of its horrendous potential conséquences. The 
institutional and personal bondage of migrant workers in the Gulf countries is notable, 
especially the legai impositions upon the workers and even on higher ranking employées. The 
said legai impositions, described below, will be unthinkable in the West. 
Legislation in the Arabian Gulf states is most often a chronological or subject-wise 
record of the décisions and decrees issued by the Amir, the Sultan, or the Malik (whatever 
the title of the ruler), or by the Shura (an advisory body of tribal sheikhs or commercial/ 
industriai elite), or by Ministerial Committees. Countries which were colonized by one of 
the European powers, do have some kind of a legislative framework derived from their 
European héritage; Egypt has some laws that are either a derivative of the Napoleonic Code 
or the British Legal Codes. The Gulf states often borrow parts of their legislative Systems, 
for which nothing could be found in the Islamic Sharia, from Egypt. The Egyptians are often 
employed in législation interprétation and advisory bodies for they are considered more 
scholarly among the Arabs. However, a review of several Egyptian legislative frameworks 
shows that Egyptian législation, where Islamic Sharia can be ignored by the legislators in 
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safety from the fundamentalist reaction, is an imitation or modification of the traditional 
British or French legal Systems. Despite such héritage, the Egyptians could do almost nothing 
to bring modem European employment or other législation to the Gulf countries. 
In the traditional Middle Eastem patriarchal ethics, an employer is the patron of the 
employée. He is the middle-man between God and the 'dépendent'. The word still used for 
an employer of foreign employées in the Middle East is kafeel which means 'the provider' 
so that the whole nature of employment is culturally seen much as a case of 'providing for 
the dépendent' and, in return, the dépendent must forsake some of his rights, including the 
right to change employment against the employer's wishes. The employment practice is 
replète with traces of the traditional values of the Arabian slave society reflected in Quranic 
and Hadeeth verses about; (i)how to buy and seil a slave and a concubine; (ii)when and how 
a slave may be allowed to marry and have children; (iii)the rights of the slave owner to have 
sex with his concubines (among the words used for slaves and concubines in Sura Al-Noor, 
is the term, malakat imanokum meaning, "your rightful possessions"); (iv)the conditions on 
which one may free a slave or a concubine; and, (v)how to free a slave or a concubine; the 
contract of the freedom of a slave or a concubine is called the mukaîibaî whereby the 
conditions under which a slave is freed must be written down. Nowhere in the Quran it is 
mentioned that freeing a slave is a compulsory religious requirement. In the Arabic-Islamic 
ethics whereby, "the hand that gives is worthier than the hand that takes", the employer is 
the patron and, despite the mistreatment and abuse of employées by many, the former still 
want to feel the pride of being the patrons. Hence, it is often an insuit to an Arab employer 
if his employée submits his résignation, or does part-time work at another place, and this is 
consequently reflected in the employment législation whereby: 
(1)A foreign employée (kharjï) cannot change his kafeel without the written consent 
of the kafeel and the acceptance of such consent by the offices of immigration; this involves 
a very complicated officiai procedure made even difficult by the customary protraction and 
procrastination of the said offices. Foreign workers are not allowed even part-time work at 
a place other than that of their kafeel. I have corne across many cases whereby the employées 
were treated very badly and had the opportunity to work elsewhere with much better 
prospects but their kafeels did not release them. A pharmacist, for example, was offered a 
better job but his kafeel refused to allow him a change in sponsorship. Another science 
graduate, brought to work in a chemistry laboratory, was forced to work among laborers and 
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made to live in a tent in the désert but not allowed a change of kafeel when offered a job 
befitting his qualifications. Foreign workers, by certain provisions of law, are almost bonded 
servants of the kafeel because once they enter the country, they cannot leave without the 
written consent of the kafeel, counter-confirmed by the Passport and Immigration Office. A i l 
foreigners entering the country for work and residence have to give finger prints to be kept 
with the local Crimes Investigation Agencies. The 'exit permit' must be shown at the airport 
before departure, without which a person cannot leave the country. Many employées reported 
that they could not attend the funerals of their parents or other relatives because it took them 
around a week to get the 'exit permit'. On the other hand, the kafeel has also the right to get 
his foreigner employée expelled from the country for whatever reasons he may have; the 
excuse may simply be that he did not like the employée. With the legal powers to stop an 
employée from leaving the country, and keep him/her at whatever wages and job conditions, 
and the powers to get him expelled without even paying his dues, whatever happens to the 
employée finally boils down to the moral character of the employer especially because there 
is séant recourse to justice and courts. And because the courts function in as arbitrary and 
unpredictable a manner as most native employers do (be they prestigious state or private 
organizations), the lower class workers in particular are at the mercy of their employers. I 
have seen Indian and Filipino women enslaved for décades, and prosperous and prestigious 
organizations playing with job contracts to squeeze even Professionals into wages, housing, 
and allowances considerably lower than those promised at the time of interview in the 
employée's home country or in a third country. 
(2) A foreign employée may bring his family to the country of work only if his salary 
is more than a certain amount and if the kafeel agrées to become the kafeel of the employée's 
family as well. Because most workers earn almost a fourth of the fixed amount, they are not 
allowed to bring their families, and hence have to live for years without seeing their families. 
(3) A foreigner cannot have rights of permanent residence, let alone local nationality, 
however long he stays in the country, or even if he/she was born and brought up there, and 
hence cannot have any rights équivalent to those of the host nationals (there are rare 
exceptions where citizenship has been granted by the rulers at their discrétion to their 
favorites). Foreigners have no rights to welfare measures (we are referring here to legislative 
measures but one may find rare exceptions where a generous patriarch may, for example, 
pay the medicai expenses of his employée). 
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(4) Non-Arab men are not allowed to marry Arab women but an Arab man can marry 
a woman of any nationality. Foreigners cannot own any businesses of any size or kind, and 
are not allowed to buy any property (a few exceptions exist where the rulers have bestowed 
certain privileges to their favorites). However, a foreigner may run a business if a native is 
the kafeel or the owner of that business. Because most natives are not keen at running 
businesses, the said law allows them to take advantage of the entrepreneurial aptitude of a 
foreigner whereby a native becomes a business kafeel and takes a regular payment from the 
foreigner business keeper in return just for being his legal kafeel. 
(5) In the eye of the law, Indians, Srilankans and Filipinos are not treated the way 
Arab women and men are. Arabs can get away with what could lead a lower income Indian 
straight to prison and deportation. Even the 'blood money rates' (Qasas is the money paid 
to the relatives of a victim of homicide or, of one who died in an accident) are different for 
different nationalities and are normally linked not only to the earning capacity of the victim 
but to his/her nationality as well: Relatives of Indians, Bengalis, Srilankans and Filipinos are 
normally awarded the lowest 'blood money'. But again, the law relies heavily upon the 
arbitrary judgements of the police and the qazis (Islamic judges). 
(6) In a Sharia court, the testimony of two women equals that of one man. Likewise, 
the blood-money prescribed for a woman is half that for a man of comparable socio-
economic status. A woman cannot travel out of country without her husband's written 
consent. An Egyptian female university teacher was working in a Gulf state. She went to 
Egypt on vacations and had some argument with her husband who then went to the 
authorities and barred her from travelling abroad. When she could not reach her university 
four months after the vacations, her job was terminated. 
Employers of higher-ranking employees cannot always restrict their employees from 
changing jobs and therefore when a high-ranking employee resigns against the wishes of his 
employer, the two may not part as friends. To a large extent, the Arabic-Islamic employer 
psychology prevails among most Muslims; the following was reported in Britain: 
'At my two weeks notice to resign, the owners (British Muslims) got so offended and 
angry that they said, "don't wait for two weeks, you better pick up your things and leave 
right now; you are sacked - just go'". 
Resignation is usually considered an affront to the owners, and so, Arab employers 
in particular, and Muslim employers in general, usually try to sack an employee if they find 
out that he is going to resign at some future date. At an Arab bank, an officer was fired only 
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because he had appeared in an interview for a better paying job with another bank. There is 
a cultural aspect of this situation whereby the one who makes "the first move" (a resignation 
is often seen as a 'move' or an insult to the patron-employer, while sacking is an exercise 
of the employer's privilege however insulting to the employee), is perceived the 'cleverer', 
which perception is a derivative of Islamic ethics whereby preemptive strike has been, 
historically, not only allowed but considered 'wise' as well. 
A study of employment legislation in the Gulf states not only shows blatant racism 
and sexism in its clauses, it also shows that a legislation reflects the historical nature of a 
culture unless made by scholars who are well-informed, well-read in the history of legislative 
systems and laws, pay due attention to human psychology, ambitions, and motives, conduct 
thorough debates and analyses, and are willing to depart from historically transmitted 
primitive attitudes where necessary. Debates on jurisprudence and legislation in Europe were 
one factor in social and cultural transformation, but in the Middle East, open debate on 
legislation is not allowed, and those few who are responsible for the formation of legislation, 
do so with a view to perpetúate and preserve the oppressive culture and not transform it 
sufficiently to make it, at the least, comparable to modern democracies. Henee, there are 
aspeets in the said legislation which will be considered sub-human by the one who looks at 
them in an objective, unbiased manner, and whose primary concern is not to preserve the 
traditions but to see them in the light of basic human rights. 
A fundamental aspect of jurisprudence, namely equity, does not reflect in the Middle 
Eastern laws. Not only is the interpretation and implementation of various laws inconsistent, 
but the contents too vary in their effect according to the nationality, race, and socio-economic 
status of the persons involved, thus showing the primitive-tribal cognitive nature of the said 
society despite its having taken on a modern material cultural facade. The interpretation of 
the law for a man of higher status would be different from that for a man of lower status. 
Workers are at the lowest end of the social hierarchy and because almost all manual workers 
are foreigners, the racist essence of the employment legislation becomes obvious. 
Despite all that has been mentioned abo ve, and much more, protest comes only from 
those who can afford to quit and have the necessary resources and contaets to be able to 
leave the country at a short notice. Among the native public, not even a concept of unions 
and associations exists. 
A n explanation for the absence of organized group or collective protest is as follows: 
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The relationship between autocratie values, fatalism. mvsticism. and 'divine providence' 
While in Western cultures, the symbols of authority would not be confused, the legai 
norms would be clear, and the syntax of laws would not allow variety of interprétation, a 
glaring example of confusion can be seen in the Islamic judicial system, the Fiqah, based 
upon the Quranic verses with such a variety of interpretation[3] that dozens of Fiqah battle 
against each other; it must be mentioned that a confusing judicial system which cannot even 
be challenged because of its claimed divine origins, can only lead to an arbitrary social 
control and hence compound subjectivity in the society. It could be estimated that a majority 
of the world cultures still hold punishment, the negative reinforcement through penalties, as 
means of social control, at times also as means of organizational control. The negative affect 
generated by punishment[4] can spread to objects and behaviors différent from the intended 
target (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 310). In many cultures, for example in Saudi Arabia, ego-
defensiveness results because penalties are tied not only to the conséquences of situations and 
proscribed actions, but also to the personalities of the accused and those of persons in power. 
'Authoritarianism' in the Western sense, fails to convey the true meaning and extent and 
nature of control in many societies. While the European jurisprudence takes account of the 
circumstances, situation, and frustrations, motives and intentions of the offender, the Islamic 
Fiqah is based upon the doctrine of penalties to avenge, not to reform, and the control it 
imposes is total and unchallenged; hence its survival for centuries despite its obvious 
weaknesses and atrocities[5]. 
[3] "... if there are many varying interprétations, then the law is not seen as having a 
character of its own but a means for obtaining individuai advantage" (Katz & Kahn, 1978: 
308). 
[4]Experiments have demonstrated that positive reinforcement is a more reliable and 
easier technique to administer and is also less subject to side effeets (Maier, 1949). 
[5]We note in the following Unes, the effeets of coercive control as constraint, avoidance, 
and aliénation of people from socio-organizational processes; the said effeets are obvious in 
most Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East: "When even minor dissidence incurs 
great penalties, dissidents are few. Most revolts in social structures are easily quelled by 
invoking the symbols of authority. Nevertheless, to escape the shorteomings of negative 
motivation, modem [Western] tendency is to gear the desired behavior to the internalized 
motives. Constraint and avoidance [as results of intimidation] are not the psychological 
conditions for new and constructive activity. Etzioni has correctly emphasized the allettative 
character of coercive measures" (summarized from Katz & Kahn: 311-12). 
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In the below quoted[6] words of Milgram echoes one of oui* recurring thèmes, namely 
the significance of cognitive culture in shaping patterns of control and conflict. Milgram's 
findings show that common ethics and mores (to hurt someone is bad) could be easily 
overridden by the instructions of an institution of the establishment. In many societies, 
hurting someone for one's interests is not considered too bad and many cultures in fact 
approve of such behavior; in such cultures, social control in fact works the opposite to that 
in civilized countries, so that in aggression-prone cultures, the non-aggressive is more likely 
to suffer from neurosis: Düring my visits to Lahore Mental Hospital, I found two men, 
classified schizoid, who feit the 'guilt of being weak' for they belonged to a culture where 
non-aggressive/non-violent men were scoffed at. 
Autocratie cultural values determine the way in which legitimate power could be 
turned into personal power, or whether legitimacy of some sort is sought or not. In the 
Western organizations, power is considered at its best if it remains invisible but in most 
Muslim countries, most parts of the sub-continent and the Middle East, the tendency is 
towards an exhibition, even flaunting of power. It maybe argued that the greatest power is 
the one which keeps issues from being spoken about[7]. 
A conséquence of the sheer weight of religious tyranny is that the under-privileged 
classes in the said countries commonly believe in fatalism. When they see their misery and 
poverty against the equally obvious riches and waste of the vainglorious landlords and 
capitalists, fear of repression generally keeps them from thinking about building a more just 
and fair society through group social action such as a long-term rational thinking would 
imply. The most common reaction, under the speli of a common belief in machismo and 
religion is to improve the individuai lot at the expense of other individuate within their own 
class; they go on under-cutting each other's wage demands. After suffering from misery and 
[6]Milgram's (1963) experiments, in which 26 out of 40 subjects obeyed the instructions 
to deliver shocks to the end, are commonly known as studies of obédience per se; in fact 
they are more revealing of socio-cultural control because his subjects, as elaborated by 
Milgram, were voluntary participants and had ali the options to quit: "Obédience occurs as 
an instrumental élément in a situation that the subject construes as significant and meaningful. 
He may not be able to see its full significance, but he may assume that the experimenter [or 
the higher authorities] does" (summarized from Milgram, 1963: 377). 
[7] "There are unspoken issues from the trivial to the revolutionary, the 'un-spokenness' 
of which is itself évidence of power. Not only are décisions the outeome of power processes, 
so are 'non-decisions'" (abridged from Hickson et al. 1980: 53). 
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inter-class or state violence for years, to add to their misfortune, they produce too many 
children under the spell of mystic beliefs (see chapter 16) that children would bring luck or 
favour in oíd age, thus driving the market rate of wages further down. By the time they have 
realized some of their mistakes, they have had so many quarrels amongst themselves that any 
faith in group activity is lost. 
Asian workers in British organizations: Some cultural factors in the reasons for unión 
formation and in the perception of unión powers 
Compared to the aforementioned situation in the sub-continent and the Middle East, 
there is hardly any racism in Britain ñor are there laws which could be described as 'racist'. 
Wages and working conditions are incomparably better. Governmental action for ethnic 
minorities (council housing, welfare measures, basic human rights, familial rights) helped the 
immigrants bring over their families and become permanent citizens. Many took advantage 
of the humanistic attitudes of European governments and societies to make themselves 
comfortable in Europe. Citizenship enables one to be legally at par with the ethnic majority 
and the jurisprudence is one of the most humane and scrupulous that man has ever designed. 
However, perhaps it is in the nature of man that, while in depravation he may think he would 
be happy if food, clothing, and shelter were guaranteed, he quickly takes his newly won 
rights and privileges for granted and moves on to the next level of demands. 
Many Asian workers in several British faetones have tried at various times to form 
unions but generally they stay aloof from White workers and their unions. At a certain 
British-American factory, some Asian workers secretly tried to make a unión when, 
reportedly, there was no need for it because their demands were likely to be met by the 
management and they were already getting good wages. However, the said workers wanted 
to make a unión because they believed that unión leaders were dignitaries and being one 
would mean an elevation of status[8]. In many examples we find that Asian employees show 
a fear of management whereby they find it difficult to enter into open communication and 
this fear could be a primary cause for assuming that the management would not listen to them 
and henee, in the said case, they engaged in unnecessary unión forming. In the said British-
American factory, the White workers had no such fear of management and because of 
[8]For detailed narration, see page 360 statement 3. 
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cultural understanding, they found it easy to communicate with the management and get their 
demands accepted relatively easily which gave the impression to some Asian workers, that 
the White workers were on better relations with the management. Although the Asian 
workers in the said case kept it secret from the management that they were forming a unión, 
one of them informed his supervisor who in turn let the cat out of the bag. Subsequently, 
fourteen workers who were found involved in unión formation, were made redundant. 
Asian workers have often been reported to behave more as competing individuáis 
rather than as cooperating colleagues. This is one reason why Asian workers are not good 
at forming unions and taking organized collective decisions. When they take a collective 
action, many make phone calis to the managers telling them that they are not the ones 
creating problems but others are doing so [9]. If they decide collectively that they will not 
work on a certain day, on a bank holiday or some other holiday, they often go individually 
to the manager and say that it is the others who don't want to work. A n interviewee said that 
it was similar to what happens between children and parents whereby each child tries to get 
more favorable treatment from the parents. Among reported reasons for not taking a 
collective stand, is the observation that Asian workers usually feel ignored, and, if they are 
qualified or skilled, they do not get treated better than an average worker. They therefore try 
to make themselves important in the eyes of the management. This also happens because 
even though one may be good at his job, competing fellow workers would discourage him 
so that barriers arise which keep people from taking group decisions. 
We saw in chapters 2 and 9 that status symbols are so important in the sub-continent 
that people go to great lengths to acquire higher status and move away from manual work. 
We saw that people 'promoted to office jobs' refused to do manual-technical work though 
they were not trained for office jobs. We saw similar motivation in people trying to get 
higher posts perceived as prestigious, and we saw in chapter 12 that the Asians who became 
'team leaders' in a factory in Britain, tried their best not to opérate machines and to retain 
their 'elevated status'. Indeed, the concept of 'high status' explains a large part of behaviour 
[9]An interesting similarity exists here in that the records at the India Office Library 
show several examples of similar behaviour shown by many rulers of the Indian states and 
many Indian politicai leaders who used to approach the Viceroy and, in privacy, claim that 
they were more loyal than the other natives were, to the English, and wanted to serve them 
better. But in their public Statements, along with the other Indians, they used to denounce the 
British (see Wali Khan, "Facts Are Sacred", Vanguard Publishers, Lahore). 
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in the sub-continent where being a political leader is almost an acmé of social status so that 
there is a strong motivation among many manual workers to form unions primarily because 
by being a unión leader, they can jump up from a lowest social status to one significantly 
higher. Once accepted as unión leaders, many refuse to do the jobs for which they were 
employed in the first place, and because of their pressure-group support, they cannot be 
compelled to work, particularly in state enterprises where it is difficult to sack an employee. 
More over, there are certain concepts of masculinity and strength prevalent in the sub-
continent and the Middle East whereby resistance and aggression are considered worthier 
than compromise and tolerance. The concepts are often applied and practiced in situations 
which do not require resistance and aggression; henee a major subjective cause of social 
conflict and violence. Many Asians carne to Britain with the psychology of 'resistance and 
aggression' deeply instilled and ingrained and henee they saw the British environment too in 
their culturally conditioned context. Having been brought up in an environment of divisions 
and suspicions, and displays of strength and aggression, many see conspiracy and racism in 
British situations where there is none. At the workplace, many workers find it incredible to 
see that workers unions in Britain may cooperate and work together with the management: 
In their home countries, they had learned that workers unión are formed primarily to resist 
and 'counter-attack' the 'evil schemes' of managers and owners. A n interviewee who was 
in a very good job with a work environment where there was no need for the unión to cali 
for strikes, said, showing his cultural conditioning, that the unión 'colluded' with the 
management because the former was not a 'strong unión'. His statements reveal a view of 
'strength' as necessarily incorporating a manifestation of resistance if not aggression even if 
there is little need for conflict. This is obvious in that the said interviewee first appreciated 
the firm for its high pay and good facilities, and yet believed that the unión was "not strong 
because there was never a strike and because it colluded with the management". 
Many incidents of seemingly irrational behaviour that I have seen myself or have been 
narrated to me by others, reveal deeper cultural perceptions and conditioning. In the case of 
a strike at Courtauld[10], Mr . K , a training officer and a comparatively higher status man 
in the factory, was seen by his compatriot workers as an agent of the English management 
and thus not trusted (the supervisor's typical role-conflict). The reasons for a walk-out by a 
[10]For details of Asian workers' strikes in Courtauld, see page 358 statement 1. 
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group of representative Asian workers, without proper discussion with the management and 
without properly sharing information among all workers, could be traced to the cultural 
conception that saying "no" means power. "They need us", the leaders typically tell the 
workers, "just walk out and show them our strength and unity, and they will come behind 
us with concessions and increments in wages". Then, as may happen in authoritarian 
cultures, when the manifestation of strength does not lead to the desired consequence but to 
the opposite, the backlash and the increasing realization of weakness may forcé the rebel to 
succumb to authority and even worse conditions than those he had had before. In the 
aforementioned strike at Courtauld, the workers on strike were all dismissed and some were 
later taken back on new contracts with conditions that were stricter than before[l 1]. Through 
interviews, I was able to gather enough evidence to see the following pattern of altitudes of 
Asian workers[12] on strike in White owned factories: In almost all reponed events of strike, 
I found that most Asian workers, (i)did not consult the 'White' unions, (ii)took action in a 
haphazard and abrupt manner (wild cat strikes), (iii)mostly, individually, betrayed the 
decisions that were taken collectively, and, (iv)after getting sacked, regretted their action and 
wanted to be taken back. 
Remarkably similar to that in the sub-continent, the collective action of Asian workers 
in conflict situations is often non-unionized, chaotic, and egotistical rather than organized and 
reasonable. In many situations of conflict, as said earlier, phoney leaders emerge due to a 
cultural glorification of leadership behaviour though they may not have the required abilities, 
skills, knowledge and potential to lead the workers and help the organization. 
The above reponed description of conflict behaviour is different from that reponed 
about the behaviour of White workers. The White workers take their issues, about pay scales 
or other matters, to their unions and the unions pick up their fights with the management. 
Once a decisión is made collectively, all involved accept it and do not individually betray it. 
In sub-continent industry and politics, those involved in disputes often become i l l -
[ll]Lawrence and Lorsch (1967-b) show that forms of conflict could be limited by a 
requirement that issues be presented by special representatives, but the use of representan ves 
was not accepted by Asian workers at Courtauld in Manchester and in some other factories; 
the said workers had a culturally engendered belief that the presence of "all workers" and 
a "great show of forcé" would intimídate the management to accept wage increase demands. 
[12]Typical interviewee statements have been given in pages 358 to 362 section titled: 
'Asian worker's attitude towards unions in native British/English Firms..." 
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tempered quickly, less tolérant when they should be more so, and do not deal with the 
conflict situation in a cold, cairn and sensible way. Most Asians in Britain often show similar 
attitude when in conflict. It may be said that they had hardly any expérience of démocratie 
methods of conflict resolution in the sub-continent. Hence, as is often reported and frequently 
observed, where Asians are in control of offices or organizations, as a senior manager said, 
"ail they heard about democracy was here, and now, if you go around in the 
community, the processes are misused in the name of democracy." 
We may conclude that there is a direct relationship between protest behaviour and 
expectation. Démocratie societies, with their safe officiai channels of protest registration, 
raise the expectations of people. Motivation and morale are linked to expectations and 
although there is greater motivation among Asian workers to work for White firms, it is in 
these that officiai protest is lodged more than in the Asian firms. Some reasons for Asians 
demanding greater facilities in British firms, but not in Asian firms where working conditions 
are much worse (see chapter 13 for détails), were found to be the following: 
(i) Awareness of more rights in Western firms than in Asian; 
(ii) -a more skilled and experienced labor force is employed in Western firms than in Asian 
firms. English factories prefer experienced employées over new entrants while Asian 
factories tend to take on the cheapest labor, YTS traînées, women, illégal immigrants etc., 
except for key tasks where expérience is essential (see chapter 13 for détails); 
(iii) cultural factors such as in-group/out-group psychology reflected in the proverb, "one of 
your kind, even if he kills you, would give a décent burial" (see chapter 14 for détails); 
(iv) greater expectations of Asians from Western ownership than that from Asian. Hence 
British Asians make many demands which would be unthinkable in their home countries and 
which would not be granted by autocratie Asian employers. 
It may safely be stated that because of the expectation dimension, the frequency of 
protest action is not necessarily a valid indicator of bad working and living conditions. 
Summarv and contributions of chapter 15 towards the Grounded Theorv to be proposed 
(l)Despite obvious exploitation of workers and white collar staff, in the sub-continent, trade 
unions have not been as successful as those in the West. The reasons were found to be; 
(a)pseudo-leaders elevated due to the possession of property or clout or 'nuisance value', 
motivated by an excessive culture-instilled désire to be a leader despite incompétence; 
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(b)abuse of positions and powers by union officiais; (c)replacement of 'class consciousness' 
among workers by ethnie, religious, linguistic, and tribal groupings; (d)an patriarchal respect 
for the rieh whatever his moral character and sources of wealth; (e)violence on both sides, 
also diverted towards communal wars (see chapter 5 for détails). (f)repression, superstition, 
over-procreation, and the conséquent greater economie burdens make most stay neurotic-
arrogant and irrational. 
(2)In most Middle Eastern countries, employées unions at ail levéis are totally banned and 
protest often brings horrendous conséquences. Although countries once colonized by one of 
the European powers, do have some legislative aspects derived from their European héritage, 
employment législation in the Gulf states is derived from the following sources: (a)The 
décisions and decrees issued by the autocrats; (b)advisory bodies of tribal sheikhs or 
commercial/industriai elite; (c)ministerial committees; (d)traditional tribal-patriarchal ethics 
whereby an employer is the patron of the employée, a dépendent who must forsake some of 
his rights, including the right to change employment against the employer's wishes; 
(e)remnants of the traditional values of the Arabian slave society preserved in religious verses 
and consequently reflected in the employment législation whereby an expatriate, (i)cannot 
change his kafeel and cannot leave the country without the written consent of the kafeel, 
counter-confirmed by the Passport and Immigration Office; (ii)must give his finger prints to 
be kept with the local crime investigation agencies; (iii)must show an 'exit permit* at the 
airport before departure; (iv)can bring his family to the country of work only if his salary 
is more than a certain amount and if the kafeel agrées to it; (v)cannot have rights of 
permanent residence or citizenship, however long he stay s in the country, or even if was 
born and brought up there, and henee cannot have any rights équivalent to those of the 
nationals; (vi)has no rights to welfare measures; (vii)cannot own any businesses or property, 
but may run a business for a native owner; the said law allows the natives to take advantage 
of the entrepreneurial aptitude of a foreigner or take regular fee from the foreigner business 
keeper in return just for being his legal kafeel. 
Because the kafeel has the legal powers to stop an employée from leaving the country 
or keep him/her at whatever wages and job conditions, whatever happens to the employée 
finally boils down to the moral character of the employer especially because there is scant 
recourse to justice and the law relies heavily upon the arbitrary judgements of the police and 
the qazis (Islamic judges). Despite all mentioned above, and much more, among the public, 
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not even a concept of unions and associations exists. 
(3)Compared to the aforementioned, the British situation is incomparably humane and 
scrupulous but many Asians in British organizations have tried at various times to form 
unions and protest groups primarily to seek an elevation in social status. However, the 
general behaviour of Asian unions has been explained as: (a)competition where cooperation 
is required; (b)discouraging each other from taking initiative; (c)a view of unions as 
necessarily incorporating resistance, if not aggression, even if there is little need for conflict; 
(d)certain concepts of masculinity/ strength whereby resistance and aggression are considered 
worthier than compromise and tolerance, an attitude which is a major subjective cause of 
social conflict: Having been brought up in an environment of divisions and suspicions, and 
displays of strength and aggression, many see conspiracy and racism in British situations 
where there is little or none; (e)the cultural conception that saying "no" means power. 
Evidence suggests the following typical pattern of attitudes of Asian workers on 
strike: In almost all reported events, the Asian workers, (i)did not consult the 'White' unions, 
(ii)took action in a haphazard and abrupt manner (wild cat strikes), (iii)mostly, individually, 
betrayed the decisions that were taken collectively, and, (iv)after getting sacked, regretted 
their action and wanted to be taken back. 
Remarkably similar to that in the sub-continent, the collective action of Asian workers 
in conflict situations is often non-unionized, chaotic, and egotistical rather than organized and 
reasonable. In many situations of conflict, as said earlier, phoney leaders emerge due to a 
cultural glorification of leadership behaviour though they may not have the required abilities, 
skills, knowledge and potential to lead the workers and help the organization. 
The above description of conflict behaviour is different from that reported about the 
typical behaviour of White workers: The White workers take their issues, about pay scales 
or other matters, to their unions which then pick up the issues with the management. Once 
a decisión is made collectively, all involved accept it and do not individually betray it. 
Reasons for Asians demanding greater facílities in British firms, but not in Asian 
where working conditions are much worse (see chapters 11, 12, 13), were found as follows; 
(i)awareness of more rights in Western firms; (ii)a more skilled and experienced labor forcé 
is employed in Western firms; (iii)cultural factors such as in-group/out-group psychology (see 
chapter 14 for details); (iv)greater expectations in Western firms than that in Asian or Arab. 
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Findings in the Middle East show that legislation should be made by scholars well-
informed in human psychology, ambitions and motives, conduct thorough analyses, and are 
willing to depart from historically transmitted traditions where necessary for the sake of 
human rights. The inequity in the contents and the inconsistency, in the interpretation and 
implementation of various employment laws, according to the nationality, race, and socio-
economic status of the subject, show how a subjectivist cognitive culture can lag so far behind 
(to its own long-term detriment), in the sophistication of social control, conflict resolution and 
motivation techniques despite having taken on a modern material-culture facade. 
The chapter sums up many comparative and recurring themes of this work; 
(i) similarities in Asian union behaviour in the sub-continent and in Britain, despite 
great differences in the two societies, demonstrate the high significance of immediate cultural 
learning in the social institutions of a culture; (ii)lack of protest and union formation in the 
Middle East despite a high degree of injustice shows clearly that actual or potential conflict 
cannot be properly understood without registering the control dimension; (iii)more protest 
registration by Asians in 'White owned* organizations than in Asian (or Arab) clearly links 
conflict to the extent of control and expectation as much as to injustice, if any, so that it may 
safely be stated that because of the expectation dimension, the frequency and extent of protest 
action is not necessarily a valid indicator of relatively bad working and living conditions. 
Protest behaviour is directly linked to expectations. Democratic societies, with their open 
official channels of protest registration, raise the expectations of people. Hence, British 
Asians make many demands which would be unthinkable in home countries and would not be 
granted by authoritative/autocratic employers. 
Motivation and morale are linked to expectations, and although there is greater 
motivation among people to live in democratic societies and work for democratic or 
participative organizations, it is in these that official protest is lodged more than in the 
authoritarian/ autocratic societies and organizations where the consequences of high control 
show in loss of motivation and intermittent violence. 
The links between control, conflict and motivation become very explicit in this 
comparison of union behaviour in three cultures. The findings shall be used to deduce our 
Grounded Theory that patterns of organizational behavioral factors are shaped by the 
structures and functions of the broader socio-cultural institutions. 
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Chapter Sixteen: The Kev Issues Raised in this Work and their Solutions 
In the empirical investigations narrated so far, the following key issues were found: 
The relationship between socio-cultural structure and organizational structural imperatives 
It was found that the structural features of society (social stratification), affect 
organizational imperatives (through corresponding hierarchical stratification) in the sub-
continent and the Middle East in a much more obvious manner than they do in the West. For 
example, in chapter 2, we saw that in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations, 
there is an explicit classification of persons with respect to class and cultural background, 
perceived socio-economie power and status, the way they are dressed and addressed, and 
their possessions. On the other hand, classification of persons in Western companies is more 
impersonal, related to the officiai désignation and task-oriented. The relationship of power 
and promotion in Western organizations is related more to the performance of the person 
than to his socio-economie status. Likewise, in the West, there are less acute socio-economie 
différences, and manual work is not seen as a curse but something which ennobles man. 
There are implications of status concepts (cultural, social and economie) and 
perceptions of people, for the way they categorize jobs, ranks and departments in terms of 
their 'worthiness'. Such a classification has implications for people's motivation, the way 
they control, and for potential for conflict. It is because of the acute social stratification, lack 
of social integration, and the conséquent class-segregated organizational hierarchical levels 
that entrepreneurs from the two said cultures mostly follow theory X type of assumptions in 
their views of control, conflict and motivation but this is no longer the case in the West. The 
findings that in Britain[l], worker wages are much lower in Asian businesses than in English 
(chapter 13), and likewise, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, worker wages are much 
lower in native companies than in the MNCs (chapters 9, 10 and 13), reveals, as one 
indicator, that the sub-continent and Arab entrepreneurs determine the monetary worth of 
[l]Most respondents in Britain mention dissimilarities in terms of class and culture 
based attitudes revealed by indicators such as the nature of supervision, feed-back and 
personal control, treatment given to new entrants, religious/life style tolérance, levels of 
wages, promotion opportunities, rest periods, extent of employer's trust, and fellow-workers' 
behaviour (chapters 11, 12, and 13). 
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their employées in accordance with sharp class, culture, nationality, and race distinctions. 
The class and culture oriented dissimilarities between British and Asian businesses 
show in the ways in which hierarchy in the organizational structure is determined, authority, 
responsibility and accountability is defined and assigned to specific persons, jobs are defined, 
described and allotted, and procédures for the flow of work implemented: While in most 
British businesses, much of the above mentioned Systems are established with scrupulous 
considération for the task and human related factors in an impersonal and functional manner, 
in most Asian businesses much is left to be done on an ad-hoc and social status basis. Hence 
most Asian businesses try to get the cheapest form of workforce and deal in such products 
(textile, knit-wear, food products etc.), services (retailing, whole-sale, simple finance) and 
technology as can be comparatively easily made, used, or provided by unskilled or semi-
skilled workers and semi-qualified staff, ail of which reflects the relevance of a 'wide gap' 
income structure to the Asian way of Organization. In other words, high-tech and creative 
organizations require low social stratification and narrower income gaps than the Asian and 
Arab culture allows for. A solution has to be found which could enable the said organizations 
to reduce the class barriers within Organization and in society. 
The relationship of aforesaid socio-cultural structure specificallv with motivation and control 
Because in the sub-continent and the Middle East, class memberships correlate with 
organizational hierarchical levels, concepts of social mobility, status and prestige shape the 
motivation and control patterns of most native people (chapter 2). Regarding control, we saw 
in chapter 2, that a décision made by a Supervisor is not accepted by workers as easily as 
when it is made by higher managers because the workers feel that the Supervisor is from 
their own "lower" class and thus have less déférence for him than that for managers who 
come from a "higher" social class. Likewise, in the Middle East, a senior officiai from a 
perceived "inferior tribe" may not be obeyed (chapter 5) by juniors from a "superior tribe", 
even in organizations as performance-oriented as the armed forces. Regarding motivation, 
acute class distinctions often breed excessive motivation to rise above one's socio-economie 
class. As discovered, people are generally motivated to avoid manual-physical-centered jobs, 
and seek jobs that could grant them more money, higher status, public contacts, and more 
powers (chapters 2 and 4). Because académie qualifications help in obtaining higher status 
and a better paying job, many strive to get académie qualifications despite lack of real 
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interest in the subjects they study. Work, éducation, and organizations become instruments 
in seeking goals that He elsewhere in society (chapter 4). Henee there is a need to offer 
solutions to channel control and motivation to work-related imperati ves. 
Major problems regarding motivation 
The relationship of motivation to innovation, found in many Western organizations[2], 
is very hard to see in sub-continent/Middle Eastern companies. Because in the Western 
culture, intrinsic motivation and the need for achievement are more common observations 
than in the other two said cultures, it is safe to conclude that intrinsic motivation is a culture-
bound need both in its existence and in its form. We have seen in chapter 8 that need for 
achievement (in the Western sense) is not strong among the Arabs. We have related the need 
for achievement to culture, personality-formation, and child-rearing practices. The oil-based 
affluent régions of Middle East are a testimony to the fact that, at a mass level, an almost 
complete satisfaction of lower level needs (physiological and safety) has not lead to a shift 
forwards to the fulfillment of higher-level needs as understood and expected in the théories 
of Maslow and McGregor. Likewise, Pakistanis in Britain, who found the satisfaction of 
basic needs guaranteed by the British welfare state (chapters 4 and 13), show only faint signs 
of a shift to higher level needs as understood and expected in the said théories. We therefore 
conclude that the development of higher level needs in man does not take place spontaneously 
but is strongly related to one's learning in a certain socio-cultural and ethical environment 
under moderate economie pressures; that the kind of motivation one has is primarily 
determined by the kind of messages that prevail in a certain society, by the type of socio-
familial structure one lives in, by the prevailing norms, values, dogmas and beliefs that 
people are programmed with, and that despite the pretence of individuai independence, the 
masses of people, with ali their idiosyncrasies (that are often of a less significant nature) are 
motivated by the common prévalent values and limitations of the society they are brought up 
in. Even the idea that intrinsic motivation is désirable, is a learned idea which, in many 
cultures, at least at mass level, does not exist. 
[2]Gregory (1983: 373) notes about Silicon Valley computer companies that 
innovation in general and new produets in particular are highly valued. The opportunity to 
work on "the newest, whizziest product" is sought while "maintaining" last year's product 
is assigned to junior, low status employées. 
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The purely instrumental/extrinsic nature of work in the sub-continent is obvious from 
the fact that the vast majority of job seekers think about the organization and job description 
only when they have choices, in which case it is not the nature of the work that détermines 
their sélection but the social status (chapter 2) attached to the job, the level of income[3], and 
the opportunities of promotion etc. [4]. We shall discuss how extrinsic motivation could be 
reduced in a society. 
Major problems regarding control 
Some major cultural différences in the exercise of authority between Western and 
other two organizations are that while in the former, influence transactions are relevant to 
organizational rôles, in the latter, they are also related to one's social and personal rôles 
(chapters 2 and 15); while in Western organizations, power is vested in the position, it may 
also be personalized in the latter (chapters 6, 8 and 15); while in the West, the pyramidal 
hierarchical organizational model is not the only choice (matrix and démocratie/participative 
models are also in vogue), in the sub-continent and the Middle East, the hierarchical 
organization (chapter 8) with status, prestige, rewards and power foliowing the pyramid of 
ranks, is still prévalent. In the Middle East, even universities and research institutions are 
formed and run on a softer form of the military model; the législative powers, the 
prérogative to hire and fire, to form policies and procédures, are vested in the top ranking 
few; orders flow from top down; lecturers, teachers or researchers are supposed to follow 
orders to implement the programs with minimal participation in décision making (chapter 8). 
[3]While there is little doubt that money is the key motivation in the sub-continent, 
Middle East, and among British-Asians (chapter 4), because of the complex nature of 
différent societies, it would be safe to conclude that the nature of such motivation is formed 
by more than a few factors: Thèse are the factors of reason, religion, caste, social class, 
economie class, socio-cultural and familial structure and the conséquent obligations, sub-
culture, and the general level of development of a society (chapter 4). The above mentioned 
factors form a particular matrix of motivation patterns for a group of people. 
[4]Dubin and Goldthrope et al. (Burrell & Morgan, p. 175, p. 195) also have 
demonstrated that people may seek to minimize their commitment to work and obtain 
satisfaction (in terms of psychological needs, goals, and personal values) elsewhere; Burrell 
& Morgan state: "The psychological analysis in terms of needs is thus modified in terms of 
the sociologicalfactors which influence attitudes to work". Goldthrope et al., in their study 
of industriai workers found a markedly instrumental orientation. 
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While control attitudes in the sub-continent and the Middle East are more based on 
perceptions of the subject's social power (chapters 2, 6 and 15), control attitudes in Western 
firms are more task-related and based on organizational imperatives. Means of control in the 
former organizations are more towards the coercive-utilitarian (chapters 6, 11, 8 and 15) end 
of the spectrum, but in Western firms, means of control are more towards the utilitarian-
normative end of the spectrum. Non-work/personal control in the two former cultures is seen 
in undue exercise of commanding behaviour extended to what in the West is regarded as 
personal choices (chapters 8 and 11). 
Major problems regarding conflict 
Compared to that in the West, industriai relations situation in the sub-continent is far 
from harmonious. The population of Pakistan is more than twice that of Britain while the 
population of India is twenty times the same and, although most industriai produce finds its 
way highly profitably into their very large internal markets, potential and actual conflict at 
various levels, in conjunction with other cultural factors (chapter 5), hampers efficiency, 
effectiveness, and creativity in the sub-continent. However, contrary to that in the West[5], 
[5]The traditional Western approach to conflict, as in modem Middle East and sub-
continent, equated conflict with trouble-making, and sought avoidance by authoritative/ 
legalistic repression of conflictive expression, and finding scapegoats (Kelly, 1974). But 
conflict in the West is now seen primarily as an integral and manageable part of the social 
and organizational process. Although many researches show a negative relationship between 
interunit conflict and performance of the Organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967-a; Blau 
and Scott, 1963-b) in certain conditions, others find conflict of opinions, discussions and 
disagreements productive. Katz and Kahn (1978: 641) give a long list of researchers who see 
the positive effects of limited or controlied conflict; as leading to the discovery of better 
organizational arrangements (Follet, 1941), as necessary for progress (Van Doom, 1966); 
as directing managerial attention to needed changes (Litterer, 1966); as bringing a dynamic 
situation into a better state of congruence with the facts of power (Coser, 1956); as effecting 
a search for better means of conflict réduction (March and Simon, 1958; Litterer, 1966); as 
a stimulus to interest and curiosity, to the full use of individuai capacities, and as a welcomed 
means for testing one's abilities (Deutsch, 1971); Katz and Kahn quote that Hall (1971) has 
summed up such research to conclude that, "conflict, effecîively managed, is a necessary 
condition for creativity", and also that Allport (1953), Hunt (1963) and Driver and Streufert 
(1964) propose many speculative benefits at the individuai level, with the assumption that 
people require certain levels of stimulation and continuing expérience of tension generation 
and réduction, within limits, to fonction well and with satisfaction. Ashforth (1995) has 
argued that even émotions are an integral and inséparable part of organizational life and offen 
functional for the Organization when applied to motivation, leadership and group dynamics. 
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conflict in the sub-continent and the Middle East, is most often viewed as the antithesis of 
social order. The main problem regarding conflict is that, while in the West a positive 
relationship between creativity of various kinds and controlled conflict has been established, 
in the sub-continent and the Middle East, conflict even if controlled, has associated negative 
connotations so that the popular attitude in general, and in management and administration 
in particular, tends to prohibit and oppress conflict at most levéis (chapters 8 and 9). Such 
an approach is often dysfunctional for it channels conflict to non-work intra-level conflict 
(chapter 5) and results in the lack of creativity for the sake of conformity (chapters 8 and 9). 
Segregation among sexes and the consequent sexist psychology not only leads to 
greater incidence of female sexual harassment (chapter 12), it also compounds community 
segregation by prohibiting inter-community marriages. Henee we observe group formation 
and conflict in the sub-continent on the basis of caste, región, language, religión, tribe and 
ethnic background brought into organizations (chapter 5)[6]. In the Middle East, we observe 
tribal conflict, along with other conflict, playing a prominent role in organizations including 
those as sensitive as the armed forces (chapter 5). Non-work conflict is seen in response to 
inequitable treatment, and about each other's valúes, beliefs and life-styles (chapter 13). 
In Western companies, conflict is either related to the distribution of rewards or to 
the multi-occupational cultures and oceupational ethnocentricism[7]. But in sub-continent and 
Middle Eastern organizations, intraorganizational conflict is more related to the contextual 
culture (chapters 5, 12 and 14). Therefore, we deduce that whilst Western companies 
primarily evolve a work-based culture, and even conflict is work-related[8], the other said 
[6]Dubin and Goldthrope (Burrell and Morgan p. 206) have demonstrated that conflict 
based on plurality of group interests may be brought into the organization from outside. 
[7]Examples of work-based soft-confliets in Western companies are supplied in 
Gregory's (1983: 371-372) study of several professionals in Silicon Valley computer 
companies; Employees sometimes alluded to different oceupation based or suborganization 
based cultures. "Hardware", "Software", "Engineering", "Marketing", or "Scientist" 
orientations were often mentioned. Just as more widely held cultures produce ethnocentricity, 
each oceupational culture justifies it own centrality and emphasizes local priorities. 
[8]The voluminous evidence for conflict behavior between organizational units shows 
the work-related nature of conflict in Western organizations: Walton and Mckersie (1966), 
loci of conflict on resource allocation; White (1961) and Seiler (1963), loci on matters of 
jurisdiction between departments; Argyris (1964b), loci on autonomy and control between 
supervisors and those supervised and on questions of status and reward. 
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organizations are open to social divisions (chapter 5) which largely over-shadow their work-
based cultures and may result in pseudo organizations (chapter 8). 
Problems regarding control, conflict and motivation in coniunction 
The findings that while workers in British-Asian organizations express little protest 
against authoritative owners (i.e. obédience to oppressive control) despite unfair working 
conditions and bad treatment, inter-personal conflict, turn-over, and wastage of time (i.e. 
low motivation) is much higher in Asian firms than in native-British (chapters 12, 13 and 15) 
lead us to believe that although high personal control may breed obédience to authority, it 
serves as a negative motivation[9] (chapters 8, 10 & 15). High control curbs work-related 
conflict and results in a loss of creativity. This is supported by overwhelming évidence from 
the Middle East where a repression of work-related conflict by autocratie, utilitarian and 
coercive control has led to an utter loss of intrinsic motivation and creativity. Repression of 
work-related conflict by high control has also channelled such conflict in the direction of non-
work conflict, even violence, based on caste, région, language, religion, tribal and ethnie 
background (chapter 5)[10]. When we find people seeking jobs that grant influence, contacts, 
and domination over others (chapter 2) unprecedented in the West, it is not difficult to link 
[9]Katz & Kahn (1978: 294) point to three major motivation patterns, namely 
compliance with rules, responsiveness to external rewards, and internalized motivation; in 
the first two of these patterns, the relationship of motivation to control is obvious as in the 
statement, "Machine theory assumes that rute enforcement, or coercive compliance, is the 
fundamental pattern. Dahrendorf holds that rute enforcement créâtes its own antithesis. Marx 
also holds that differential rewards and hierarchical control are inimicai to internalized 
motivation". Handy (1981: 37-39) talks about a tacit psychological contract between the 
individuai and the Organization and mentions three types of organizations with coercive 
contraets, calculative contraets, and cooperative contraets thus reminding one of Etzioni's 
three kinds of power and compliance, which relates motivation to control. 
[10]Hofstede's (1980) observations which provide support to a relationship between 
obsequiousness (personal control) and conflict are that more violence is found in the middle 
and in the upper third of PDI countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, India, Italy, 
Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela). On the 
other hand low PDI is more likely to be associated with a certain consensus among the 
population which reduces disruptive confliets. Those lower in PDI (Austria, New Zealand, 
Israel, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden) are relatively stable pluralist Systems. 
Argyris (1964-b) relating loci of conflict to autonomy and control between Supervisors 
and those supervised, shows the relationship of conflict to control. 
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such motivation to the security needs triggered by coercive control (chapters 6 and 15). 
The consequence of misplaced controls, instrumental motivation (organizations used 
to seek strong familial goals), and suppression of conflict is that many native organizations 
are in fact, what I have termed, 'pseudo organizations' in that they consume huge resources 
but do not really achieve their stated objectives except in appearance so that the functions and 
procedures in the said organizations were found to be concerned with activities without real 
tangible results, that is, concerned with appearance rather than soul (chapter 8). I see pseudo 
organizations as a characteristic of 'imitation cultures' in which people borrow aspects or 
organizations from a 'genuine culture' perhaps because they need them or are impressed 
either by their functionalism or by their glamour, but because the said aspects or 
organizations have few roots in the 'imitation culture', they gradually reduce to what maybe 
symbolized as 'actions without much meaning', or 'forms without much content'. This, 
unfortunately, has happened to many developmental projects designed by foreign experts who 
perhaps did not have the capacity to explore the native culture in suffícient depth and henee 
primarily used 'self reference criteria' when planning for the sub-continent and Middle 
Eastern situations. However, while many local capitalists and bureaucrats offer cultural and 
religious excuses for the aforementioned problems at the workplace, better human resource 
practices of multinationals in the sub-continent and the Middle East créate an optimism about 
these few companies. 
Problems in the Eastern familialism 
As a result of a major cultural focus on an exclusive familialism, there is a greater 
and exclusive involvement of the sub-continent-Middle Eastern family and the British-Asian 
family in businesses than is the case in Western businesses (chapter 3). There is evidence 
showing that the former families run businesses in the solé interest of the family prosperity 
often at the cost of social, legal, governmental, and moral concerns. More over, 
organizational patterns of control, conflict generation and resolution, and motivation, are 
strongly related to the same patterns observable in the families from which organizational 
participants come[see endnote 1]. In chapters 3 and 4, we saw that money motivation may 
be instilled into children at home by parents and elders, and materialized in the workplace: 
In-group/out-group psychology and racism as well as lack of inter-religious tolerance (chapter 
14) (Sikhs, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Whites, Asians) may also be imparted to children at 
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home and then expressed in the workplace; similar observations were made regarding the 
induction of patriarchal authoritarianism (chapter 7), personal control, non-work and religious 
control, and ségrégation of sexes, practiced in the workplace analogous to the way they are 
practiced in homes. For example, high personal control at family level has parallels in high 
personal control in the workplace. 
Problems in the broader cultural context 
I have provided ample évidence to show that control, conflict and motivation are as 
much interrelated as they are shaped by the contextual culture. Patterns of control are shaped 
by the religion and beliefs of employées as much as by work-related imperatives; patterns 
of conflict too are engendered as much by cognitive cultures as by work-related factors. 
The empirical studies conducted for this work support our thesis that the influence of 
a social-familial culture reigns supreme over the organizational culture, and that many aspects 
of the latter are often an extension of the former. Hence, although native M N E personnel 
work with almost as much resuit-orientation as M N E personnel in Europe, this does not 
mean that MNEs in the sub-continent have the same organizational culture as they have in 
the West: Because of the nature of social relationships that exist in the sub-continent and the 
Middle East, cultural factors constantly interfere with the imperatives of organizational 
functioning as developed and understood in the West. A major différence between the former 
organizations and the Western, in terms of cultural focus, is the greater relevance of the 
contextual culture (religious, social, familial, national, ethnie) in the former than in the latter. 
For the reasons as mentioned, when offering solutions to the above mentioned problems, we 
shall offer possible solutions not only at the organizational level, but at cultural level as well. 
What are the solutions to the problems pointed at in this work? 
My twenty years of engagement with several socio-political groups/organizations 
working for socio-organizational reformation have made me rather pessimistic about certain 
cultures though I console myself by looking at other cultures that are continuously 
progressing. In offering solutions to the issues raised in this work, I am therefore standing 
at cross roads: I can hide behind the data to argue that the culture décides on its own whether 
it is going to prosper or not, or survive in one or the other way. The slave society also 
survived for centuries and even authoritarian and violent cultures survive for long. I can say 
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that democracy can work only when the culture has prepared people to listen to the voice of 
reason. When the culture does not do so, democracy and capitalism will not succeed to a 
reasonable level but neither will communism for it needs an even higher level of mass 
consciousness and humanism to function adequately. However, I am aware that such an 
attitude will be criticized as 'arm chair theorizing' and besides, a sensé of duty forces one 
to think that there must be solutions. 
The aims of science were once noted by some scholar as 'understanding, prédiction 
and control of the phenomena under study'. In so far as understanding and prédiction are 
concerned, it would appear to many, particularly the European readers of this work, that I 
have offered a gloomy picture (the tragedy of expérience is that it can often not be 
transferred to those who live in a différent socio-cultural context) of the majority in the sub-
continent and the Middle East. This is mainly because, unlike many studies which focus at 
the tiny elite-business classes for their déductions and consequently, reflect the class-centered 
and 'politically correct' typical optimism of the elite, I have looked at the behaviour patterns 
of a sample that represents the vast majority of the people in question, and, used ali methods 
that I could, to grasp the true essence of the two cultures in question. However, I am very 
well aware that the said people can improve their collective lot in a few générations by taking 
the 'right décisions' now. The purpose of my expositions is not to predici impending doom. 
Exposition is a first step to realizing what is wrong and perceiving its true depth if any 
remédies are to be sought. I have tried to understand, expose, and predict what will happen 
if history is allowed to take its own course as it has been so far in the said cultures. 
In understanding the said cultures, I have arrived at two 'structural over-determinants' 
which I see as the main barriers to a désirable movement of thèse cultures, and the main 
causes of social stagnation; this needs some explanation: In 'Althusserian structuralism', at 
times one or more structural éléments overdetermine [see endnote 2] the course of history: 
The configuration of particular over-determinations create in différent societies quite différent 
social forms. People's actions and historical events are determined fundamentally by the 
social formations in which they are located (Burrell & Morgan: 343-5; Marx see page 7). 
The two structural over-determinants that I see as the main barriers to social progress 
are a particular type of familialism and a particular type of attitude towards religion in the 
contemporary sub-continent and Middle East. But before I préjudice my reader against the 
solutions to be proposed, let me emphasize that I am neither against the family system as a 
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mode of social life nor against religion per se. On the contrary, I am very well aware of the 
immediate risks to mankind and civilization if any of the two Systems in question is 
blemished. However, the significance of both Systems to the continuity of civilization, ipso 
facto, makes them the prime vehicles for the progress or stagnation of a society. In seeking 
certain changes, I am only criticizing the 'over-determinant' way in which the two Systems 
in question have taken hold of the contemporary sub-continent and Middle Eastern cultures 
while in the West, a remarkable refinement in religious social control and the inclusiveness 
of individuai and moral concerns within the family means that the two are no longer barriers 
to human progress in the sense explained in this chapter. Religions cannot be abolished but 
transformation must be allowed, as many Christian sects have done in the West, to adapt 
religions to modera circumstances and give people at least the freedom to use logicai and 
basic solutions to their seething problems. 
I shall now come to the third aforementioned aim of science and try to suggest ways 
to control and alter the future to a désirable direction of social harmony and prosperity which 
i 
only then will be reflected in organizations in the forni of work-related control, productive 
conflict, and a motivation to create in a work-related context. Because of limited space in this 
work, I shall discuss only two main solutions in some détail: One offers a materialistic, 
objective, and scientific approach (the experiments on the social behaviour of rats[ll] in 
circumstances of over-population quoted in chapter 5 p. 79) and deals with the i l i effects of 
the particular kind of familialism found in the two said cultures, albeit in varying forms, but 
is not spécifie to the said cultures; the Philippines, for example, suffers from similar 
problems and needs similar solutions as shall be offered. 
The second solution looks at the subjective side of the human mind in offering 
possible methods of transformation of a cognitive culture and deals with the inappropriate 
view of 'immutable religion' in the said societies. However, in offering thèse two main 
solutions, I am also aware of the barriers, that will probably arise, to the implementation of 
the solutions to be proposed. I shall try to deal with ali thèse issues in this chapter. 
[ll]Some readers might object to my référence to rats' behaviour in solving human 
problems, considering such an analogy a debasement of mankind. To such readers I 
recommend a stay in Bombay, Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, Cairo or in many other cities with 
similar problems, for profound observations over of a period of no less than one year and 
in the social position of an average-income person, divorced from the city upper classes. I 
am certain that a sensitive observer will then look at my 'rats analogy' quite sympathetically.. 
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It is not difficult to find and implement solutions for organizational problems unless 
the solutions come in conflict with certain sensitive cultural symbols. In such a case, 
organizational change in the said two cultures gets inextricably linked to politics. This is 
because organizational development to a significant extent is not possible without significant 
socio-cultural changes of the type which require efforts of hundreds of intellectuals and a 
mass participation over longer periods of history (Burtrend Russell once said that if a 
hundred great thinkers of Europe had been killed in infancy, modera world would not ha ve 
come into existence). In the West, the work of thousands of intellectuals, bit by bit, accepted 
gradually by the masses, has resulted in a reasonable level of cognition (and even then a lot 
is left to be desired) which most in the West now take for granted. In the other two cultures 
in question, the process has probably just begun and faces many threats. There are factors, 
inherent in these cultures, that inhibit the refmement of cognition, so that many argüe that 
the cultures need radical transformation in several áreas of social life. Henee, we shall look 
at solutions and barriers both at the organizational and social level. 
Solutions at the organizational level 
In chapters 9 and 10, we compared the working conditions between MNCs in the sub-
continent and native companies and found that foreign companies have shown by example 
that a functional organizational environment with a primarily work-related control, conflict 
and motivation can be created. If the MNCs can do it in the sub-continent, so can the native 
organizations. For example, the native compames can adopt the same incentive structure that 
is being followed in the MNCs . This would lead to greater motivation and reduced conflict, 
as was found in the MNCs and described in chapters 9 and 10. In this respect, Sheriff s 
(1958) experiment showing that conflict could be generated or resolved by changing the 
incentive structure provides a vital clue to understanding the relationship of conflict with 
motivation in organizations that have immense gaps between employee salaries. In Sheriff s 
experiment, mere social interaction did not show conflict reduction but the introduction of 
superordinate goals which induced joint activity for common purpose did. 
Many authors on organizational change have mentioned several kinds of reactions to 
change and reasons for resistance to change (Lippitt, 1982) and henee 'change management' 
is their theme. But these have been written in the context of Western culture which, unlike 
the other two, is not a barrier to many required changes. A change and development even 
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at the organizational level requires a long-term view of the situation: French and Bell (1970) 
suggest a period between three and five years. Lippitt (1982) gives some reasons, very valid 
in the sub-continent and the Middle East, for resistance to change and suggests the following 
to reduce such resistance; (i)make the employees particípate in change; (ii)continuously 
provide information regarding the need and goals of change; (iii)take employee habits into 
consideration; (iv)stimulate the ambitious among the employees, and, (iv)use problem solving 
methods. Facilitating learning of new skills required in change helps adjustment to change. 
Regarding the creation of work-related motivation in the two said cultures, managers 
can find many objective ways to relate rewards to performance and ensure that the personnel 
know that only work and performance can lead to higher rewards. Such methods can be 
found in numerous books on personnel management. 
Regarding eliminating personal control, managers can design objective and impersonal 
systems of control, make it easy for the staff to understand the procedures, targets and goals, 
simplify them, and ensure knowledge by publishing them for reference. 
Intra-level conflict can be reduced by institutionalizing equity in treatment (uniform 
pay scales within one rank, hiring, selection and promotion on the basis of merit) at least 
within a rank. Equity in treatment will also reduce conflict on the basis of nationality, race 
and región etc. by mitigating people's suspicions about each other: Many problems occur 
because people are not given the right information about their place and status in the 
organization so that they keep guessing and have no alternative but to form grape vines and 
listen to rumours. Regular and trustworthy publications from the seniors, imparting clarity 
about things such as the incentives and promotion systems for the staff, can allay their fears 
and diminish the bickering which is a consequence of abandoning the employees in the haze 
of half-information or ignorance. 
Solutions to reducing coercive control in the organization, mitigating non-work 
conflict, and linking motivation to work and performance are often possible[see endnote 3] 
if the owners and managers show commitment to these. Examples where managers have 
successfully tried to shift management style from authoritative to democratic, along with 
suggestions in the light of such experiments, were summarized in chapter 6. In authoritarian 
societies, an advantage, that may be exploited by owners/managers, is the reverence that 
subordinates have for seniors; such a reverence can be positively used by the seniors to show 
by example and instruct their middle management to be more participative, democratic, and 
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supportive of the good work of the middle/junior staff[12]. In authoritarian societies, 
whatever comes from the top will be followed by those below in the hierarchy. In ancient 
times, if the king changed his religion, so did his subjects. Likewise, during Bhutto's 
government (1972-1976), most officers donned the awami dress and during the Zia regime 
in Pakistan (1977-1988), most bureaucrats had placed Islamic books on their shelves. 
Therefore, the prime responsibility for organizational change and development, in 
authoritarian cultures, rests with the top managers and the owners who can get their decisions 
(of decentralization, participation, and raising the cognitive levels of the lower ranks so that 
they could be made fit to share responsibility) implemented with much greater ease than their 
counter-parts in the West can. There is a need therefore, for the authoritarian senior to 
realize that by giving up some of his powers, he can share his burdens, reduce his 
responsibilities and while, in the short term, he might feel uneasy at not being the 'master', 
in the long run he can only have less stress and strain, feel the pleasure of being appreciated 
by those who benefit from participation, and enjoy the contentment of not being 'all in al l ' . 
While the authoritarian feudal lords, capitalists, bureaucrats, and religious leaders pay 
attention to the benefits of power-centralization, they ignore it's self-destructive aspects. If 
they could see the advantages of power sharing (shared responsibility and accountability, less 
burden on one's shoulders, less stress) they would be willing to move towards democratic 
control where possible. There is evidence suggesting that such a movement towards greater 
participation and less coercive control has begun to show in the urban regions of India, 
remarkably paralleled at the social level by growing freedom that middle classes now allow 
to their children, and the growing acceptance of female employment and independence. 
Regarding the Middle East, there are solutions at the organizational level such as, for 
example, in the immigration departments, the control procedures could be shortened or 
simplified. But these solutions will not be brought about primarily by the personnel who man 
these organizations because of reasons mentioned in chapter 8. Hence the solution lies in a 
social transformation which could enable the growth of people who are not, for example, 
[12]Likert and Likert (1976) see conflict management as one derivative advantage of 
participative organizational structure (System 4), proposing supportive interpersonal style 
with emphasis on integrative goals, a de-emphasis of status, the use of consensus rather than 
majority rule, overlapping vertical and lateral membership, and, measurement and feedback 
with appropriate third party coaching, as means of bringing about such structural and 
interpersonal changes. 
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status-power-seekers for its own sake, who are creative and capable of designing everyday 
commonplace solutions to immediate routine organizational problems. 
I shall not dwell much on organizational level solutions because of, that I shall be 
committing a logicai fallacy, an inconsistency in my theory, by claiming that organizations 
can be radically transformed without a radical change in the culture on which they are 
predicated[13]. Organizational solutions can be offered by managers if they are 'made of the 
right staff which cornes from the society. In the radical structaralist Organization theory, the 
notion of 'totality' implies that it is cruciai to study total social formations as a means of 
understanding the éléments of a social system; organizations can be understood and radically 
changed only in terms of their place in the wider social formations within which they exist 
and which they reflect[14]. 
A solution to transforming subiectivist cultures: Obiectivitv generating éducation system 
Social transformation in the Middle East can primarily be brought about by a radicai 
transformation in the focus of éducation, starting from the primary schools, which requires 
the rulers, for example, to enact laws requiring that every five year old be sent to 'good' 
schools. It will be easy to do so in most Gulf states which have a relatively smaller 
population and enough resources to pay for. In future, the receding oil money and the 
burgeoning population will close this option too. In the schools, many cultural structural 
éléments of the Middle East, if they are not to be a barrier to any désirable change, will need 
[13]Burke and Litwin (1992), using a case study of British Airways, have shown that 
transformation in organizational mission, strategy, leadership and culture are a response to 
external environment. The former changes, in turn, affect organizational structure, systems 
and management practices leading on to influencing motivation and finally, performance. 
[14]V. L . Allen's 'dynamic sociology' as an alternative to 'static sociology' implies 
that organizations are causally connected to their past states as well to the hidden and 
observable featares of their environments, with which there is a perpetual process of 
interaction and absorption. We should be concerned with what properties organizations have 
in common with, as well as distinguished from, the environment; what is the meaning of 
organizational autonomy and what is the source of movement in organizations? Many writers 
such as Goldthorpe, Hyman, Fryer, and Brough have directed attention the possibilities for 
sweeping social change. Radical Weberianism also points towards the development of macro-
theorizing of organizational process against the middle range theorizing (organizations 
interacting with environment) reflected in the work of the majority of organization theorists 
(summarized from Burrell & Morgan chapters on the radical structuralist theory). 
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transformation. One example of such cultural elements is the way the Arabic language is used 
to instill irrevocable fatalism and fear/reverence for traditional authority, such as the rebuff 
one receives for not using the fatalistic word insha Allah each time one refers to a future 
plan, or for not using the reverential titles with the names of office seniors, let alone political 
and religious dignitaries, or the vague notions of time and period in history inherent in the 
language (see Patai's chapter, "under the spell of language", details suggesting reformation 
in Arabic; such reformation has already been done in Hebrew to the benefit of the Israelis). 
However, if modifying sensitive cultural symbols is too much for the Arabs to accept 
[see endnote 4], then there are other ways of reducing subjectivity in cognition: At the least, 
a good education with a strong focus on natural sciences must be made compulsory, starting 
from young children, in order to reduce the high subjectivism ingrained in the forms of social 
life in question. Compulsory education, for all the young, in natural sciences is a primary 
solution to the seething social stagnation for it will make the child think about the real, 
material, and vast world at an early age, thus, as if, 'vaccinating' him against the subsequent 
prevalent socialization to being egocentric, inward looking, subjectivist, and too proud to pay 
attention to others and to the realities of life. 
That such a solution will succeed, became obvious to me when I noted, during giving 
private lessons, that children who were sent to Western schools at an early age, even within 
their home countries, were much more capable of looking at problems in an objective 
manner, and hence solving them with much greater ease, than those who had attended 
traditional schools, described in chapter 8, in their early formative years. 
Education in natural sciences, without maiming the essence of scientific knowledge 
with belief systems, is essential at a very young age because once the fatalistic attitude has 
been instilled, the child will not understand the real difference between a scientific knowledge 
and other knowledge: It will come as a great surprise to many to know that the word Ilm and 
uluum (the plural of Ilm) is used in all Arab scientific research centers to denote both 
'science' and 'knowledge', so that, I was shocked to find, even many Arab 'professors' saw 
no distinction between 'scientific' and other knowledge. 
Many Arabs are aware that such a solution as proposed in this section, is badly 
needed. Hence the emphasis on education in Arabic has begun to recede so that in many Gulf 
states, teachers who were brought in to teach in Arabic, are being sent back and extensive 
programs in English as a medium of teaching are being designed. The native upper classes 
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have for long sent their children to Western schools, and even in their own countries, prefer 
American and British schools over the traditional ones. But the need is to provide objectivist 
éducation, in an objectivity-oriented language, for all, not just for the minority elite. 
The Family Planning Solution: Understanding the relationship between over-population. 
coercive control, obsessive money motivation, nepotism. communal conflict. and mysticism 
The population situation in the sub-continent and many Middle Eastern countries such 
as Egypt and Iraq, is as described by Maurice Dobb: 
"In addition to abysmal poverty, afairly common featttre of underdeveloped countries 
is the existence both of a high population density in relation to area of cultivated land and 
a large surplus ofmanpower, unemployed or underemployed... In the towns there is similarly 
a pool of unemployed or irregularly employed, composed of landless persons or members of 
peasant familles forced by debt or hunger to migrate to the towns in search of employment ". 
Population in Pakistan is growing at 6% while the maximum G N P growth in the last 
decade has been 3%. This reminds one of the numeric versus geometrie progression of 
Reverend Malthus; "when food grains grow by 1, 2, 3..., numbers grow by 1, 2, 4,..," 
It is obvious that so long as there are people vulnerable to coercion and allow 
themselves to be coerced and used in harsh working conditions at a pittance, there will 
always be coercive control in organizations, for such is the only way the poor can have their 
daily bread. To add to it, poverty is exacerbated and compounded by massive procréation, 
ironically, by the very poor in the sub-continent, leading to an over-supply of labour. Hence 
over-populations gets linked to coercive control. Because the poor over-procreate under the 
speli of superstition, religion and culturally engendered beliefs, these beliefs get linked to 
coercive control. Religion is linked also from another side; Hinduism and Islam both preach 
submission to the patriarchs and female submission to the male (sati). Hence there is 'divine' 
support for submission to high personal control. Carrying the analysis forward, we arrive at 
our thesis of socio-cultural détermination of individuai behavior. 
When the over-populating poor cannot feed his kith and kin properly, let alone the 
issues of shelter, clothing, health, éducation, jobs, and old âge destitution in a society 
without any state social security system, he gets neurotic, which further Compounds his 
superstitions for he was never educated in the traditions of objective problem-solving. He is 
fatalistic by compulsion of the only mystic socialization he ever received. Therefore, he sees 
the only solution to bis grinding problems either in rituals to please the divine or, obviously, 
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in money. The Hindus even have a goddess of wealth known as the 'Lakshami Devi' to 
which many of them address their prayers. Money becomes an obsession for reasons of 
poverty, and also, of an extravagant life style described in chapters 2 and 4. 
The majority cannot get enough money for it is scarce. Many cannot even get jobs, 
and those who do have jobs find it hard to meet the ends for, unlike that in the West, they 
have to pro vide for their old parents, younger brothers and sisters (and there are many of 
them), wives and children (not a few). Many vent out their extreme frustration in the form 
of communal conflict: The Muslim blâmes the Hindu in the sub-continent and the Jew in the 
Middle East. The over-populating Asian in Britain talks about 'White racism'. The détails 
of ethnie confliets have been provided in chapters 5 and 14. The aggressive instinct is 
triggered by frustration and the person finds excuses in projecting blame to the other 
communities. The psychological évidence linking aggression to over-population in scarce 
resources has been provided by the aforementioned experiments about the effeets of over-
population on rats who become increasingly violent and aggressive as their population out-
grows available resources in a controlied residential environment. 
What are the solutions to the aforementioned problems? It is obvious that the Indian 
capitalist, out of the goodness of his heart, is not going to give four meals worth of money 
a day to a worker when he can get another at two meals a day, or a child worker who eats 
less than an adult[15]. Hence the relationship of the state providing 'basic social security' in 
order to reduce 'coercive control and communal conflict'. But universal social security 
cannot be provided, because the sub-continent states have no funds for it, and besides, the 
system will be open to gross abuse in conformity with the general inclination to corruption 
(as explained in chapter 13). What then is the solution? 
In the poverty-stricken over-populated countries, the adoption of family planning has 
for long been advocated by the enlightened, as the primary solution to reducing the massive 
over-supply of labour and the conséquent coercion, repression, and the inclination of the 
family-centric man to corruption self-justified on a figurative account of "a need to feed my 
children". Through family planning the supply of labour can be reduced to a level where the 
workers will be able to demand fair wages, as happens in Europe where almost half the non-
[15]Galbraith (1979) as the American ambassador to India, noted, "...India, which, 
while it employs socialist rhetoric, remains a property owning republic with capitalist 
entrepreneurs who, for studied rapacity, can probably claim to be the equal ofany... " 
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Muslim population either do not marry or do not have children, and so the population growth 
rate is almost zero, if the 'Muslim effect' is ignored. Such reasoning is further supported by 
observations about the plight of Indian Muslims against the relative prosperity of Indian 
Parsees and Ànglo-Indians (see chapter 5). 
Nepotism also is primarily caused by the large net-work family where it becomes 
important for the head of the family to get his sons, brothers, nephews etc. placed imo jobs. 
A small family, as an institutional base, will dimimsh the need for nepotism. More over, 
because of a smaller population, when the scarce resources will be available to most, there 
will be less cause for communal conflict. In smaller families, working members will have 
less economie pressures to support the non-working members of the family. Hence, they will 
have more economie freedom to think about intrinsic motivation and, rather than seek more 
money and do unwanted jobs to support the large family, they will be able to do things 
towards which they are naturally inclined[16]. Money motivation caused by insecurity will 
reduce when people will have smaller families. A shift of cultural focus from familialism to 
work-related attitudes will be more likely to take place. Consequently, when the people will 
be relatively prosperous, they will be less likely to succumb to coercive control. Hence 
family planning appears to be the primary solution to many evils. As a side effect, it will 
also decrease the pressure on the depletion of naturai resources and dégradation of the 
environment. Many large cities are already suffocating under the enormous smoke, traffic, 
noise, and concrétisation of the few green belts left, ali that serve as stimulants to neurosis 
and aggression (see the links here of a large family life-style to conflict). 
Barriers to the proposed solution of family planning 
It is not in the short-sighted self-interest of the upper and middle classes to uplift the 
[16]Herzberg's (1966: 347) diesis that man can be happy only by seeking to satisfy 
both his animal need to avoid pain and his human need to grow psychologically, with 
psychological growth defined by Herzberg as, "creativity and individuai initiative, artistic and 
scholarly interests, réceptive openness to new insights, true relaxation and regrouping of 
growth potentials as contrasted with plain laziness, realistic attitude against vague aspirations, 
to fulfil himself as a creative, unique individuai according to his own innate potentialities and 
within the limits of reality" (pp.343-44), could be validated in the sub-continent and the 
Middle East when most will learn not to equate growth and achievement only with having 
a family. At the moment, the majority may safely be placed as money seeker deriving the 
motivation to work from the claimed pleasures of having enough to enjoy closed family life. 
235 
Cognition level of the lower classes, for the existing life-style of the latter provides the 
former with domestic servants, gardeners, cooks, drivers, child servants and workers at 
ridiculously low wages. Regarding the power-seeking and control-seeking culture-bred desires 
of people in the said two cultures, capitalism has made a lethal conjugation with the native 
culture so that the European sensible and humane capitalism stands in stark contrast to the 
Indian and Middle Eastern exploitative capitalism. On the other hand, the working class itself 
is prejudiced against small family life style and the modes of social conjugation other than 
the over-procreative family though, hypocritically, almost ali men avail the opportunities they 
may find of extra-marital sex. 
Serving as if the mouth-piece of the employers, the Islamic Ideological Council's 
Committee on Family Planning condemned family planning as unlslamic[17]. The reasons 
often given to justify a ban on family planning are that, 
"Allah states in the Quran that it is He who créâtes life and He alone is the provider 
of ail: Man's attempts to stop lives from coming into being show weakness of faith: Family 
planning is the conspiracy of the West to reduce the number of Muslim populace, a 
conspiracy that must be fought against: The Quran commands Muslims to be vigilant in their 
defence against non-Muslims; any réduction in numbers will mean less young men to défend 
our country and therefore ail attempts at family planning must be abrogated". 
However, the report did not lead the government to the closure of the Family 
Planning Association of Pakistan. It was renamed as 'Department for Population Welfare' 
and instructed to work discretely. Even the Islamist General Zia could not afford to lose 
funds donated by international aid agencies. 
In most underdeveloped countries, the resuit of such fatalistic creeds means that it is 
most often the child's father who leaves the child at the workplace as soon as he is eight or 
nine with strict instructions to obey the master and bring some money home in the evening. 
In fact the most common argument in favour of large families given by the poor are the naive 
over-optimistic adages such as, "the more the hands, the more they will bring home; God 
has given man one mouth to eat but two hands to earn". Many continue procréation only to 
seek, or add to the number of, male children. 
How can the vast majority of poor in Pakistan or Egypt, for example, be made to 
adhère to family planning and proper brought-up of their children rather than letting them 
ri71Report of the Federai Islamic Ideological Council's Committee on Family 
Planning, headed by Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Government Press, Islamabad, 1985. 
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grow on streets as they do now? Suppose the government announces a reward money for 
each vasectomy. Pretty soon, fake certificates of vasectomy, because of rampant bribery, will 
appear for which some antidote will have to be found. The sufferings of the female family 
planning workers in segregated societies where sex is a taboo subject, are another problem. 
For more than a decade, as a voluntary worker for the Family Planning Association of 
Pakistan, I saw that resistance to family planning was embedded in the Pakistani cognitive 
culture[18] and therefore, I shall suggest some methods of transformation of a traditionalist 
cognitive culture (defined on page 246). 
In the Middle East, an artificial prosperity based on oil sales has so far hidden the 
aforementioned consequences of overpopulation. The Middle Eastern rulers channel some 
oil wealth to grant basic social security to all and hence we do not see, at the workplace, 
coercive control on the prosperous natives, but only on expatriate workers who come to the 
Middle East because of grinding poverty back home. The Gulf states social security has 
further supported the overpopulating behaviour commanded by the tribal ethics. The oil is 
expected to run out in not too distant future and the Gulf states will find themselves with a 
burgeoning population but without significant skills to compensate for the receding oil 
revenues. The conflict-prone cognitive culture is then strongly likely to show with a ferocity 
matched by recent events in Zaire, Yemen, and Bahrain. 
Some optimism for India 
In India however, many required social changes are tacitly being brought about by 
the growth of capitalism in the urban areas. For example, the increasing financial problems 
of modern life and the consequent emphasis on calculation of one's income and expenditure 
have pressed the urban middle classes to happily accept family planning. Also, to some 
extent, people engaged in non-familial modes of sexual gratification are ignored if not 
tolerated, but then, the middle classes have never been as subject to coercion as have been 
the working classes. The government of Indira Gandhi tried its best to bring about family 
[18]Tominaga (1991), drawing on the works of Max Weber to understand delayed 
modernization in Japanese kinship and family systems, concludes that in non-Western 
societies, economic modernization, first directed towards societal and cultural modernization, 
is the most difficult to achieve. In order to achieve societal and cultural modernization, three 
essential conditions must exist; (l)diffusibility of modernizing values; (2)motivation in 
accepting these values; and (3)possibility of accepting these values without causing conflict. 
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planning by incentives and rewards but at that time the cognitive culture of India was not as 
ready for transformation as it seems now. In the state of Kerala, mass éducation among 
women has reportedly led to a common acceptance of family planning and a major rôle of 
women in cultural transformation. More female employment is also another dimension of the 
solution. Where female employment is growing, family planning cornes naturally because 
working women cannot raise as many children as house wives possibly can. 
The need to abandon mystification of materialistic Problems if poverty is to be reduced 
The obscurantist and mystic interprétation of objective/material problems is a main 
barrier to social and organizational development in almost ali high subjectivist cultures[19]. 
One frequently meets the dead end of the kind of opportunistic dogmatism that can best be 
explained perhaps only by examples, though a very large number of such examples can be 
used, through thematic qualitative coding, to find a pattern, or a 'meaning structure'. For 
example, in my conversations, during the empirical investigations for mis work, I found that 
most Muslim employers seek justification of their behaviour in Islamic ethics which is neither 
homogeneous nor logically consistent. For example, the common justification for paying 
ridiculously low wages (lower than the social security payments in the West), is that it is not 
man but Allah Who détermines how much a man should receive for his livelihood. A verse 
commonly used to justify such an excuse is, 
"And He is the One to elevate to honour and He is the One to throw into abysmal 
humiliation" [the Quran]. 
When questioned that the employer himself détermines what wages should be given 
to the workers, the typical reply is that the employers are only the middle men between Allah 
and the worker[20]. Divine providence is the final décision maker so that people are but 
[19]Several authors, for example V .S . Naipal, Among the Believers. and Christina 
Lamb, Waiting for Allah, have written directly or indirectly on the thème prefixed as the 
heading of this section. 
[20]The use of religion to justify one's own actions is rampant in Islamic countries. 
At an Arab bank, a fired officer went to see one of the owners and requested for an 
explanation. The owner, an Arab Sheikh, retorted by questioning the faith of the fired 
employée,"if you were a true Muslim", the Sheikh admonished, "you should have known that 
it is not me who décides but Allah. In this case, Allah has simply shifted your account of 
livelihood somewhere else. AU you need now is find where your account has been shifted". 
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pawns in its hands[21]. But there are many other verses that most employers overlook in 
order to choose those that serve them well. For example, the following verses, taken 
together, contradict the above mentioned justification: 
"All Muslims are brothers amongst themselves", and, "the one who does not choose 
for his brother what he choosesfor himself is not amongst us" [Hadeeth]. 
Likewise in Pakistan, the Industriai Relations Ordinances frequently come into conflict 
with Islamic traditions which provide ample holy verses to replace action: Most employers 
hold that social responsibilities must be left to the personal conscience of the entrepreneurs 
and that Islamic ethics was sovereign over state legislation[see endnote 5]. Laws have been 
effective only where individuate choose to abide by them. Although many industrialists look 
down upon the Industriai Relations Ordinance as artifact of Western civilization, they are 
eager to exploit, for their own purpose, such laws from the arsenal of state législation as 
could serve their personal ambitions. The choice is thus determined by extreme selfishness: 
Islam holds sovereign where it goes to their advantage, and state législation are pursued 
vigorously where thèse bring advantage. For example, most Pakistani industrialists demanded 
strictest Implementation of the notorious Martial Law Regulation 51 because it gave them 
unlimited freedom to hire and fire (K. D . , one of the top most industrialists of Pakistan, once 
recalled, not without regret, that his father fired a red haired worker on spot because he 
considered red hair a bad omen). The resuit of such manipulation both of Islam and state 
législation is the excessive concentration of wealth and the conséquent wastage of capital as 
mentioned in a United Nations report: 
"There is excessive wastage of private capital, partly because of concentration ofhuge 
amounts of capital in fewer familles, on non-developmental outlets such as extravagant import 
ofluxuries, speculative land purchase, show-off marriages or luxury residence building " [22]. 
Many Muslim businessmen go to great lengths in preserving ségrégation of sexes and 
performing Islamic rituals but brush off the real moral and legal issues of excessive 
corruption. Some relevant observations might help explain such an attitude: I once worked 
as exports manager for Din Limited, a large textile and carpets manufacturing and export 
[21]The European reader can relate to the said attitude, by reading about King Henry 
VIII. The use of religion to justify one's own actions has been brilliantly depicted in the film, 
"Ann of a Thousand Days", in phrases such as, "when I pray, God answers..." 
[221 Processes and Problems of Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries. United 
Nations Publication, p. 34. 
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company. At Din Limited, we were once preparing an advertising campaign for our women's 
fabrics. The owners of Din Limited, three brothers, were ali bearded mullahs one of whom 
later became the President of the locai Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When an 
advertising agency was asked to prepare television commercials, the owners told them that 
no woman should be shown in the advertisement. The advertising agency argued, only for 
a short while, that an advertisement for women's fabrics must have women in it but the 
owners refused to allow it and consequently, the commercial had to be made showing a 
number of designs and flowers but no women. On the one hand the owners of Din Limited 
were so particular about religious values that they fired an accountant for not praying after 
the lunch break, on the other hand, they used to prepare fake export orders to get cheap 
loans from the State Bank of Pakistan: The owners had counterfeit letter pads of German, 
Belgian and French firms on which they used to get orders typed of the values they required 
now and then to finance their new textile mili, one of the largest in Asia. The loans were 
granted by State Bank at 3% interest to promote exports but thèse loans were being used, 
illegally, in the construction of a textile mili. If Din Limited had borrowed these sums from 
commercial banks, or government development banks, they would have had to pay 16% in 
interest. When our finance manager returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca, he requested to 
be spared from making counterfeit papers, at which the managing director replied, "you 
should leave your pilgrimage at home when you come to work". There were several incidents 
of similar nature which made me resign after having worked only for a month. 
A Pakistani marketing manager of a German multinational narrated the following: 
"There is a place near Islamabad, where D. S., one of the big industrialists of 
Pakistan, has got a large polyester plant erected. The Pir of D. Sharif (a holy man considered 
sacred by his followers who go to great lengths in solemn obsequiousness and fellowship) 
was invited to inaugurate the plant. After the célébrations, when they began their prayers, 
the Pir Sahib raised his hands and asked everyone to be silent. He than listened to something 
in silence for a while, pretending that some divine source was telling him something and then 
said, in a solemn tone, that he had been told by a divine voice that the plant would prosper 
and flourish, and there will be a lot of demand for its produce. The owner of the project was 
so pleased at this that he gave an extra fìfty thousand rupees to the Pir Sahib. Now, when 
you see these things happening here, you just wonder about the psychology of these people". 
Many Muslim owners think that by observing religious practices, they will please 
Allah Who in turn, wil l be kind to them and bestow them with greater material gains, as they 
say, "there will be more barkat (blessings) and Allah will give us more". This kind of 
psychology showed itself in its extreme form in our neighbor who was the managing director 
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of a cooperative bank. He used to arrange for religious gatherings every Thursday, offer 
expensive meals to more than a hundred guests after which loud-speakers were turned on and 
ail présent did the zikr (singing praises of the Prophet) until mid-night. This was their week-
end ritual. The loud speakers blared and disturbed the entire neighborhood. He believed that 
as long as he would keep pleasing Allah by feeding the mullahs who sang His praises and 
did the 'khatm' (recite the Quran), his bank will keep prospering. But the bank money was 
not being invested properly and loans were given to influential politicai people. After three 
years, the bank went bankrupt and its depositors sued the managing director who was then 
sent to prison though the influential politicai men who had taken the major share of the bank 
deposits in the form of loans, were ali spared. The property of the scape-goat managing 
director was confiscated. His son, once used to luxury living, was seen selling producís of 
other companies on foot. The son worked very hard and has now been able to open a small 
retail store but, ironically, spends his spare time preaching for the same beliefs that, as a 
factor if not primarily, led to his father's ruin. 
The above mentioned case was one of mystic beliefs leading to bankruptcy but, in 
most cases, Muslim businessmen show great skill in using religious doctrines to their 
personal gain. The injunction of halal which enabled Muslim meat producers in Britain to 
carve an exclusive market for them has now been extended to halal banking and even to 
halal super markets which, though they sell the same producís as 'non-Muslim super-
markets' do, use the word halal as an exhortation to influence Muslims to buy only from 
halal super markets. While Islam is often used as a 'marketing gimmick', the massive tax 
évasion, V A T évasion, and other malpractice are never talked about. A n interviewée 
explained such behaviour as foliows: 
'Religion here is an integral part of business which takes ethics out of business 
dealings. When it cornes to ethical questions, they argue that they cannot afford to be ethical 
because it often goes against profit making of the kind they are accustomed to. Like, for 
example, those who evade taxes, say that because they ha ve spend money in the name of 
Allah, they should not be asked to pay government taxes, that any taxation beyond 2.5% of 
one's net savings is not an Islamic prescription. There are instances where one's due tax 
cornes to a million but the man is happy with spending a small fraction of his due tax on 
religious causes and then expropriating the rest without feeling guilty about it. They justify, 
"look, we have spend a hundred thousand in the name of Allah '" . 
Many say that zakaî (2.5% for charity) has been commanded by Allah, but taxes are 
the artifacts of Western civilization to which they need not subscribe. We need not emphasize 
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the destructive social and government-related conséquences of such an attitude. One only has 
to look at the near bankruptcy state of many governments where tax évasion is rampant. 
Learning from Britain: The need to discuss issues of povertv in objective, materialistic and 
problem- solving terminology 
In the sub-continent, one observes poverty of the kind that existed in Britain until the 
mid of this Century reported as: 
"By 1851 over half the population lived in factory towns which with their factories, 
businesses, ports and warehouses were the source of the great wealth which flowed into the 
pockets of the new industriai middle classes. But the majority of the working classes lived 
in appalling conditions, suffered from fréquent unemployment and total loss of income unless 
their children went out to work. Low income was one reason for the poor quality of their 
food, health, éducation, forniture and entertainment. In 1845 there was a public outcry; the 
poor in the Andover workhouse had been driven by hunger to eat rotting bone marrow. In 
1835, it was reported about the working classes in new industriai towns: A very great 
number are unable to provide for themselves and their families a sufficiency of food of the 
plainest and cheapest kind. They are clothed in rags and indisposed on this account to go to 
any place of worship or to send their children to the Sunday schools. They have scarcely 
anything like forniture in their houses. Their beds and bedding are of the most wretched 
description and many sleep upon Straw" (summarized from Lane, Peter 1979). 
However, there are many différences in the poverty situation that existed in Britain 
in the past and that which exists in the sub-continent at présent. First, while some segments 
of the working class in Britain were suffering because of the new inventions of machinery 
or for other economie reasons, some other segments of the working class were prospering. 
In 1770, for example, the Staffordshire potteriers have been reported to have been living in 
prosperity. The state of poverty of the working class in Britain was not as general a state of 
affairs as it is in the sub-continent and among the Middle Eastern migrant workers. Second, 
where segments of working class suffered in Britain, it was not because of a deliberate and 
socially institutionalized disdain of the rieh for the poor, as is the case in many undeveloped 
countries, but often because of economie factors (international trade or demand and supply 
factors) and technological inventions that replaced one kind of labour force for another. The 
third and most important différence is that in Britain, problems of poverty were materially 
and objectively defmed and described (detailed enquiries and reports on cost of living, wages, 
living conditions, commissions on the state of health in towns, parliamentary debates etc.) 
and remédies (Poor Laws, work-houses, government intervention, taxation, Councils etc.) 
sought by influential people, even by members of the aristocracy, upper classes, clergy, and 
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the Parliament, as an ongoing process of social improvement. Many of the reformers were 
themselves owners of faetones or Workshops; there is a long list of upper and middle class 
men and societies which sought to improve the lot of the common people: 
- (1790-1820) William Cobbett (gave to the 'deserving poor'). 
- (1802) Sir Robert Peel and (1819) Robert Owen persuaded parliament to pass Factory Acts 
to improve the conditions of poor children workers. 
- (1840s) Edwin Chadwick (for healthy environment and sanitary reforms). 
- (1842) Richard Oastler and John Fielden (lead protest against inhuman conditions in 
Workhouses) and many others' efforts (clergymen up and down the country preached 
about the new system's inhumanity to thepoof) resulted in a new Poor Law Board 
in 1847 and Locai Government Boards, 1871. 
- (1830s) Robert Owen (tried to get laws passed against employment of children in 
factories or mines, for éducation of workers' children, tried to form a Grand National 
Consolidated Trade Union). 
- Several middle class reformers, doctors, clergymen, civil servants, journalists and teachers, 
such as Dr. John Simon (1858). 
- (1860) Titus Salt (built a new town for his workers). 
- (1860) Lord Leverhulme (built a town for his workers). 
- (1860) George Peabody (build 50,000 flats for cheaper rent). 
- (1864) Octavia Hi l l (bought and improved slums to house some London poor). 
- (1870) W. E. Forster (Education Bil l for state éducation). 
- (1875) Disraeli government's Public Health Act (Councils to appoint Medical and Health 
inspectors, build sewers, Street drainage, new réservoirs, public parks, libraries, wash 
houses, swimming baths and public lavatories). 
- (1879) George Cadbury (built Bournville for his workers). 
- (1881) Henry Hyndman (Social Démocratie Fédération). 
- (1883) Rev. Mearns (drew attention to the housing conditions for the poor). 
- (1884) William Morris (Socialist League; wrote, How I Became a Socialisti 1896). 
- (1884) The Fabian Society (H.G. Wells,, Bernard Shaw, Sidney & Beatrice Webbs). 
- (1885) Joseph Chamberlain (unofficial program of social reforms). 
- (1890) William Booth(In the Darkest England and Way Out; found the Salvation Army). 
- (1891) Charles Booth (investigations of the London Poor; wrote, Life and Labour and the 
People of London). 
- (1898) Ebenezer Howard (his ideas were taken up by some politicians and civil servants 
leading to the 1909 Town Planning Act). 
- (1902) Rowntree (Poverty, a Study in Town Life; showed that 40% of wage earners in 
York li ved in poverty). 
- (1906) Asquith, Lloyd George, Churchill (Parliamentary Acts of social reform). 
(Abridged from Lane, 1979) 
And then the process culminated in a welfare system that looked after those left 
behind in the economie race: 
"The increased così of social services in the UK, as elsewhere in capitalist Europe, 
is one ofthe most dramatic faets of state policy in the twentieth Century. From about 4% of 
the GNP in 1910, social expenditures -from income security (pensions, unemployment, family 
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allowances, and national assistance); to medicai care; éducation; and housing - increased 
by 1970 to some 24 percent of the GNP. In fact, during the rise of the postwar settlement 
welfare provision expanded to a point where it accounted for one-half of ali state 
expenditures" (Joel, Kreiger, 1986). 
The sub-continent and Middle Eastern upper classes can learn from Britain that in 
each power gaining class in Britain, there were many who rose beyond narrow class interests 
and presented the case of the lower classes, in just and équitable terms, to the Parliament. 
From the onset of the 17th Century, each lower class that was left out from politicai power 
in the Parliament (first the bourgeoisie, then the skilled workers, then the unskilled workers, 
and finally, women) launched a struggle, at times violent, during which course they spelled 
out their demands, reasons for the demands, and suggested courses of action in détails, 
justifying their causes logically, and, in materialistic and objective terms. There was little 
populär attempt to obscure the problems by directing the material issues towards 
mythological, supernatural, or metaphysical haze, as is done in almost ali subjectivist cultures 
and has been explained in the last section. The ullema must note that the role of the Christian 
clergy was significantly différent from that of the mullahs in that the former offen supported 
the lower classes when their cause was just. Because religion plays a very strong role in 
shaping attitudes, the role of religious leaders cannot be ignored in directing people's 
behaviour towards either harmony and development or zeal and the perpétuation of misery. 
Learning from Europe: The need for creativitv bv shunning nationalistic and cultural 
chauvinism on the one hand and thoughtless imitation on the other 
In terms of originality and creativity, we may note that almost ali modem social and 
economie philosophies were bom during struggle between classes in European countries. 
During the politicai processes that were triggered on by the French Revolution and the 
Industriai Revolution, the European intellectuals and concemed people tackled issues of social 
and economie development as first-hand, new expériences. They had little to follow as 
examples of a nature similar to the issues they faced. Thus they showed phénoménal 
creativity and originality in solving problems in almost ali fields of knowledge and activity; 
politicai, social, economie, literary, scientific and technological. 
On the other hand, most developing countries at présent badly suffer from lack of 
originality and creativity. The upper and middle classes who have the time and resources to 
think about possible solutions to socio-economie problems and want to do so, mostly fall into 
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three sets of attitudes which in their extreme forms maybe described as follows: The first is 
that some find it easy to, literally, photocopy Western designs and solutions and try to 
implement them without much thought. For example, some Pakistani bureaucrats who were 
sent to Britain and USA for éducation and training in business administration, have now 
launched a Reagonite-Thatcherite cost cutting program in Pakistani governmental and public 
sector organizations. In doing so, they are using the 'performance indicators' method to 
reduce as much staff as they can but have paid no attention to the fact that the vast majority 
of public sector employées works at salaries below the social security payments in Britain. 
And to add to it, there is no social security net work in Pakistan on which the fired 
employées can rely. If the government is paying less than social security money to keep, as 
an extreme case, say, two persons on a job which one can do, then it makes little long-term 
socio-economie sense to tire one and thereby deprive him of any kind of livelihood. 
Productivity in this case should not have been measured as production per person but 
production per rupee paid in wages. A use of the latter criterion will show that the said 
government gets it jobs done much cheaper than that in the West. 
The second attitude is that, in reaction to the West, many fanatically try to exert their 
'national and cultural identity' by entirely excluding Western examples per se and sticking 
to their ancestral héritage which has little to offer in modera socio-economie problems. 
Fanaticism and zeal for the past pervades ali social classes, and because ali creativity must 
at times contradict old doctrines, radical creativity is strongly discouraged and penalized to 
an extent that little energy or desire is left in people to think logically. 
The third attitude seeks to find a compromise between logie and traditionally 
ingrained irrationality, and, therefore, sensitive though to cultural dogmas and prévalent 
values, is as ineffective as the first two. In its essence, the third kind of attitude does involve 
hypocrisy which seldom pays except that it may save one's skin at times. This attitude is 
shown even by remarkably brilliant people (for example Bhutto and Habib Bourqiba) because 
it sometimes becomes absolutely essential to prétend if one wants to stay in power - or 
sometimes, just to stay alive, as a Persian poet in a zealous regime said: 
Pretending to be a believer, 
I saved myself 
From the Sheikh; though I know, 
The arch unbetiever 
Is the Sheikh himself (My translation). 
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The problem lies with the way people understand and perceive the imperatives of 
living. Unless the traditionalist cogntive culture is modernized, people will stay, as if, 'brain 
washed' by myths that perpetuate misery and poverty and bar modernization. 
Traditionalist cognitive cultures may be understood as being characterized by: 
1- Fewer socially acceptable rôles, ways of behavior, or life styles; for example, in the 
traditional majority of the subcontinent and the Middle East, by virtue of the prévalent norms 
and values supported by various assumptions and dogmas, people, despite economie or social 
constraints, must marry and have children; their primary loyalties must be to their kith and 
kin; ali males must make money by hook or by crook; ali must strive for prestige and status 
of various kinds; male and female roles are stereotyped. Those who do not subscribe to any 
of the "accepted truths" face taunts, isolation, suspicion and disapproval[23]. 
2- Mass subscription to simplistic ideologies[24]. 
Modernist cultures on the other hand are characterized by a multiplicity and variety 
in acceptable behavior; for example, in the West, marriage, and having children is not 
socially compulsory; the concept of loyalty to kith and kin does not override legai/ 
governmental/social/ personal concerns, making money is good but through fair means, and 
prestige and status have many more kinds and shapes than those found in the traditionalist 
cultures. The opportunities to have multifarious roles for most people do exist[25]. 
How then can a traditionalist cognitive culture be modernized? Some suggestions 
(l)Trainine for presentine information in an objective, problem-solvine manner: 
From a thematic-content analysis of mass media reports, newspapers, journals, 
magazines, the way T V news are written, I have found that the way language is used in 
authoritarian-conflict-prone cultures needs radical change. I suggest that the media control 
[23]Patai (1973: 279) notes that in a culture in which traditionalism is pronounced, 
change and innovation in every area of culture are inhibited. Triandis (1982: 89) states, 
"Modernity is characterized by openness to new expériences, while traditionalism is not". 
[24]For example: "The world, in the traditional Arab view, is divided into two parts: 
an inner part constituting the 'House of Islam', and an outer one, constituting the 'House of 
War'. Under the Western influences, the concept of the 'House of War' has become obsolete 
but the distinction between Muslim and infidel remains sharp" (abridged from Patai: 13-14). 
[25] "In contemporary large-scale industriai societies with their great diversity of 
constituent sectors, there may be several modalpersonality structures" (Patai, 1973: 19). 
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agencies and ministries of information and broadcasting should arrange for training of 
presenting information not in authoritarian and conflict-prone language but in an objective-
problem solving manner. The détails of such programs are easy to prepare, for the 
authoritarian and conflict-prone language in media is very self-evident. 
(2)Raising public level of consciousness through debates about relevant issues: 
Cultural transformation can be sought by debates and criticism of the 'over-
determining' structural éléments such as the abuse of the religious system, the over-stretching 
of familialism, hierarchical patterns of language that create undue obsequiousness, and the 
authoritarian personality etc. Such debates are not often prohibited if one takes care of not 
attacking the basic symbols of révérence. Literature, art and media have a major rôle to play 
in such transformation (see an example from Omar Khayyam given below). Likewise, 
freedom of speech, criticism and debate on the nature of social institutions and their 
functions, and their effects on organizations can lead to the generation of creative solutions 
to problems. Following are some guidelines from my expérience of engaging in such debates: 
(i) Provide correct information that breaks the existing structure of cognition: 
A cognitive culture can be modified if not entirely altered by challenging the wrong 
or prejudicial information on which a belief system is predicated. One fìrst has to understand 
the existing cognitive structural base of the subjectivist mind. Indoctrination can be countered 
by correct information. Kurt Lewin's (1958) approach to organizational change in three 
stages of, "unfreezing, change, and refreezing" can be used to seek transformation of a 
cognitive pattern. This may be explained by some examples given below. 
(ii) Point at self-contradictions rather than criticize from an 'outsider's frame of mind': 
Self-contradictions are the easiest to point at in attempts to make people think. For 
example, the question of 'divine determinism' versus 'free wi l l ' frequently brings 
contradictory premises. Taken logically, the belief implies that the sinners, being mere 
puppets in the hands of divine providence, must not be subjected to the tortures of hell. The 
Persian poet Omar Khayyam has subjected this kind of reasoning to satire which is but one 
example of how literature can make people think about their belief structures thereby 
bringing their beliefs closer to acceptable logie: 
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/ was, from dust, conjured 
My sins, Lord, Thou adjured. 
Thou determined my predicament 
Why then, send me to tonnent? (My translation). 
During discussions with people in conflict prone cultures, I realized that a main 
recurring thème of their belief structure was that the assumed "enemy groups" cannot be 
friends and "will always intrigue against us so that we must be wary of them". They had 
been fed by news papers and journals with information to similar effect as mentioned. I 
understood that, in the beginning, the structure of their thought patterns could not be 
challenged from an 'alien' frame work of thought (such as by using unfamiliar thought 
patterns) but, by hitting one structural élément of their beliefs against the other, I could 
perhaps make them think. I pointed at their self-contradictions and hoped that the basic 
logicai faculties of the mind (whatever the nature of such faculties) wil l begin to work. In 
most cases, the strategy did work in softening hostile attitudes. 
(iii) The initial challenges to a subjectivist thought pattern must come from within: 
The nature of an idealistic subjectivist thought pattern is such that it generally refuses 
to accept objective and broad information. Hence, it is important that one should grasp the 
'intrinsic' essence of the subjectivist notions and criticize them from within. 
(iv) Do not forsake responsibilitv if the knowledge sought does not fall in your specialism: 
The social reformer should be a kind of 'generalist' in information seeking and 
disseminating for he may face challenges from many disciplines of knowledge. He should 
therefore strive to obtain ali necessary information to which ever field it may belong. 
(v) Find out the exact reasons for which an incorrect belief is held: 
The belief structures of the subjects could be absurdly simple and yet when we try 
to modify them, we find that the problem is one of the most intricate we ever had. The 
examples they quote and the 'reasoning' they give can be absurd but held with an enthusiasm 
and strength of conviction which makes up for the absurdity. In the first place, we may find 
that one is holding beliefs only because his parents and relatives have them, or that the 
media, particularly the news papers, propagate thèse and, as justified, "newspapers cannot 
be wrong, they are written by qualified intellectuals". The person may not know about the 
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marketing requirements of news papers and the aims behind writings and broadcasts. The 
young may have been bombarded during their formative and teenage years through the 
media, newspapers, books, magazines, teachers and so on. 
(vi) In the beginning. stav cióse to the subiect's level of understanding: 
For most public debates in many cultures, one can argüe in the beginning only by 
staying cióse to the level of common understanding. Logic and sophistication have to wait. 
For example, in the Middle East, one cannot usually talk about Freud or Russell. Even when 
I referred to scholars from Muslim background, such as the Mautazilla, Ornar Khayyam, Tua 
Hussain, or Najeeb Mahfooz, most educated people had no knowledge of them. The writings 
of the Mautazilla and other early non-conformists have long been hidden though one may 
find many of their works in some corners of a few libraries that rarely if anyone visits[26]. 
The information offered should be commensurate with the subject's comprehension level. 
(vii) Appeal to common sense and common observation: 
An example is that, in altering the interpretation of the oft-quoted Quranic verse "God 
is the provider ofall, and the best provider", presented against family planning, when one 
points at the famines and people dying of starvation, one can make many reform the 
interpretation of their beliefs, and make it commensurate with basic logic. 
(viii) Do not expect transformation in cognition in the short-term: 
Except for the very bright individuáis, transformation of a cognitive pattern seldom 
takes place in a year or two. Most often, the intelligent will not require outside help, except 
perhaps, some guidance about from where to obtain the right books etc. With the majority, 
the social reformer must be patient and impart information bit by bit when the individuáis 
are willing to listen [see endnote 6]. In almost every culture, there are intellectuals who 
publish works that are promising in raising public level of consciousness. Finding out about 
these intellectuals can help augment one's personal efforts. 
[26]See the following published about Saudi Arabia: "One cannot butfeel sad to see 
many of our public libraries deserted and hundreds of thousands of books and reference 
works remaining dusted. A relative of mine.... was terribly shocked to find that he had to 
work in a library devoid of visitors..." (Arab News, Aprii 4, 1997, p. 3). 
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Notes and Explanations 
1. Many studies have found some relationship between parent-child relations and the 
degree of the child's achievement need (Whiting and Child, 1953). The idea of variations in 
the need for achievement among individuals is well known in literature (McClelland et al. 
1953). Closely related to McClelland's characteristics of those with high achievement need 
is the idea of Argyris (1964-a) that an individual seeks to increase his self-esteem and 
enhance his self-concept by searching for psychological success. McClelland (1961) 
maintained that the variability among human beings in the strength of need for achievement 
(defined as "behaviour towards competition with a standard of excellence") is a function of 
differing cultural backgrounds, childhood training, parental attitudes, education etc. He 
believed that economic development is strongly influenced by entrepreneurial activity and 
showed that such activity could be stimulated by education and training in strengthening the 
businessmen's need for achievement (Cowling et al., 1988: 77-78). Variations among 
achievement motivation in cultures is so common observation that Prothro (1961) linked 
economic development not only to available natural resources, investment capital, or 
technological skills alone, but also to the amount of achievement motive found in the 
inhabitants of a nation. He made a comprehensive study of differences in achievement 
motivation among three culturally heterogenous communities in Lebanon; the Sunni Muslim 
Arabs, Greek Orthodox Arabs, and Gregorian Orthodox Armenians. He found that the group 
whose five year old children scored highest in the "Goodenough Draw-a-Man test" ranked 
highest in adult achievement as well, thereby establishing the existence of inter-ethnic 
differences at the early age of five. He then related the achievement differences to differences 
in the three groups of rewarding the child for accomplishing approved tasks and found that 
the Sunni Arab mothers reward successful accomplishment relatively infrequently and use the 
threat of punishment frequently (often fail to carry out their threats), foster independence less 
frequently, and let the father predominate over the child. Related to the said finding is that 
the Sunni Muslims lag behind the two Christian groups 'with respect to achievement in the 
economic, and probably also the educational and cultural spheres': Patai states that since 
similar correlations between child-rearing practices and achievement have been found in 
America as well, it seems legitimate to conclude that there is a cause-effect relationship 
between the two. Patai relates the above mentioned "mother's threats without action" with 
the well known Arab proclivity for emphatically uttering intentions without following them 
up by actions, such as shown in Sadam's "mother of all battles"; a trait the knowledge of 
which helped me understand why most of my Arab students would strongly commit but 
neither work nor bring in their assignments until the very day the examinations started. 
2. Similarly, Hoebel (1971: 217-218) states that the significance of a culture is less 
in its inventory of traits than in the manner of integration of traits, of all its parts, in 
accordance with some basic and dominant principles or value systems underlying the whole 
scheme. Herskovits (1948) and Patai (1973) use the word 'foci' for the said 'dominant 
principles': The characteristic differences between cultures can be seen by looking at their 
foci, i.e. those cultural features which constitute the prime preoccupation of the modal 
personality in that culture. Such a preoccupation may often be cognitive in its prime origins: 
"Among the focal concerns of the West are technology, scientific inquiry, the belief in and 
preoccupation with progress, which means that innovation and change are considered benefits 
in themselves. Other preoccupations are nationalism, democracy, individual freedoms, and 
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the like. As against them, the Arab world has had a complément of dominant concerns such 
as religion, familism, traditionalism, sexual modesty, and the like. These focal concerns are 
so pronounced that they can be used with advantage to characterize an entire culture, to draw 
its profile" (summarized from Patai, 1973: 279-280). "The modal personality not only puts 
high value on the focal aspects of his culture, but considers them ethnocentrically as superior 
to corresponding features in other cultures" (summarized from Patai, 1973: 358-359). 
3. In their study, very relevant to the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizational 
culture, Walton, Dutton and Fitch (1966) showed that rigid, formal and circumscribed 
structural arrangements (commonly found the two said cultures) between groups were 
associated with restriction and distortion of information between groups, conflict-resolution 
through bargaining rather man joint problem solving, and attitudes of suspicion and hostility. 
Supportive of the below given classification are observations that in the said countries, the 
enactment of inappropriate rules and placing focus of control on the exhibition of power 
rather than on problem solving (described in chapters 6, 11, 12 and 15), heightens tensions 
to an extent not paralleled in the West. That the exhibition of power is not limited to those 
in authority shows its cultural rather than objective origins. 
Components and Characteristics of Contrasting Types of Lateral Relationships 
Type of Lateral Relationship 
Component of Relationship Integrative Distributive 
Form of joint décision 
process between units 
Structure of interaction 
and interunit décision 
framework 
Attitudes toward other 
unit 
Problem solving: Free 
information exchange 
Conscientious accuracy 
of information transfer 
Flexible, informai, and 
open 
Positive attitudes: trust 
friendliness, inclusion 
of other unit 
Bargaining: Careful rationing 
of information 
Deliberate distortion of 
information 
Rigid, formai, and 
circumscribed 
Negative attitudes: suspicion 
hostility, disassociation 
from other unit 
The said authors proposed a change in the formal structure to induce change toward 
more problem solving and less bargaining or open conflict. 
4. While the most objective things would lend themselves easily to understanding and 
adoption by people from différent cultures and languages (such things abound in material 
cultures; motor car and aéroplane for example), cognitive culture is hard to transfer even 
when the changes suggested are based on logie, scientific truths and objectivity, unless there 
is a willingness on the part of the récipients to believe in thèse three bases. Objectivity at 
mass level is a fairly récent phenomenon. Bertrand Russell (1975) once equated the amount 
of scientifically tested beliefs to a luggage in a boat rocking perilously in an océan of 
subjectivity. Patai (1973) notes how the Arabs are happy to buy new artifacts and gadgets 
of technology that make life easy for them though there is stagnation in their social and 
politicai culture. Hence, it is in their cognitive cultures (values, norms, beliefs) that 
traditionalist people exhibit maximum résistance to change and therein lie the main sources 
of stagnation. Kroeber (1963: 73-74) has discussed this which maybe summarized as follows: 
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"As soon as people were opposed, pressed or cross-questioned on customs of this sort, they 
manifested resentment. When asked as to the reason for the observance, they either had none 
beyond the allegation that that was the way it had always been done, or they gave a 
mythological justification that was obvious fantasy. Comparative studies showed that moral 
codes were essentially mere group habits or customs, non-rational, though often falsely 
rationalized. Summer's Folkways states that folkways are ways of the unsophisticated, 
unanalytic mass of mankind, customs held to with much momentum but with incomplete 
rationality; and crossing them may cause a fiare up of fear or anger, for, they are basic 
societal forces and include a belief that they are desirable for social welfare, and which 
people insist that their fellows conform to. Though the mores are not derived from politically 
constituted authority, they may produce laws just as they result in taboos. 'Folkways whose 
ethical sanctions have risen into consciousness', might be a fair definition of mores". 
Kroeber, like Patai and other anthropologists, sees the reasons of "persistence" in 
habit adjustment, in spontaneous and delibérate exaltation of the ideáis and valúes of 
instructing generations, assimilation and participation, voluntary adaptation, imitation, 
wanting to conform, learning from examples, some of which is conscious, and more of it is 
unconscious or foreconscious, and education. 
On the other hand, Murdock (1971) gives a good description of "cultural diffusion" 
or "cultural borrowing" regarding the ease in the diffusion of material culture. The same is 
mentioned by Kroeber (1963: 65-68) and may be summarized as follows: As soon as a 
culture has accepted a new item, it tends to lose interest in the foreignness of origin of this 
item. In the sphere of practical, mechanical things, there are objective superiorities which 
start the process of its adoption by other cultures. Then, whatever comes from a society that 
is stronger, wealthier, cleverer or has greater prestige, comes with a favorable 
recommendation. Kroeber uses the terms organic diversity and cultural hybridity to explain 
that cultures can blend, thrive, perpetúate, diverge and syncretize. 
5. The essence of the "Islamic management philosophy" is in fact reflected in the 
words which Enoch Powell has used to describe a socialist government; " . . . A socialist 
government knows best; that a nation cannot flourish and prosper unless people conduct their 
Uves and use their energies in the manner laid down by the higher wisdom of a little group 
ofmen somewhere in the center... Anyone else 's decisions or management, any other system 
but state control, is contemptuously dismissed in the jargon ofsocialism as 'chaos "'. Muslim 
capitalists use similar phraseology to describe their view of control except that the 'socialist 
government', 'the center' and the 'state control' are substituted by an abstract versión of 'the 
Islamic rule' which de facto means 'the capitalist-clergy rule'. 
6. During discussions with my Arab students over a period of five years, I realized 
that a main recurring theme of their belief structure was that "Jews and Christians cannot be 
friends to Muslims". Another theme was that "Jews and Christians will always intrigue 
against Muslims and so the Muslims must be wary of them". They had been fed with 
propaganda such as that the "'West' was working in unisón for Christian supremacy and the 
destruction of the Muslim world". I once told them that because Moses was an Egyptian and 
Jesús was a Palestinian, the Jews and the Christians were following Arab prophets. By a 
certain 'management of meaning', foliowers of Arab prophets could not be enemies to Arabs. 
To my own surprise, there were exclamations of amazement among the students. Many 
suddenly developed a likening for me and wanted me to talk more. I was amazed at why 
such 'information' had not been provided to them earlier in schools and colleges. I then went 
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on with whatever I could imagine to break the "thought structures" they had, simple things 
such as that Israelis and Arabs, as reported in the Quran, had a common ancestor, Abraham, 
and so by virtue of the Arab genealogical tribal ethics, the Jews and the Arabs were, sort of, 
cousins, and even constituted one tribe (an appeal to tribal ethics). The students had been told 
that Muslims constituted one nation. I had to point to them that this was an idealistic notion, 
for nations were not based around common aspects of a certain religion or otherwise the 
relatively small Gulf region, all comprising Muslims, would not be split into many nations. 
Many European readers will wonder why I, a lecturer in management, got involved 
with changing the cognition of my students; it came naturally when in encouraging them to 
debate about 'systems of management' I found them most often turning to 'Islamic and non-
Islamic' categorizations in almost every sphere of life. Their attention would often stray away 
from their work and study-related issues to issues of religion and infidelity. Discussions 
broke out in and outside the class room. The students faced enormous dilemmas; in the 
university they relied on Western text books for knowledge in any modern academic, 
professional or technical field. Outside the university, they were told that the main goals of 
a Muslim did not lay in worldly knowledge but in the 'true' Islamic knowledge. In 
motivating them to accept knowledge from wherever it came, I had to engage into extra-
curricular discussions. For example, whilst taking classes in 'principles of management', 
some students would ask, "what does the Quran tell us about management?". I couldn't just 
tell them to go to the 'Center for Preaching and Guidance' run by the Saudi government at 
great financial expense in many countries. 
Four students launched an year long campaign that male teachers should not be sent 
to teach in the women's building and female teachers should not come to teach male students. 
They refused to attend classes where female teachers taught. When explained that the number 
of female students was six times that of male students and, hence, segregated teaching would 
result in a six times greater burden on female teachers, they declared that Islamic segregation 
was supreme to any functional considerations. 
One could argue in the beginning only by staying close to their level of understanding. 
For example, when my female students, all covered in hijabs, expressed dislike for, say, the 
Egyptian women because the latter "don't cover themselves up and live like the promiscuous 
Europeans", and that, "this is because a large percentage of them are Christians", I would 
say, "but before the advent of Islam, all Arabs were either Christians, Jews, or pagans". One 
of these students was, as if, stunned, "were Arabs Christians?", she asked twice. I told her 
that even in her own country which, she had been told by the mullahs, was "always 
Muslim", there was still an area called Nasrania, meaning, "the Christian region". I would 
tell them that promiscuity in Europe was not the norm and that while a European could 
legally have only one wife at a time, Arab men could have many. 
Although the information I gave them in the beginning was very basic (such as that, 
the Westerners were not "all Christians"), it was commensurate with the level of their ideas 
and it helped as I found the attitudes of many towards other cultures softened. 
In Pakistan, where the standard of education is much higher, many students often 
came to my home to debate about complicated issues and many thought I had benefitted them 
so that some, even after eight years, keep writing to me. Such examples have, at times, made 
me optimistic that changing a cognitive culture by dialogue and mass publication is not very 
difficult. Those who have the means must engage in such work. 
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Chapter Seventeen: Constructing the Theorv 
Before we offer our grounded theory, it is important that some clarifications and 
explanations are noted. The first explanation deals with the use of analogies between findings 
about the structures/functions of various socio-cultural and organizational Systems. A n 
analogy is a relationship but not necessarily a causal one [see footnotes 1 & 3]. By seeking 
such analogies as mentioned, I aim at showing that the structures and de facto functions of 
socio-cultural institutions play a main rôle not only in organizational behaviour, but also in 
helping or hindering solutions to socio-economie problems. The use of analogies may be 
demonstrated by an example of inducing links between the following four groups of findings: 
1- (a)Regarding the organizational control Systems, it was established through research 
methods mentioned in chapter one, that, typically, in Middle Eastern organizations, and to 
lesser extent, in sub-continent organizations, subordinates must not challenge their superiors. 
This factor, along with several others, necessities formal compliance to higher level décisions 
even if their consequential invalidity and incorrect placement of functional contents is obvious 
to the subordinates. (b)Much greater intra-level conflict was found as compared to the 
amount of inter-level conflict. I see finding (b) partially an effect of finding (a). 
2- Regarding the social/familial control system, it is commonly reported in literature 
and was observed as well as found in interviews, that in the traditional Middle Eastern family 
and to a lesser extent, in the traditional sub-continent family, the male head, and in the tribe, 
the tribal chiefs/elders, must not be challenged. Heavy sanctions against non-conformers 
necessitate apparent compliance with little concern for the true feelings of those patronized. 
3- Regarding the politicai control system, it has been established in relevant literature, 
is common knowledge, and was observed as well as confirmed in intensive interviews, that 
in the Middle Eastern tribal-autocratie politicai system, the king, the malik, the sultan or the 
amir (whatever the title) has the final and absolute authority in all matters, including judicial 
affairs, that may be brought to him. The emphasis of compliance is again on appearance 
rather than soul (i.e., on form rather than on content). 
4- (a)Regarding the religious control system. I was able to deduce from an exhaustive 
content-thematic analysis of Quranic verses, the Ahadeeth (sayings of prophet Mohammed 
reported by many in traditional Islamic books) and books on Islamic history, that there is an 
overwhelming support for autocracy in the Islamic religious-political system. This is 
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symbolized in many Quranic commands such as: "Oh those who believe, obey Allah, His 
prophet and the 'oli-al-amf"; the literal meaning of 'oli-al-amr' is 'the one who is the first 
in giving Orders'; the command is commonly understood as meaning, 'the one who has the 
authority'. Because the penalties for non-conformism can be horrendous, the result, often 
found in Muslim countries, is the sacrifice of creativity for the sake of conformity. (b)We 
see high sectarian conflict (e.g. violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and Afghanistan) among 
followers of various Islamic leaders, each claiming to be the genuine 'oli-al-amf in socio-
religious matters. I see finding (b) partially an effect of finding (a), just as fìnding l(b) was 
seen an effect of finding l(a), showing a relationship of high control to intra-level conflict. 
In the aforementioned four groups of findings, one can see analogies[see footnote 1], 
about control and conflict, between (l)organizational, (2)social/familial, (3)political, and 
(4)religious Systems so that the structures and fonctions of the four Systems appear to be 
mutually supportive in shaping (i)the prescribed incontestable control system, and (ii)the lack 
of tolérance for inter-level conflict despite significant tolérance for intra-level conflict. 
Analvsis. interprétation, and seeking relationships in the data for the three cultures 
The three figures given in pages 257, 258 and 259, summarize the key cultural-
organizational characteristics deduced front empirical studies and literature. It must be noted 
that the said characteristics have been described here in an 'abstract and quintessential' rather 
than 'absolutely real' manner; inother words, inarriving at thèse 'typical abstractions' (given 
below), we have ignored exceptional behaviour as well as economie class and regional-urban 
différences. However, the characteristics reflect the attitudes of the 'modal personality', 
though they have been simplified to facilitate understanding, and slightly magnifìed in the 
[l]See a similar use of analogies in Hofstede's findings that high power distance is 
found in countries where, parents put high value on children's obédience, students subscribe 
to authoritarian attitudes as a social norm, employées show considérable mistrust of each 
other, there is less éducation for lower classes, concentration of wealth and politicai power 
in the elite, and less questioning of authority. Hofstede (1980) has linked his "power distance 
indicator" (a measure of the interpersonal influence between a boss and a subordinate as 
perceived by the least powerful of the two) with income inequality, éducation system, 
historical factors, religion and the politicai system: "Politicai Systems, unless imposed by 
foreign violence, reflect... the values and behavior of the population" (Hofstede, 1980, ch. 
3). His hypothesis that the power distance between the two is determined by their national 
cultures to a considérable extent, is supported by the findings in this work. 
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differential side to Highlight the Western comparative dimension. The heuristic value of such 
models was explained by Bran and Sweezy (Burrell and Morgan, 1993: 391-392) as: 
"Scientific unäerstandingproceeds by way of constmcting and analyzing 'models' of 
the segments or aspects of reality under study. The purpose of thèse models is not to give a 
mirror image of reality, nor to include all its éléments in their exact sizes and proportions, 
but rather to single out and moke available for intensive investigation those éléments which 
are decisive. We abstract from non-essentials, blot out the unimportant, we magnify in order 
to improve the range and accuracy ofour observation... ". 
Relating Factor Boxes in the Figures (p. 257-259) to Observations in the Empirical Studies 
Box 1 The Over-determining Cultural Factors 
The Sub-continent: Procreative familism and superstition (deduced from observations noted 
in pages 49 to 51, 226, 227, 233 to 236, 238, 246, 247, 251) leading to subjectivity shown 
in mystification of social issues (pp. 233 to 242). 
The Middle East: Procreative familism (see pages 49, 50 to 52, 57, 85, 226, 227, 233 to 
236, 238, 246, 247, 250, 251) and religion (mostly, Islam; see the pages quoted under the 
title, Tslam/Islamic', in the Subject Index given at the end) leading to subjectivity shown in 
mystification of social issues (pp. 233 to 242). 
Euroamerica: Several cultural factors (technology, scientific inquiry, belief in and occupation 
with progress, innovation and change, family values, democracy, individuai freedoms etc.) 
determine behaviour in a counter-balancing manner (see p. 250 endnote 2, and 251) leading 
to objectivity shown in a problem-solving attitude towards social issues (pp. 242 to 244). 
Box 2 Relationship of Socio-cultural Control to Organizational Control 
The Sub-continent: At the socio-political level, an imposition of a unitary view of nation-
state, strong familial culture and religion[see footnote 2], despite plurality in relatively 
insignificant aspects of life, (deduced from observations noted in pages 23, 75, 112 to 116, 
[2]This observation is valid for Pakistan and Bangladesh. While India manifests 
politicai pluralism and decentralization among states, the tendency towards a forced unitary 
view of a nation-state remains strong which makes many Indians blame the British rule for 
Splitting India into two parts. However, the various communities in India are so diverse and 
varied in their languages and religions that, in the words of Indira Gandhi, the two things 
that have kept India united are, ironically, the British left English language and bureaucracy. 
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Common Cultural Characteristics (Structures/Functions of Cultural Institutions of the Traditional Majority) of the Sub-Continent, Related to Control, Conflict & Motivation 
Legend: Darker boxes show findings in the broader society white lighter boxes show those in the organizations. Inter-box joining Unes refer to analogies while arrows 
point to likely causai relationships. Box numbers have no order but merely refer to respective référence to empirical studies in pages 256 to 268 
§ o ^ | ^ t u ^ g o ^ ^ ^ P g i t i c a l ? 
Box 11 Extent of Coercive 
Control: On an among workers; 
related to absence of social sec-
urity; demeaning attitudes; a 
source of conflict; abuse of 
power/personalized power 
ï 
Box 17(b) Patterns of Conflict: 
Non work conflict; intra-level; 
Personality clashes; inter-
personal physical; strikes; group 
pressure; related to wages; 
ethno-conflict; hooliganism 
Box 21 Motivation for Corrup-
tion and Nepotism: Widespread 
corruption and nepotism: In the 
private sector; in some educa-
tional institutions; sifarish in 
promotions; in govemment 
departments; cheating in argum-
ents; Asian corruption in Britain 
related to low motivation; 
related to Eastern family values 
Box 1 Tlie'Ovër&etS 
Gultural Factors:-?Efòcreà^yèÌ\V.^a 
familismi and - super stitiohv ; 
leadmg;itO;S^ 
mystifiçation^^^ 
B o x ' 3 ; Ä l ü ^ 
Work: • Culturàliànclimonetary ) 
d è g r a d ^ ^ ^ ^ m a n ^ k w ^ l ç i - ^ ^ 
Box 10 Social Status and 
Control: Control related 
to social Status 
Box 13 Effects of Coercion and 
Repression on Creativity: Lack 
of creativity and initiative, 
constraint, avoidance and 
aliénation from workplace 
Box 18 Methods of Conflict 
Resolution: Equated with trouble 
making; playing down; hard 
bargaining; strikes; through 
pressure groups and unions; 
Iobbying; using v nuisance value' 
and by creating pocket unions 
Box 2(b) Non-work Control on 





ilial culture/and^ desp.ite: 'Ì 
pluräli,ty;^ 
"ri rit", ri otSÀ'r» ti >.'/Sfri ì fififc-Vari ri 1 rin rnic'itWi-•>'.* 
Box 7 Relationship of Social 
Différences to Organizational 
Hierarchical Levels: Positions 
in the organizational hierarchy 
correspond direcUy to one's 
membership of a certain, 
socio-economic group 
Box 19 Unions: Chaotic behav-
ior; pressure groups; associated 
with politicai parties; influence 
on employment practice; pseudo 
leaders; ineffective; misconcep-
tion of union fonctions 
Box 16 Reasons for Conflict: 
Unhealthy compétition/intrigues 
in appointments, transfers and 
promotions; lobbying; 
inéquitable treatment in recruit-
ment, sélection, évaluation, 
rémunération etc.; about prom-
otions/performance appraisal; 
dorninance seeking; related to 
control; conflict proneness 
1 
Box 9 Control Attitudes: 
Authoritative, theory X ; patriar-
chal; dislike for challenges; by 
Personal observation; non-work; 
dominance-seeking; Machiavel-
lian; use of informers; loyalty/ 
obsequiousness demanded; lack 
of managerial independence; a 
cause of conflict; centralization 
standardsigatTAoeiA 
. d ^ f o r e n e ê s ^ p ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ i ô S g 
Box 5 Différences in Living 
Standards Related to Incentive 
Structures in Organizations: 
Very high différences in living 
standards (box 4) are related to 
similar différences in lowest 
and highest paid jobs; in a 
typical organization, average 
différence estimated as that 
between 1 and 50 
Box 15 Basis of Evaluation and 
Remuneration: Rewards and 
penalties not performance-
related; relationship of rewards 
and penalties with social status, 
with divine providence among 
Muslims and with fate among 
Hindus; inéquitable treatment, 
favoritism and discrimination, 
related to demoralization 
Box 22 Pseudo Organizations: 
In private sector, created to 
embezzle state or international 
developmental fonds, to evade 
taxes etc.; govemment depart-
ments rendered ineffective due 
to corruption or politicai influen-
ce; imitative civil service; 
many developmental programs 
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Common Cultural Characteristics (Structures/Functions of Cultural Institutions of the Traditional Majority) of the Middle East, Related to Control, Conflict & Motivation 
Legend: Darker boxes showfindings in broader society white lighter boxes show those in the organizations. Inter-box joining Unes refer to analogies while arrows 
point to Ukely causai relationships. Box numbers have no order but merely refer to respective référence to empirical studies in pages 256 to 268 
Box 11 Extent of Coercive 
Control: On lower classes and 
expatríate workers; related to 
the absence of social security; 
demeaning attitudes; abuse of 
power/personalized power 
Ï 
Box 17(b) Patterns of Conflict: 
Non-work; intra-level; persona-
lity clashes; inter-personal bas-
ed on tribal/nationalistic affilia-
tions, attributes of worth or lack 
of it associated with certain 
tribes, races, and nations, and 
the consequential préjudices 
Box 21 Motivation for Corrup-
tion and Nepotism: Widespread 
corruption and nepotism: In the 
private sector; in educational 
institutions; wasta in hiring and 
promotions; in govemment 
departments; cheating in argum-
ents; related to very low 
motivation; related to Middle 
Eastern tribal family values 
aciDrs..»iírui;reauvcf¿;.: 
farnilism:and¿religi^ 
lslam) ;leading^ í 
'mystiflçàtipïi^pf^s^i^issues l 
Box 10 Social Status & Control: 
Control related to social status 
and tribal membership 
Box 13 Effects of Coerción and 
Repression on Creativity: Lack 
of creativity and initiative, 
constraint, avoidance, aliénation 
and e ven "thought control' 
Box 18 Methods of Conflict 
Resolution: Total repression for 
lower classes/tribes; for natives 
of comparable social status, tri-
bal methods (use of intermedia-
ries [wasit] and calling cogér-
ances) of resolving conflict used 
Box 2(b) Non-work Control on 
personal behavior and beliefs 
Böx:2(ä)RM 
CuItaraKÇontrot.to ^ Orgar^ation' 
Control: Ä^the^ocioTpölitical 
levêl i iaiiiimpositipmöf ; a -unitaÊy 
Box 7 Relationship of Social 
Différences to Organizational 
Hierarchy: Positions in organiz-
ational hiérarchies correspond 
to socio-economic stratification; 
also, for certain jobs, positions 
correspond to tribal identities 
Box 19 Union Activities: 
A gênerai prohibition of unions 
and associations of employées 
Box 16 Reasons for Conflict: 
Unhealthy competition/intrigues 
in appointments/transfers/prom-
otions; lobbying; inequitable 
treatment on individuai, tribal & 
racial grounds in promotions, 
remuneration, evaluation etc., 
dominance seeking; related to 
control; conflict proneness 
Í 
Box 9 Control Attitudes: 
Authoritative, theory X ; patriar-
chal; dislike for challenges; by 
personal observation; non-work; 
dorninance-seeking; Machiavel-
lian; use of informers; loyalty/ 
obsequiousness demanded; high 
centralization; misplaced and 
pseudo; by subüe coerción; 
excessive control curbs protest 
staimrdsía^?basic;nghtsíishoWfEi9 
Box 5 Différences in Living 
Standards Related to Incentive 
Structures in Organizations: 
Very high différences in living 
standards (box 4) are related to 
similar différences in Iowest 
and highest paid jobs; average 
différence as that between 1 and 
50; wide gaps in incentives and 
treatment between races as well 
Box 15 Basis of Evaluation and 
Rémunération: Not related to 
performance; relationship of 
rewards/penalties with social 
status/tribal membership, divine 
providence, patriarchal genero-
sity/anger more than with work; 
inequitable treatment; favorit-
ismi discrimination; and racism 
in remuneration and evaluation 
Box 22 Pseudo Organizations: 
In private sector, created to 
embezzle state or international 
developmental ftinds, to evade 
taxes etc.; govemment depart-
ments rendered ineffective due 
to corruption and lack of know-
ledge; pseudo éducation; imitat-
ive civil service and other orga-
nizations emphasizing form with 
little content, analogous to very 
common hollow religious rituals 
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Comparative Common Cultural Characteristics (Structures/Functions of Cultural Institutions) of the Western Countries, Related to Control, Conflict & Motivation 
Legend: Darker boxes show findings in the broader society while lighter boxes show those in the organizations. Inter-box joining lines refer to analogies while arrows 
point to likely causal relationships. Box numbers have no order but merely refer to respective reference to empirical studies in pages 256 to 268 
Box 11 Extent of Coercive 
Control: Coercion not found; 
means of control tend towards 
the utilitarian-normative end 
Box 17(b) Pattems of Conflict: 
Absence of non-work conflict; 
conflict is task-related; group 
formation is function-based such 
as the * occupational groups' 
Box 21 Motivation for Corrup-
tion and Nepotism: Not found to 
a significant extent 
Ho* I rheOvti determining 
Cultural 1 rtCtiTS. SCICIJ! 
:ui\ (reilincili*^, »ucrmtic 
uiqutry hJu-ì m arid OLt.tip.umn 
<Mih piflglLb«, lI11ir>V<ìl10!l rilld 
eringi1, fjmil> vtlucj, dcmoii 
:tcv, individuai Uacûtan cue.) 
rì.'isrmini: behawm in <i counter 
Kiljticing nunnei leading io 
ob|i'cr:vny shown m a prubk-m-
•»olvin*.; attitude (mv.uds issue-
BOA » Attitude towaids Manual 
W urk. Culmi al and monti trj 
repaid » ipp inunuiLs dial for 
I \ C K iiihtfi t>T*s ot t-nttipuv 
Box 10 Social Status and Control 
Influence transaction related to 
organizational rôles only 
Box 13 Effects of Coercion and 
Repression on Creativity: 
Absence of repression; efforts 
at integration of employees; 
innovation and creativity is 
found and encouraged 
Box 18 Methods of Conflict 
Resolution: Channels of protest 
registration and conflict resolu-
tion are available; conflict seen 
as a positive, integral, product-
ive, creative, stimulating and 
manageable part of social and 
organizational process; 
integrative approach and collect-
ive bargaining, in addition to 
various other methods are used 
Box 7 Relationship of Social 
Différences to Organizational 
Hierarchical Levels: Equity in 
treatment enables one to trans-
cend class différences, if any, 
in promotions to higher offices 
Box 19 Unions: Activities are 
relatively organized; variations 
in union behavior exist across 
countries; unions in MNCs in 
the sub-continent enjoy good ind-
ustrial relations; strikes/go-slow 
tactics and lock-outs virtually 
never experienced partly due to 
MNC abidance by labor laws; 
Asian groups/unions in Western 
firms show inter-ethnic commu-
nication problems and inaptitude 
for union formation 
Box 16 Reasons for Conflict: 
Distribution of rewards; task-
related status; 'occupational 
ethnocentricism'; resource 
allocation; jurisdiction between 
departments; autonomy and 
control; awareness of rights 
Box 9 Control Attitudes: 
Impersonal rules and means of 
control; task-related control; 
control related conflict not found 
Box 4 HillvieDics in l.tvirg 
Standards and Basic Rights 
J-gahi.n un values enable jaunie 
tt» iMmcend cîa-s ditlUTcncet 
Citizens' light* in taw and SLHC 
institutions nr.* the fame i"j all 
Box 5 Differences in Living 
Standards Related to Incentive 
Structures in Organizations: 
Equity in treatment; difference 
between lowest and highest paid 
job, on an average in a typical 
Organization, estimated to be 
that between 1 and 5 
Box 15 Basis of Evaluation and 
Remuneration: Rewards and 
penalties related to performance 
Equitable treatment in rémunér-
ation; merit-based Systems 
Box 22 Pseudo Organizations: 
No significant occurrence 
Note: Western cultural factors 
mentioned here have been 
selected for their comparative 
significance to the two earlier 
models and hence, do not 
represent the whole of the 
Western culture. Fewer links in 
this last of the three figures, 
supports our notion of the great-
er relevance of the broader cul-
ture to organizations in the sub-
continent and the Middle East 
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129, 130), and repression of criticism and non-conformism (pages 11, 98, 99, 101, 102,221 
to 223) is analogous[see footnote 3] to non-work organizational control on personal 
behaviour, values and beliefs (pp. 113 to 116, 129, 130, 156, 240). 
The Middle East: Socio-political imposition of a unitary view of race, nation, strong tribal 
culture and religion, and even minor aspects of choices (see pages 23, 112 to 116, 120, 129, 
130, 253; the G C C Arabs ail wear a same dress in white), and repression of criticism and 
non-conformism (pp. 52, 83, 113 to 117, 123, 124, 129, 130) is analogous to non-work 
organizational control on behaviour, values and beliefs (pp. 113 to 116, 129, 130, 156, 240). 
Euroamerica: Pluralist view of society is reflected in a pluralist view of organization[see 
footnote 4]. Emphasis of social control is not on personal and politicai behaviour but on 
control adaptive to human nature/self-control ( 153, 159) analogous to the use of impersonal 
means of control and task-related control in organizations (pp. 158, 159, 160, 217, 218, 221) 
Box 3 Attitude towards Manual Work 
The Sub-continent: Cultural and monetary dégradation of manual work (pp. 7, 15, 33 to 38, 
66, 157, 177 to 179, 210, 211); low wages (149, 236, 238; Asian; 157, 164, 175, 176, 179, 
180, 181, 182, 183, 186) [see footnote 5]. 
The Middle East: Cultural and monetary dégradation of manual work (pp. 38, 39, 119, 120), 
and exploitation of expatriate labor (pp. 202 to 206). 
Euroamerica: Cultural and monetary regard for manual work approximates that for most 
other types of enterprise (pp. 39, 242). 
f31 Arrows and Lines in the Figures: Note that relationships in the figures (p. 257-259) 
are based on analogies because causal connections in social sciences are hard to establish. 
However, because of the comparative nature of this work, causal connections can be shown 
between factors X and Y , if X appears along with Y in a culture while both are missing in 
the other. But deciding whether ' X caused Y ' or ' Y caused X ' , is similar to the 'chicken and 
egg' situation. Hence, arrows in the figures point to the most likely causal relationships only. 
[4]Where référence page numbers are not given for the Western cultural factors, see 
the Subject Index at the end of this work, catégories, 'West/Western' & 'Western companies 
in the sub-continent'. Observations regarding the West are literature-based as well as those 
noted during empirical studies in Britain, and in some Multinationals in the sub-continent. 
[5]Where, in explanation of a cultural factor for the sub-continent, the reader is 
referred to observations made among Asians in Britain, this is because of the similarity in 
behavior patterns among people in the sub-continent and those who migrated to Britain. 
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Box 4 Différences in Living Standards and Basic Rights 
The Sub-continent: High différences shown in physical évidence of living standard gaps 
(pages 12, 17, 18, 30, 31), social status différences (pages 30 to 32, 39 to 41, 46, 54, 55, 
56, 58, 64, 186, 217, 239), upper class privilèges (pages 31, 32, 39 to 41, 46, 58, 65, 126, 
135, 141, 158, 177 to 179, 183, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239) and upper class/socio-political 
powers (pp. 6, 42 to 44, 65, 70, 71, 102, 104, 105 to 107, 141, 183). 
The Middle East: In addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there are tribal 
inequalities (pp. 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 206), and racial inequalities (pp. 204, 205, 206). 
Euroamerica: Egalitarian values enable people to transcend class différences. Citizens' rights 
in law and state institutions (written or tacit) are the same for all Citizens. 
Box 5 Différences in Living Standards Related to Incentive Structures in Organizations 
The Sub-continent: Very high différences in living standards (mentioned in box 4) are related 
to similar différences in lowest and highest paid jobs in a typical Organization; the average 
différence estimated as that between 1 and 50 (see pages 66, 67, 133, 140, 143, 186, 239). 
The Middle East: Same as for the sub-continent[see footnote 6] in addition to wide gaps in 
incentives/treatment between races as well (see racism in rémunération, pp. 175, 185, 204). 
Euroamerica: Equity in treatment (pages 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209). Différence 
between lowest and highest paid job, on an average, estimated to be that between 1 and 5, 
i.e., ten times less than that for the other two cultures (176, 177, 179) 
Box 6 Level of Egalitarianism 
The Sub-continent: Inequality values and norms (pages 104, 125, 141, 157, 158, 164, 177, 
[6]Where, in empirical referencing of a Middle Eastern cultural/organizational factor, 
the reader is referred to an observation front a sub-continent country, or vice versa, this is 
because of the following reasons: 
(i) The observation explains a phenomenon whose cross-culturally commonality among 
the said régions was beyond doubt. Hence, addition of examples in the text, from the other 
régions, was considered repetitious and hence, superfluous. 
(ii) Most Arabian Gulf middle and lower level employées come from the sub-continent 
countries; expatriâtes out-number natives in almost ali Arabian Gulf countries. 
(iii) Tape recording of interviews in the Middle Eastern countries was not possible due 
to interviewée reluctance and prohibition of certain types of research (see pp. 11, 25 endnote 
2) by the state authorities. Hence, detailed empirical narrations, though provided in informai 
conversations, could not be reproduced Verbatim from memory alone. 
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178, 217); high class-barriers and distinctions (pages 5, 7, 71, 146, 158, 162, 177, 178, 
218); significance of class background (pages 41, 46, 127, 141, 157, 158, 177, 178, 217). 
The Middle East: In addition to the similar found in the sub-continent (page numbers as 
given above; see footnote 6), there are tribal inequality values (pages 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 
206) and racial inequality values (see pages 204, 205, 206). 
Euroamerica: Egalitarian and démocratie values (pp. 8, 95, 158, 230). 
Box 7 Relationship of Social Différences to Organizational Hierarchical Levels 
The Sub-continent: Positions in the organizational hierarchy correspond directly to one's 
membership of a certain socio-economic group [social stratification](pp. 39,40,41, 46, 217). 
The Middle East: In addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], for certain jobs, 
positions in the organizational hierarchy correspond to tribal identities (6, 46, 85). 
Euroamerica: Equity in treatment (pages 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209) enables people 
to transcend class différences, if any, in promotions to higher offices. 
Box 8 Family Values 
The Sub-continent: Economie dependence of the young, the unemployed, women, and the 
property-less old, on family (pp. 53, 54) due to absence of state social security. Excessive 
control and indoctrination of children[see footnote 7] (pp. 49, 52 to 54, 56, 63, 64, 195 to 
197, 201, 250); strong conditioning of children into set patterns of motivation (pp. 50, 63, 
64, 138); high influence of relatives (pp. 53, 169, 170); exclusion of societal and broader 
(other than religious) concerns (pp. 57, 58, 59); patriarchal values (99, 201). Family values 
related to nepotism (p. 235), control of business (pp. 146, 154), concentration of wealth (pp. 
58, 239), motivation for corruption (pp. 57 to 59, 63, 140, 141); instrumental use of work 
and organization for familial goals (pp. 53, 54, 63, 64, 234, 235). Extension of family feuds/ 
relations to those at workplace (p. 55). Ségrégation of sexes, arranged endogamy (prohibition 
of inter-communal marriages), the conséquent communal ségrégation (pp. 71, 79, 81, 82, 
86, 222) plus closed-familial goal seeking at the cost of other similar groups amidst scarce 
resources perpétuâtes and intensifies communal conflict (pp. 58, 130, 222, 234, 235). 
The Middle East: Procrustean control on children (p. 52, 250), and wasta (nepotism), in 
[7]See the analogy to authoritarian control in organizations. 
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addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6] mentioned above. Préservation of tribal 
family values, patrilineal descent and maie authoritarianism (pp. 51, 57, 84, 85, 93, 250, 
254), perpétuâtes tribal conflict which then shows in organizations. 
Euroamerica: State social security frees individuals without means, from economie bondage 
to family (pp. 243, 244). Family values are generally inclusive of individuai, social, legal, 
governmental and community concerns (pp. 58, 64, 246). Permission for celibacy, family 
planning, female employment, and non-procreative conjugation leads to controlied population 
size, lesser economie burdens, hence low vulnerability to coercion, nepotism and corruption. 
Normative control in family reflects in normative control in organizations. Inter-communal 
marriages have since long eliminated conflictive communal divisions. 
Box 9 Control Attitudes in Organizations 
The Sub-continent: Autoritative control, theory X (pp. 91, 94 to 96, 146, 154, 169); 
patriarchal control (pp. 98, 99, 101, 104, 201, 203); dislike for challenges (pp. 98, 101, 111, 
116, 254); culturally engendered non-work considérations in performance appraisal (pp. 139, 
140); control by personal observation (pp. 154, 155, 156); non-work control (pp. 142, 154, 
155, 156, 221, 239, 240); dominance-seeking (pp. 162 to 164); Machiavellian control by the 
use of informers (p. 155); loyalty/ obsequiousness demanded (pp. 101, 116, 141, 142); lack 
of managerial independence in décision making (pp. 141, 142); control related conflict is not 
uncommon (pp. 154, 155, 162 to 164, 251); centralization of control (pp. 99, 119, 230). 
The Middle East: In addition to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is high 
centralizationof control (pp. 119, 141); misplaced controls (pp. 111, 112, 126, 127); pseudo 
controls (pp. 109 to 111); control by subtle coercion (pp. 112, 113); excessive controls curb 
protest (pp. 202, 206 to 209) except for occasionai outbursts of violence. 
Euro America: Impersonal rules (pp. 95, 104, 217, 218) and means of control/task-related 
control (pp. 158, 159, 160, 217, 218, 221); control related conflict not found (p. 159). 
Box 10 Social Status and Control 
The Sub-continent: Control related to social status (pp. 44 to 46, 141, 157, 158, 169, 218). 
The Middle East: Control related to social status and tribal membership (p. 46, 218). 
Euroamerica: Influence transactions related only to organizational rôles (p. 220). 
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Box 11 Extent of Coercive Control 
The Sub-continent: Coercive control: on and among workers (pp. 23, 91, 146, 147, 149, 
157, 158, 162 to 164); related to the absence of social security system (pp. 23, 113, 117, 
118, 181, 234, 237); over illegai workers/new immigrants (pp. 156, 157, 164, 179); as 
source of conflict (p. 164); demeaning attitudes (pp. 177 to 179); abuse of power/ 
personalized power (pp. 154, 155, 158, 162, 163, 168, 177 to 179, 208, 220, 239, 240). 
The Middle East: Coercive control on lower classes and expatriate workers (pp. 203 to 209, 
in addition to pages referred to for the sub-continent; see footnote 6). 
Euroamerica: Coercion not found; means of control tend towards the utilitarian-normative 
end (p. 221). 
Box 12 Relationship of Values/norms to Coercive Control 
The Sub-continent: Authoritarian values/norms (pp. 91 to 93, 113 to 116, 129, 130, 162, 
163, 166 to 168, 211, 254) show in organizations in the form of 'significance of loyalty and 
obsequiousness' (pp. 101, 116, 141, 142, 255), and coercive control mentioned in box 11. 
The Middle East: Autocratic values/norms (pp. 91 to 93, 166 to 168, 203 to 209, 211, 254, 
255) show in organizations in the form of coercion, loyalty/obsequiousness (pages as above) 
and high external conformism (pp. 115, 117, 127, 131, 245, 254, 255). 
Euroamerica: Democratic values and norms, at times bordering to individualistic isolation[see 
endnote 1] and indifference. Coercive control found neither in society nor in organizations. 
Box 13 Effects of Coercion and Repression on Creativitv and Initiative 
The Sub-continent: Lack of creativity and initiative (pp. 114, 116, 222, 223, 245), constraint, 
avoidance, and alienation from workplace (pp. 147, 158, 177, 178, 207). 
The Middle East: Lack of creativity and initiative (pp. 114, 123, 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 
244, 245); constraint, avoidance, alienation (page numbers as above; see footnote 6) and 
even 'thought control' (pp. 123, 124, 130, 131, 223). 
Euroamerica: Absence of repressioni efforts at integration of employees (p. 140); innovation 
and creativity is found and encouraged (pp. 142, 219, 244) 
Box 14 Key Motivation Patterns 
The Sub-continent: Money/instrumental/extrinsic (pp. 15, 44, 61, 62 to 70, 184, 219, 220); 
for power/contacts (pp. 42 to 44, 65, 104, 111, 126, 138, 162, 163, 179, 223); for high 
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status (see pp. 30 to 32, 39 to 44, 63, 64, 119, 138, 169, 209 to 212, 218, 239); related to 
family needs (pp. 53, 54, 63, 64, 234, 235); related to beliefs (pp. 233, 234, 240, 241). 
The Middle East: Similar to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6]. 
Euroamerica: Several forms of motivation along with intrinsic motivation (pp. 159, 207). 
Box 15 Basis of Evaluation and Rémunération 
The Sub-continent: Rewards/penalties not performance-related (pp. 138 to 140, 238, 239) but 
related to social status more than with work (pp. 31, 32, 64, 65, 156 to 158, 174, 175, 178, 
217); relationship of rewards with 'divine providence' among Muslims and with 'fate' among 
Hindus (pp. 238, 239); inéquitable treatment related to demoralization (pp. 80, 158, 164, 
174, 181, 185, 186); favoritism & discrimination (pp. 78 to 81, 101, 104 to 106, 135, 136). 
The Middle East: In addition to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is a 
relationship of rewards/penalties with tribal membership (6, 125, 203 to 206), with 'divine 
providence' (pp. 238, 239), patriarchal generosity/anger more than with work (pp. 117, 124, 
125, 203), and racism in rémunération and évaluation (pp. 175, 185, 204). 
Euroamerica: Relationship of rewards with performance/merit based Systems (pp. 57, 104, 
140, 175, 217); équitable treatment (pp. 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209). 
Box 16 Reasons for Conflict 
The Sub-continent: Unhealthy compétition/intrigues in appointments, transfers, promotions 
(pp. 15, 77, 78, 101, 104 to 106, 137, 162, 163, 169, 170, 210); lobbying (p. 101); 
inéquitable treatment in recruitment, sélection, évaluation, rémunération etc. (pp. 80, 101, 
104, 157, 158, 164, 165, 174, 175, 181, 186, 191, 222, 223); on promotions/performance 
appraisal (pp. 139, 140); dominance-seeking (pp. 162, 163, 164, 211); related to control (pp. 
154, 155, 162 to 164, 251); conflict-proneness (pp. 15, 94, 195, 196, 202, 211). 
The Middle East: In addition to those mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there 
is inéquitable treatment on individual, tribal and racial grounds, in recruitment, sélection, 
évaluation, rémunération etc. (pp. 125, 175, 185, 203 to 206, 217, 222, 223); conflict-
proneness (pp. 83 to 85, 195, 196, 206, 211, 237, 248, 252, 253. 
Euroamerica: Distribution of rewards; task-related status; 'occupational ethnocentricisnV ; 
resource allocation; jurisdiction between departments; autonomy and control (p. 222); 
awareness of rights (p. 213) etc. 
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Box 17 (a) & (b) Patterns of Conflict 
The Sub-continent: (a)Socio-cultural conflict (political, religious, ethnic, regional, linguistic 
etc.) is reflected in similar (b)non-work conflict in the organizations (pp. 75 to 80, 82, 106, 
107, 162, 163, 183, 195, 196, 211 to 213, 222, 223, 255). Intra-level (pp. 147, 158, 162, 
163, 222, 223, 254, 255); personality clashes (pp. 42, 116); inter-personal physical (pp. 91, 
155, 162, 163, 167); strikes (pp. 102 to 104); pressure groups/unions (pp. 99 to 107, 133, 
168, 211 to 213); related to wages (pp. 62, 168, 179, 180); ethno-conflict (pp. 191 to 196, 
211); hooliganism (pp. 99, 102, 103, 105, 211, 212, 213). 
The Middle East: (a)Repressed conflict on grounds as those in the sub-continent [see footnote 
6], analogous to (b)potential/manifest conflict in organizations (pp. 83 to 85, 237) in addition 
to tribal/nationalistic affiliations, attributes of worth or lack of it attached to tribes, races and 
nations (pp. 6, 46, 83, 85, 125, 203 to 206) and the consequential prejudices. 
Euroamerica: (a)Socio-cultural conflict if any, does not significantly affect organizations. 
(b)Absence of non-work conflict (p. 168); conflict is task-related (p. 168, 222); group 
formation is function-based such as in the form of occupational groups (p. 222). 
Box 18 Methods of Conflict Resolution 
The Sub-continent: Conflict equated with trouble making (pp. 164, 221, 222); playing down 
(pp. 164, 167); hard bargaining (pp. 202); strikes (pp. 102 to 104); through pressure groups 
and unions (pp. 99 to 107, 133, 168, 211 to 213); lobbying (p. 101); and using "nuisance 
value" (pp. 102, 103, 201, 202); by creating pocket unions (pp. 99, 100). 
The Middle East: Total repression for lower classes/tribes (pp. 202, 206 to 209); for conflict 
between natives of a comparable social status, tribal methods (use of intermediaries [wasit] 
or calling conferences) of conflict resolution are used (pp. 85, 90). 
Euroamerica: Channels of protest registration/conflict resolution are available (pp. 159, 160, 
168, 192, 193, 280); conflict seen as a positive, integral, productive, creative, stimulating 
and manageable part of social/organizational process (pp. 221, 222); integrative approach (p. 
251) and collective bargaining (p. 153) in addition to various other methodsfsee endnote 2]. 
Box 19 Union Activities 
The Sub-continent: Chaotic behavior (pp. 15, 94, 99, 102, 106, 107, 201, 202, 210 to 213); 
pressure groups (pp. 99 to 107, 133); associated with political parties (pp. 104 to 107); 
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influence on employment practice (pp. 104 to 106, 139); pseudo leaders (pp. 201, 209 to 
212); ineffectiveness of unions (pp. 169, 192, 201, 202, 210 to 213); misconception of union 
functions (p. 211). 
The Middle East: A general prohibition of unions and associations of employées (p. 202). 
Euroamerica: Union activities are relatively organized (p. 212); variations in union behavior 
exist across countries (p. 8); unions in MNCs working in the sub-continent enjoy good 
industriai relations; strikes, go-slow tactics and lock-outs, virtually never experienced (pp. 
142, 150) partly due to abidance by labor législation (pp. 176, 177, 179). Asian 
groups/unions in Western firms show inter-ethnic difficuities in communication (pp. 168, 
209, 210 to 212) and inaptitude for union formation (pp. 169, 192, 209, 210 to 213). 
Box 20 Over-population in Absence of Social Securitv. a Cause of Povertv. Coercion. 
and Communal Conflict 
The Sub-continent: Over-population (p. 233); material poverty (pp. 13, 17, 18, 100, 146 to 
148, 233, 236, 242); cause of material poverty (pp. 9, 14, 151, 201, 233 to 237); caused by 
beliefs (pp. 13, 49, 50, 51, 209, 233 to 237); vulnerability to coercion (9, 151, 153, 165, 
201, 233 to 237); related to coercive control and negative motivation in absence of social 
security (pp. 23, 113, 117, 118, 181, 234, 237); cause of aggression and communal conflict 
(pp. 14, 76, 79, 227, 234, 235, 237) over scarce resources. 
The Middle East: The same as mentioned above is true for Middle Eastern countries that are 
without enough oil and also overpopulated [see footnote 6]. 
Euroamerica: Significant state provision of basic social security, controlied population size, 
little poverty, and the consequential low vulnerability to, and absence of, coercion. 
Box 21 Motivation for Corruption and Nepotism 
The Sub-continent: Widespread corruption: In the private sector (pp. 70, 71, 110, 111, 136, 
137, 141, 146, 149, 239); in some educational institutions (p. 77); sifarish in promotions (p. 
139); in government departments (pp. 103 to 106, 110, 136, 137, 149); cheating in 
arguments (pp. 179, 180, 238, 239); DSS, welfare services and Asian corruption in Britain 
(pp. 63, 65, 156, 157, 175, 176, 180 to 183, 186, 198, 234); nepotism (pp. 55, 56, 104 to 
106, 134 to 136, 144); related to low motivation (pp. 15, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131, 137); 
related to Eastern family values (pp. 57 to 59, 63, 234, 235). 
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The Middle East: In addition to that mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there 
is widespread corruption in educational institutions (118 to 127, 130, 131). 
Euroamerica Not found to a significant extent. 
Box 22 Pseudo-organizations 
The Sub-continent: In prívate sector, created to embezzle state or international developmental 
funds, or to evade taxes etc. (pp. 70, 71, 110, 111, 135 to 137, 141, 149); government 
departments and institutions rendered ineffective due to corruption or political influence (pp. 
104 to 106, 110, 136, 137, 149); imitative civil service (pp. 110, 245); many international 
developmental programs (pp. 110, 133, 135, 136, 224). 
The Middle East: In addition to that mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], further 
high incidence of pseudo organizations (pp. 109, 111 to 117, 224); pseudo education (pp. 
118 to 127, 130, 131); imitative civil service and other organizations (pp. 110, 118, 245) 
emphasizing form with little content. A remarkable parallel exists here with the heavy social 
emphasis on hollow religious rituals (pp. 9, 114, 121, 124, 183 , 239, 240, 241) whose real 
contents are seldom discussed or allowed elaboration. 
Euroamerica: No significant occurrence of pseudo organizations. 
Implications of our findings for theories of motivation 
In the light of our findings, we can now review some popular motivation theories. 
Handy (1981: 24-28) has categorized theories of motivation as; (a)satisfaction theories, 
(b)incentive theories, and (c)intrinsic theories. Followers of the last approach, McGregor, 
Argyris, Likert, and Herzberg, implicitly or explicitly, extend Maslow's ideas (hierarchy of 
human needs; physiological, safety, affiliation and love, esteem and self-actualization) into 
management (Cowling et al., 1988: 73). However, Schein (1972) points out that people are 
much more complex than the assumptions of motivation theories (social or psychological 
man, rational-economic man, and self-actualizing man) suggest. Handy (1981: 27-28) notes 
that these theories do not work well when the individual does not have strong needs for self-
actualization, or when he likes authoritarian masters. In this work, the same was found in 
the Middle East where affluence and security do not seem to have led to a noticeable 
progress towards self-actualization (see pp. 114, 121 to 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245). 
McGregor suggested his versión of the nature of "average human being" in his 
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Theory Y stating that the expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as naturai as 
play or rest, that man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives 
to which he is committed, that the most significant rewards were the satisfaction of ego and 
self-actualization, that the average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to 
accept but to seek responsibility, that the capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of 
imagination, ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not 
narrowly, distributed in the population (McGregor, 1960-b: 324, 326-327). 
However, as found in this work, there are cultures where the incidence of creativity 
is a fraction of that in the West. Second, exercising self-direction and self-control in the 
service of self-determined objectives is not common in most familial societies where the 
objectives of the individuai are determined, directly or sub-consciously, by the larger family 
net-work (see pp. 51 to 59, 62, 63, 93, 234, 235). Third, one does not find satisfaction of 
ego and self-actualization (in the Western sensé) as the most significant rewards either in the 
prosperous Middle East or in the poverty stricken sub-continent where the most significant 
rewards were found to be money (see pp. 15, 44, 61, 62, 184, 219, 220), power (see pp. 
42 to 44, 65, 104, 111, 126, 138, 162, 163, 179, 223), and status (see pp. 30 to 32, 39 to 
44, 63, 64, 119, 138, 169, 209 to 212, 218, 239). Fourth, in the Middle East and the sub-
continent, it is hard to find people seeking "responsibility" though they do often strive for 
power and status and are happy to shift responsibility of unpleasant conséquences to others. 
Fifth, the assertion that "ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organizational problems 
is widely distributed in population", is questionable for Islamic countries and the sub-
continent where almost every aspect of organizational life in every sphère of modem activity 
(éducation, health care, administration, police, civil service, private business, technology, 
factory and workplace design, office procédures etc.) is little more than imitation (see pp. 
110, 118, 224, 245) of the Western designs, manuals and manuscripts but lacking in 
objectivity and sensitivity to native circumstances. There are many cultures which do not 
socialize the child through a uniform pattern of objectivity generating éducation and the basic 
learning of mutuai obligation. Such cultures, with their emphasis on primitive egotism, often 
produce whimsical people insensitive to others' needs, and ignorant of their responsibilities 
and obligations towards those with whom they deal in one or the other capacity, which 
behaviour has a direct relevance for motivation situation in organizations. 
McGregor asserts that "If employées are lazy, indiffèrent, unwilling to take 
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responsibility, intransigent, uncreative, uncooperative, Theory Y implies that the causes lie 
in management's methods of organizational and control" (1960-b: 327). But it is seldom 
within management powers to change employer or employee culture-bred attitudes. Henee 
we suggest that the effeets of the cultural 'suprasystem', and the learning of individuáis in 
certain social conditions should be taken into account in building theories about motivation. 
Proposed extensions in the Expectancv Theory 
Cowling et al. (1988: 80) state that the expectancy-valence theory, one of the most 
popular motivation theories, owes to the work of Porter, Lawler, Campbell, Dunnette, and 
Weick. Vroom (1964)[see footnote 8] expressed this motivation theory in terms of strength 
or salience of the need, the expectaney that effort will lead to a particular result, and the 
instrumentality of that result in reducing the need. Vroom's model of the expectaney theory 
seems to have cross-cultural validity because it deals with the abstracted mechanism of the 
teleological process of reaching to desired goals through instrumental means and henee 
supersedes the culture-bound factors of needs and means determination. Although Vroom's 
model leaves room for taking account of people's such subjective calculations and 
expectations as are influenced by learning in a culture, it helped me understand the extremely 
low motivation in the Gulf Arabs to work or study: While investigating why our mature 
students would neither be particular about coming to classes ñor working even to a least 
mínimum level, I discovered a whole set of socio-cultural circumstances that inculcated 
expectations and beliefs in them that could be explained in a joint framework of cognitive 
understanding and the expectancy-valence theory: In a society, where almost everything from 
secondary school certificates to jobs, positions, status, privileges and monetary rewards could 
possibly be obtained by an appeal to the "patriarchal generosity" of first, the father, then the 
teachers, influential relatives, tribal chiefs, the Sheikhs etc. (see pp. 117, 124, 125, 203, for 
details) and where fatalistic beliefs created a relationship of rewards with 'divine providence' 
(see pp. 238, 239), the 'type II expectaney' (performance-reward relationship) was very low, 
because the aforementioned "other means" for securing the reward intervened. Henee a 
minimal effort to perform. However, the expectaney theory could not explain many culture 
[8]Any explanation of the expectaney theory here has been made in the context of the 
proposed extensions in the said theory. For a detailed understanding of the expectaney 
theory, the interested reader may refer to the authors quoted here. 
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based findings; one example would suffîce to show the point: The said theory, in its original 
form, implies (see the figure on page 273) that low effort would lead to low performance, 
low perceived équitable rewards, low actual rewards, and less satisfaction. But among more 
than a thousand Arab mature students, I found that despite extremely low efforts, their 
perceptions for équitable rewards were very high. More over, the way people seek 
'satisfaction' (the last right hand box in the figure on page 273) is highly culture-bound; in 
the Western culture, it is important that the individuai should feel that it is due to his efforts 
or energy that the goal was achieved: "If the achievement was fortuitous, or the means were 
decided for him, then the feeling of success is reduced" (Handy, 1981: 51). Thus students in 
Britain do not usually cheat or buy their degrees; the poor would not accept money from rich 
relatives unless in dire circumstances and employées would want to work hard to "earn their 
money". This perhaps has a lot to do with ethics and the concepts of "guilt culture" and 
"shame culture" (see pp. 117, 127, 131): Among the Arabs, as mentioned earlier, the idea 
of psychological success is quite différent; money is normally sought from generous 
patriarchs without doing enough work; likewise, degrees and marks are sought by an appeal 
to the "generosity" of the teacher; hard work is often shunned and influential mediators are 
used to seek jobs, promotions and privilèges of various sorts. The ease with which 
undeserved positions and goals are achieved does not bother the Arabs whose cultural foci 
is not on content but on form, concerned not with the soul but with the body (see external 
conformism, pp. 115, 117, 127, 131, 245, 255). Likewise, nepotism in the sub-continent 
(pp. 55, 56, 104 to 106, 134 to 136, 144) does not deprive the privilege-seeker from a 
feeling of "success" and, among the non-working classes, undeserved rewards are sought 
more often than hard earned rewards (see "higherthandeservedexpectations", pp. 123, 137, 
138, 201, 209 to 212, and incompétence, pp. 105, 106, 117, 119, 135, 137, 138). The 
expectancy theory, based as it is upon the "fair play" assumptions of the West, cannot 
explain other cultural phenomenon whereby the manifestation of higher expectations is a 
bargaining trick used to confuse the distributor of rewards to give more than deserved, and 
undeserved rewards can be seen bringing not only satisfaction but célébration as well. 
For the aforementioned reasons, and more to follow, I have added the darker boxes 
1 and 2 to the expectancy theory figure on page 273, thus implying that "Self esteem" and 
"Rôle Perceptions" are "Culturally learned attitudes", and that "Characteristics of 
individuals" are strongly influenced by "Socio-cultural learning". 
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We nave seen that motivation among Asians in Britain is more centered around money 
(see pages 15, 44, 61, 62, 184, 219, 220) than it is among the English, due to différences 
in familial and social commitments (see pages 53, 54, 61 to 66; the Asian compulsion to 
marry, emphasis on a larger than nuclear family, and to possess much more than required) 
and in the way people are brought up in the two cultures. This shows that money is a means 
of achieving non-work-related social and cultural goals such as enhancing family prestige, 
higher social status and politicai ambitions. Hence I have extended the said expectancy theory 
figure to include social imperatives and expectations. More reasons for adding the socio-
cultural dimension (boxes 1 and 2) to the expectancy theory are that people process 
information regarding social variables, not only work-related factors, and then form their 
patterns of motivation[see footnote 9]. Often the said process takes place subconsciously. 
Apparently totally irrelevant social variables play their part in shaping patterns of motivation. 
For example, lack of equity in basic citizenship rights (see "social status différences", pages 
30 to 32, 39 to 41, 46, 54, 55, 56, 58, 64, 186, 217, 239), the consequential differential 
police treatment, and utter absence of social security outside family in the sub-continent (pp. 
53, 54) is a key factor in the excessive money, status and power-seeking, triggered by the 
frustration of the security motive. 
Because the search for intrinsic (box 4) and extrinsic (box 5) rewards is determined, 
among other factors, by the nature of control, that is, high control reduces intrinsic 
motivation but the person may carry on working for the sake of extrinsic rewards i.e. 
negative motivation in the absence of social security (pp. 113, 117, 118, 181), I have also 
linked the control dimension in box 3, to boxes 4 and 5 in the figure on page 273. 
Furthermore, because repression of work-related challenges to seniors (i.e. repression 
of work-related conflict by high control) curbs creativity among employées (see pp. 114, 
123, 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245) and reduces intrinsic motivation, I have linked the 
conflict dimension in box 3 to the extrinsic/intrinsic rewards (boxes 4 and 5) in the said 
figure. And because the nature and value of intrinsic rewards (box 4) dépends on the 
'characteristics of individuai' (box 6) which are largely culturally conditioned (explained in 
page 271), I have linked the boxes 1, 6 and 4, in the said figure accordingly. 
[9]Similar was reported in the Hawthorne studies: "The ultimate significance of art 
individuai 's work is not defined so much by his relation to the company as by his relation to 
the wider social reality" (Roethlisberger & Dickson in Burrell & Morgan, p. 138). 
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Box î Socio-Cultural Learning, 
influence of social institutions 
(family, religion, values and 
norms) 
Type I expectancy 
Effort/performance 
re lati onship 
t 
Self esteem 





Box 4 Intrinsic 
rewards 
















Box 5 Extrinsic 
rewards 
Box 2 Culturally learned attitudes; 
the nature of. socialization; .socially. . 
valued goals and rôles 
Box 3 The nature of social and 
organizational corittokonthe 
individuabandnhe'extenMowKich' 
cónflict is aceepted-and'channelled 
to creativity _ 
The Expectancy-Valence theoretical model showing déterminants of 
effort, performance and satisfaction, adopted from Cowling et al. (1988: 81), 
simplified and modified to take account of cultural factors. Darker boxes with 
phrases in italics are my additions 
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The Grounded Theorv arising out of the fìndings of this work 
Stated most succinctly and simply, the theory that arises out of the various fìndings 
in this work is that organizational behaviour is strongly influenced, if not determined, by the 
peculiar structures and de facto functions of the socio-cultural institutions (such as religion, 
family, values) of a society. A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict 
and motivation in organizations are derived from the same found in the broader socio-cultural 
institutions. The various analogies between socio-cultural behaviour and organizational 
behaviour (for example, between religious autocracy and non-work control in organizations), 
found in this work and mentioned earlier, provide ample évidence for the said theory. The 
theory finds strong empirical support particularly from the comparisons made between three 
cultures which clearly show that behaviour patterns in Western organizations are analogous 
to that in other Western cultural institutions. The same is true for the other two cultures. 
Further évidence for the said theory comes from that the key issues (major problems) 
in the sub-continent and the Middle East, turned out to be also the key différences between 
the Western and the other two cultures (see the Subject Index catégories, "Key issues", and 
"Key organizational-cultural différences"). In other words, the reasons for the long-term 
effectiveness of Western organizations in bringing about socio-economie development could 
be attributed to the dissimilar functions of Western cultural institutions. Likewise, the reasons 
for the long-term ineffectiveness of most organizations in the other two cultures, in bringing 
about socio-economie development, became attributable to the inappropriate functions of the 
broader cultural institutions. 
The placement of the pronosed theorv in Social Sciences Paradigms 
When various theoretical formulations began to take shape from the patterns and 
relationships in my data, I found that many of my thèses supported the structural fiinctionalist 
view, of the fundamental nature of sociological reality, which regards society as ontologically 
prior to man, and seeks to place man and his activities within a wider social context (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1993: 106-7). From the various empirical observations narrated in this work, 
it becomes évident that organizations can neither be fully understood nor significantly 
transformed without understanding and transformation of the culture at large. The said 
propositions become self-evident when we see ali the earlier mentioned strong similarities 
between socio-cultural characteristics and organizational characteristics. However, my 
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findings do not support the assumptions of 'purposive rationality' in the functionalist 
paradigm but suggest that the presence of long-term rationality depends upon the de facto 
functions of the institutions of a particular culture. The said suggestion derives from the 
findings that creativity emerges in certain cultural conditions which give rise to certain 
relationships between the nature of control, conflict and motivation. This needs explanation. 
First, structural functionalism does not advocate that a social system, whether arisen 
spontaneously or designed, necessarily functions to its best for long-term rationality and 
survival of a society: The exposition of a structure and its de facto functions is not the same 
as the advocacy of a particular tradition. The latent and the manifest functions of socio-
cultural structures should be discovered through empirical investigations, and their long-term 
consequences for the social system should be noted. The notion of 'purposive rationality', 
commonly associated with the functionalist approach to the study of social systems, should 
not be a postulate but a topic of research, for while organizations can be rational in the 
pursuit of their goals, this does not necessarily lead to long term survival of a culture; the 
'value rationality' of many social structures, such as religious prohibition of family planning 
(described in our pages 233 to 237), may in fact reduce the possibility of long-term survival 
of a society[see footnote 10]. 
The second explanation deals with methodological issues. Burrell and Morgan (1993) 
characterize stmctural-functionalism with a realistic ontology and a positivistic epistemology 
[see endnote 3] and differentiate it from the 'interpretive paradigm' which is unified by its 
'subjectivist, nominalist, voluntarist, anti-positivist, and ideographic methods' stance: 
"The ontological assumptions of a truly interpretive theory do not permit a 
functionalist perspective; the two types of theories are based upon fundamentally different 
assumptions with regard to the ontological status of the social world" (Burrell: 253-254) 
However, in view of the eclectic and integrative use of methodologies that we have 
followed in this work, and which (as we shall show later) is also recommended by Burrell 
[10]Malinowski advocated a functionalist explanation of social phenomenon, that the 
spécial characteristics of social Systems, such as social organization, religion, language, 
economy, political organization etc. might be understood in terms of the functions which they 
perform. He suggested a holistic approach to studying a culture because the consistency, the 
law and order which we obtain within each aspect in the whole area of a culture, makes also 
for joining them into one cohérent whole. Thus, Malinowski established the importance of 
field work in socio-anthropological studies of small scale societies in order to form their 
holistic views in manageable empirical contexts (Burrell and Morgan, 1993: 50-51). 
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and Morgan, the above quoted statement can be addressed on account that the structures and 
fonctions of cultural institutions can shape subjectivity which can then be understood by 
interpretive sociological methods and henee there is no inhérent contradiction between the 
functionalist and interpretive paradigms. More over, research using interpretive methods may 
lead to functionalist explanations, such as Schutz's concern with understanding the meaning 
structure of the world of everyday Iife (Burrell and Morgan: 246) and the linguistic theorists' 
(interpretive sociology) attempts to find the structure and fonctions of language and subjective 
meanings reveal. Likewise, a functionalist research may find a structure in subjective patterns 
of behaviour, for example Durkheim's functionalist determinism of subjectivity, as Burrell 
and Morgan themselves acknowledge: 
"The response... to the problem of the 'subjective' has indeed been diverse. 
Durkheim... found a solution consistent with a functionalist orientation, Sorel veered in the 
direction of Marxism (dialectical materialism) and Freud into the realm of psychoanalysis 
(objective social influence in subjectivity)" (Burrell and Morgan: 256). 
Likewise, the said authors see too strong a dichotomy between 'Organization theorists' 
and the 'interpretive paradigm' (though they later recommend integration): 
"From the Standpoint ofthe interpretive paradigm, organizations simply do not exist" 
(Burrell and Morgan: 260)... the ontological assumptions ofthe interpretive paradigm are 
completely destructive as far as contemporary Organization theory is concerned... The 
contemporary organization theorist cannot build his théories within the context of the 
interpretive paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 274). 
One is pleased however, at the said authors, later, talking in detail about the attempts 
of many social theorists to integrate idealism and positivism and seeing the social action 
theory and certain varieties of interactionism as the direct product of such concern (Burrell 
and Morgan: 275). In addition, they see the conflict fùnctionalism of Merton, Coser and 
Gouldner as integrating two paradigms, fùnctionalism and radicai structuralism. 
A detailed study shows that Burrell and Morgan's paradigms are in fact ideal type 
construets, and as such of great heuristic value, but paradigm boundaries can be crossed 
without sacrificing logicai consistency. When a certain author works in more than one 
paradigms, Burrell and Morgan cali it 'a change in basic paradigm': 
"Wittgenstein, like a number of other social philosophers... (for example, Mead, 
Husserl, Marx), embarked during his lifetime upon an intellectual journey which involved a 
change in basic paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 259). 
Such a change in basic paradigm as mentioned, the said authors call 'ontological 
oscillation' and, because several authors continually shift their attention from the subjective 
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to the objective, from the nominal to the real, and from the determinisi aspects of human 
nature to the voluntarist, Burrell and Morgan find it difficult to classify them in accordance 
with their four paradigm schema [see endnote 3]. Hence, after referring to Silverman's 
'ontological oscillation' and 'paradigm shift' (described in the fourth explanation below), they 
quote his "The Theory of Organizations" (Silverman, 1970) as one example of an integrative 
attempt, and state: 
"There is scope for adopting an epistemology, a view of human nature and a 
methodology consonant with this revised view of the ontological status of the social world... 
contemporary organization theory can usefully assess and reappraise its basic orientation with 
regard to its assumptions on each of the four strands of the subjective-objective dimension of 
our analytical scheme" (Burrell and Morgan: 275). 
For such reasons as given above, and more to follow, I have made an eclectic use of 
methodologies and paradigms and one can see that this has not been done at the cost of logic. 
My third explanation deals with the 'regulation versus radical change' dimension. 
Burrell and Morgan differentiate between the sociology of regulation and that of radical 
change. However, many theorists recognize the need for regulation in certain social aspects 
and yet suggest radical change in other social aspects, which makes it difficult for Burrell 
and Morgan to locate them in the sociology of regulation or that of radical change. Hence, 
after suggesting that, "...the paradigms reflect four alternative realities. They stand as four 
mutually exclusive ways of seeing the world", Burrell and Morgan (p. 398) find it necessary 
to split Weber's works into four parts in order to suggest that, 
"Weber's influence has been felt in all of the four paradigms... his discussion of 
scientific rationality pervades much of radical humanism... verstehen in the interpretive 
paradigm... bureaucracy... dominates functionalist organization theory... Within radical 
structuralism, certain strands of his work consistent with the... sociology of radical change... 
[warrant the use of ] the term 'radical Weberianism'" (Burrell and Morgan: 331). 
I have adopted an eclectic approach to the use of the regulation versus radical change 
dimension suggesting, in chapter sixteen, radical change only in some crucial social aspects. 
My fourth explanation is about views of human nature. Again, the 'four paradigm ' 
schema, followed strictly, necessitates that authors subscribe either to high voluntarism or 
high determinism depending upon the paradigm in which they may be located. But many 
authors hold that behaviour is at times voluntarist and at other times determined: 
"Silverman recognizes that reality is socially constructed, socially sustained and 
socially changed, yet he interprets this essentially as indicating the need for social theories 
to adopt a more voluntaristic theory of action and to avoid the reification of social 
277 
phenomena. In other words,... Silverman adheres to a highly voluntaristic view of human 
nature but to an ontology, an epistemology and a methodology characteristic of the 
subjectivist region of the functionalist paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 266). 
The above quoted statement can be addressed as follows: In the quoted statement, the 
proposition before the word yet is concerned with short/medium-term individual behaviour 
which, as said, is most often socially determined. However, social changes can be brought 
about in the long term if a sufficient number of people choose to wash off the social 
deterministic effects. Hence, in the very long term human behaviour can be seen as 
voluntarist (as shown in historical changes). To add to it, we have cultures that foster greater 
determinism (Saudi Arabia) or greater voluntarism (United States and Europe). The simple 
duality of human nature, both determined and voluntary ("we shape our dwellings and then 
our dwellings shape us") and its cultural determination in the short-medium term, until the 
culture is transformed in the long term, implies that an author can be logically consistent 
without subscribing to either one camp of a set of positions or the other. Silverman's 
approach is eclectic and thus reflects the social reality which is both subjective and objective 
as much as human nature is both determined and voluntarist. 
It is safe to conclude then, that, regarding voluntarism versus determinism, these 
should not be the basic postulates but topics of research to determine where behaviour is 
determined and where it is voluntarist. Our findings show that man's behaviour is culturally 
determined but there are always exceptional individuals, capable of understanding the 
imperatives of society and life other than those transmitted to them by their immediate 
culture. Such exceptional individuals may become voluntarists in shrugging off cultural 
prejudices and guiding others to follow suit. If a sufficiently large number of people choose 
to transform culture and society, voluntarism in the long-term may be achieved. Hence, our 
grounded theory, implying 'cultural determinism plus some voluntarism' in the development 
of a society, comes close to Althusserian structuralism as explained on page 226. 
A Last Word 
For the European reader, this work, in the words of Barry Turner, is a window 
through which they can look at other dissimilar cultures. At the least, it has shed light on 
predicting what will happen if, say, Europe was to abolish basic social security, reduce 
wages below a reasonable basic level, and had religions that stopped family planning. Such 
an exercise may lead to a growth in mass neurosis, corruption, conflict of many sorts, 
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irritabiliry among people, greed and selfishness; it may lead to coercive control and the 
workplace will show many non-work problems. The message that people will get from such 
a reversion in history, if it ever took place, will be that it is not necessary to value human 
beings per se. Europeans can see in this work that the sub-continent or Middle Eastern form 
of capitalism can only lead to a Hobbesian instrumental individualist society which does not 
bring even economic good, because the European style of capitalism can survive only with 
the support of the often concealed bed rock of European socialism. 
For the sub-continent and the Middle Eastern reader, the message is very clear. If the 
people in the said cultures will continue to allow their superstitious beliefs to generate 
intolérance of non-conformism and the type of familism and socialization which is the basis 
for poverty, coercive control, communal conflict, and power-status-money motivation, then 
their fate will indeed be determined by, in terms of Althusser's structuralism, the 
configuration of particular 'over-determinations' in social forms. On the contrary, if they 
choose to look at their lives in depth with a view to prédiction and change, they can take 
décisions now to alter their future. 
Notes and Explanations 
1. One manifestation of the Western type of individualism is that even researchers in 
social sciences often use their own peculiar définitions of well established concepts. There 
is no harm in defining concepts differently to suit the context of a particular work, but 
research findings cannot be shared evenly, let alone on scientific grounds, if even the very 
basic, well-established and fundamental concepts of social sciences are defined differently by 
différent researchers. For example, Gregory (1983) in her study of technical Professionals 
in Silicon Valley, individualizes the commonly accepted supra-individual définition of a 
paradigm Çconceptual orientation or perspective from which research questions, methods, 
and styles of explanation flow") by adding: "A paradigm is a researcher's 'native' view 
regarding appropriate research behavior" (p. 360), and, sees "multiple native views" 
(probably confused with "personal views"), that is, as many 'paradigms' as the number of 
researchers. She also defines culture as "learned ways of coping with expérience" (p. 364), 
and hence questions the robustness of any group as a culture in large complex societies, and 
"probably in apparently simple ones as well" (p. 365). Her approach is in stark contrast to 
the established one, of macro comparisons between "culture continents, cultural foci, national 
cultures, and modal personalities" explained in this work (see pp. 1, 2, 3) but an adequate 
reflection of her chosen Western organizations where multi-cultural sub-groups compete, as 
also described by March and Simon (1958; clash of values/ traditions in multiplex 
bureaucracies), Likert (1961), and Strauss (1978). Nevertheless, Gregory's approach is but 
one example of individualism growing towards isolationism so much so that modem Western 
social science research is facing the threat of what has been termed, 'fragmentation'. 
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2. Comparative studies of conflict resolution by Walton and Dutton (1966), Blake et 
al. (1964-b), and Litwin and Stringer (1968) show, substantial variance in mode of conflict 
management, from collaborative to persistently conflictful. 
Feldman and Arnold (1983) classify strategies of resolving conflict into four types; 
avoidance (keep conflict from surfacing); diffusion (cool off, play down the importance or 
establish superordinate goals); containment (allow some conflict to surface, negotiate and 
bargain within the established structure); confrontation (open discussion of issues to arrive 
at a mutually satisfactory solution). Pondy (1967-b) identifies conflict management 
approaches as; the bargaining approach (increase resources or reduce demands of competing 
groups); the bureaucratic approach (conflict occurs when subordinates resist superior's 
control; hence replace personal control by impersonal bureaucratic rules) and the systems 
approach (reduce functional conflict and interdependence, e.g. between marketing and 
production functions, by reducing goal differentiation and dependence upon common 
resources, by training, making loose schedules, creating buffers etc.). Kilmann and Thomas 
(1978-b) suggest steps for effective conflict management as perceiving unacceptable conflict, 
diagnosing causes, and intervening. Blake et al. (1964-c) report some effects of intensive 
group training in reducing behavioral propensities to conflict: "Participants were instructed 
in specific approaches to conflict management, for example, being sure that one understands 
the opposition point of view well enough to state it to the satisfaction of one's opponents, 
acquiring skills in building on areas of agreement, and re-examining disagreements jointly 
so that a consensus statement of the issues at conflict can be made". The said authors also 
show that rapid disposition of conflict by problem solving teams of union and management 
could save going to formal and written grievance handling procedures. Walton and Mckersie 
(1965-a), in line with Blake et al. quoted above, suggest the use of "integrative" rather than 
"distributive" presentation of issues at conflict so that both parties are satisfied with the 
statement of the issue. Recommendations in the quoted studies can be useful in the sub-
continent and the Middle East. 
3. Burrell and Morgan (1993) classify social science research into four paradigms 
based on two dimensions. The first dimension is the "subjective versus objective" dimension. 
Subjectivism is characterized by the use of a nominalist ontology, an anti-positivist 
epistemology, a voluntarist view of human nature, and an idiographic research methodology. 
On the other hand, objectivism is characterized by the use of a realist ontology, a positivistic 
epistemology, a deterministic view of human nature, and a nomothetic research methodology. 
Their second dimension is the "regulation versus radical change" dimension. Researchers are 
classified under the 'sociology of regulation' or the 'sociology of radical change' depending 
upon whether they support the existing status quo or suggest radical social change. The four 
paradigms that arise on the basis of these two dimension are as follows: 
Sociology of Radical Change 
The Radical Humanist 
Paradigm 







Sociology of Regulation 
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Appendices of Raw Data 
Cases and Excerpts from 
Interviewée Statements 
Asían Family Business: Exclusion of Social/Legal Concerns: Control Attitudes; Patriarchy; Money 
Motivation: Status-Power-Seeking; Exploitation; Corruption: Intrigues: Inter-personal Conflict 
A Tvpical Manner in which Asian Family Businesses in Britain are Managed 
In thefollowing detailed study of one of the richest Asian familles in Britain, the ownerfamily 
exhibits many known characteristics ofthe sub-continentpatriarchs[lj. The détails ofthe way business 
is run by one of the Asian multi-millionaires in Britain, were narrated to me by a sales manager[2] 
who has seen both the patriarchal generosity and the indifférence of the family which is running 
several industries and wäre houses in Britain and in some other European countries. 
When I left my first job, I talked with a friend to get me a job as I was desperate for a job. 
He told me that there was a firm cálled 'Krishna Sons[3]\ They had multi-million pounds worth of 
businesses, four or five wäre houses, a net work of import and export, a chain of ten or twelve retail 
Shops, factories and some businesses in Portugal. They were very big. I began working at one of their 
wäre houses from where they used to despatch goods to ail their shops and retail units. I worked on 
trucks and vans loading and unloading and realized that despite being so big, they too were keen at 
exploitation of workers. We worked from ten in the morning until twelve at night and sometimes, 
when they had to ship large orders, we worked even until two in the next morning. They made us 
do this work but no one counted the hours that we worked. For six days a week work, they paid us 
only £55. This was a fixed rate for six days a week, twelve hours a day extending sometimes to 
fourteen and sixteen hours a day. There were times when we began at ten in the morning and finished 
work at three in the next morning. And ail this at a fixed weekly wages of £55. It was a family 
business. The work at the factory and the wäre house was supervised by a mother, her three sons, 
and two daughters-in-law who were members of the owning family. One of the daughters-in-law was 
Dutch and the other was an English woman, that is, the sons had married European women. These 
people supervised and ran the entire business at that site. There was neither a regular organizational 
structure nor a discipline or job descriptions. The stocks were not regularly accounted for and even 
cash was handled without the strict recording system that is normally associated with cash 
transactions. I wondered at how such a large business could be run without proper accounting 
procédures and still, at the end of the year, they used to sit, make books, satisfy the Inland Revenue 
people, and get on with it very successfully. The goods turn-over of ail of their projects collectively 
must be, at least, in millions and stili the business was run in a haphazard manner. 
When I had spent around two or three weeks at Krishna Sons, the year end came up. The 
owners and some staff were hectic in preparing final accounts, books, fake invoices of transactions, 
because there were no regular invoices when goods were despatched. They made the invoices for the 
entire year at the end of the year, fake invoices leading to a certain amount of sales that would show 
[l]In claiming that the case of Krishna sons depicts a typical situation of the Asian family way 
of running business, I have least qualms because, first, during the last decade, I have not been able 
to find enough examples that could suggest otherwise, though I admit that there must be a few Asian 
private businesses run as professionally and scrupulously, and with as due regard for the employée 
efforts, as most Western businesses are. Secondly, the more interviews I gather, the more information 
of similar nature keeps pouring in. For reasons of brevity, I have quoted nere only one case in detail 
but it is possible to obtain dozens of descriptions to the same conclusion as mentioned. 
[2]I have no doubts in the veracity of the narration about Krishna Sons. I have known the 
interviewée for the last thirty years. 
[3]Some Asian ñames, and the ñames of some British cities in this narration, nave been disguised. 
The English names stay as narrated. 
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a nominal profit and a token amount of tax to be paid to the Inland Revenue. Now because it was the 
end of the year, and they were busy in making invoices, they needed extra hands. Those who were 
working in the office had many other things to do and so they began searching for some literate 
worker who could sit and make those invoices. I presented my services to them and told them that 
I could do that work. They said, "are you literate?", I told them that I had a graduation, at which they 
asked me to leave all other work, sit down, and then they gave me a list of goods for which I had 
to make back-dated invoices. By the time it was mid-night, I had filled in ten books of invoices, some 
worth £100, some £500, some £1000 and so on, different prices. When they checked the books that 
I had made, they were impressed by my work and said to me, "you deserve an office job, you should 
not be a handy man. So from tomorrow don't do the loading/unloading. Your job title from now 
onwards will be a sales manager and we shall assign you sales duties. You will look after the sales 
supplies to our ten local retail outlets, you will keep the despatch records, you will supervise the 
shipment from the ware house, you will keep liaison with the ten branch managers of the retail 
outlets, and also keep records for the intake of goods for each retail outlet. You will be doing all this 
accounting and will have control over all staff and things that this work involves". I said that it was 
a lot of work but I would be happy to do it. When I asked what financial improvement would it bring 
to me, they said, "we give £55 to other workers, your salary would be £70 (off the books and hence 
illegal) a week". I accepted that and I thought it did not matter if I got less for a lot of work but at 
least I had gained respect from the owners and a decent job compared to loading/unloading for all my 
education, and then I had gained some authority and an office job and so on. After all I had gained 
something in a short period of time and secondly, I thought, whenever I would apply for a regular 
and legal job, I would quote this job as a valuable experience, that I have worked as a sales manager. 
So these were my priorities because of which I accepted their offer though at less salary: It was a 
jump in status and it was an experience that could open further opportunities for me especially 
because they were a well known manufacturers who supplied to such prestigious stores as C&A, Top 
Shop, British Home Stores, Burton's etc. We used to fix labels of these prestigious stores as 
mentioned above on the T Shirts and other clothing which they either imported or manufactured and 
then supplied them to the highly respected outlets. 
I accepted the job also because the mother, one of the owners, had expressed sympathy for 
me and respected me because of my education and my polite tone. She thus granted me some 
privileges such as that I was allowed to take clothes for myself either without payment or on big 
discounts. The family benefited from me in that they didn't have to deal with the branch managers 
directly by themselves. In each retail outlet, there used to be six or seven sales staff, an assistant 
manager and a manager. On top of this, each retail shop had week-end extra staff. Because there were 
more customers on the week-ends, the retail shops used to hire six or seven more girls and boys as 
sales staff. Before I was hired, the owners had to go to these retail shops and argue with the branch 
managers about one or the other things. Now it was me who took over the responsibility for dealing 
with the branch managers and was supposed to resolve the conflicts that arose between the branch 
managers and the ware-house or the factory when, things such as shipments were not exactly made 
as the branch managers wanted them to be. I was now the middle man between the owner family and 
the branch managers and I was dealing with the problems of the sales and shipment staff at the ware-
house and at the retail outlets. 
Among the four hundred workers and staff there, I hardly found fifty people there who were 
legally employed. We also had White people working there. The White staff were paid regular wages 
at an hourly rate though they too were paid low and some of the Whites too were working off-the-
books, that is, they were on social security benefits and they worked without informing the DSS. 
However, there was a difference of treatment extended to the White staff and to the Asian staff. One 
difference was that the Asians had to work without specified fixed hours but the Whites worked on 
fixed hours. If the family decided that they had to ship goods to say, C&A, to meet an order 
deadline, the Asian staff had to stay and work even if it came to working until four in the morning. 
The family used to stay there as well and the order had to be shipped at all costs. We had to stay 
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though we were paid not a penny in overtime. The White employées were treated with more 
politeness and fairness. At least the Whites had a certain fixed rate of wages, they used to get paid 
on hourly basis which meant more money for more work, and if they were supposed to finish at six 
in the evening, they did leave at six, that's it, but with the Asian workers, it was weekly rate without 
any limit to working hours. At the wäre house we had only four White men and the rest were Asians. 
At the retail shops, about 25% staff was White, but most Whites worked on a legal basis on the 
national insurance card. There were far fewer Whites compared to Asians in the whole net work of 
businesses, and this despite that they had two White daughters-in-law. Among the White staff, very 
few worked on illegal basis. On the retail shops, they were perhaps compelled to take White staff 
because they couldn't run clothing shops in up market and fine areas without any White staff. The 
shops were in fine areas frequented by White customers and because they were in city centers, they 
had to hire a certain number of people on legal basis, on regularized payroll so that if concerned 
government departments decided to inspect their records, they should be able to show that they had 
a regular staff. They had some managers who were working on legal basis, on NI cards, but even 
those managers were exploited in many ways. 
Conflicts used to arise often. I have personal knowledge of the fact that many among the staff 
used to steal things and they used to steal because they believed that they had a right to do so, 
because the owners exploited them, they had a right to steal. There were often quarrels of the kind 
that we despatched a certain amount of goods but the amount that reached the shops was less than that 
shipped. I know that there were some who would steal whole cartons full of clothes. For example, 
we once despatched fourteen cartons to a certain store but when the truck reached there, it contained 
only thirteen cartons. Sometimes the staff would open up cartons and steal clothes from several 
cartons. What amazed me was that the family often turned a blind eye to thefts even when it was very 
obvious that goods had been stolen. They won't go deeply into such things and seldom investigated 
what really happened. Perhaps because there was no way to stop it with an exploited workforce and, 
perhaps, if police was involved, they had no regular Systems of records in which case a police 
investigation could lead to the disclosure of the corruption, for example, that the employées were 
employed illegally. Predominantly this was the reason, but they could use advanced technology for 
record and stock keeping which they never wanted to do. They didn't want to keep precise records. 
Least records on paper were kept. Such a big business and no proper book keeping! They were one 
of the biggest clothing manufacturing and wholesale supplying company in Britain, a company that 
supplied to such big stores as I have told you earlier. They used to be the patrons of Bradford football 
team. The Bradford club was their's. And still no proper accounts, and I used to wonder how the 
whole system worked. I think that their bigger wäre house in London was better organized, and I 
know this because I used to go to the London wäre house frequently in the course of my work. At 
London wäre house, they paid better wages to workers and perhaps the reason for better Organization 
at London was that Rajiv, another member of the owner family, who looked after the London wäre 
house, and his wife who was White, were better Organizers. At London they had better Systems and 
not as much exploitation of staff as they did in Leicester. There could be another reason for this better 
Organization: The London office was perhaps a show piece of the company especially for international 
foreign clients. It could be a reason that because they were there at main Oxford Street, they had to 
keep up a certain standard. But in that company, all personnel were working for their own personal 
interests. No one worked for the deeper interests of the Organization because all knew that the 
company badly exploited them and so there were often clashes and conflicts. There were conflicts of 
the kind that, for example, a retail shop manager, frustrated at not being delivered the right goods 
at the right time, would say that a certain manager of another retail outlet has taken more than 
necessary goods and therefore there was a shortage. But it was not really a conflict because the branch 
managers usually tried to water down each other's miscalculations or hide each other's mistakes 
because they had there, relationships that were more like the 'Mafia' relationships. They did quarrel 
with each other outside the'factory and the wäre house over issues, "why you took so much of those 
skirts and left nothing for us, why did you take two hundred blouses when you can seil only a 
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hundred and there was little left for my shop". This happened because most retail managers had links 
with non-company retailers and businessmen and they had commitments to supply them the most 
popular clothes in return for a certain percentage commission, so that if a certain manager could sell 
say, ten shirts at his shop, he would take twenty instead and sell ten to his non-company business 
contacts. I could have made a lot of money had I joined this 'Mafia' -1 don't claim to be an angel -
but I wanted to be fair, or perhaps the truth is that I was in direct contact with the owners ali the time 
and it was easy for them to keep an eye on my activities, and so I didn't dare get involved in making 
money. The only advantage that I took from my job was that I would take the clothes that I liked for 
myself but I used to let the owners know that I was taking something. I was on good terms with the 
mother and I used to say to her, "mummy, I am taking this and this", and she never stopped me from 
taking home some nice clothes. 
There were often conflicts about money, about the hours of work, and about exploitation. 
Employées would say, "you make us work so and so many hours but you pay so little". The only way 
the owners had found to résolve such conflicts was that if someone raised a lot of hue and cry and 
protested a lot, they would cali him aside, give him some ten or twenty pounds in privacy and say, 
"you have worked hard, we know that, hère, don't be angry, take this money and go to a fine 
restaurant and have a nice meal". Thèse were temporary solutions for conflict and if someone really 
did protest a lot, too much, they would kick him out of his job saying "we don't need your services, 
you quit". It was ali whimsical and the organization was being run so haphazardly that I cannot figure 
out for you what control methods or conflict resolution methods were used there. It would be more 
true to say that there was no organization at ail, that is, if you mean by organization, a stable pattern 
of relationships. 
Many people were fired in my présence. For example, one of my colleagues filled up a bin 
liner with clothes and put it in his car boot. Whether he was stealing those clothes for personal use 
or sale outside, I don't know. After a while, Bénir jee, one of the sons of the owning family, came 
out in rush to go somewhere but found that none of the company cars was présent at site. Bénir asked 
this colleague to lend him his car for a while, and the latter gave it to him. He either forgot that he 
had put a bin liner full of clothes in his car boot or perhaps he thought that Bénir would not open the 
car boot. When Bénir went somewhere, he opened the car boot to put something in and found the bin 
liner full of clothes. When he came back, he called the said employée in and said, "you have stolen 
those clothes that are lying in your car". The employée tried to make an excuse, "no Babu Jee, I had 
gone to deliver some clothes to a retail outlet and perhaps we forgot one bag in the car". The excuse 
obviously appeared a lame one and Bénir said, "I am calling the police". They called in a police 
officer and made him sit without telling him anything. While the police officer was made to wait, 
Bénir Jee kept putting pressure on the employée and negotiated with him, "if you do not admit that 
you have stolen, I would hand over the case to the police". Eventually the employée admitted that he 
had stolen, and asked to be forgiven because he could not afford to be investigated by the police; he 
used to work but claim social security as well. Had he been investigated, he could lose ail benefits. 
Bénir Jee then asked the police officer to go back because, as Bénir Jee told him, "sorry, we have 
sorted out the matter, it was a misunderstanding". The employée was fired but, another strange aspect 
of the owners, after two months the employée came back, applied for a job, and they gave him the 
job despite the knowledge that he had stolen in the past[4]. 
I shall give you an excellent example in this regard: This example shows the extent to which 
[4]The above described 'generosity ' shows the traditional patriarchal values whereby a rich man 
may be generous and exploitative at the same time and would like to be the police and the court ail 
by himself within the boundary walls of his property where he fonctions some what like a mini-king. 
In the subcontinent, the village chaudharies, for example, consider it a disgrâce and gross affront 
should police enter their village to investigate matters which the chaudharies think they should sort 
out themselves. Many battles between the 'intruding' police and the villagers have been fought about 
whether, in the village, the chaudharies or the government institutions are the supreme authority. 
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corruption had sunk into their psyche. A certain shipment came from abroad for us at the airport. 
When such shipments would come at the airport, some employee was told to go and get the goods 
released and cleared from the Airport Customs. He used to take the airway bills and invoices 
pertaining to the letters of credit, and bring the goods from the airport to the factory. On this 
occasion, Jamil, the same employee who had been fired earlier for stealing and then taken back on 
job, was sent to collect the goods. When he reached the airport, he found that there were two lots of 
goods there but he had papers for only one lot. Jamil went inside to collect the goods. Now the 
officer at the airport, who was dealing with this shipment, made a mistake and delivered him the 
second lot as well, thinking that it had been cleared. The mistake was made by the person on 
deliveries. Jamil had gone their with papers pertaining to one lot but the officer there thought that the 
papers were for the entire shipment that had come in the name of Krishna Sons. He gave him all that 
bore the name of Krishna Sons. Our man knew that the second lot had not been cleared but he 
received it. Had he wanted to dispose off the second lot by himself, he could have made money and, 
perhaps, there was no way the owners could find out this embezzlement. Any way, he brought both 
the lots to the factory. They were about six thousand T shirts. The owners not only kept the second 
lot, they praised Jamil for his cleverness, "Jamil, what a wonderful thing you have done - excellent". 
Now the T shirts, had they been through the Customs, would have been sold at £4 each, but they very 
quickly sold them off at £2 per shirt because they didn't want them to be kept in the ware house for 
long, fearing that the Airport Authorities might find out that they had made a mistake and come for 
an investigation. The interesting thing is that Jamil, this employee who had brought in the lots from 
the airport and was the source of this profit, wanted to take one shirt for himself but the Krishnas 
made him pay £2 for the shirt he took: They had praised him for his clever manoeuvre but were not 
in a mood, at that time, to give him one shirt free. On top of that, the Krishnas, after having sold the 
second lot for twelve thousand pounds, found the papers and invoices for the second lot, filed a 
complaint that they had not received the second lot and therefore got their money back from the 
exporters who perhaps got refunded for it by the Cargo Insurance Company believing that the 
consignment was lost by the Airline. It was a mistake by the Airport Cargo Authorities that they got 
this lot, made twelve thousand pounds by selling the second lot, got more money from the exporters, 
which was easy because they had a full set of invoices and airway bill telling that they had not 
received the goods. The exporter might have got his money from the insurance company[5]. But just 
look at this, from the same lot that gave them twelve thousand pounds extra, they were not willing 
to give one shirt worth £2 to Jamil who had been the source of all this profit. Perhaps they thought 
that this was Jamil's way of repaying for the thefts he had been doing earlier and for which he was 
fired. But they set this example of embezzlement for their employees, and perhaps that is why they 
ignored the comparatively smaller thefts of their employees. 
There were other events as well of this kind: A certain person who owed the Krishnas about 
six or seven thousand pounds, refused to pay his debts, and the matter was sent to court. The 
Krishnas had no evidence that the man owed them the money because, as usual, no proper record for 
the transaction were kept. When the matter was sent to the court, they instructed me to go to the court 
as a witness that the man owed them money. I said how could I be a witness, because when the goods 
were delivered to that man, I did not work for the Krishnas. The Krishnas said that it was part of my 
duty to go as a witness or else I would be putting my job at risk. Interestingly, when they had made 
the transaction with that man, I had not even arrived in Britain. When they forced me to go, I said, 
"in the court room, I shall have to testify on oath on the Quran that he owed you money and I cannot 
do that because I have no knowledge of the dealings between you and him". They said, "we tell you 
a way out, you tell the court that you have no faith, that you are an atheist, or say you are a Hindu 
and testify on the Gita". Now because Gita is the holy book of the Hindus, an oath on Gita, according 
[5]I know many Asian businessmen and others who hâve made a lot of money by insurance frauds 
and though thèse events have implications for motivation of people to work, going into détails would 
be beyond the scope of this work. 
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to their logie, was not binding on me not to tell more than what I knew. I was terribly desperate those 
days as I had no legal rights to work in Britain and I knew that without the job I won't survive, and 
so I went to the court and testified. They won the case, and the décision was based solely upon my 
testimony. I later found that the man owed them only £2000, but they had claimed that he owed much 
more than that. Such events of gross dishonesty were quite common in that company. There was no 
discipline, no rules, and a lot of conflict between managers over petty issues. If I tried to mediate in 
conflicts between staff and managers, the managers resisted my authority. If I tried to tell the owners 
they would laugh it off, "leave matters where they are". I am stili surprised how such a large 
organization thrived and made enormous profits. And to add to my surprise, I found that the old 
Krishnas, the founding husband and wife, had began work in Britain as door to door sales people. 
Perhaps this is just a legend, as legends are often made about successful people. But I think that in 
this case it was true that they began from scratch, because the mother was very frank with me and 
would often tell me stories of how they began, what hardships they faced and so on. But there was 
a help in this case in that when the father died, he was insured for a large sum, and that insurance 
money really helped them in crossing the barrier of lack of capital. They opened a shop in Liverpool, 
which was successful, and from there they went on and on to their présent fortunes. 
I worked for Krishna Sons for four years. I don't know how they dealt with the government 
departments and how they managed investigations if any. They often took me to their home because 
the mother grew fond of me. I think that the house was worth more than a million pounds. It was 
situated in W., a posh locality in Leicester. I used to go to their birthday parties where they used to 
spend a lot of money on entertaining the guests. Many White people used to corne. Champagne was 
served. They had contacts with several influential White people. They had contacts with the Inland 
Revenue and VAT officers. I saw them many times giving bottles of special wines and whisky, and 
gifts to some White people but I don't know who they were. But I personally believe that they did 
use to bribe some people. For example, I saw them giving gifts to some White people who would 
come to the factory, "this is for your wife, this is for the kids", and so on. They were very generous 
with their bank manager as well. But the prime reason for their success was the strong cohésion 
within a relatively small family. They were so united they never allowed a non-family partner to join 
in or even take a senior manageria) post. I was the only man there who was allowed to touch the cash 
registers and make invoices without their supervision. Perhaps by going to the court and testifying 
for them, I had proved my loyalty for them, or perhaps they liked me somehow, I have no idea why 
they began trusting me a bit more than the others. 
However, they soon changed their attitude towards me. The only reason for this change was 
that their factory manager began filling their ears against me, and they began ignoring me. Perhaps 
he thought that in my présence, he won't be very close to the owners. I had to take goods from the 
factory and henee I had to check their quality and keep in touch with the production people and the 
said factory manager. I had to tell the factory manager what the shops required, what orders we had, 
what the production people should make and what not. I had to tell the factory manager about the 
quantity and quality of clothes we required, and what clothes could be sold in the ware house and 
henee should be made available ali the time at the ware house for outside whole-sale customers to 
come, see, inspect and order. I even had to check the quality of the clothes. So I had a lot of work 
relationship with the factory manager. I had to deal with him ali the time, and because I was keen 
on keeping up the quality, I sometimes used to snub him particularly because, being so much in their 
good books and having shown so much loyalty towards them, I thought my job was safe with the 
owners. I would say to the factory manager, "those jumpers were not of the right quality, I cannot 
accept them, I cannot sell them either to outside customers or to our own units". I used to do that 
only because I was quality conscious but he thought that I was pulling his leg, and so in revenge, he 
began filling the ears of the owners. He messed up the work relationship with his personal problems 
and because he was a Hindú and so were the owners, and because he had a degree in textile 
engineering and he thought high of himself, he began creating troubles for me in his presumed 
revenge. He began saying rotten things about me to the owners who then showed their mistrust in 
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such thìngs as that they took away facilities from me: I used to have a company car and free petrol, 
but they took away this car from me and gave it to the factory manager. Gradually it became 
unbearable and I realized that it was not possible to stay there and work in a respectful way: I had 
sold my conscience for the owners but at least I had their trust and respect to count on - there was 
little money but their were some favours. Now this too was lost and so there was no point in carrying 
on. One day I said to the mother, "mother, I have been working for you for the last four years. I 
don't need to elaborate how fair and sincere I have been with you and with the company. But now 
things have become hard for me here and I fìnd it difficult to continue". She appreciated ali that I had 
done for them and she asked me to take a leave for four weeks, relax and think it over. I asked if it 
would be a leave with pay because if I stopped getting the £70 a week they used to give me, how 
would I pay my rent and survive without money? During ali those four years we had never been 
given a holiday. Staff holidays were not on their agenda. The mother turned cool and said, "it is not 
our principle to allow holidays and, just to remind you, you are not a legai employee of this 
company". We never had a holiday, no national holidays, bank holidays, week-ends, none. We 
worked even during Christmas holidays. However, I went on a leave without pay and didn't teli them 
that I was leaving. After two weeks, I found work at another place and then I went to them and told 
them that I had got a job and that I was leaving. They said nothing. 
Asian Family Businesses; Theorv X Control Attitudes: Authoritative Control bv Personal Observation 
1- The work was mainly supervised by the family who owned. Two sons and a daughter-in-
law, the owner, his wife, and a sister used to take turns in walking around us. So five of the owners, 
and two supervisors would come in for a round after every hour or two. They would stand by our 
side and check if the stitching was done properly, then they would check the bins that are kepi by the 
side of each machinist to see if we had thrown any damaged piece in there. If they found one, they 
would pick it and put it back on our tables and record it in front of us so that its cost be deducted 
from our wages. (Manchester). 
2- There should be a discipline. There should be a foreman because ali the bosses behave as 
foremen. Two brothers and their father own the factory. They do not understand each other well. One 
may instruct us to do one thing and the other may come and want us to do something else. Its like 
being in a home where a child has many fathers and each wants him to do things in different 
manners. We have three bosses who do not agree amongst themselves. Then the Pakistani employers 
have a habit of criticizing you in front of ali others at the work station. I think this is very bad. 
Instead they should cali you in the office if they have to teli you about any wrong doings. They 
should not humiliate one in front of others but warn in private, in the office. Pakistani employers 
don't treat workers as human beings. They think that workers are animals who need a stick and 
should be kept under strici control if they have to be made understood. They do not consider that we 
have a self-respect and an ego. One has to give up self-respect if one wants to work - one has to work 
like a slave with them. After forty hours one doesn't find the energy to work more. It is very tough 
work. At first I would fix hooks in hangers. Plastic hangers would fall at the rate of four in eight 
seconds. Two men have to fix hooks in them at the same speed as they fall. You have to be very 
quick. I couldn't work so fast and so I left it. Now I am working on the press, and because it is piece 
work, I have the advantage to work on my own. There's no one to keep an eye on me. (Oldham). 
3- The pressure was too much to take. If one was a little late, the boss would scold. If one 
took a bit more lime while taking tea break they would scold. They pressured the workers too much 
and I couldn't bear it. The owner and his wife checked the quality and speed of work. They would 
frown if the thread broke because it meant wastage of some time. Ali the time the workers were 
watched by one breathing on their shoulders. They would criticize and find faults and if someone 
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would damage a piece of cloth, the cost was deducted from his wages. They would not even give half 
an hour for lunch; it was fifteen minutes. If anyone was late, they would deduct money from his 
wages. I left and then never worked again. (Manchester). 
4- The three boys, the owner's sons were supposed to be three supervisors to me. They didn't 
trust me because the sooner they turned their back they thought I wasn't doing any work and as soon 
as they supervised me, I was doing all the work, and when they went I won't do any. So, they had 
a system like one boy went off to watch the other workers and one watched me and then, it was a 
sort of rota system. All the time they were watching me and they were watching the other workers 
as well. They thought I was a kid of fifteen that needed supervising: They gave me one job and they 
imagined I made mistakes, I mean, like cutting strings where [the nature of job was such that] no 
body could [possibly] say to me "maybe you were making mistakes", but it was just they would tell 
me that. The string was about 3 centimeters [long] and if I was to cut it in the middle they would say, 
"oh you cut it too short", and things like that, and there was another fact, while they were watching 
me, since I was taller than them and little people have something against taller ones, I don't know 
perhaps they always wanted to be tall because if they wanted to go for dancing and all that, you get 
pushed around by others, and that was another factor [personal dislike]. In addition to the work on 
machine for which I was employed, I had to do packing, sweep the floor and some times the toilets, 
if one of the boys who were there, it was there job but I couldn't complain to their father because 
they could have told their father I wasn't doing well he could have kicked me out so I agreed to clean 
the toilets.... In an Asian factory, they pay you less, if you want a tea break, they put on a sour face 
on like, "oh you haven't done enough work, go and do some more". (Huddersfield). 
5- 1 used to do a packing job, and, sometimes, it was cheap plastic bags, and you had to open 
them, you had to fold the clothes in a certain way and put them in the bags, and put the cello-tape 
on - and because I didn't want to do over-locking, because that makes your - you know those fibers 
that are left - they go into your nose and down your throat, they are very bad for your health - I 
wanted to do packing. And they, one of the brothers, he was the general dogs body - he used to do 
everything, he wanted me to work so fast, you know, I mean, I couldn't believe -1 mean - so fast -
sometimes I would say to him, "why don't you try it?", but very nicely -1 mean I didn't say, "look -
you try and see, I'll see how faster you can do it", but he wanted me to work so fast. All the women 
were pushed to their limits. They couldn't talk to each other, they couldn't have a rest-break, you 
know, they couldn't say, "well, I'm having a cup of tea now, I am tired". They were really forced 
to work. We had half an hour lunch break - and tea was brought around - but you didn't stop to have 
a tea break, because he wanted to, out of that £1.50 or £2.00 [per hour] he may have paid them, he 
wanted double the amount, he wanted more than he was giving. 
The wives of the owners worked there. These wives were working as supervisors while they 
were sewing as well. There was no conflict between the worker and the owners' wives - it was just 
the same old one - work faster - do this like this - do you understand? and you really wanted to say, 
"well you did it like this before but why are you telling me this". They always wanted you to work 
slightly better than they had, and you didn't understand, "look, I am doing as good as you are". If 
one of the other workers didn't do a job good, you know, like didn't sew properly, they were kind 
of, start quibbling, you know, saying, "that seam is not straight, you should do it properly", and I 
was very - oh God, there was one terrible time, when one women, I think was at some pressure at 
home, and she was sewing, and she couldn't sew properly, it was over-locking and you have to be 
very good at it to do it properly - and she kept missing parts out and we had to return them back, and 
they started quibbling, "why can't you do it properly, you have missed this little seam", or this and 
that, and she used to cry, and, Oh God!, 1 feel awful. 
They checked the amount of waste. At first, when you are over-locking, the design of the 
cloth - right - it has been cut - its like a size 12 - now the over-locking has to be done very careful, 
that they put so much into the machine and sew; if you - like some of the girls used to put 2 inches, 
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3 inches into the machine - by the time you have cut that off, it is of size 10 - they used to tell her 
very gently - they were very nice in that - "oh! do this properly, do it like this", but if she didn't, 
then they would get angry. They would say, "well, sister", that was the word they kind of used, 
"would you leave because we don't think you are doing the job properly". She was fired - but not 
in a very nice way; "you can't do it and we don't want to waste our things". (Leicester). 
6- 1 and my colleagues had a conflict once with the owners. They used to get their goods from 
France and they were very conscious that no one should know the names and addresses of their 
suppliers (an exports manager in Pakistan faced a similar fear on the part of the owners who were 
keen to conceal the particulars of the importers of their products in Germany, France and Britain) or 
otherwise, their competitor ware houses would import the same stuff from France. They wanted the 
addresses of their suppliers to be kept secret. But once they saw, at the show room of one of their 
competitors, a few lines of dresses which they had believed had been exclusively displayed at their 
ware house. Now anyone can find the names and addresses of the makers of any dresses in the French 
trade directories and then import them but the owner's wife was distrustful and she wanted to see if 
anyone from the ware house had leaked the addresses and so she began suspecting us. We knew that 
the owners didn't want to lose us because we worked very hard, and so when she questioned us in 
strict tones, we took a stand, and we told her that if we were treated with mistrust, we might think 
about quitting the job. After some time, the same problem arose again and they suspected us and 
questioned us in a rude manner, and insisted upon their charges against us, that we had given their 
secret addresses to their competitors, at which we resigned. (Manchester). 
7- The employers always looked for excuses to humiliate and would scold at petty things such 
as putting a chair here or there as if they enjoy exercise of authority. Quarrels were common. For 
example, often, when one would take a bit longer tea-time, because all were Pakistanis, the others 
would fill the boss's ears against him. That X was wasting time or Y had gone there or done this or 
that. Even if the boss was away from the factory, he found out all that happened in his absence. The 
selected workers would see to it that he was told of all that happened in his absence. ( Manchester). 
Typical Statements about Money Motivation: Differences between Asian and English Workers' 
Motivation: Greater Familial Commitments: More Hours: Least Incentive for Cultural Uplift 
1- Pakistanis, or the Asians came here to this country predominantly for money - not for the 
love of anything else. They came for money and the night shifts offered more money because there 
was a bonus attached with the night shifts, what they called 'night shift bonus'. There, the salary 
scales were more than those on the day shifts. So practically everybody went for the night shifts. If 
any overtime was offered, then Pakistanis were the only people who were prepared to work 
overtime.... their main purpose to come here was to make money, as much as possible. (Oldham). 
2- The next rank from what I was doing was the supervisor which was one more of a headache 
because you have more responsibility, and he just did the same work as I do, pay is slightly different 
but slightly. It wasn't worth the trouble. I didn't want to be the supervisor. Extra work. Wish I could 
have been positive. Because if you get into trouble, you are responsible for it because you have 
authority. But if you are just a worker, it doesn't matter; you just get a smack once in a while. 
And your motivation to work was? 
Money. There are lot of chances of promotion if you want to. Good thing about TESCO is that you 
get cash in hand; probably its the only place that gives you cash... (Leicester). 
3- There was no incentive for cultural uplift - to learn more than what was necessary to make 
money apart from that when you learn more and understand the language, you get more responsibility 
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for less pay. I will tell you one thing, they used to mess up things deliberately so that they should not 
get extra jobs. One operator... was asked to do the extra job when he had spare time. But he... 
messed up, his intention was that the supervisor should not give him extra jobs though that could 
enrich his job learning. For betterment, or learning language there was no incentive of promotion or 
furthering career for the pay high up was not equal to the effort they had to put. Their main 
motivation to work was to get money. That was that main thing and remained always as the top 
priority. The majority of workers didn't go for self-development. It was enough development for them 
to come from a remote village and start wearing trousers and suits, tie, hat, and money in the pocket, 
house of their own and a car... Another thing is that people who had the qualifications could not get 
goodjobs. (Manchester). 
4- 1 was working to be away from domestic problems, to keep myself busy. I didn't like 
working with the machines but one has to when there is no alternative... Then the wages were 
reduced further and I quit. (Oldham). 
5- A prívate company offered me a job; I didn't go because the salary was less. But when I 
carne to the Gulf, the salary difference was too big to resist; I thought I'd be getting 25000 and if I 
work for ten years, I'd nave a much better life than I'd have after putting 30 years in India. (Qatar). 
6- Conflict aróse mostly when they would want a change in the pay scales... A number of 
times they did go on strikes. Mostly they would complain about the wages. (Manchester) 
7- The workers wanted a pay rise. The unión called a strike but the management sacked all 
involved and moved the factory elsewhere. (Slough). 
8- From sixties onwards, predominantly, Asians were employed. The English employers 
employed the Asians because jobs were rough. English people don't want to do any dirty job. They 
don't want to work night shifts. An Englishman, when he has ñnished his shift at four or five o' 
clock in the evening, would not stay on overtime till ten o' clock in the night because he has social 
hours in front of him. He socializes - completely different. (Manchester). 
9- The Asian workers work twelve hours a day and six/seven days a week. The basic reason 
is financial; the more you work, the more money you make. There is so much greed among our 
people that they keenly watch how much they are going to make each week. They have high income 
targets on weekly basis. They keep thinking, whether they are at home or in a shop or wherever, how 
many more hours of work they can get. We have a worker who virtually falls sick if he is told that 
this week there would be work for only five or six days and he keeps wondering what he would do 
on the weekend, and he worries a lot at a day's loss of work; this man has been working for seven 
days a week for the last five years. When there is not enough work to give seven day work to all 
workers, we have a rota system whereby the work on the sixth and seventh day is divided among 
workers turn by turn and none is willing to give up his turn and take some rest or spend time with 
family. Normally all work seven days a week. (Brentford). 
10- There is no wage rate difference between that of the English workers, who work eight 
hours a day and five days a week, and that of the Asian workers, and therefore, because the White 
workers work eight hours a day and five days a week, they get nearly half the weekly wages which 
an Asian worker gets. The major difference in earnings between Asians and Whites comes from the 
work on the weekends which makes the earnings of our Asian workers almost twice that of an English 
worker. A weekend work makes your earnings as if you have worked for two weeks, so that an Asian 
worker gets for a week what an English worker gets for two weeks, but the latter seem to be happy 
with what they get for lesser hours and lesser days. (Brentford). 
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11- 1 think our Asians are more sort of money conscious when it cornes to, you know, Asian 
people would do more for money but the White people would do more for promotion; but at the end 
of the day, money cornes with the responsibility and with promotion. I mean, if you are in charge 
of fifty people, the fifty won't get more than you obviously. When it comes to overtime our people 
would work twenty-four hours (if it was possible) a day seven days a week because they think about 
money. But if you ask an English person, he would say, eight hours, that's it mate, I am going... 
Well, first of ali, their [the Whites] out-going is différent; for example, they quite often go out for 
a weekend or during a week to a pub, drinking, while it is strictly forbidden in our religion. Eating 
habits, you know, you can be good friends but on the other hand you got to respect each other's way 
of living. We are more motivated towards the interests of our children, our forefathers, our parents 
and so on. But the English people are there for themselves. I am aware of one White person in our 
firm, he is doing at the moment shift work, he is doing three nights from 10 in the evening to 7 o' 
clock in the morning, three afternoons, 2 to 10, and three mornings from 7 to 2, and then he gets 
three days off. He is getting more for this kind of work but he applied to be transferred to load 
planning;; he volunteered to do load planning where he would be working from 9 to 5 and he was 
prepared to take a pay cut. The advantage he would have is that he would be working Monday to 
Friday, 9 to 5 but at a lesser pay. (Slough). 
12- Now there is another inspector who is going to be retired next year, August, they know 
that he is retiring and they are asking me to take his job because, normally, it would be very difficult 
for them to get a White man because Whites don't want to work in the night shifts. They are 
expecting me to take the night shift because it would be easy for them to hire one for the day shift.... 
We don't have a lot of social life like the English people; they have to go out in the evening, we have 
our own way of life, and so we are prepared to work virtually any hours, day or night. (Slough). 
13- 1 had some complaints that I thought that we worked more than what we were paid for. 
I thought the hours were too long and I didn't feel like working there. If I had said that I wanted to 
work eight or nine hours, the other workers would not agrée. I could be sacked because if ali [Asiani 
workers work twelve hours, then one in the shift cannot work for lesser hours. I asked twice for 
réduction in working hours but none among the workers agreed. I would say that they have serious 
family obligations; there is perhaps greed as well, but they have commitments to keep and no other 
work is available. I would say that even if they could get 16 hours a day work, they would do it. 
Compared to the English people, our people have much greater family obligations. An average 
English man usually has to, financially, look after himself only but an average Asian man has to pay 
for his parents, brothers and sisters, wife and kids as well. Then there are many social problems as 
well such as payments for the marriages of relatives etc. It is because of the large family and kinship 
structures that while one is earning, there are ten to eat out of his earnings. (Slough). 
14- Asian workers want money at the cost of their physical fitness -1 mean many who have 
worked 12 hours - seven days for several years, are not very fit now. Many have a regular back-bone 
problem. They have too many family commitments and problems. About the Whites, their style of 
life and family responsibilities are différent from ours; their family responsibilities are lesser than 
ours. Our people want to keep relatives happy, to own property, spend on marriages etc. The Whites 
mostly have to look after themselves only, in financial terms, and they can afford to work forty hours 
only. And then their wives too work in many cases, then there are many who do not marry at ali 
which is very rare among Asians, and then they don't have to spend heavily on their daughter's or 
son's wedding. When husband and wife both work, they share their financial burden. Our wives do 
not work outside home. Indians too work twelve hours though the entire family works; mothers, 
daughters, sons - and they are financially much better off than Pakistanis. If there are four in an 
Indian family, they ali work hard. Either the needs are more, or the greed is more... (Brentford). 
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15- 1 didn't want to work that much. It was really hot and since I couldn't claim income 
support because my mum was claiming child benefit for me, I had to go and work because my dad 
told me to... I didn't really want to work and what happened was that I used to earn around £100 
every week and my dad was not that happy about it, he said, "look you don't need O levels so why 
don't you get a better job"; he expected me to get at least a better job somewhere in a chemist's or 
anything like that. (Huddersfield). 
16- Family finances needed sorting out. I left my studies at the university to support my 
parents and six younger sisters. There was no expectation, no motivation, they were just interested 
in running the place and pay us our wages and that was all we could expect there. (Oldham). 
17- You can get more work out of the Asians easily because they want more money - like if 
they want to work overtime they [the employers] won't give them one and a half times more; they 
would say we will give you about half or same when they should have given one and half. 
(Huddersfield). 
18- 1 was working after the women had gone just to get a bit more, because when you are 
working, you know, when it was 6 o' clock and everybody used to go, you are dead, but just to get 
that little bit more money, you would kill yourself - just a little bit more to get those £2; even those 
£2 you might spend it when you are going down the street, but you would stay there, an extra hour, 
to get that £2. Psychologically it's very funny ... Also the women considered themselves very lucky 
if the factory opened on a Saturday or Sunday, oh they would love to come. (Leicester). 
19- Asian women started to ask for more work and I was forced to come in to pack what they 
had sewn. (Coventry). 
20- The money they got (£30 a week) was close to the level they could get on income support 
but they worked because most of their husbands were working and so they were not entitled to 
income support - so they were working there - that was their pin money. It was their money - pocket 
money like. As you give to a child 50p or £1 a day. They worked for their own private use of 
money; the husband might not give them enough for clothes and for gold. (Leicester). 
Typical Income Differences in Sub-continent Organizations and the Consequent Psychology 
1- Operator-three used to get around IRs. 1600, operator-two used to get IRs. 1800 and 
operator-one used to get IRs. 2000. An executive started from IRs. 2700 basic and the total used to 
come around 3000. The salary of an assistant manager started from nearly 5500. So there was a big 
jump in salary from executive to an assistant manager. A very big jump; and then the difference 
between the salary of an assistant manager and that of a deputy manager was again 2000, and so on; 
each time you were promoted, you got a jump of IRs. 2000. A joint-manager used to get about 
10,000; the Deputy General Manager about 12,000, and the Managing Director used to get about 
15,000.. 
2- ... before Smith Kline and Beecham had a merger, the sales team of Smith Kline was 
getting more money than the sales team of Beecham and therefore felt superior. Hence, after the 
merger of the two companies, the 'upper brass' of Smith Kline began undermining the sales team of 
the previously Beecham. Such patronizing was not acceptable to the Beecham team but the conflict 
went so far that they all resigned, remained unemployed for some time and were then taken by our 
company. (Narrated by a sales manager in Pakistan). 
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Communal (Non-WorlO Conflict and Intrigues Leaving Little Room for Improving Effectiveness: 
Corruption; Hooliganism: Rewards not Related to Performance: Pseudo Organizations 
The following are excerpts from interview with a former lecturer at Sindh University in Pakistan: 
The majority of students at Sindh University were predominantly Sindhis. No Punjabis were 
there but there were some Urdu-speaking students. There were around twenty to twenty-five lecturers 
only two of whom were Urdu-speaking, namely the Chairman and me. The rest were ail Sindhis. 
In the beginning, when I went from Punjab to work in Sindh, because I had been told by 
many people that the Sindhis do not accept Urdu-speaking people, I told them that I was a Punjabi, 
which was not untrue in that though my parents were Urdu-speaking migrants of India, I had been 
brought up and lived in Punjab. But telling them that I was a Punjabi turned out to be a grave mistake 
because the times when the Sindhis hated the Urdu-speaking communities have largely passed and 
now they accept them on account of being the 'new Sindhis', and have allied with them against the 
Punjabis who were propagated against as 'alien and imperialist infiltrators'. I had been incorrectly 
told that the Sindhis were more likely to tolerate Punjabis than they would the Urdu-speaking. I found 
that while they would tolerate the Urdu-speaking, they would not accept Punjabis coming to Sindh. 
I went to a lunch where the Sindhi students began discouraging me from staying at the 
University by telling me things that howsoever hard I worked and however long I stayed at the 
University, I would neither get a promotion nor a scholarship for further studies abroad because it 
was usually the Sindhi teachers who had the required influence and contacts to get promotions or 
scholarships. One of the boys told me that he was going to get appointed as a lecturer as soon as he 
passed his last examination and that he would get a scholarship to study abroad because he had got 
the right contacts. He said it was no use me staying at the University for even if I stayed for ten 
years, I won't get promoted at the right time, and that he would get a scholarship to study abroad 
much earlier than I was likely to. 
When the Punjab football team came to play at the Sindh University, some Sindhi students 
got hold of one of them and broke his legs. 
The first event took place when I was asked to invigilate the B.Sc. examinations. When I tried 
to stop the students from copying, they felt offended. The lecturers felt offended too. They asked me 
why I was being so strict, and the students demanded that I let them do what they were doing. They 
used to copy to such an extent that they had the officiai answer sheets, already filled in, smuggle into 
the examination hall and attach them with the regulär answer sheets. I have no idea how they 
managed to get the answer sheets from outside. I won't say that the teachers gave them the question 
papers, but the teachers used to make questions from that part of the syllabus that was taught during 
the semester. Because the students knew that the exam questions would come from what the teachers 
had been teaching in the class room, they used to write the answers to ali the questions that could 
possibly come in the examination, and then, during the two hour exam, search for the right answer 
sheet from among those they had brought in with them and then replace the issued answer sheets. 
Among the other methods they used were that they would bring in, what we called 'kartoos' 
(cartridges) or 'golay' (rolls) which were papers rolled into cartridge or bail shapes for easy hiding 
into their clothes, one roll hère one there. They had stränge and novel methods of hiding thèse in 
their dresses. On my first exam, I kept stopping them from using thèse rolls by taking them away 
from them. It was an unusual thing for them and so when they went out, they probably planned that 
the next day, when I would try to stop them, they would protest and walk-out of the examination hall. 
There was a student who brought in with him a lot of papers and rolls of which I took away as many 
as I could find. Then he deliberately dropped a rupee note near him which from a distance, I thought 
was a piece of paper. When I picked it up, he immediately got up and protested that I had taken his 
rupee, that it was not a cheating paper, and that I was being too much of a nuisance. I said to him, 
"forget about the rupee, you are wasting your time when you should pay attention to your 
examination paper". He said I had been unfair to him and that he was unduly checked and stopped 
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from concentrating on his examination paper, and in protest he was walking out. He went out and 
began shouting in Sindhi, "Fazal na khapay, Fazal na khapay" (Fazal is not acceptable) and some 
other things. Then most students got up, and began walking out to join him. This was my first 
expérience of this kind and I tried my best to stop the students at the door, from walking out. Many 
pushed me aside and walked out but around eight or ten students kept sitting at their desks to whom 
I lei do their papers until the finishing lime. There was a Sindhi lecturer there, a very nice man. He 
came and told me not to worry. 
I was amazed at the way they openly cheated and it reminded me of the time I was at Quaid-
e-Azam University where we used to do so much hard work, during examinations there was such 
strict control over us that it was said that not a sparrow can fly into the examination hall. And we 
used to be so afraid of the invigilators and examiners. There were very strict rules; if one got a 
supplementary, he could get only one chance to pass it and if he failed the second time, they never 
cared whether he had passed ail other tests and done his final thesis in the last semester, he was 
expelled from the University and could not be re-admitted accept under very special circumstances. 
Anyhow, the Chairman got the report of the incident and he came immediately. He said to 
me not to worry because such incidents used to happen there now and then, and that things would be 
alright. But, he added, that I should not have been so strict with the students. When the students 
finished their protest and left the premises, the Chairman called me into his office and said that I had 
been heavy handed with the students and that I should not have been so strict. He advised me to be 
lenient in future at which I got upset and I said, "Sir, I am sorry but either you do not give me 
invigilation duties or I won't tolerate cheating going on under my nose. Whatever you say, but I have 
this problem that I cannot accept such things happening in front of me. I will have to stop it. There 
was so much cheating material with the students that it covered my table. They had their notes and 
even books with them". Although they were instructed to leave notes and books outside, they stili 
brought them in, and perhaps because they were so rough, one couldn't possibly stop them. In such 
an environment, I think the Urdu-speaking students too would be doing it but I couldn't possibly 
know about them because the students I was invigilating were mostly Sindhis (the Urdu-speaking were 
a tiny minority both in Sindh University and in the districts around it). 
The Chairman said that I should take a leave for a week and go home to take rest and think. 
I left. When my (Sindhi) colleagues found that the Chairman, who was Urdu-speaking, had granted 
me a leave and that I had left for Lahore, they complained to the Vice Chancellor, a Sindhi, that I 
had just disappeared, and was not on my job, and that I had left without informing them. The Vice 
Chancellor sent me a telegram at home which said that the University administration had no idea 
about my whereabouts and that I should immediately report at my job. I was perplexed and worried 
at thèse strange events. It was the Chairman who had asked me to go on leave; how could he do this 
thing while the University administration had a différent idea about my leave? Anyway, I rushed back 
to the University only to fìnd that the teachers, my colleagues, were on a social boycott against me 
and would not talk to me. They won't answer me. I'used to go to the tea room, make tea for myself, 
and sit alone because not one of them would talk to me. 
The Chairman too was from the Urdu-speaking community but they accepted him because he 
ran the department exactly as they told him to. The lecturers used to tell him to do this and that and 
he seldom argued. I said to the Chairman, "now that the Vice Chancellor knows that I was absent 
from my job, I think I better see him in person and explain what has happened, that you allowed me 
a leave, so that he should not think that I have been neglecting my duties. He should know what 
happens here and what happens with us". The Chairman allowed me to see the Vice Chancellor. The 
Vice Chancellor was a Sindhi too. When I went to see him, he said, "Oh! so you are the person we 
have been hearing so much about. Well. Now the problem is that we have a lot of problems here. 
We cannot run this University if we confront the students head long. You will have to make 
compromises and do what other teachers and students tell you to do. You know that the whole area 
is full of arms, the students have got weapons and if you want to carry on in your way, I cannot 
provide you with an armed escort or guarantee your safety and security. It would lead us to great 
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troubles. Even when the Ministers and top politicians come to visit the University, we face great 
problems in arranging for their security. The boys here are at freedom to do whatever they want to 
do; there is no one who could possibly stop them. You will have to be very careful in future." I was 
greatly disappointed and I said I would rather resign than to compromise. He said, "you are at liberty 
to do whatever you like but please be very careful. You may stay here if you take precautions and 
do not offend others. I would advise you to avoid offending others and only then you may stay here". 
I then went to the Chairman and said to him, "if you want me to stay in this job, I might but I cannot 
let them cheat to such an extent because I remember how hard we have worked to get our degrees, 
and besides, how will things improve if we give in? How would the University benefit if we do not 
do our duties?". The Chairman just kept listening and went into a deep silence 
Finally I resigned. I gave in the resignation letter and kept waiting and waiting for a reply 
but no one would tell me if the resignation had been accepted. I later found out that the resignation 
had been accepted but they didn't tell me that because they didn't want me to leave before the end 
of the session.... When the session ended, I went to see the Chairman and asked him to allow me to 
leave. He requested me to stay for a while until all things were finalized. I said, "but everything has 
been finalized. I have even marked the papers and given you the results". He said the result I had 
made was very bad, that I had been very strict in marking the papers, and he asked me to review it 
and be lenient. He asked me to add fifteen to every student's marks and I did that. So everyone got 
upgraded by fifteen marks. I then stayed there for only four days and then left. 
I think the Vice Chancellor could have appreciated me. He could have said that what I did 
was the right thing to do, and that it should be done though no one had tried to do this so far. But 
could he provide me with the security that I would have needed? These were his words: "Do as the 
students want, because we cannot provide you with guards all the time". And this especially because 
I was living in the bachelors hostel where the students could come whenever they wanted to. 
There is a feeling among Sindhis that they have been left behind in the economic gains, and 
that they are socially and economically backward while the Mahajars (the Urdu-speaking) have got 
businesses, factories, jobs and positions in government offices because they have got education and 
so they get good jobs. One way to compete against the Mahajars is to let the Sindhi boys have as 
much degree qualifications as they can manage to get. It seems to me that the Vice Chancellor 
probably wanted a large number of Sindhi students to get their certificates regardless of whether they 
deserved or not. His aims were to help the Sindhis come up because they could not come up if merit 
system was followed strictly. 
Authoritarian and Inequality Values: Concepts of Masculinity and Strength: Authoritative. Theory X 
and Coercive Control: Obsequiousness: Inter-Personal Physical Conflict 
The following narration by a quality controller in a Pakistani factory, reveals some aspects of the sub-
continent authoritarianism linked to interpersonal physical conflict: 
Until today, we had a worker from Laiyah (a rural district well known for honour-related 
disputes and feuds). This worker is bearded and stout and often boasts that people from his region 
are well known for upholding honour (often mistaken for arrogance and a big ego). He had been with 
us for the last six months and because he was hired on the sifarish (referral) of our director of 
administration, he thought that no one could touch him (sack him). Now, because the director of 
administration got him appointed, this worker would not pay quick attention to the orders of his 
supervisors. When the shift-incharge or the supervisors ordered him to do something, he would do 
it in accordance with his temperament, that is, he would do it in his own way and in his own time 
and not rush or do the work in the docile manner typical of an average worker. Though he used to 
do his job properly and correctly, he would not like to be ordered in the coarse manner to which our 
supervisors are accustomed. Now, most workers here are hard pressed for jobs. They could be fired 
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upon the recommendations of the supervisors, and this knowledge has sunk into the minds of both 
the supervisors and the workers. The result is that most workers, in their efforts not to displease the 
supervisors, have become more than obedient in that they usually rush to do a job at the first demand 
of the supervisor though they keep begrudging and resenting the high handedness, and show their 
grudge in mutual squabbles. The supervisors know their power over the workers but they also know 
that they too could be fired if the work is not done properly and in time, and so they are tense most 
of the time, and often take their exasperation out on the workers through castigation and rebuke. 
Now this worker from Laiyah was a hard worker in that despite his so called haughtiness, 
there is a certain way to get good work out of him: For example, he has never been insolent to me 
because I did not hurt his self-esteem. I have got a lot of work out of him because I do not resort to 
tongue-lashing or instruct workers in a derogatory way or in high tones. He would not like to be 
shouted at, and if you let him keep up his bearing and be polite, he would do his work very well. If 
he was shouted at or spoken to in insulting manner such as our supervisors often do; "you owl", or 
"you donkey - do this or do that", he would be offended. During the last six months, the worker has 
had several arguments and squabbles with fellow workers and the shift-incharges. Sardar, the deputy 
manager, wrote a recommendation to the plant manager that the said worker be sacked. Many say 
that there was no need to dismiss the worker, but because Sardar has a personality clash with the 
director of administration, and because the said worker is an appointee of the said director, Sardar 
has been considered by many as rather prejudiced against the worker. The day before yesterday, the 
said worker had a fight with another worker who got his head injured. A report was made to the plant 
manager, and Sardar recommended on the report that the said worker be sacked. The plant manager 
got the due salary of the worker calculated, and was preparing the final papers when the worker 
walked in and explained that he was not responsible for the quarrel, and pleaded that he should not 
be fired. After defending his actions in vain, the worker left. When he was leaving the plant 
manager's office, he had an encounter with three men, Sardar, the deputy manager who had written 
the fatal report against him, and the assistant managers of two departments. They had just finished 
their jobs and were about to leave the factory. The three men were going upstairs to the plant 
manager's office to report that they had finished a certain job and were leaving, while the worker was 
going downstairs. One assistant manager, who usually acts as a minion to Sardar, the deputy 
manager, tried to please Sardar by being nasty to the sacked worker and said in Punjabi (a language 
considered coarser than Urdu, the polite language), "you disreputable man, why are you still hanging 
around? if you had any shame you won't show us your face". The worker had some respect for 
Sardar, the deputy manager, and had never been cross with him directly, but he considered the 
assistant manager not worthy of respect because of the latter being "a sycophant and a toady to 
Sardar". Therefore, he retorted, "you are a bootlicker and a greater disgrace than I am". This was 
the first time that this worker admitted that there was an element of disgrace in him, and he did so 
only because that the fact of being dismissed had begun to sink in his mind. But he had not yet lost 
his pride and believed that whatever disgrace he had caused himself, he had not sunk low to the level 
of the assistant manager who was a flatterer. Sardar lost his temper because the reference to his 
assistant manager being a bootlicker implied that he somehow patronized sycophancy. He thus shouted 
back, "shut-up and have some shame you (an invective which is not mentionable)". The worker had 
not been coarse to Sardar before, and had some reverence for him being a higher official and an 
educated man. He therefore pleaded to the manager's expected sense of fairness: "sir jee", he said, 
"you had a right to condemn me when I was your subordinate, but I have resigned from the job and 
I no longer work for you; you should therefore not resort to invective - show some kindness to me". 
The words, "I have resigned now", reflected the high sense of pride the worker had: Everybody knew 
that he had been sacked, but, by claiming that he had not been sacked but resigned of his own accord, 
the worker probably wanted to maintain his self-respect. Sardar interpreted this desperate appeal to 
self-respect as lying. I think that he had been seeing the worker as a cheater and as a liar, and 
therefore he was enraged, and threw a tirade of abuses at the desperate worker which made the 
worker lose all self-control. Thus, he slapped in Sardar's face so hard that his glasses went flying off 
297 
and his lips began to bleed. The 'toady' assistant manager, in order to stop the worker from hitting 
further, gave a strong blow on his neck from behind at which the worker turned towards him and 
pushed and kicked him several times. He then hit him again and again until several people rushed in 
and grabbed the worker. The worker kept shouting, "I will not spare you, I will see you ail". The 
security men took him out and calmed him. Because the worker had already been fired, there was 
little action that could be taken against him; a police report would have been in vain because by the 
time the local police could have begin to find the worker, he would already have left for Laiyah, 
which is very far from our town. 
Rafiq, another assistant manager, had once advised the said deputy manager, in my présence, 
that he being a high ranking officiai, must not come into direct contact with low ranks because he did 
not know how to deal with the common man. He told him that he must observe the hierarchical ladder 
of deputy manager to assistant manager to shift-incharge and supervisore and so on; that the managers 
in this case should not communicate with the workers and supervisore directly. If the managers would 
start talking with the workers directly, then there are several types of workers: Some are haughty and 
insolent enough to possibly insuit them. For example, this assistant manager, whom the said worker 
accused of being a toady, was once wandering on the shop floor. He saw that the thread on the 
machine of a worker, who had big moustaches, had broken. He shouted at him, "hey, your thread 
is broken; where is your mind?". The worker, because he was addressed to in a coarse manner, 
looked at him but ignored his command. The assistant manager shouted again, "are you deaf? don't 
you hear what I am saying?; get the thread fixed". The worker, right in front of ali the other workers, 
retorted by downright challenging his authority, "I can't fix it, come down and get it fixed yourself". 
The other workers began to laugh at the assistant manager being disgraced so badly. If the assistant 
manager had been wiser, he could have been polite or asked the shift-incharge or the supervisor to 
deal with the said worker; this would have kept the assistant manager's authority and control 
untarnished. Because of these officers sinking low to the level of menial and lowly workers by talking 
to them in the same vulgar manner as the workers do, most of them have lost respect which fact was 
well exhibited once when a trip of students came on a tour to the factory. There were twenty students 
and a couple of teachers. Now, our plant manager is not a professional, not even very well educated. 
He had joined the Wali Group of Industries after finishing his high school. From Wali, he went to 
Khyber Rayon and there he did his F.A. (Faculty of Arts) by studying in his spare time. Then he 
joined our organization and did his B.Sc. and since then has been promoted step by step to his présent 
high rank. In other words, he is what we cali, a 'ranker' and though he has got his degree, his tone, 
accent, gestures, and manner of speech betray his low upbringing and his coarse origins. When he 
talks, you cannot teli that he has ever received proper éducation. Now this trip of students was there 
on the shop-floor. There, in front of the spindles, we have small doors that have to be kept closed 
so that air could not come out, but many workers keep these doors open on purpose so that if the 
thread breaks, they could eie it quickly. This is not the right thing to do; the proper procedure is that 
the workers should keep the doors closed and check, after every five minutes, if the thread has 
broken. It was nine o' clock in the morning. Those twenty students were there, their teachers were 
there, and the workers were working with the doors of the spindles open. The plant manager carne 
and when he saw the said doors open, he probably thought that if the university teachers saw this, 
they would think that the plant manager was a novice, and didn't know the righi procedure. He lost 
his temper at the thought of being perceived incompétent and tried to build his self-esteem by 
showing, to the visitors, what 'great authority' he possessed over his staff. He thus called the assistant 
manager, whose name was Rifat. "Rifai", goes the plant manager in front of ali the workers, the 
students and the university teachers, "why are those doors open? If I saw those doors open again, I 
will take off your trousers and make you sit at the factory gate for everyone to have a good look". 
Rifat went red with shame but couldn't utter a word. The plant manager didn't see that he was 
disgracing the assistant manager in front of the latter's subordínales - he could have called him into 
his office and reprimanded him in privacy to keep the latter's authority on his workers unmarred. 
when ali had left, the assistant manager took out his frustration at the workers. 
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Authoritarian Values. Coercive Control, and Inter-Personal Phvsical Conflict 
An event of physical conflict and the reasons for it were reported by an Indian assistant production 
manager asfollows: 
(Our executive) was very rough with them. He used to act in a proud state of mind and had 
an authoritative style. (For such executives) they would say, "don't bring him here, it would cause 
problems" ... and one of our managers kept telling, "don't take him, don't take him, it would cause 
Problems", but they took him and it led to problems. Everyday he would tell the employées to work 
and one would say, "he touched me" and would fight back. When I had such problems, I would ask 
the supervisor, "who began the fight first", and the supervisor would say, "the executive touched him 
first" ... (a worker) grabbed hold of the executive and pushed him due to a fear of being hit first; he 
was afraid that the executive was going to hit him, and as a counter-measure, the Operator hit him 
first. I knew that the executive was doing wrong against the Operator and had to support ... the 
employée.... When the management came to know that I had supported the Operator and was not 
taking sides with the executive, I was called inside and questioned. I told them that it was the 
executive's fault. My manager started questioning me, "why you have to, we have come to know that 
you are supporting the staff against an executive". I said I was not supporting anyone, but the action 
that had led to this situation of conflict between the Operator and the executive, was wrong. I was just 
giving the facts that just because of the rough manner in which the executive handled the people, or 
his favoritism, had led to this problem. "By supporting the executive, we cannot change the facts or 
résolve the conflict. The executive has to change his attitude to change the environment. Because of 
his attitude, I am also having problems which I find very difficult to handle. If I have to handle the 
people, I want my colleague to change his way of thinking". You should have self control. I told the 
executive that he won't be able to work if he went on like that, and then it happened, and he could 
not work, and he kept saying, "I want to leave, I want to leave"... and in the last year, it carne to 
that situation ... where it was difficult for anybody to work... 
Authoritarian Values: Obsequiousness: Concepts of Masculinitv and Strength: Upper Class Privileges 
An élaboration ofthe sub-continent authoritarian values comes from a sales manager in Pakistan. 
It happened so, why I kept a moustache; . . . i t was during the very early days when I joined 
M.G. We had a very special client, Babu[6] F., he is the owner of D. Laboratories and a regular 
customer of M.G. Apart from that, he is also a movie producer and a film director. He used to make 
Punjabi films of the kind of Maula Jat and Noori Nath (films that emphasize the Punjabi concepts of 
virility, heroism, honour and feuds, thus serving or creating a cheap but popular concept of warrior-
like manhood). His character was not proper according to our social norms but acceptable for a rieh 
men. For example, he used to drink, attend to the prostitutes and dancing girls in the red light area, 
and other things. But he never kept any of his acts secret because he was a very rieh and influential 
man and not many would dare to condemn him. He used to boast openly about his alcoholism and 
prostitution in public and thought that this was how a true man should live. In fact he was a very 
[6]The word 'Babu' has two meanings; when prefixed to the name of a distinguished man, it 
reflects honour and prestige usually among the rural people or those rural people who have migrated 
and settled in the big cities, but in its derogatory sensé, a 'Babu' maybe defined as a soft speaking 
clerk in British India, educated by the British with a view, commonly believed, 'to serve as an 
obsequious pen pusher and to know the manners of the upper classes'. Many native Punjabis who 
subscribe to the Punjabi style of masculinity and pride, use this term in rather derogatory sense to 
discourage polite young men who like to wear western clothes that reflect decency. 
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entertaining and interesting personality, and as is common with these kind of people, he knew how 
to treat his guests and please them with-his stories, but such people are very blunt and out-spoken as 
well. They do not spare words in expressing their true sentiments about a person or a situation and 
may get easily offended if they, in return to their frankness and candidness, are not honoured, valued 
and entertained. When I went to see him as our valued customer and began talking politely with him 
in Urdù he expressed annoyance and said, "oh Babu, what is this? You began talking to me in Urdù? 
Can't you speak your mother tongue? talk in Punjabi -1 don't enjoy this Urdù". When I talked to him 
in Punjabi, he was pleased. When I would forget to talk in Punjabi and speak in Urdù, because I 
usually talk in Urdù, he would express irritation and prétend to be aloof, but when I spoke in Punjabi 
he was frank and open with me. To be intimate with him, my knowledge of Punjabi language and 
some cultural factors that he loved, helped a lot. When I would talk about things that interested him 
most, he used to feel pleased and say, "friend, you are really my own type". He then invited me to 
his son's wedding and entertained me very well though I was just a sales executive at that time while 
he was a very well known man. But then, because he was a rich man, he could afford to deal only 
with those who liked his style of life and his views, and ignore other people. He became a good 
friend and would place orders only when I visited him and would seldom complain. On the other 
hand, when our sales manager would visit him, Babu F. found his orthodox views, apparent from his 
beard and his usage of a language laden with religious terms, repulsive. Babu F. used to make fun 
of him while the sales manager used to flatter him which Babu F. did not like. He could teli 
sycophancy from true and genuine warmth. 
The first time I went to Babu F., I was clean shaven and I looked very young. Now I had 
gone to him as a sales executive and on business but he straight away said to me, "what is this? the 
M. G. people! what are they doing? they send a kid to talk business with me! Go back son, bring an 
eider along with you"... he had a preconceived idea, when he had looked at me, that M. G. had send 
a kid to him, and when I couldn't reply to some of his questions, he blurted out what he felt. Later, 
in the same meeting, I answered his questions, satisfied him that I was not a kid, but he stili stayed 
aloof. He was not cooperative. There were many incidents like this with other people and I realized 
the general trend that people make an impression of you the moment they see you, that your 
appearance and the way you dress counts a lot. When I began my projects ... I felt that people's 
attitude towards me was as if they were talking to a juvénile (that is why I had to keep a moustache, 
to look grown up and to be listened to). 
Patriarchal/Unitarv/Non-work Control: Favoritism: Intrigues; the Influence of Pressure Groups/ 
Political Clout on Employment Practice; the Inter-play between Patriarchal Values & Légal Provisions 
The following was narrated by a head master, about the times when he was a school teacher: 
Among the privilèges and benefits which the favourite teachers could get from the head master 
were, relaxation in teaching hours, the casual periods that used to corne up were shared unequally, 
when there were suggestions asked for in the day to day administration of the school, the favourite 
teachers were listened to more than the others. The group of disfavoured teachers used to keep the 
DEO (district éducation offîcer) informed about the indecorous acts, or what they thought was morally 
improper on the part of the head master. They would also bring the said things into the notice of the 
teachers, the public through news papers, and also make the students realize the same in such a way 
that they could not singly be pointed out and victimized. 
When the élections of the Teachers Association came up, the head master wanted that a 
candidate from his favourite group should get elected. He thought that if his favourite teacher got 
elected, it would mean that administration would be done as he wanted and there would not arise 
unwanted demands from the Teachers Association. To get his candidate elected, he began exploiting 
the teachers. The teachers are basically very weak in front of the administration. They cannot afford 
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to be bold enough to refuse the demands of the head master because the head master is the one who 
writes their ACRs (annual confidential reports), he allots periods to them, he sanctions their leaves, 
he can recommend to the Director of Education that a certain teacher be transferred. He can create 
a number of problems for the teachers. To add to it, he himself was the presiding officer on the 
polling day. He was to get the ballot-papers polled. He and his favourite teachers sat together and 
made a plan as to how the votes would be casted and how they would defeat our candidate in the 
élections. We were confident of our victory because we had campaigned as much as we could, and 
the majority of teachers favoured us. We had calculated because we knew, in most cases, who would 
vote for whom. 
When I went to cast my vote, the polling was close to an end and about six votes were left 
to be casted. I saw that the ballot paper which they gave me had a serial number on it, which act was 
grossly undemocratic because, when you issue the ballot paper with a serial number, anyone among 
the polling staff could write down the name of the person to whom they gave the ballot paper with 
such and such serial number. You can find out who voted for whom because they had a voters list 
as well which too had serial numbers. And they were doing so to put pressure on the teachers that 
the head master was going to find out who listened to him and voted for his candidate and who did 
not. When I saw this happening, I protested in front of the head master and the polling was stopped. 
We said we had no confidence in such an élection where the secrecy of votes was not maintained. The 
DEO carne in and he conducted the rest of the polling. The serial numbers were there and could not 
be erased, but he stopped that practice of noting down to whom a certain ballot paper was issued. A 
lot of hot words were exchanged, we protested, but when the results were announced, it was found 
that both candidates had secured an equal number of votes. The solution they found was to toss a 
coin. Our candidate lost the élection. Düring the time we were protesting on the use of unfair methods 
in polling, the head master lost his temper and said that he did not accept us as "my teachers" (note 
the assumption of loyalty from the subordinate staff expressed in the words, "my teachers"). We said, 
ali right, we are teachers at the school, not his personal staff, and we would carry on doing our 
duties. When the détails of the events of the élection were reported in the news papers, he made it 
a personal issue, a matter of honour, and he called in the President of the Head Masters Association 
to contemplate taking action against us. On our part, we called in our leaders in the Teachers 
Association. But after one week, four teachers from our group, including me, were transferred from 
that school. When the transfer orders carne from the Directorate of Education, we found that we had 
been transferred to four différent locations far from our homes. We protested a lot and got the 
transfers canceled once. But hardly had we heaved a sigh of relief that the transfer orders were sent 
again. We appealed to the Minister of Education, and then to the Chief Minister and the Governor, 
that we were being victimized on politicai grounds and that we sought their interférence. A big 
conflict arose because of the politicization of the issue so much so that in the concerned offices of the 
government, the concerned officers and politicians could be divided into two groups; those who 
favoured us as being victimized without offense, and those who favoured the head master and the 
Head Masters Association as being morally right in seeking to control the "unruly teachers in our 
educational institutions". When our appeal was presented to the Ministerial Cabinet, for discussion, 
the Cabinet too got divided into two groups so that the Minister of Education supported the case of 
the head master because he did not want to lose support of the Head Masters Association, and 
therefore the Secretary of Education too supported the head master. The Governor of the province 
supported our group - then known as the aggrieved group. The Governor supported our case because 
a few relatives of the other teachers (who had been transferred along with me) were politically 
influential and had contacts with some Ministers who lobbied for the Governor in the Provincial 
Assembly. These Ministers had asked the Governor to favour the aggrieved teachers. They began a 
long inquiry into the matter which took six months. Düring thèse six months, several times the 
transfer orders were despatched to us and then canceled: The Minister of Education would get us 
transferred, my fellow teachers would rush to their relatives and then some influential politicians 
would pressurize the said Minister and get the orders canceled. At this, the head master would use 
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his influence to get us transferred again, and so on. 
When the Cabinet was divided into two groups, when several teachers began to protest, and 
a major issue was made, the only way they could résolve the issue was to start an inquiry. The 
Minister of Education issued the Orders and the Director of Education was sent for the inquiry. It was 
a one-man-probe. The Director spent seven days at our school during which time he interviewed 
many among the staff. We couldn't find out what he wrote and what allégations were made against 
us. But the benefit of the inquiry was that all the other allégations against the head master were 
brought to surface; allégations such as misappropriation of funds, partiality in sending admission 
forms of students for the BSHE (Board of Secondary and Higher Education) examinations. The 
Secondary School Certificate examinations are conducted by the BSHE and only those students are 
allowed to appear in this examination whose admission forms are approved and endorsed by the head 
masters of their schools. The head masters try to stop those students, from appearing in the 
examination, whose chances of success are the least, because a higher failure ratio reflects badly on 
the performance of the school administration and the teaching staff, for which mainly the head master 
is held responsible. Normally the admission forms of those students are sent to the Board who take 
33 percent marks in the school internai examinations. This is the criterion. If you send the forms of 
some of those students, who have secured below 33 percent marks, and do not endorse the forms of 
some others who have secured similar marks, on the basis of nepotism or relationships with their 
relatives, then this is partiality and favoritism. So thèse allégations against the head master were 
made. Then there was a serious politicai case made against the head master: When D.M. had become 
the Governor of our province, he had issued Orders that in ail schools the 'slogans of our nation' 
should be written either on walls or on boards fixed on the school walls. Now, in between the two 
periods of the D.M. rule, the People's Party had taken over, during which period the school 
administration, feeling scant need for the slogan boards on the wall, had taken off a certain board and 
put it in a store room which in fact was not a store room but the collective toilets of the students 
turned into a store. When the Director of Education asked some teachers to file their grievances, they 
tried to score a 'major politicai point' against the head master, by appealing to the pro-government 
sentiments of the Director by telling that the contempt of the head master for the government was 
obvious from his haughty acts; that the 'sacred' board hearing the 'slogan of our nation' had been 
"thrown away in the toilets"[7]. When we heard this, we too picked upon this issue because we were 
in a war which we couldn't afford to lose. Though the whole issue of the slogan board was ludicrous, 
it nevertheless shows what kind of loyalties people show in order to win a battle. And many knew 
that if the Governor heard about the 'disdain' of the head master for the 'sacred slogan board', he 
would not spare the head master. In such cases, all parties involved claim that they are more loyal 
to the présent government than their opponents are, and try to win the sympathies of the higher 
authorities. Because our opponents claimed to be faithful to the Ideology of the State and its rulers, 
we had to claim that we were even greater servants of the same cause, because once you accept what 
you are, you have lost the battle and you are out of the establishment. The conflict was publicized 
to such an extent that interested teachers ali over the province used to talk about the 'battle' and were 
divided into two groups supporting either the transferred teachers or the head master. The Teachers 
Union too was split on the issue. The President of the Teachers Union did not favour us because 
during the élections we had campaigned for his rivai candidate who, though he had lost the élections, 
did use his influence among teachers to create support for us. 
The hierarchy of the administration in the Education Department had some internai conflicts 
amongst themselves. For example, the Secretary of Education and the Director of Education had a 
personal rift between them. The Director did not like the Secretary, and because the Secretary was 
[7]Note that the State Ideology, called the 'Two Nations Theory', which says that Muslims and 
non-Muslims form two separate and distinct nations all over the world, however absurd, is considered 
very sacred in general, so that various legai and social penalties are imposed for lack of respect for 
the said Ideology. 
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against us, we round a soft corner in the Director who, luckily, was the sole conductor of the inquiry. 
The Secretary supported the head master and therefore we hoped that the Director would report the 
whole matter in an objective and impartial manner and write the facts as they were. The inquiry 
resulted in a compromise, a kind of patch up. It was decided that the teachers would be transferred, 
but they would not be sent to schools far off from their homes, but to schools within the limits of the 
local Municipal Committee. We agreed to this décision because this was the best possible resuit we 
could hope for in view that the head master had greater politicai clout than we had. 
The Influence of Pressure Groups on Emplovment Practice; Personality Clashes: the Inter-play 
between Patriarchy & Legal Provisions, Ineffectiveness of Rules/Orders. Sifarish (Politicai Contacts) 
The following was narratedby a lecturer: 
Legally, I should be transferred to the town where my wife is teaching; there is a rule which 
says that a husband and wife should be posted to one station. But transfers are not made according 
to rules, and I know this, and therefore when I wanted to get transferred, I did not start my case from 
the Directorate of Education. I did not launch a request at the Directorate that under such and such 
clause of the service rules, I should be transferred, because I know that they would find some other 
clause to keep me where I am. Because I am not in the fundamental ist group of Jamaat-e-Islami to 
which the Director of Education belongs, it will be hard for me to get transferred. Secondly, it is a 
big problem to have a conscience and to worry about the state of affairs of your country, because, 
when I.say to someone that the appointment of the Director of Education was illegally done, it 
reaches his ears somehow and he then develops hostility towards me. I know that he is hostile towards 
me and therefore he is not going to transfer me upon my request. Day before yesterday, I met the 
President of the College Teachers Association, who told me that I won't get transferred unless I meet 
the Director of Education and ensure him that I support his appointment as Director of Education. 
My interest is to get transferred, his interest is to stay the Director of Education. Now I have to go 
to him and ensure him that I would not talk against his interests. But there are some problems of 
conscience, or you may call it an ego problem if you don't want to give me the credit of having a 
conscience. I don't want to go to him and say that he has a right to be the Director of Education. I 
therefore approached the Chief Minister through my relatives and friends who are close to him. We 
call it politicai approach. There is an ex-MPA (Member of the Provincial Assembly) who is my 
relative under the 'braadri' net-work (genealogical clan system) and I have asked him to get me 
transferred. There is no other way. The Chief Minister has to keep influential parliamentarians happy 
in order to get their support. It is a net work of power games. So I went to this relative of mine who 
got the Chief Minister to write on my application that I should be transferred. The Chief Minister has 
also got it noted down to his personal secretary that he should get the job done. 
However, I still have some doubts. The doubts are that the Chief Minister is pressurized daily 
by dignitaries to write, to recommend, and to do this or that. He issues several instructions everyday, 
like the one issued for me, but for the administration, that is, the Secrétariat or the Directorate, it is 
not possible to make ail recommended transfers. So they take the orders of the Chief Minister Iightly. 
If they pay no heed to the Chief Minister's orders, there is little one can do. The Chief Minister has 
no time to peruse every petty order and ask if orders have been obeyed or not. No one is going to 
ask if an action has been taken on the Chief Minister's orders. If I do not peruse my case, the order 
will stay in the pipe line and no one will bother about it. So I will have to follow my file step by step 
to whichever office it is sent. 
303 
Control on Personal Beliefs/Values: Non-Work Conflict: Imposition of a Unitarv View of Culture: 
Authoritarianism: Penalties for Non-Conformers: Intrigues: Politicai Influence in Emplovment 
Practice 
When I was appointed a teacher at the P. School, my réputation or rumors, whatever you 
cali them, of being a liberal and a 'dehria' (those who refuse to accept the supremacy of Islamic 
thought over other) had spread in anticipation among the teachers. Many teachers and the head 
master were keen to prove that I was a non-believer. Therefore, they made a special lime table 
for me: I was to teach Islamic Studies (compulsory) to the ninth and the tenth class and then I was 
to teach Islamic Studies (optional) to the same classes. Thèse were not my subjects at the 
University, but four periods of Islamic Studies were given to me and on top of that I was to teach 
Pakistan Studies as well. They gave thèse subjects to me because they suspected that I was not 
much of a subscriber to the 'Two Nations Doctrine' (the said doctrine, that Muslims and non-
Muslims forni two distinct and separate nations, led to the formation of the Islamic State), and did 
not show high révérence for the Father of the Nation. By giving me subjects where sometimes, 
they thought, by a slip of tongue, I would reveal my lack of faith in Islam and the need for the 
Islamic State, they expected that I would provide évidence against myself, thereby giving them 
excuse to get me expelled. Contrary to their expectations, that I would object to teaching subjects 
that were not relevant to my qualifications, I didn't object to the time table, at which they decided 
that I should also be given the periods of ldaras\ that I was to give sermons as well. It was the 
daily morning sermon. Ali classes begin their daily studies by reciting from the Quran in the first 
period which is called the religious studies period. I then said that I was not an Islamyat teacher, 
that I had never had a degree in Islamyat. How could they throw ali Islamic studies periods and 
sermons at me? So they abstained from allotting me the sermons. I carefully avoided conflict on 
religious issues but conflict arose on other issues. There were some différences with the head 
master and his administration because there were a few incidents on which we had to take a moral 
stand. One incident was this: There was a wing of our school building where the walls and the 
roof had not been plastered. There were no funds for that and the wing was not usable. We 
motivated the students and launched a scheme called 'help yourselves'. The students collected 
some funds and bought sand, cernent etc. They also provided labour because we could not pay for 
labour wages. There were ten or twelve rooms in that wing which our students plastered 
themselves and, to motivate them, we gave it the shape of a compétition. We announced that the 
class which would be rated first in this compétition of work, would have the honour of winning 
a cup and some prizes. I said to the head master that the way the compétition had been designed 
was not fair because there they had included a finished building in this work which only required 
a white wash and fixing of some charts on the walls. On the other hand, the unfinished building 
required a lot of plastering job and so more funds had to be raised by the classes which were 
allotted the unfinished building to work on. More over, the work being done in the unfinished 
building had been allotted to the junior classes, that is, younger kids were working riarder and 
collecting more funds only to compete against elder students who had lesser work and little need 
for funds. I said to the head master that it was not a just compétition. To do justice we should 
divide the compétition into two parts: One compétition among the senior classes who were working 
in the finished building, and another compétition among the junior classes who were working in 
the unfinished building and collecting more donations because they needed more money and 
labour. Such an arrangement would be fair and just, but the head master and three senior teachers, 
who were closer to the him, did not accept my suggestions. When the students had finished the 
work, judges were called in from outside. The judges were the DEO (District Education Officer), 
a retired Divisionai Director, and a senior teacher. The criteria that they developed for the 
évaluation of work were prepared by the form teachers who had been supervising the work, were 
involved in the compétition, and were in charge of the classes that made the efforts to finish and 
decorate the class rooms. The irony of the situation is that the list of items to be marked were 
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things like, 10 marks if there was a plaque outside the class room telling which class it was, 10 
marks for a chart saying 'WELCOME' in front of the entry door, 10 marks for a chart saying 
'FAREWELL' which should be visible to the evaluating judges when leaving a room, 10 marks 
for cleanliness etc. It was gross injustice in that the real hard work of collecting donations and the 
physical labour of plastering the walls with cernent, which young kids had done without any 
training, had been ali ignored. Finally, the three sections of the tenth class, the elder-most boys, 
who had done the least hard work but were adept at putting charts, were given the first, the second 
and the third positions. The judges had their tea and snacks and the junior kids and their teachers, 
who had been labouring very hard for the past several months, felt cheated and demoralized. At 
this I protested verbally, and spoke in the staff meeting. 
The above mentioned incident, of the majority of teachers taking the question of justice 
and fairness lightly in a school, a very socially significant place, is just one small incident. There 
were many incidents of this nature in the school and it went on so that finally I was dubbed a 
'politicai agitator' by the head master, and reports were sent against me to the higher authorities. 
The conflict arose when I had already applied to be promoted to the post of a head master. I had 
already appeared in the Public Service Commission tests and interviews and the PSC (Public 
Service Commission) had sent its recommendations to the government for my promotion to be a 
head master. The Minister of Education had recommended that I be appointed head master in a 
school in the district of K.. When the conflict arose, our head master tried to get the 
recommendati on of the Minister of Education, in favour of my promotion, cancelled. The 
Secretary of Education turned against me when he was told by the head master that I was an 
atheist. But the government, by law, is not authorized to ignore the recommendations of the PSC 
(Public Service Commission), and the irony of the matter is that the Secretary of Education himself 
was a member, as a subject specialist, of that Sélection Board of the PSC which had recommended 
my appointment. I had stood first among the candidates and hence there was no way he could stop 
me. When the recommendations came from the Minister of Education, though the Secretary could 
not stop me from being appointed a head master, he could and he did change the location and the 
school where I was to be posted. I had already received a notification of appointment about my 
new posting but he sent a cancellation and then issued a new order which stated that I was 
appointed head master in that God forsaken place, the last border town in the mountains. He could 
not stop my appointment but he could punish by sending me to the last corner of the country. I 
appealed to the Governor against my appointment to that God forsaken place, and when he asked 
the Secretary of Education why a man from town M . was posted in the remotest corner of district 
R., the Secretary said to him that I was a non-believer and a communist and whatever allégations 
he could raise against me, whereupon the Governor said, "look imo the matter" and then forgot 
about me. The Secretary of Education got so angry at my going to the Governor that when 
Naseem, my brother, appeared in the Public Service Commission, though he had stood first in the 
written examination, the said Secretary failed him in the interview. The Secretary of Education 
was on the interviewing panel. Naseem had stood first in the written state competitive 
examinations for civil servants. It happened like this: There are fifty percent marks for the 
candidate's académie career, and from among the remaining fifty percent, sixty percent are for the 
relevant subject and forty percent for one's knowledge in Islamic studies and general knowledge. 
If one fails the sixty percent relevant subject marks, he is considered totally failed. Because the 
Secretary of Education was the subject specialist, he had the powers to pass or fail a candidate. 
The irony is that Naseem was already working as a section officer in the Ministry of Education 
under the very nose of the Secretary of Education, and that is why the Secretary knew that he was 
my brother and so he took revenge from him. Naseem could have been appointed an assistant 
commissioner had he cleared the PSC interview. That is why he worked hard and stood first in 
the PSC examination for ACs (assistant commissioners), ASPs (assistant Superintendent police) and 
SOs (section officers). He also appeared in the PSC examination for tehseeldars (land record and 
revenue officers) and secured the first position among 65 candidates. That is, he secured first 
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positions in both written examinations. After the former PSC examination, he was failed in the 
interview by the Secretary of Education. After the latter PSC examination, he was interviewed by 
a Selection Board which comprised members not including the said Secretary and so he passed and 
was subsequently appointed a revenue officer. This shows that it was only the Secretary who 
sought to spoil his career, only because he was my brother. 
I was transferred to the remote mountains, to one of the most remote villages where life 
is led much in the same way as it was many centuries ago. There are no roads, modern transport 
and electricity, and one can reach there only after a two days journey from the capital, and that 
only in summers. In winters, the mountains are covered with snow for around six months during 
which season, there are risks of famine and disease due to inaccessibility to the region. I worked 
there for two years after which I was posted to an even worst station called K. This village too 
is close to the Indian border (villages close to the Indian border are generally considered at risk 
of being caught up in skirmishes between military personnel on the two sides). Meanwhile, I kept 
trying to get transferred to some reasonable station, but the Secretary of Education kept sending 
the recommendations of the Minister of Education back on one or the other pretext. I once got 
recommended to be posted near my home town but he dropped the recommendations. He even 
ignored the orders of the Chief Minister. At that time, all transfers of officers of grade 17 and 
above were to be ordered by the Chief Minister but now, the Ministers have been delegated the 
powers to transfer officers of grade 17 and 18. Above these, the orders are to be issued by the 
Chief Minister. To defy the orders of the Chief Minister, the Secretary used to write back that the 
said officer is badly required at the station where he is currently posted, or that under the service 
rules the said officer cannot yet be transferred, or that the service period of the said officer in the 
capacity of grade 17 is too short to entitle him to a transfer, or that there are more senior officers 
waiting to get transferred, etc. He could make many excuses to stop the implementation of orders 
from Minister and the Chief Minister: Secretaries in government departments are relied upon by 
Ministers and the Chief Minister in that while the latter could be good politicians, they do not 
make claims of knowing such things as service rules and regulations. The Chief Minister's orders 
could be challenged in the High Court and the Supreme Court in which case it is the secretaries 
on whose legal expertise the politicians depend. Thus the secretaries can acquire enormous powers 
as experts in the ways governments should legally function. 
When the government changed, and Peoples' Party took over, I found enough political 
contacts with comparatively liberal leaders to be able to get transferred into the very heart of the 
state administration, the Civil Secretariat in the capital. To get my orders of deputation 
implemented, I wanted to find a channel of hierarchies so that my orders should not be sent 
through the Education Department, because I was afraid that the said Secretary of Education might 
create problems for me. Transfers within the Secretariat are done by the Services and General 
Administration Department. The orders issuing authority lies with the Chief Minister but the 
notifications are issued by the Services and General Administration Department which functions 
as a kind of services controlling department. I wanted the orders to be issued by the Services and 
General Administration Department so that once I get my orders, I would go and join the 
Secretariat Education Department and then the said Secretary of Education won't be in a position 
to stop me. I could then work in his office and work in proximity to him as I had build this desire 
in myself to study what kind of a man he was who had put me into such a long trouble without 
even ever meeting me once. But I couldn't get the orders issued because the said Secretary found 
out that I was being sent to his department and he rang up the Secretary of Services and General 
Administration and said, "if you send this man to my department, I would be 'sandwiched' 
between these two brothers; one is already the section officer for colleges, and the other would 
be the section officer for schools", and so my orders were stopped in the Services and General 
Administration Department. The Secretary of Services and General Administration sent my file 
back to the Chief Minister's Secretariat with remarks that instead of deputing me to the Education 
Department, I should be deputed as a section officer to the Services and General Administration. 
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Control on Personal Beliefs/Values: Non-Work Conflict: Imposition of a Unitarv View of Culture: 
Authoritarianism: Penalties for Non-Conformers: Intrigues: Politicai Influence in Emplovment 
Practice; Student Unions Associated with Politicai Parties 
I began in 1975 as a lecturer in D. College. At that time, People's Party was ruling the 
country and there was a common social and politicai conflict between the left-progressive people 
and the rightist-fundamentalist forces. You could feel the conflict with greater force in the 
educational institutions. There were several Student organizations. The leftist parties were NSF 
(Nationalist Students Fédération), the PSF (Peoples Students Fédération is a student section of the 
Peoples Party), NSO (Nationalist Students Organization). The rightist organizations were the 
Islami Jammiat-e-Tulba (follows the Jamaat-e-IsIami), and the MSF (Muslim Students Fédération 
which follows the Muslim League) which appeared much later. When it was time for the élections 
of the students union, the teachers had to play some kind of roles in there because if you are a 
liberal teacher and the Jammiat wins the control of the students union, you could find yourself in 
big trouble in the class room. There used to be many conflicts among students, among teachers, 
and between students and teachers, on the questions of their social and politicai beliefs and on the 
issue of élections. All thèse conflicts used to create an environment of fear. For example if the 
Principal of the college reports to the Directorate of Education that a certain lecturer has non-
conformist views, it is enough ground for the government to sack the lecturer. A situation in 
which such a report could be sent against you arose often in those days. For example, my fear was 
at peak when, perhaps in 1978, the élections of the students union were being held, and the verbal 
and physical conflict between the left-wing students and the fundamentalists often used to break 
out. The lecturers too had some involvement in students conflicts and therefore the two most 
fundamental ist lecturers sent a complaint against me to the Director of Education that I held left-
wing views and that I spread thèse views among students. The Director at that time was a man 
with liberal views and so he didn't take any action against me, and dumped the complaint, but if 
it had been a différent man, I could get kicked out of the service. These conflicts still go on but 
we have now learned the tactics to survive in our jobs. 
A conflict arose on the issue of my promotion. The Secretary of Education did not want 
me get the promotion. I was teaching at A. P. College those days and I have an impression that 
he said to the Principal to write one adverse ACR (annual confidential report) about me. The 
Principal wrote in my ACR, "an average performer but none of his students passed this year: Zero 
pass percentage". This was written in such a haste that the Principal forgot to check that I had 
been transferred to his college when this class, with zero pass percentage, had only three months 
to go for the examinations. By the Service Rules, the credit of the resuit of a class, good or bad, 
could be attributed to a lecturer only if he had taught that class for a minimum period of six 
months. At that time I didn't know that one adverse ACR could have so much bad effect on one's 
career and because my previous ACRs were all good or average, I didn't bother much about the 
adverse one. But because the Secretary of Education was resolute that he won't let me have my 
promotion, when he sent my case to the Minister of Education, he wrote the following statement: 
"In our God blessed Islamic State, we should not employ lecturers with views such as those he 
cherishes: The question of promoting him does not arise". So what he did, he used this ACR with 
adverse remarks, and he found that in 1978, in 1980 and in 1987, my ACRs said 'average' about 
me, and so he attached only those ACRs with his letter to the Minister of Education, concluding 
on the basis of the enclosed ACRs that my performance was not adequate. No one among the 
concerned officers of the Education Department paid attention to the fact that my ACRs, other than 
those ACRs that were enclosed with the letter to the Minister of Education, were ali good, that 
is, above average. And on top of it, he went so far in his préjudice against me that he broke 
another service rule which says that while evaluating a man for promotion, you have to see his 
last Ave year record and not the record before that; he did not care that the ACRs of 1978 and 
1980 had been written nine and seven years ago, in other words, he selected the four worst ACRs 
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from among a list of last eleven years ACRs and attached them in support of his claim. He 
succeeded in stopping my promotion the first time it was due. I was to be promoted from lecturer 
to assistant professor. I appealed to the Chief Minister that the ACR for 1978 should not be 
counted in évaluation because that was written a long time back. Then I checked my personal file 
at the Education Department and found that my ACR for 1982 had been tempered with and though 
it was better than 'average', they had made it look like 'average'. When the Chief Minister sent 
my case to the Chief Secretary for considération, I went to the Chief Secretary and told him that 
the Secretary had lied about the 1982 ACR. At first the Chief Secretary would not accept that such 
a thing was possible, that such a high ranking officer would temper with a lecturer's ACR, but 
when I stressed that he should call for my file and check it, he called for the record to be brought 
in. When the record was called in, the Secretary of Education found no way out because he had 
to send all my ACRs which would prove that only two years 'average' ACRs were valid and a 
third had been tempered with. To justify his partial treatment of my case, he attached a note 
written to the Chief Secretary saying that the lecturer in considération was a communist and 
therefore, ideologically, he couldn't be promoted. Thus, he gave a new twist to his arguments 
(knowing that in those days of General Zia's regime, with Afghan war going on and the Russian 
troops close to Pakistani borders, the allégation of being a communist was nothing but horrifying) 
and gave a moral dimension to his partiality. However, to cut the matter short, his allégation was 
not believed in. The Chief Minister accepted my appeal and I got my promotion from the date it 
was due. The officer who was asked to write a report after an inquiry on the issue, wrote that the 
promotion had been stopped on insufficient grounds. However, it took me nine years to get my 
right. The first time my case was sent to the Directorate in 1989. Then I had to go to the Chief 
Minister, to the Chief Secretary, and there is a long list of intermediary funetionaries and offices. 
Nepotism and Intrigues in Hiring and Promotion, the Conséquent Unhealthv Compétition for Jobs 
and Positions: Incompétence: Pseudo Organizations in International Development Proiects 
The following was narrateci by a former section officer in the Ministry of Education: 
The World Bank has given some aid, called matching grant, to our government. Matching 
grant is that if in a certain project we are using 40 percent local resources out of the total project 
cost, then they would supply the rest of 60 percent funds. There is a Health and Sanitation Project 
of one billion rupees that would take eight years to completion. It is a project for those areas 
which do not yet have clean water supply Systems. Under this World Bank grant, health educators 
were to be employed. A certain criteria was given for the sélection of health educators. There is 
a complete feasibility study of the project and an annual development program under which thèse 
vacancies were created and people were to be employed. There were criteria made for monitoring 
and évaluation of the work that was to be done. The financing agency keeps evaluating how much 
of the target has been achieved. Now, the people being hired were taken in without following the 
recommended criteria and proper sélection procédures. Hence the required results could not be 
produced, the objectives remain unachieved but on paper. The Ministers want people to be hired 
on the basis of their politicai needs of pleasing their supporters, thus employing their relatives. 
Healthy compétition cannot exist in such environment. People affiliated with the ruling party have 
to be given employment. The department which is entrusted with the task of making recruitment 
and sélection rules and determining person-specifications and qualification for différent posts to 
be filled, keeps the person-specification and qualifications as vague as possible so that the politicai 
allies and relatives could be hired, and this leads to having a workforce unable and incapable of 
achieving the organizational objectives. The person-specifications are made obscure so that they 
could hire their men who may not otherwise meet the criteria if genuine spécifications were made. 
The concerned top officiais of the Ministry of Local Government, under whose supervision 
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this project has been launched, created two posts for health educators which were grade 18 posts 
(equivalent to the post of an assistant professor in the educational institutions). One was to be filled 
in from within the department because they wanted to promote a certain officer and therefore did 
not stipulate high qualifications, because when there are people who have put in a certain length 
of service and deserve promotion, they would be promoted regardless of whether they have a 
Graduation or less. If an officer is in grade 17 and may be promoted to grade 18 for the length 
of his service, has less qualifications than would be required from a fresh grade 18 candidate, he 
can still be promoted to grade 18. These are the Service Rules. For the second health educator 
who was to be recruited externally, they advertised that the required qualifications were a masters 
degree in social sciences. Now, social sciences include several subjects such as political science, 
economics, history, psychology, sociology, social work, anthropology, business administration, 
public administration, etc. There are about twenty-four subjects that are deemed as being social 
sciences. The term 'social sciences' did not clarify whether they would be willing to hire one with 
a masters degree in Islamic studies or in economics. Keeping in view the job description of a 
health educator, a candidate with a masters in social work or in sociology would be appropriate. 
They could even ask for one who had masters in psychology or in education because, the job 
required educating people in community heath and sanitation aspects. But they used this vague 
term 'social sciences' in the job advertisement and thus involved a very large number of subjects. 
Their purpose in doing this, as we found later, was to establish the candidature of a certain official 
already working in the Local Government Department. This official was in grade 17 and had a 
masters degree in statistics and, therefore, they included statistics as being among social sciences 
and accepted his application for consideration. They wanted to make him eligible to apply for the 
post of a health educator. When the job was advertised, I applied for it because I had masters 
degrees in social work as well as in education. There were several external candidates because of 
whom an easy selection of this favourite candidate was not possible. When they were to issue call 
letters for interviews, they, in their efforts to exclude many from entering into competition, played 
another absurd trick: They determined that social work, sociology, and business administration 
could not be called social sciences and hence candidates having degrees in these subjects were not 
considered eligible for the said post. Incidently, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Local 
Government, who was to sit in the Selection Board, had a MBA and he took offence at this 
trickery. He declared that if business administration was not a social science, then no other subject 
could logically be called a social science. Therefore, he issued call letters to all candidates who 
had a degree in any of the social sciences. We went for the interviews which were conducted by 
a special Selection Board which is different from the Public Service Commission in that it is an 
internal Selection Board of the Ministry of Local Government. This Board comprises the 
Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Director of the Local Government Department, a senior 
officer from the Planning and Development Division and a few other members. The candidate with 
masters in statistics also appeared for the interview and because it had been mutually agreed within 
his department, the Local Government Department, that he will be appointed, they placed him on 
top position while I got the second position though I thought that I was the most suitable person 
for this job, that I had all the right qualifications which he did not have, and I had done very well 
in the interview as well. My qualifications in social work and education were the most relevant 
and I am the only one in the Civil Secretariat with a combination of all relevant qualifications. 
When I found that they had selected their favourite candidate, I appealed for a review saying that 
statistics could not be placed among social sciences. I appealed to the Chairman of the same 
Selection Board which had interviewed me. The candidate who was selected was so influential that 
he got a letter from the Director of Education saying that statistics was a social science, another 
letter from the Registrar of the A. K. University to the same effect, and a third similar letter from 
the Public Service Commission. Now you know that all universities are controlled by the UGC 
(Universities Grants Commission) and it is the prerogative of the UGC to determine what was the 
right classification of various subjects, which degree was equivalent to which one, and all these 
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matters of categorization. I knew that in 1984, the UGC had given a décision saying that statistics 
was classified among natural, pure, or physical sciences and not among social sciences. I presented 
this décision of the UGC to the Chairman of the aforementioned Sélection Board but the successful 
candidate apparently approached the Director of Académies at the UGC and brought a letter saying 
that statistics was a social science but, when I looked at that letter, I thought it was a dubious 
looking letter. I said to him that I was prepared to take this matter to the court and there they 
would find out that the latter was fake, at which he withdrew this letter which he had claimed was 
issued by the UGC. He got so afraid that he wrote to the Sélection Board that the letter from UGC 
which he had given earlier to the Board, should be considered null and void because he had been 
issued a second letter. I got an officiai letter written by the UGC to the Registrar of A. K. 
University (because the UGC would not write a letter to the Ministry of Local Administration 
directly, which Ministry it thought had nothing to do with the UGC) that statistics did not fall 
among social sciences. The Registrar wrote them back asking to confirm that they had sent him 
that letter (for fear that it could be fake) and when he reeeived the confirmation, he too wrote to 
the Sélection Board saying that his earlier letter should be deemed cancelled and that statistics was 
not classified among social sciences but among natural or physical sciences. I took this letter to 
the Public Service Commission and the Director of Education who then withdrew the letters they 
had issued earlier to the Sélection Board. All letters were withdrawn and yet the Sélection Board 
remained adamant that their favourite man should be appointed. Thus, they sent their 
recommendations for appointment to the Minister of Local Government. When I found this, I filed 
a pétition in the High Court that injustice had been done to me by the said Sélection Board, that 
I had the qualifications which were sought in the job advertisement but they were appointing a 
candidate who didn*t have the required qualifications. The Court has been giving us dates for the 
last two years and has not yet reached a décision. A couple of months ago, the Local Government 
Department advertised the same post again stipulating the same required qualifications and 
expérience as before. I wrote to them that until the décision of the High Court, they cannot 
advertise this post and seek fresh applicants. They withdrew their advertisement but they played 
another trick: They have written to their Sélection Board that we need a health educator badly and 
therefore that man, their favourite man, should be appointed. And this they are doing despite the 
knowledge that the matter is in the High Court. The irony of this situation is that the man was so 
influential that he got three highly responsible men (a Registrar of a University, a member of the 
Public Service Commission and the Director of Education), representing three prestigious 
institutions, to write a statement which they knew was false. 
In the High Court, during the first hearing, there was only one Judge présent. After the 
hearing, he didn't give a décision but said that this needed the présence of the full bench which 
normally consists, in such cases, of three Judges. When there were three Judges, ali the hearing 
was redone, all the things were repeated and this took five months. The date for décision was 
given but on that date they postponed the proclamation of the décision and while we were waiting 
for a new date to be given for the pronouncement of the décision, it was discovered that one of 
the three Judges had been retired. This Judge was expecting retirement but he didn't include it in 
his case hearing schedule. Now the previous panel of Judges is said to be incomplete and therefore 
a new panel has been formed which means that the trial shall start from the Scratch and we shall 
be going again through the same procedure, that we have been through twice earlier. 
Nepotism. Regionalism and Favoritism in Emplovment Practice; the Significance of Lovalty 
The following was reported by a geophysicist in the OH and Gas Development Corporation: 
It happens at times, and it amazes me, that if someone in the department is from the town 
C , you later find that someone else too is from the same area, and later you discover that the two 
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are related to each other. For example, 1 had worked in Pakistan Petroleum Limited and I knew 
an accounts officer there for two years and, after four years since I left the company, I met that 
accounts officer somewhere. He told me, to my utter amazement, that a certain manager in the 
said company was his uncle. They had never mentioned this to me when I was with them for two 
years. Now, I know, that the accounts officer was not able enough to find his way himself in the 
company and you put two and two together. Similar things happen in our company and I feel 
surprised when I find that, for example, X is the brother of Y and that they had never told this 
to me before but casually, just during conversation, it slips out of the man's mouth or some 
reason compels him to tell. Then you find someone is someone's uncle, that two or even three 
brothers are working in the same Organization (there used to be a mie in the Employaient 
Legislation for state companies that relatives could not be hired and, in the application forms, you 
had to fili if you had any relatives working for the Organization you applied in). You find cousins 
and brothers working in a department you know and that tells you about regionalism or nepotism. 
A geophysicist has recently been promoted to the post of Senior Geophysicist as a special 
case, that is, he superseded about ten or twelve people due for promotion. None among his batch 
have been promoted and it is commonly known that he was promoted because he spends more time 
with the Chief and is very close to him. The Chief wrote a very favourable ACR about him and 
some exceptional remarks sayîng that he deserved 'accelerated promotion'. Though he spends 
more time with the computers, this is just because he was posted in that section, that he was given 
the opportunity to work there. Anyone could be posted to the Computer Section. We are all 
equally qualified and when one has been working at that level of professional work and has that 
much expérience, you cannot usually say that one among others is exceptionally hard working and 
the others are not hard working or inefficient. There can be a différence of that as nineteen to 
twenty; some may have a bit more ability or capability and some may have a bit less but the 
nature of the work we are talking about, we ail have to give reasonable production, make 
geological maps and therefore it is not the kind of work where either one may show exceptional 
talents or another may prove to be stupid than the others. The level of work remains roughly the 
same for all geophysicists. They ail have done their Masters in Science and do the work at similar 
levéis and therefore when one is promoted and the others are not, you can attribute the reasons 
only to loyalty, favouritism, regionalism etc. It did not use to happen much in the past but thèse 
day s such things are happening a lot. 
Nepotism in Emplovment Practice 
Thefollowing was reponed by a production manager in Pakistan International Airlines: 
I recently mentioned to the top management that I require to hire people, and the usual 
way of doing this is that I make a list of required people and the General Manager signs it and the 
Director approves it. I had said to them that the people I require should be of certain 
qualifications, science graduâtes, but they sent guys, who had qualifications in commerce, because 
they were from among their acquaintances and they asked me to let them join in. When I objected 
to it, they said no, you will have to take them and make do with them, and train them to work. 
The resuit was that, I needed to hire eleven staff, and they sent nine persons who were relative 
or friends and had unsuitable qualifications: None was of the merits that were required. Two of 
my colleagues and staff said to me that their brothers were jobless and in severe hardship, and now 
that ail new people were being hired like that (i.e. on the basis of nepotism), and you have to 
accept them, then why don't you be kind enough to take our brothers in as well. I then had to 
fight for thèse two tili the last stage to get them accepted, not that they were my relatives or they 
were on merit or had proper qualifications, but only because I said that thèse two men who were 
already working so well and giving good service to us, and now that others' relatives and friends 
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were taking jobs, then why not thèse two should be taken in so that our employées should not feel 
left behind in the race for jobs. 
In Pakistan International Airlines, for a long time, appointments had been altogether 
banned. But they had found a loop-hole in the manpower-ban régulations. The loop-hole allowed 
them to hire one as a casual worker, for which they didn't need to advertise and follow a regular 
hiring procedure. This loop-hole became an easy way to employ relatives or friends. It went on 
like this for a time and many told their relatives that if one of them needed a job, bring his 
application and we would interview him. It was also notified at certain institutes that fresh leavers 
could apply as candidates for casual employées. 
The procedure to be adopted is that the department manager, the administration manager, 
and the man who would be the direct manager to the new employée at the shop floor, should 
interview the candidate. But in my particular case, the higher management never gave me a chance 
to interview and select those who were to report to me and through whom I had to get the work 
done. My superiors began sending new staff to me. I hadn't yet secured the approvai to fili the 
new vacancies when new employées began appearing with appointment letters in their hands. The 
resuit was that I had staff for which there was no work because, I had applied for new staff 
approvai anticipating heavier work load in future and, while the work load was still to come, they 
sent new staff in. The work load was to come in future, contracts were being signed for which 
work was to start in three/four months. But they sent their men before even giving the approvai 
for new vacancies. 
The Use of Politicai Contacts (sifarish) in Getting Undue Favours 
When I joined the University, a number of students came to me and invited me to lunch. 
I had been there for a month by then and I had obtained enough information to suspect that they 
would tell me things like they know some influential people, that some relative of theirs is the 
Deputy Commissioner of the district, or that they nave contacts with some other high officiai and 
then they could use this influence to impress upon me in order to give them more marks and 
higher grades. I therefore asked the Chairman of the Department if I should accept their invitation 
or not. He advised that I may go for once in order to see what their intentions were, or what kind 
of people they were, but that I should avoid such meetings in future and not accept any more 
invitations because, he suspected, that the students will then begin asking for undue favours. The 
reason that it was easy for [many] boys to cheat is that they were supported by many from their 
community and in case of trouble, the local influential persons came to their rescue. 
Politicai Corruption in Emplovment Practice; Desire to be in High Positions Despite 
Incompétence; The Effects of Incompétence at Higher Levéis 
The following was reponed by a section officer at the provincial Ministry of Services and General 
Administration: 
There was a time when the Services and General Administration Department [in the Civil 
Secrétariat] was considered a model department and it provided an example for other departments 
as how to fonction better and how to provide good service. But conditions have deteriorated there 
now. It is no longer a model department. There are several reasons: What is essential for a 
department? An adequate organizational structure, proper distribution of work, and suitable 
employées who have the right skills, qualifications and aptitude for the job spécifications, that is, 
they are compétent and have been placed on the right positions. These four or flve things are 
essential for a department to work effectively. Now in the Services and General Administration 
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Department, the top management, that is the Secretary and the additional secretaries, are not taking 
enough interest in the departmental problems, or we can say that they are not solving the problems 
that are there. The problem is that incompetent people have been posted there. The department has 
been so over-crowded that they don't have enough space to accommodate all employees. One room 
is being shared by three section officers who deal in three sepárate sections and have cases and 
tasks of sepárate nature. When I was posted there, my work was continually disturbed by the 
presence of too many people. Over the last decade, not only that the volume of work has been 
increasing in almost every department, the nature of tasks too has been changing. We need 
changes in organizado nal structures to go along with these developments, new dimensions, 
extensión of tasks and more employees. There has come new staff but no new accommodation. 
I remember that section officers a decade ago, were considered high status officials and at least, 
they were given a room of their own. The reason for the decline of prestige is that incompetent 
people, hired on the basis of nepotism and political afñliations, show their inaptitude in doing the 
business of the state in a shabby manner. They don't know how to do their work. Work is not 
being done. I will give you one example: An additional secretary was appointed by the government 
on the merit of his being a political ally. He does not know his job and has no training, the 
consequences of which are that his work is being done by somebody else. Such practice leads to 
greater load of work on others. 
I have two good examples to show how incompetent people behave when they are 
appointed on as high ranks as the head of an attached department. When I was a section officer 
in the Ministry of Social Welfare, I had the Secretary of Social Welfare as my direct superior. 
Now the Secretary sees a file only to give a decisión, put his signatures, issue orders, and send 
it to the Minister, of course after seeing that all the basic work has been done on the case. The 
detailed analysis of the case after consulting the relevant legislation, bylaws, government rules and 
regulations etc. is all done by the section officers. In our case it was all done by me. Now the 
head of the attached department is the Director who, in the hierarchy, is one step below the 
Secretary. But the Director we had was incompetent. Now there are several institutions and their 
employees upon whom a Director has to keep control and implement the decisions sent to him by 
the Secretary. In short, he has to supervise the operations of all the institutions that fall under a 
particular ministry. He is responsible for the proper running of these institutions. If he cannot do 
this properly, then the Secretary guides him how to do it and what to do and how to resolve the 
problems. Now our Director had little aptitude and relevant qualifications to do his job because 
when they place a man as a head of a department, they usually do not see whether he has the 
relevant aptitude, skills and qualifications for such a job. They don't even see if he has had, as 
a basic minimum, some relevant training in the department which he is going to lead. He does not 
even know about the organizational set-up of his department and henee no plans as to how he 
would run it. When the head of an attached department does not know all these aforementioned 
things, how can he be expected to solve its problems? Ignoring that he does not possess proper 
theoretical or academic insight into the nature of his job, he does not even know how office work 
which we cali 'file work' is done and has no aptitude, let alone the competeney, for it. If one 
cannot even do the file work, he would not be able to move papers or files anead to the next 
processing section. Work will start piling up and so the problems arising in the institutions under 
the control of the said departmental head will not be resolved. What happens then? The whole 
organization becomes ineffective. The tragedy is that almost all departmental heads are appointed 
here on the basis of political affiliations and not on a professional criteria. The Governor, the 
Chief Minister, and the Ministers have to win the next general election and they cannot keep their 
seats in the Provincial Assembly unless they hire and promote the relatives, sons and nephews of 
influential people in their constituencies, or those political workers who have worked hard for the 
party that has won the elections on promises that they would be given big posts to satisfy their 
status and prestige needs. When appointing a head of department, it is not seen as to who is 
competent enough to run the organization effectively. Now this Director of the Ministry of Social 
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Work, who was sent to us, was previously a Deputy Director in the Ministry of Industries. He was 
there in grade 18 and with us he was promoted to grade 19. He worked for one year but he 
couldn't run the organization and so much work got piled up that he was transferred to some other 
department. An additional secretary from another department was sent as our new Director, 
apparently to sort out the mess, but after trying unsuccessfully for eight months, he too requested 
to be sent back to his previous post and was thus transferred. These people had all the prestige, 
facilities and status symbols that are attached with the post of being a head of department but they 
were not competent. Now what is competency? It is decision making skills, skills to get work done 
from the subordinates, if a subordinate does not know how to do his job properly, the head should 
be able to train and guide him. If the Director says to a subordinate, go and get this work done 
but the subordinate does not know how to do it and the Director does not know how to train the 
subordinate, who will do the job? The untrained subordinate may not present the file back for fear 
of being criticized. There are many little things that one has to teach to his subordinates, slowly 
and gradually. If you cannot do this, you cannot get work done from the subordinates. Ours was 
a new Ministry and therefore we had greater problems. If the Director had found himself heading 
an established organization with properly trained subordinates, the latter might have been able to 
prop him up, despite his inaptitude and incompetency, and continued working in a stereotyped 
fashion. The subordinates could guide their boss, but this was a new organization. 
Seeking Higher Positions and Status Despite Incompetence: The Effects of Incompetence 
The following was reported by a production manager in a semi-government manufacturing unit: 
When someone is given the designation of a manager, it is not that only his salary is 
increased or that his status and benefits get raised, like for example that he gets a car and a peon, 
he also gets the powers that should in fact stay only with the 'real' manager. The Officers 
Association suggested another thing: We said, all right, we have colleagues who say they are, after 
all, working too, they are doing something and they think they are entitled to promotions. But 
though we have no objections to annual increments, salary raises, and grade enhancement after 
five years, we do want that their designations should not be raised so that the power and authority 
should rest with the 'real managers', so that they [the incompetent yet promoted] should not be 
able to say to the manager that they would not do this or that, that they, being equal in 
designation, would not obey his instructions. Only the designation of those be raised who are 
really capable of working in the higher designation. This would then motivate those capable of a 
higher designation. 
The Effects of Corruption on Motivation 
A production and purchase manager in a high-technology defence sensitive industry reported the 
following: 
A certain part that goes into the product we make, used to be bought either from Taiwan 
or Singapore at US$ 66 a piece. Through some kind of maneuvering among the competitors who 
supplied this thing, I managed to get the pieces at US$ 50 a piece and this led to a saving of 
$96,000 but, the General Manager said to me, about the import project, that he would hand it over 
to some other manager (instead of appreciating me). 
I have developed a feeling now that the higher management had some understanding with 
the suppliers from whom they used to buy that product at $66 a piece so that they used to get a 
certain percentage as their (illegal) commission. When I got the same thing at lower price, their 
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percentage commission got cut. How can they then appreciate me? Such things have happened a 
number of times and so they don't like me. However, because I do so much work for the 
company, I know that they cannot withdraw many projects from me. They know that if, in 
reaction, I gave up my enthusiasm in work, then the deliveries we are to make this year would 
be affected. Thus they keep saying, "okay, carry on, do this, do that, okay, we will see, we will 
do this or that for you". Last week I got fed up and I said to my General Manager that I didn't 
know what would happen to me and I asked him to resolve once and for all what they are going 
to decide about me and my work load so that I could sit on one side in peace and quiet and forget 
about high performance. But he knows my nature, he knows that I cannot live without doing hard 
work. Everyone has some natural compulsions. Some are different, and therefore, they can say, 
let all go to hell, but my nature is such that I want things to happen by whatever efforts. They 
know that they can linger on decisions about me until all deliveries have been made in time - and 
then they would see what could be given to me and what not. 
Many among the higher management have tried, during the last fifteen years, to find 
someone to replace me, but they cannot replace me because people of my qualifications are not 
normally interested in low paid government jobs. People are not interested unless special privileges 
and salaries are given. And who wants to work so hard and get so less unless they have side-
businesses benefiting from their official capacities. I know that I can run the factory at much 
greater profits and much lower costs, with greater efficiency but the corruption of many gets into 
the way. I once got frustrated at the lack of appreciation for honest work that had shown results, 
and I said to my General Manager, concealing the bite behind a smile, "if you lend me this factory 
and take me as a sub-contractor, I promise to raise the profits by ten million rupees and even then 
I would make much more for myself than what I get". He laughed it off but the thought of having 
my own factory, now that I know every thing from how to get orders, manufacture the product 
through to the last stage of receiving the payment, has been circulating in my mind. I have talked 
to a couple of investors but then, in private business, you have to do things such as, one of the 
potential investors in my proposed factory told me that he can introduce me to a senior 
government official who would create a requirement for our products in his department and get 
such specifications of the product approved for purchase by that department as could be made only 
in our factory. Obviously the order will be placed with our factory and then I can negotiate such 
a price per piece as will include a certain percentage for ourselves well above the normal profit 
margin, but we can charge this price only if we add his [the senior government officer] 
commission as well. It will be difficult to get returns if we do honest business. 
Corruption and Motivation 
The following events were narrated by a sales manager in a private pharmaceutical company. The 
events explain how strongly corruption is linked to improper motivation and control. Therefore, 
the strategies, designed to fight corruption in the said company, incorporated proper motivation 
and control, along with increased incentives for the sales staff: 
The top management introduced some changes to fight corruption. In the beginning, the 
managers and the sales representatives used to collude amongst themselves, and instead of 
distributing samples of medicines, that used to come from the Head Office for free distribution 
among doctors and consultants, they would sell them (though these samples have printed on the 
boxes: 'Physician's Sample: Not For Sale') to certain medical stores that take them cheaply and 
sell them along with the other product. They made enough money in this way and so they would 
just sit all month and do little work. It used to happen like this, for example, I have received 200 
packs of a certain medicines each containing 500 tablets that is 100,000 tablets in all. The retail 
price of each pack is say, Rs.165 and the trade price is say, Rs.140. Now I would go to the main 
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market and see a friend distributor and offer him the product along with all the samples so that 
each pack would cost the distributor say Rs.130 rather than Rs.140. The distributor would make 
Rs.10 extra on each pack and I would take my share. The retailers were happy too and so they 
used to give massive orders to the corrupt sales staff who then didn't need visiting many doctors, 
but it was a bad name for the company and a few medical representatives were fired when this was 
discovered. The General Manager (sales) got rid of this problem by dividing our marketing area 
into three zones. He appointed three zonal sales managers, and asked all sales representatives and 
zonal sales managers to make monthly and weekly client visit schedules in three copies, one for 
the zonal managers, one for the regional managers, and one for the General Manager. They were 
asked to give their appointment times, meeting times with clients, and they were told that they 
could be checked at random at the time and place which they had supplied in their client visit 
schedules. If the person being checked was found absent from the place at the time he was 
supposed to visit a client, he would be inquired and could be considered a defaulter. Then, we 
added some incentives for the distributors as well. For major sales orders, they were given 
discounts. We also had incentives for our sales teams to encourage them to work hard and not 
resort to irregularities. We made a policy that no new staff will be hired, people in senior positions 
will not be hired from outside the company, and good workers will be promoted. The said 
measures put a check to the corruption described earlier. 
Low Motivation; Lack of Creativity and Initiative; Hooliganism in Institutions 
The following narration by a former lecturer In Physics, is so typical of educational institutions 
in the sub-continent that it would be hard to find many academicians who would disagree with the 
typicality of the described situation: 
I resigned from lectureship basically for two reasons. One was that, in teaching jobs, 
especially in science teaching jobs, there is little room for self-development and improvement. I 
mean that you go on teaching the same things again and again and you feel getting rusted (it was 
said about such experience that it was not a six years experience but one year experience repeated 
six times). The second reason was that the working environment at the college had become such 
that I couldn't deliver the things that I wanted to deliver. I had begun to feel that I was unable to 
impart this consciousness to the students that they should take some benefit from the teachers, that 
they should learn something of value to them in practical life. Some kind of improvement in 
consciousness was not taking place. The attitude of many students was that they would come to 
the college if they had nothing else to do. They were either studying for jobs or because they 
couldn't get high marks in intermediate examinations to be able to get admission in either a 
medical college or an engineering university, so they took admission in B.Sc. and if they still 
won't get high marks, they went on to do their M.Sc. Many took admission in the Science College 
because they couldn't get admissions elsewhere in subjects which are in high demand in the job 
market, for example, business subjects. 
With my colleagues, there was not a lack of coordination but if you wanted to introduce 
a new system, people used to resist it especially if the implementation of the new system implied 
hard work on their parts. For example, I found that students who came to do their experiments 
in the laboratories, required good command of logarithms. I used to take an hour test in logarithms 
in order to determine their strengths and weaknesses in it so that I could teach them the use of 
logarithms. I did allow them to begin their experiments until they had passed the logarithms test. 
I offered them to understand logarithms from me in extra time before they could qualify for 
starting experiments. Now the other teachers began resisting these tests saying that if the students 
don't know logarithms, then it was not the teachers' problem. I wanted the students, as a matter 
of routine, to give me a short weekly report of the work they had done in the laboratory. I wanted 
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them to give me the figures and results of the tests, whatever they were, irrespective of whether 
the readings appeared correct or not, so that these could be discussed the next week. If the 
readings were incorrect, what caused the errors, and if the readings were correct, how they could 
be improved. This meant a lot of work on the part of the teacher because it involved reading each 
student's report and then discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each report: It meant giving 
time to each student individually. Many teachers did not like this because it meant more work 
load. Then, at the B.Sc level, I wanted the concept of uncertainty to be understood by the senior 
students, that is, the results they get in their experiments are not one hundred percent accurate, 
that there are divisions and fractions of errors, that they should know how to detect and calculate 
these and how to write about these; what is the practical significance of these tiny deviations, what 
ramifications they have for our practical purposes. Many teachers thought that I was overdoing 
it and that I created problems and hardships for them, that I created hardships for students as well 
as for the teachers. 
Both students and teachers had low motivation to pursue education in science in its true 
spirit. But the level of motivation in many students was not as low as that in many teachers. I had 
many good students as well. Normally we had an intake of students who had low grades, ' C , 'D', 
or even 'E' at the intermediate level. We seldom had students who had had 'A' or 'B' grades at 
the intermediate level. But, I used to get good results and our out-put did include some who 
secured 'A' grades. At masters level, we used to get better intake with some having had 'B' grades 
and one or two with 'A'. After hard work, we got better results and our out-put included students 
who secured distinctions in the University examinations. The studious ones would gather around 
me and visit me often which created a problem that the other teachers felt that I was gaining 
popularity among students. 
The basic causes of low motivation in teachers for hard work was that they were low paid. 
The second reason was that there was no novelty or interesting things in the syllabus: It was a fifty 
year old syllabus which had not been revised since. Most teachers had passed their examinations 
by memorizing the notes they got from their teachers who in turn had got them from their teachers 
and so this fifty year old syllabus was carried on for several generations. Even the pattern of 
question papers and examinations had not changed. Most remembered by heart that such and such 
questions could be made from such and such parts of the curriculum and these questions had such 
and such answers and that if the students would answer in such and such way, they may be given 
so many out of so many marks. It had not changed for decades and there was little that could be 
used as a method of assessment for one's genuine abilities. The teachers knew that introducing 
new things would not lead to any self-benefit and so did most students whose primary targets were 
to score the maximum possible marks in the examinations so that they could get admissions in 
medical or engineering collages or some other prestigious institutions. Thus it was easy for the 
students, as well as the teachers, to know and follow the established pattern rather than venture 
into newer methods of learning and evaluation. When a teacher was allotted a subject, he usually 
wanted to stick to it because he could memorize the syllabus, the concepts, theories and problems 
related to his subject, and pass them on to the students each year in the same fashion. If the 
syllabus or the methods of teaching were to change, the teachers would have to study new concepts 
and theories, keep abreast with modern researches in their subjects and tell to their students about 
these: it could boost creativity among teachers and students alike but would bring no quick gains; 
intellectual improvement for its own sake was not the criterion. 
When the students used to conduct experiments in the laboratories, there used to be two 
supervising teachers. Some teachers supported me and these would like to join in supervising 
students along with me. Those who resisted, wanted their names to be struck off when they were 
grouped or paired with me in laboratory supervision. There was no verbal conflict. The benefit 
of being educated is that even if some didn't like me, they didn't go for discouraging me. The 
Principal had a degree in languages and so he had little idea of what we were doing but the 
Chairman of our department appreciated me a lot, increased my responsibilities, got me involved 
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in other departmental affairs, and when problems arose which others didn't want to tackle, he 
would ask me to help him in solving them. When I was a new entrant, normally junior teachers 
were not given degree classes, but he allowed me to teach degree classes in the very beginning. 
And he also allotted me to teach expérimentation at degree level. He could not use my services 
as an examiner due to certain rules and régulations which stopped new lecturers from examining 
answer sheets, but he asked me to serve in conducting examinations. 
I was not given any promotion during the six years of service. Nothing for the extra hard 
work. I felt discouraged not just because of that, because, in those days, things were happening 
in such a way that many, who were my seniors, had not been promoted and were pulling along 
in grade 17. One satisfaction I had was that many students used to appreciate my efforts. If my 
class was to take place in the afternoon, and they had free periods ail morning, many used to stay 
so that they could attend my class. When there were empty seats in the class room, many students 
from other classes would corne and sit to listen to my lectures because they thought that I could 
explain better and give better material. I felt pleased that I was delivering something and that I was 
being appreciated. 
The basic reason for my résignation was that I had begun to feel a kind of stagnation. 
Things were not changing further and I realized that I had done ali I could in that environment and 
there seemed no room for further changes. I had begun to teach the same things year after year, 
and what happens is that you then go on becoming slower and slower. The enthusiasm of the first 
expérience dies out and you begin to'lose motivation. I wanted a change. Another reason was that 
newer groups of students brought newer environment with them. Respect for teachers was 
beginning to fade away. An event happened where I stopped a couple of students from cheating 
in the examinations and it lead to a quarrel. One of the students threatened me with a knife. I felt 
unsupported and unprotected. The other teachers were afraid too. Some advised that we should 
just pass such dangerous students and it was no use confronting them. They may attack you outside 
the college premises. Another teacher, who was senior to me, and had supported me in my earlier 
efforts, once conducted examinations with me. We didn't allow any cheating to take place but this 
senior teacher was attacked and beaten outside the college. A court case was filed and we had to 
go on and on for court hearings. After an year, the Examinations Board at the college decided that 
the student, who had attacked, be rusticated for three years. Regrading the court case, it took so 
long that I don't even remember if a judgement was passed. 
Unhealthv Compétition for Promotions and Higher Status 
Excerpts from interview with a geophysicist: 
Some problems arise in the distribution of work load. Sometimes people try to conceal data 
from one another. They do this in their efforts to what we cali 'increase one's score', that is, to 
get promotions, to be seen as more hard working. Everyone wants to increase his score. This 
créâtes some problems and conflicts. Like for example, I have done most of my work on the 
North district. There is no area of the North on which I have not worked. But what happened, I 
was sent on a two year deputation to another company. During my absence for two years, my 
colleagues had access to ali the data and they began to 'possess' it. When my deputation ended and 
I came back, I had no data to work on. My colleagues kept guarding the data and each thought 
that if he gave some data to me, he will have less data to work on and consequently less work on 
his part. This caused much problems for me. I tried to get into those project areas which I myself 
had handed over to some of my colleagues when I was sent on deputation, but they kept the data 
under lock and key, and won't give me some to work on. It would have looked childish of me to 
go to the Chief and make complaints. Besides, I knew that the Chief s attitude to such complaints 
in the past had been to just ask us to compromise with each other instead of complaining. He 
318 
didn't ask all to give data to each other or make a data library where all who needed data could 
have access to it and work on it. The data for the G.K. area had been snatched by a colleague 
though he was working on another area. So I had to force my way into that area and he finally 
gave half of his data to me. But I couldn't force my way with the seniors because when I tried 
with one, he brushed aside the request in jokes and said, "why don't you take some rest? There 
is little need to work. If some senior asked you why you aren't working, come to me". I couldn't 
argue with such seniors who are cunning yet act innocent, and those who know how to dawdle. 
They waste their time in laughter and jokes but when there is some trouble and they cannot answer 
to the Chiefs questions and demands, they send you in saying that it was you who claimed to be 
the expert. Düring those days when I was asked to give my opinion as an expert, all I had to say 
was that I had no data to give my opinions, and that opinions should be asked frorri those who 
were sitting on the data. 
Unhealthv Compétition for Promotions and Higher Status 
Excerpts from interview with a sales manager: 
At managerial level, there is a regular tussle between regional managers and group 
managers who try to show that they are doing better than the others or that others are doing worse 
than they are. In order to score more points at the Head Office, they not only highlight their 
achievements but keep recording the faults and flaws of other regional and group managers and 
try their best to get documentary évidence of others' faults, weaknesses or négligence (visit 
schedules for example) and do not hesitate a bit in reporting thèse to the Head Office even when 
it is just hearsay. Our zonal sales manager is trying to résolve différences among regional 
managers and create harmony among them. Basically, antagonism among regional managers is 
related to the volume of sales. When the sales of one group increase abo ve those of others, the 
other groups feel low and undermined, in which case, the manager of the low performing group 
would try to concoct alibies or excuses or charges or allégations that could be brought against the 
successful group in order that the former's lower sales volummes may be overlooked by the higher 
management. 
Unhealthv Compétition for Promotions and Higher Status 
Excerpts from interview with a production manager in a private leather tanning industry: 
There were some conflicts between managers from one department. Lets say, the 
production people used to have conflicts amongst themselves but if you look at the Mechanical 
Department versus Production, there was no inter-departmental conflict. The reason for conflict 
within a department was that people within a department were in compétition with each other. 
Like, when a senior officer was on leave, his replacement man used to think that if he gave better 
production than did his senior, he might take the latter's place. The seniors used to be wary of 
ambitious subordinates who could jeopardize the formers' position, and so they had skirmishes, 
but there was not much inter-departmental conflict because of the separate nature of tasks and lack 
of compétition between departments. Intra-departmental conflict had its base in people seeking 
position and status. There were events such as hot discussions, someone would complain, there 
were counter-justifications, followed by more incrimination. Nothing physical. Such things used 
to be repeated time and again. There were problems of proper quality control and because quality 
control and production was joined in one department, officers would blâme each other, there was 
always some senior blaming a subordinate while the subordinate held the senior responsible - it 
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was a routine matter. Normally the issues were resolved by us within the Production Department. 
If we couldn't, then a Director used to corne in and résolve the issue. 
It happened once with me. Last time, when I went to Germany for a month, it was a time 
when we were holding in our stores large stocks of raw hides. There appeared a quality problem 
in my section and about seventy hides got burned during the process. The skins were worth one 
lakh rupees. My seniors held me responsible for the loss, while I held them responsable because 
they had piled up the stock during the period when I was in Germany. As soon as I had returned, 
they had given me an unusually heavy work load which I could have been able to manage in a 
better way if they had taken an early start. But because they hadn't started the work, and had the 
hides piled up, I had to face a backlog. Now, in quality control, problems arise at this stage due 
to a time factor. If you lose time, if you do not taxe the hides into the chemical processor within 
a désirable time, you are likely to mess them up in the way we got them messed up. The skins 
were putrefied. Rotten. They couldn't be processed for the right kind of leather. But no one knew 
that the hides had been putrefying. The effects of putréfaction appeared when I got the hides 
chemically processed. I hadn't held them in stock. They had been held in my absence and petrified 
during the time they were held in stock. When I came back and began processing them, now it 
is not possible for the manager to observe each and every piece of hide individually before starting 
the process. There are large quantities of hides in truck loads coming now and then. You cannot 
possibly know the fate of each skin. Large quantities are entered into the processing vessels and 
when they corne out, they go through several processes, and only after the process, each and every 
skin is observed. That was the time when it was found that about sixty-seven skins were burned. 
I was asked to explain, in writing, why this loss had occurred. I explained, as I have told 
you, that this happened because of the lapse of time before the processing was started. Work on 
thèse skins should have been started in my absence, but when I came back, I was given this much 
stock. I attached stock statements with my explanation, clarifying that I resumed work on such and 
such date by which time there was an unusual piling up of the stocks, this much was the incoming 
load, and I did the best I could in such circumstances. I did the maximum processing I could. In 
such cases there is nothing else one could do though I probably saved as much skins as I could. 
The Director agreed that it was not my fault. I was just asked to be more careful in future and take 
precautionary measures so that we do not get into a situation like this in future. 
Work Pressure and Transfer of Blâme down the Hierarchical Chain 
Thefollowing was described by a production manager of an Indian manufacturing company, but 
similar has been reponed about many Pakistani organizationsparticularly where there is a clearly 
identifiable chain of command and control, such as in the police or bureaucracy: 
There was some conflict especially between the production people and the top most 
managers when we had high demand and had to meet deadlines. In a drug manufacturing 
company, there are no short cuts for quick manufacturing. You have to manufacture drugs in 
accordance with the standard manufacturing practice. We cannot do things overnight or in a 
humbug way - the scientific procedure must be followed - so, what happened, when the top bosses 
would say, "we need this thing tomorrow" and you know there are some issues, some problems 
with the type of materials that are to be filled, problems could arise, then there used to be a severe 
conflict that would often lead to reprisais from the top management saying, "this fellow is not 
efficient". The blâme used to drop down the line: One would take the blâme from his superior and 
pass it on to the next down the line so that finally it was my head that would be in the block 
because I was at the bottom of the managerial chain. I used to présent facts to the seniors, why 
something had happened, for them to understand the problem. Some managers used to understand 
the problems but then there were some at the top with whom you just couldn't reason. 
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The Significance of Loyalty; Repression of Initiative and Creativity; Personality Clashes; Dislike 
for Challenges 
At V. Industries, one of the largest native shoe manufacturers employing six thousand 
workers, when the workers showed some initiative and developed something, Gauhar, a production 
manager, wanted that the credit should be given to the workers. However, many managers used 
to get credit for the innovations of the workers. Gauhar used to appreciate skilled and innovative 
workers which encouraged them to give more production and utilize more of their skills. The 
problem with Gauhar, for which he had been expelled from the Military Academy, and later from 
V. Industries, was that he criticized the system of favouritism and authoritarianism. He gave 
excellent performance at V. Industries and was very popular among the staff. 
He was fired once because he had a personality clash with the General Manager. After a 
while, Gauhar applied again at the same industry and was taken back. The same General Manager 
fired him a second time. The said General Manager was a retired Brigadier. Retired military 
officers are commonly taken in as managers in Pakistani industry. The said G .M. was so offended 
at Gauhar that he said, "if Gauhar comes back to this company, either he or I will work here". 
Gauhar stayed out of employment for one and a half year and then went to B. Industries 
who are the market leaders in this field. After having spent some years there, he admitted that 
"pampering and buttering" (the Pakistani slang for sycophancy) mattered a lot, and though he is 
still not doing these kind of things, because he is not of that type, somehow he is not that blunt 
as he used to be. He has learnt some lessons and he is doing so well in B. Industries that he was 
sent to Indonesia for three months, to Europe for a month, and then on a tour to India on training. 
The Significance of Lovaltv/obsequiousness: Repression of Initiative/Creativity; Personality 
Clashes: Lobbying; Unhealthy Competition and Intrigues; Corruption 
A sales executive in a large public limited pharmaceutical industry, now working as a sales 
manager in another company, reported the following: 
The company was planning to undertake a new venture for which I was doing some 
research. I had advised the company to take a step forward, but all managerial staff except me had 
voted against that step. The Chairman had agreed with me and this, my boss, the Sales Director 
didn't like. He thought I was being a threat to his position in the eyes of the Chairman and there 
the conflict started. There were two more reasons: The Sales Director was rather antagonistic 
towards me because I did not try to please him in the customary way as subordinates do. To be 
blunt, I didn't flatter him. For example, I refused to run errands for him when, in fact, our sales 
manager had gone to such an extent of submissiveness that he ran errands for the Director. Then, 
the Sales Director expected compliments now and then, he wanted obsequiousness. 
When my proposal was admired by the Chairman, and he began showing that he liked me, 
the Sales Director's dislike became obvious because he stooped to the level of trying to undermine 
me in front of the Chairman. He began taking false complaints against me to the Chairman, like 
for example, he complained that I did not come to the office in time, that I did not work hard 
enough, that I leave my office on pretext of visiting industrial clients but I just go home and come 
back in the evening claiming that I had visited the clients. He made up these false complaints 
because he did not want anyone in the Sales Department to become an important figure and thus 
jeopardize his position or pose a threat to his rank. He did not want the existing status quo to be 
disturbed. Later, the Chairman appointed a Managing Director who was a friend of the sales 
manager. This Managing Director was a liberal and friendly man and he invited us to come to his 
house and have drinks. I overlooked this offer which offended the Sales Director because he began 
thinking that I thought so high of myself that I did not want to mix up with them, and because I 
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came from a high status family (my father and uncles are land lords and one of my uncles was a 
Minister in the provincial government), he assumed that I thought that the Director, the manager 
and the Managing Director were not worth my standing. He thought that I despised them and 
considered them low class though they were all my seniors and my bosses. They knew that the 
Chairman was related to me, and when I was hired by the company, they considered me a mole 
(informer). Then they began suspecting that I was not a mole because I never reported against 
them to the Chairman. Then they tried to win me and be a part of their lobbying group. When I 
declined their invitations, and stayed non-aligned, they assumed that I was ambitious and hence 
a potential threat to their positions. Gradually, what happened, they even began undermining my 
big successes in my job, and when I gained success in the research and development of the new 
venture, they presented these to the Chairman as my blunders and issued me 'show-cause notices' 
on that account. I was given notices that contained charges on very weak grounds. 
We had a buy-back arrangement with a certain industry. In those days, our own 
pharmaceutical factory was not operating, and we used to get our products made at another factory 
and then sell them at our sale points. The factory used to invest half a million rupees every month 
in this project and got a net profit of between sixty to seventy thousand rupees per month. It was 
all done on my initiative and my responsibility. In short, I was getting them sixty to seventy 
thousand rupees per month on a rolling investment of half million. We used to take finished stocks 
from our sub-contractors. Once, the sub-contractors had to stop production, for certain reasons, 
for a few days. In those few days, these three men went there and inspected the finished and 
unfinished stock and found a few boxes missing. What had happened was that our product was 
such that there used to be some regular breakages - sometimes less, sometimes more, and some 
of the boxes therefore were not usable and hence not considered part of the stock. This clique of 
the three wrote a report against me, attributed that small bit of shortage in stock to my inefficiency 
and to my corruption, and blamed that I had sold the missing boxes and expropriated the sum. A 
show-cause notice was issued. The second complaint in that notice was that when the sales 
manager and the others went to inspect the stocks, I was not present at the site though, they 
claimed, I should have been there. The fact was that two days earlier, I had informed the Sales 
Director, verbally, that I was going on leave: It was a custom there that you could go on leave 
after communicating verbally to your boss. They wrote that I was not on leave, I was supposed 
to be at the site of inspection and that I failed to be there in time. There was a third allegation 
against me that I had given too much credit to my clients and, because of this, the liquidity 
position of the company was in danger. I got this notice asking to explain why I had not kept the 
liquidity position of the company in mind while issuing credit to clients. In fact the entire amount 
of credit was only half a million rupees. There were no bad debts. Not a penny was lost because 
the credit we used to give was not a long term credit. It was a credit for only three days and they 
blew it beyond proportions, turned it into a major issue, a gross irregularity, and presented a 
whole case against me to the Chairman. I didn't resign on this account. What happened was that 
they placed me in a corner and took away important assignments from me. They hired a new Sales 
Executive and asked me to give him on-the-job training. I knew that the new man was taken in 
to replace me. I knew that if I did not dispense with the new man, he would get me despatched 
with the help of the Sales Director, but even then, I stayed loyal to the company and gave him the 
necessary training. And it turned out as I had predicted. When the new man had learned about my 
assignments, they transferred me to the Accounts Department. I was dumped there and it became 
hard for me to pass my days because I was not made for the accounts. It was a great torture to 
be in the Accounts Department. And apart from that, I had no experience of working in accounts. 
They assigned me to do things like making vouchers, bringing in cash from the bank, depositing 
cash to the bank, petty jobs, so that I should get frustrated and leave the company. 
The Chairman didn't like that I should be cornered like this. He called them and asked 
them to transfer me back to the Sales Department. Four times he called us and expressed anger 
at the Sales Director, in front of me, though I don't know if he was sincere in his words because, 
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I used to think, the Chairman has made it clear that he wants me back in Sales, then why aren't 
the Orders being issued? He seemed to be sincere but perhaps he was more busy with his other 
ventures (he was on the boards of many other companies) and didn't want to lose the Sales 
Director who was one of the prime figures running the business, or because they used to drink 
together at night, or some other reasons. I got fed up at the mock angers which the Chairman 
showed, and the lack of action at my transfer, and so I just resigned. When I tended in my 
résignation, the Managing Director called me to his office and asked why I wanted to leave the 
company. I said, "it has been rive months since I was dumped in the Accounts Department for 
which I have no aptitude. I am fed up of your delays in transferring me back". I had known that 
the Chairman had issued his last warning to them to take me back to Sales. The Managing 
Director got worried at the ensuing potential conflict between the Chairman (who was my relative) 
and his clique. He called in the Sales Director and the General Manager (production) and these 
three high-ups began coaxing me to take the résignation back. They wrote an order that Salmón 
is hereby transferred to the Sales Department and they increased my salary to almost double the 
amount that I was getting. But I refused to take the résignation back saying that I had been 
humiliated too much to stay with the company. I had done so much work for the company, and 
in return what had been done to me was enough. I said, even if they increased my salary four 
times, I would not stay. They tried a lot. They had called in the General Manager (production) 
to coax me because I had been on good terms with him, he was not a part of the clique and they 
thought perhaps he could influence me. So they asked him to pursue me to take my décision back 
because, as they said to the General Manager (production), the Chairman had warned them that 
he would take it seriously if I was not sent back to the Sales Department. On the contrary, I was 
resigning and they feared that they had lost the game with the Chairman: If the Chairman heard 
of my résignation, he would be mad at them. The General Manager requested that I do not leave 
the company, he promised that he would create several prospects for me and that they would give 
me a company car. He said that the sales manager would be leaving the company shortly and that 
I would be promoted to his post. But I stopped going to the company from the next day because 
I believed that they will not stick to their word: in most cases, they had not honoured their 
commitments whether these commitments were done at corporate level, or with the vendors who 
supplied raw material to the company, or with the banks. With ali business organizations that dealt 
with us, unless these organizations had been strict and demanding, these men had tried not to pay 
their dues and stay away from their commitments. Usually ali our bilis were paid along with fines. 
Regarding tax bilis, their first attempts were to avoid taxes, but if some bilis had to be paid while 
the fine had already accumulated, then they would contact their friends in the tax offices and ask 
them to get the fine deducted. There had been so many incidents like that and I had lost 
whatsoever faith I had in them. I had seen them promising one thing one day and forgetting it the 
next day. 
Dislike for Challenges: The Signifìcance of Lovaltv; Personality Clashes 
The following example comes from an assistant production manager in a very large state enterprise 
in India: 
About inter-personal conflict between managers, we had our engineering section headed 
by a dynamic manager called Mr. Phillips. He was a Tamilian Christian, a lowest caste which is 
not categorized as a scheduled caste because they were those people who were previously in a very 
poor scheduled caste but then converted to Christianity. He carne up to the level of a department 
manager because he was smart enough and had good éducation (note the Indian préoccupation with 
people's castes when talking about them), his wife was a doctor from the United States (note the 
status symbol here). He was heading the engineering section of our company. He had two people 
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working under him, one was a Brahmin, the other was a non-Brahmin Hindu of the second highest 
caste, the Vishuas. The first subordinate was an engineering graduate, a professional, very good 
at his job. In addition to his professionalism, he was also a very good person and was liked by the 
production staff. The other subordinate had only a diploma in engineering but had long expérience 
of work. Both subordinates were at same grade, they were both executives. When it carne to 
promotion, Mr. Philips knew that the first guy, with more éducation, had the right aptitude, and 
so he favoured him and promoted him to be a deputy manager. The other guy too was promoted 
to be a deputy manager but after a delay of one year. 
When Mr. Philips left, another man took over. He too was a Christian, a Mr. Thomas 
from Kerala. Now the engineering graduate whom Mr. Philip had got promoted, was given 
responsibilities, but he had a habit of talking back in that he used to discuss things straight on the 
face and speak his mind that this was wrong and that was right, which Mr. Philip used to take as 
a positive attribute that showed knowledge and understanding. But the new manager, Mr. Thomas, 
who had been working in the Gulf and had come back, took this habit of the engineering graduate, 
of speaking his mind that this is how you have to do it, as personally insulting, and pondered to 
take revenge. When it carne to promoting the two subordinates further, Mr. Thomas denied 
promotion to the engineer but gave promotion to the second guy. In other words, the personality 
attribute which Mr. Philip saw as a positive thing worth developing, the new manager didn't like 
it, and so the engineer didn't get a promotion but the diploma holder got it and became a joint 
manager. The engineer just could not take it and so he resigned from his job. Because of the 
dislike of a senior, he could not get promotion. What I am trying to say is that one manager had 
the ability to analyze the potential worth of a man but the other didn't like to be challenged. Mr. 
Philip was a forthright man, commanding and author itati ve, henee undaunted by the other's free 
expression, but Mr. Thomas was a very soft man and he saw the self-confidence of the engineer 
as an attempi to control him, to mould him, as an affront which he took as personal and so he 
brought him (the out-speaking man) down and brought the other guy up. The engineer's 
résignation was accepted but he was so much liked by the production staff that they fought for 
him, but nothing carne up and he didn't stay, he said, "I cannot accept this, there is no chance that 
I am going to work here, how can one take this shock?". 
(Note how important promotion to higher ranks is in sectionalized societies, because of 
that, being low in some respect means little defacto citizenship rights, little respect and security, 
and tesser access to civic institutions that are taken for granted in the West). 
He could complain to the Managing Director, but the M. D. naturally has to accept what 
the managers tell him: He has a responsibility to listen to the managers more than to the lower 
employées because the manager is the one who is analyzing and so, what he says, the M. D. has 
to accept it. Otherwise the manager is not going to work for the interests of the Managing Director 
and the two would have a confliet of interests. 
Unions in the Sub-continent: Chaotic Behavior; Ineffectiveness of Union Activities 
Thefollowing was narrated by a marketing manager in a British multinational run by Pakistani 
management: 
The management implemented some new rules to enhance productivity, that is, they 
revised and raised the existing productivity standards. This revisión in productivity standards was 
not a counter-attack on the workers' demands for increase in pay but had coincided badly at that 
time. The productivity standards that were applicable at that time were for the machines that had 
been there since 1950. New machines had been brought in and these machines were faster and 
produced more. As a consequence of the introduction of the new machines but older productivity 
standards, an average worker was making lot of money in the form of over-time. So long as the 
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oíd productivity standards were in forcé, we were bound to pay them over-time and this lead to 
unduly high production costs. 
For three and a half months the factories remained closed. It was the longest dispute we 
had. In the beginning the unión was not willing to go to the Industrial Tribunal. They were 
insolent and misbehaved with the managers at which the matter was reponed and cases were filed 
against three or four unión leaders. When the unión leaders saw little chances of winning in the 
courts, they ended the strike. Then they began apologizing for misconduct and went to great 
lengths for getting reinstated. Some were fired but they were later taken back after a compromise 
with the management was reached. During the compromise settlement, the new productivity 
standards were accepted by the workers. During the strike, we had to bear some losses. We lost 
our target of production but got rid of some stocks that we had piled up from earlier productions. 
However, we kept realizing the effects of the strike for six months onwards because then there was 
a shortage of finished goods. 
MNEs in the Sub-continent Handed Over to Native Management; Greater Profit-Orientation of the 
Native Management Compared to the Western; Transformation of Organizational Culture from 
'Less Differences between Hierarchical Levéis' to a Greater One, and towards Greater Benefits 
for the Upper Levéis but Exploitation of the Lower Levéis: Creeping in of Nepotism. ínter-
Personal Conflict. Favoritism. Power-Seeking. Personalitv Clashes. Intrigues, and Non-Work 
Cultural Pressures 
Case I: The following was reponed by a marketing manager in a British multinational recently 
handed over to native management: 
When we had British management, they had given cars as a matter of functional necessity, 
maintained by the company, to all field managers. When the Pakistani Managing Director took 
over, he reverted this facility and introduced a new scheme which meant that we were more than 
a thousand rupees worse off each month and that in addition to the instalment of the car loan. This 
was quite a de-motivating factor and I felt frustrated. Then the Pakistani M . D. immediately had 
a unión problem. 
The basic issue for strike was that the new government of Nawaz Sharif had announced 
an increase of rupees three hundred in the workers' salaries. The workers demanded that they be 
given this increase: Our management claimed that this increase of rupees three hundred had been 
incorporated in the regular annual increment of the workers' salaries. 
The Pakistani management was more profit-oriented than the British but there was a 
contradiction between these cost-cutting policies for the workers/middle management on the one 
hand, and those for the top management on the other hand. The extent of cost-cutting did not go 
farther than the level of junior/middle management. Cars were taken from us, but the top 
managers were given two cars, one for official use and one for personal use. The second car was 
in fact used by the wives of the top managers. These cars, for personal use, were maintained on 
company's expense - and brand new expensive cars. When I was teaving the company, they had 
promoted the four divisional managers to Directors who were thus entitled to luxury cars worth 
rupees sixteen hundred thousand each. At the middle management level, people were feeling that 
they were not being rewarded for their hard work despite that at that time the company 
profitability had reached a record level. The high profit was partly due to our hard work in the 
field but every year, when the increments carne, we felt that our benefits were not being increased 
in real terms. I felt my motivation declining. I had been happy in getting more and more 
responsibility but there was a limit to it. When that limit was crossed, I began complaining to my 
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boss that the work load and responsibilities had become too much for me. You can estimate the 
situation of work progress from the fact that when I joined, we used to have a small office in 
Lahore but when I left, we had a huge 9000 square feet bungalow as our office and a ware house, 
ali under my supervision and control. I was doing office management in addition to marketing 
functions and on top of that I was dealing in legal matters as well. I was controlling the sales 
officers in consumer products for the entire country. I asked them to give me an office manager, 
or an assistant, or an additional manager so that somebody should look after some of my jobs and 
that my tasks and responsibilities should be reduced, but the new Pakistani management was 
cutting costs. They said a manager would be expensive to hire so I take another sales 
représentative and make do with him. The more sales représentatives I took, they proved to be an 
additional burden on me in that I had more sales staff to supervise and control. 
If the British management had stayed there, they would have given me a manager. Perhaps 
yes. One thing I want to add: I have worked so hard there for fìve and a half years, but I don't 
think I got my due. I think that they always underpaid us and they knew that. When I got the 
provident fund and gratuity, for the calculation of this, they used the rules made five years ago. 
And I asked them to revise the rules (because our profitability had gone very high in these years), 
but they refused straight away. 
Between divisionai heads there were conflicts. Mostly the conflict was based around 
getting more power and authority; who had more powers. Our marketing manager had such a 
personality that he didn't like being dictated by others. In some issues, the finance manager, who 
was also a company Director, wanted to interfere but the marketing manager didn't like his 
décisions being influenced by divisions he said had nothing to do with it. When he didn't accept 
the opinions of the finance manager in such cases, there used to be some tension between the two. 
I would say that there were personality clashes as well as work-related issues. When it comes to 
having authority in certain matters, the issue is work-related, but there were personal stances as 
well. One of our managers - the same thing - my boss didn't like him and said he was talkative 
and unproductive, that he was taken in on nepotism and favoured nepotism, that he was a trouble-
creator in our department and goes for 'groupings' and this and that. So he was fired. 
The finance manager, and the heads of Personnel and Logistics were not keen on fair 
sélection and hiring. When we had a vacancy, they would send recommendations saying please 
hire this or that of our relatives or acquaintances, and this frustrated our boss. We once had a 
vacancy in Marketing at the Head Office. There was a lot of pressure from various managers that 
their men should be taken in but the marketing manager was not prepared to do that. When I 
resigned, my boss asked me not to let anyone know that I had resigned, not even the Managing 
Director. The reasons being that because my post was a very important one, everyone including 
the Managing Director, would put pressure on my boss to get their own men appointed in my 
place. My boss feared that if the other managers succeeded in placing one of their men at the 
vacancy, this would be the équivalent of having their informer in his office. He didn't want to 
have their informers in his office. My boss felt particularly pressurized from the Managing 
Director and the other Directors and managers and feared from offending them. If he didn't take 
one of their men, that is, if he refused to take their recommendations and pressures, there would 
be a new conflict springing up which he might not be able to manage. The result of this was that 
I didn't teli anyone for six months and finally, in the last days, when it was revealed that I was 
leaving, many managers got angry with me that I hadn't told them earlier that I was leaving. Thus, 
many people from other departments did not attend my farewell party. My boss sent R. from his 
Karachi office to replace me in Lahore so that he could make an excuse that filling the vacancy 
created by my departure was an inter-departmental affair and because there was no new 
appointment, no one should feel hurt that we didn't take their men. 
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Case II: The following was reponed by a sales manager in a Germán multinational 
recently handed over to native management: 
There are about one and a half dozen assistant managers. They belong to non-field 
departments in that they are not marketing people and henee do not need travelling for company 
sake. Four of these one and a half dozen assistant managers have been given cars. Having a 
company car is a big incentive because after four years, you are the owners of these cars when 
all you have to pay is twenty percent of the market price of a car and that too you pay in 
installments and, to add to it, if deductions are made from one's conveyance allowance, you are 
more than compensated even for the installments that you pay, so the contribution for these cars 
does not go from one's pocket. Because the cars have been given only to selected persons who are 
very cióse to the higher management, many say that this is favouritism and this has caused 
personal conflict among many equi-status people who feel that either all equi-status people should 
be given cars or none. Those who haven't got the cars resent it. A lot of resentment, and they are 
developing it further. 
In many departments there is conflict. There are many misunderstandings, serious at time. 
They are just on working relationships so as to be able to carry on working but they are not really 
a team. In some departments, sales are declining. In one such department, the manager has hired 
three or four technical sales officers whose hiring cannot be justified. To justify these recruitment, 
you have to either promote sales or else cut down on other personnel. When it comes to cutting 
down, all become tense; whose turn is it?; it could be their turn in future. The managers in 
departments where sales are declining and cuts in staff are demanded, generally become more 
critical of their staff. It is hard to find real justification to sack someone when sales are dropping 
due to market conditions and not from a lack of efforts on the part of the sales staff. We are no 
longer as competitive as we have been, henee sales have dropped and everybody knows this, if 
there had been a different staff, they too would have failed in promoting the sales. This leads to 
arguments, discussions and confliets. But mostly the confliets we have are work-related. Non-work 
confliets, such as personality clashes, are much less in our company than found in local 
organizations. 
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Control & Conflict Attitudes in Asian Firms: Non-Work & Theory X Control; Authoritative: Control 
bv Informers: Machiavellian Control: Control Related to Conflict: Inter-Personaï and Non-Work 
Conflict; Unheaithv Compétition and Intrigues: Domineering Attitudes: Harsh Working Conditions 
U[In a large Asian factory employing 150 workers] the three partners were owners, directors, 
and supervisors themselves. There was one supervisor but he would only keep time-record. For 
control, they had internal video cameras and they could see who was working and who was not. One 
of the partners would sit in the "control room", attend to the telephone, receive visitors (he had a 
secretary as well) and did all the office work while he could watch the workers on the internal TV 
screen. The second partner was an "all rounder": He was working as a supervisor as well as a 
manager. The factory was very large but he would walk from the cutting branch right to the end 
where the ladies sew, to the department for pressing; he would wander all day and did all the 
"control" himself. 
Al l the control system and conflict resolution was done personally by the owners. There were 
no established procedure for either control or conflict resolution. There were no forms or sheets for 
recording the production level of each workers. All these things were done orally. First of all they 
emphasized the need to produce more. Secondly, they wanted people to remain silent during work. 
When one partner would sit on the screen watching us, he kept looking for incidence when someone 
would talk with the other. Now, at times, it was inevitable for one to talk with another. The first 
partner would then inform the second partner on an inter-com that a certain person was talking and 
then the second partner would go and catch him talking. The worker would say, "but I am working 
and my production is okay". He would say, "I have received many complains against you, that you 
spend more than usual time in the toilet"; this, it was found, had been reported by the supervisor. He 
would warn that if we talked, we would produce less. But about the senior workers, like I was one 
of them (many had come and left since I joined but I had stayed), they knew that even if we talked, 
our production would be okay so that my behaviour was acceptable such as, it had been established, 
that I would come and leave at the right time. 
Mostly the reason for quarrel [interpersonal conflict] was that the supervisor would go to the 
owners and fill their ears against one or the other worker, such as a certain person spent more time 
in the toilet than he should, or that he wanted to fight with the supervisor. The owners of the factory 
used to give extra money to the supervisor for drinking in return for keeping them informed of all 
that went on among the workers in the factory such as which worker was more in a position of 
leadership among others or who had such ambitions. 
The workers quarreled amongst themselves because of that supervisor. He would never talk 
with the owners in front of the workers but gave them reports secretly, to keep face that he had no 
special relationship with the owners. He had become greedy and wanted drink parties now and then. 
He was nice to those workers who bought him drinks but those who gave him nothing, he would 
report against them. Most quarrels were caused by the supervisor's attitude. He would incite one to 
fight against the other. The owners favoured the supervisor such as if we took a trouser from the 
factory, we had to pay for it but he could take things without payment. Every Friday, after the work, 
they would go to the pub for parties and some workers would entertain him. Those who didn't try 
to please him, he would complain against them and get them sacked. For example, he tried his best 
to get me into trouble because I never gave him any gift. He was troubled at that I was allowed an 
hour's break on Fridays, and that I would take paid holidays on Eid days. Thus he once complained 
that I had stolen. I think he did complain before this incident as well but the owners never called me 
in. In fact I knew that even before this supervisor had joined the factory, I was allowed to take a 
trouser when I needed one but the supervisor saw this as an insult that I had not told him. He added, 
"this man is trying to be a leader among workers and while they are supposed to be under my control, 
they listen more to him". The owner pretended that he was angry and he scolded me which I think 
he did only to satisfy the supervisor. When the supervisor left, I told the owner that [the supervisor] 
328 
was against me because I had never bought him a drink and that he had tried on several occasions to 
incite the workers against me. The owner said he knew it all but he advised me to stay calm. Perhaps 
he [the supervisor] just wanted to create a misunderstanding between me and the owners. He thought 
that the owner would reprimand me, that I would be rude to him or that perhaps I would quit the job 
myself and this would leave him in full control of the workers. 
The owners had seen that I worked very hard, that I worked even on Sundays and was ready 
to come whenever called, and so they didn't want to sack me but, on the other hand, they were also 
depending on the supervisor. This supervisor was important to the owners because he was quite 
senior, almost as senior as I was. He was very good at his job. The best attribute that he had, from 
the point of view of the owners, was that he understood the psychology of the factory workers very 
well. He was senior, and he was an expert in telling the owners whatsoever happened in the factory. 
He was serving as an intermediary between the workers and the owners and he was to the workers 
just as he was the owner himself. When the owners had, for example, a party, they would give him 
some extra cash. The greatest benefit to the owners was that they had bought just one man and that 
was because they didn't want to go to each worker and say, for example, "you don't work hard", or 
that, "you don't do this or that properly". They just wanted the right kind and amount of production 
and they were happy in giving him ten pounds extra so that he would then deal with the workers and 
it was all left over to him. In those five years I was there, he quarrelled with between 15 to 20 
workers. One of the workers grabbed him outside the factory and beat him so much that he became 
all wounded and bloody. The police came in but all the workers laid the blame on the supervisor, that 
he was very mean. The workers and the supervisor decided to solve the matter amongst themselves 
and a truce was made. But the supervisor developed an enmity with many others too. The worker 
who had beaten him, was fired by the owners though he had been wronged against beyond limits... 
2- There were two workers who quarrelled a lot and one was expelled from the factory. The 
reason for the quarrel was this: The workers had to pack the finally prepared dresses in see-through 
bags. When the packed product was sold to a warehouse, they returned it because of certain defects. 
The boss called the two packers in for an inquiry. Each accused the other of carelessness. The goods 
were returned because they were wrongly packed. But there was no way to find out who packed 
wrongly. So they blamed each other and started to fight. The fight went on to such an extent that they 
fought outside the factory after it was closed. So the boss called both inside and dismissed one of 
them. Such quarrels were common. (Oldham). 
3- Once, one of my co-workers was expelled from the factory. The owner pushed him 
physically out of the factory. The owner said he talked too much. He was a part-time worker and had 
his own taxi cab so he was not desperate for work. He therefore didn't submit to the scolding but 
answered back. He said that he was working properly and that the target of work was being achieved 
and therefore it didn't matter if he talked whilst at work. The owner said, "I am the boss here and 
you will have to do what I say". He said, "I don't know any boss. I only know my work. If I do the 
work incorrectly, only then you have a right to reprimand". The boss resorted to invective and said, 
"get lost". I asked him to be polite to the workers. He said, "all those who want to leave can pick 
up their jackets and go. We can get as many workers from the market as we want". However, later, 
the boss realized that he had lost his temper and asked me to call the fired worker back but the latter 
had already left. Physical clashes or little short of that happened four or five times during the last 
year; it is always those present around who stop the two involved from hitting each other. (Oldham). 
4- We had a worker there, for ironing and pressing dresses. He used to drink at work but he 
was good at his job. The supervisor kept filling the owners' ears against him, about his drinking, and 
that he didn't do his job properly. We knew that he was a good worker but he drank because his 
duties were very hard; when you iron you have to work in steam. He seemed quite fed up from his 
work. The owners reprimanded him at drinking at which he became so angry that he picked up a rod 
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and broke the windows glasses. He shook the old lady, who was one of the owners, by her collar and 
threatened to kill her. The police were called in and they arrested him. Later we saw him being 
brought in police custody to collect his wages. Three police officers escorted him. (Manchester). 
5- Many times we have a conflict at the workplace. Once two of us quarrelled at playing a tape 
recorder. They shouted at each other because one wanted to play it and the other wanted silence. 
(Manchester). 
6- Often, when one would take a bit longer tea-time, because all were Pakistanis, the others 
would fill the boss's ears against him that X was wasting time or Y had gone there or done this or 
that. Even if the boss was away from the factory, he found out all that happened in his absence. The 
selected workers would see to it that he was told of all that happened in his absence. (Oldham). 
7- Now it is like this; I know this job well because I have experience of doing this job in two 
factories, but there is a tradition among our people that they want to show that they know better than 
others which they show in the often said remarks about others' performance and comparing it with 
that of their own. They say, "I know the job, I work more than he does" or that, "he doesn't know 
the job", or "he doesn't do his job properly". Because there are no certain criteria for performance 
evaluation, and there are many tasks of different nature and dimensions, you can't easily compare 
one's performance against the other. There is no major issue or a big problem here except the 
remarks that people pass about each other, "I am better than him". Now my co-workers have been 
in the same factory for a very long time and so they think that they are more experienced, and that 
they can handle situations of trouble, but they want to believe that I cannot do the trouble shooting 
when needed. Now a time of problem or crisis doesn't come every day, so how can you prove that 
you can do the trouble shooting? So they form negative opinions about a person that he wouldn't be 
able to handle a situation when, in fact, the situation hasn't appeared and the man hasn't been tried. 
It is rare that a machine breaks down and you have to pull up, or there is a power failure and you 
have to locate the cause. The usual faults that arise are only that the size of bags is smaller or larger 
than required which you can easily correct, or that the printer has stopped and you have to fill ink 
in or make it work, or mix the raw material in proper proportions, what ratio of which colour, and 
so on. When the supervisor is on leave, you are supposed to do his job but then the workers compete 
to take his place because they think that by showing that they are more capable than the others, they 
could be promoted to the level of the supervisor and at such a time they discourage others by saying 
that the others don't know many things and therefore should not be trusted to work in place of the 
supervisor. They [my colleagues] were ignoring me and they believed that in the absence of the 
supervisor and some senior workers, I wouldn't be able to run the shop floor, they even went so far 
as to say that I cannot run the section if the supervisor is not there. 
Once the supervisor went on a leave for four weeks. I and a senior worker were supposed 
to run the extruder section and we took in a third worker to help us in running the section. On one 
weekend, the senior worker working with me had to attend some social events and then attend a 
religious gathering, and so he said, "lets close the factory for three days because the supervisor is not 
here, I will not be here, and Zamir cannot run the section on his own". I said I could run the section 
on my own but they didn't trust me and they decided to close the factory for the weekend. On top 
of this, they mistrusted me so much that they kept the decision, to close down, a secret until Friday 
came. Friday was the day I had to take full responsibility for the working of my section and they 
believed that I would not be able to do and hence would ask myself that work be stopped that 
weekend. When I reached the factory, the supervisor of the day shift told me that there was a power 
failure and nothing was working. They told me to ring the manager at eight in the evening and tell 
him that there was no power, and then shut the factory and go home. When I rang the manager and 
told him that there was a power failure, he said, "wait there, I am sending a technician who would 
sort out the problem". A technician came and I told him about the circuits at which he corrected the 
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system and we started to work. I was able to get the factory going ali weekend as against the 
expectations and prédictions of my colleagues. My colleagues didn't like it much. (Slough). 
8-When I realized my mistake and began to sweep the floor, many began laughing at me; they 
ridiculed me by calling each other and showing them, "look he is cleaning now". And then they 
would satire, "now clean the other side as well". I thought I could not stay there. People there were 
wilfully dishonoring me. I felt tense because there was no respect for me there. They treated me 
bad... when I had that problem with the supervisor who said, "I will cut your throat", the Asian 
workers told me to go and apologize... The workers told me he had stabbed someone before, not 
in the factory but outside somewhere. It could be a rumour but he was fit [strong]. (Slough). 
Tvpical Cases of British Asian Coercive Control on New Immigrants: Harsh Working Conditions: 
Demeaning Attitudes: Off-Books Work: Non-Work Control: Frustrated New Immigrants and Inter-
Personal Confi ict 
\-Kalim carne to Britain when someone, takingpity on his sheer dépravation despite éducation 
and hard work, gave him his British passport on which he pasted his own photograph. His description 
of the working conditions is typical ofthe Asian restaurants, has been narrated by many working in 
thèse restaurants, but the employers are seldom short of man-power in this sector due to the 
continuous arrivai ofnew spouses from the sub-continent. We note here, to show the extent to which 
the desire to control others exists among Asians, that in most arrangea marriages, the spouses are 
brought over from home countries even when proposais from British Asians are available, mainly 
because the new corners, owing to their legai/social dependence upon the host family, are more 
amenable to control: 
The restaurant opened at nine in the morning and during the week we worked from nine to 
nine. Then we would close after cleaning up and arranging things. During Thursdays, Fridays, 
Saturdays and Sundays there was no limit to working hours. We could work until mid night or carry 
on until one o* clock in the morning (that is, much more work on the week-ends). We could sleep 
only when the work finished. The employer said we must start at nine every day but the time to leave 
depended on when the work finished which was not certain; no holidays at ali, seven days a week 
work. But we had lesser work on Sundays when the work would finish at around nine in the evening 
and then we needed an hour to clean up things. But on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays, there was 
no limit to work ending. On one night I finished working at two in the morning because we had an 
order for a marriage party and then he rang up and said that I should come back to work at six in the 
morning (this means that I worked 20 hours out of 24 that day). But for ali this hard work there was 
no credit because I had a weak point in that I was not allowed to stay in the country and so he knew 
that it would be nearly impossible for me to find a better job (and he took advantage of this): Once, 
it was the Eid day and I said to him that I wanted a holiday. He said that as our restaurant was an 
Asian one, more people would visit the restaurant on the Eid day. I said it was his business, but I am 
a Muslim. He said, "well I am a Muslim too but we have to make money". I said, "you are a 
businessman and you need money, so you would keep the restaurant open, but I am just a worker and 
it is my holy day and so I want this one day to stay at home". He said I couldn't take a leave and he 
talked with his partner who said that though I couldn't leave, I may go for the prayers but then I must 
come back to work. My weekly wages were £30. I said to him that he could keep my one week 
wages (£30) but he must let me have one holiday but he refused at which I said, "during the last fìve 
months, I have worked seven days a week and had only five holidays and that only because I was so 
sick that I couldn't come to the restaurant", but he said that I must come to work after the prayers. 
At this I said, "I will work for you after the prayers but that is ali, and I resign". He then told his 
partner that I was determined to leave at which the partner asked him to give me £10 extra for the 
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Eid day. I said to him, "I get paid for my work and this money on the Eid day is given to children. 
I am not a child that you should give me these £10". He said he would be happy to give it to me. I 
said, "if you are so generous, why don't you give me a day's leave for which I am willing to give 
you £30; my one day wages are only £5 but I am giving you £30 and you can hire someone for that 
sum to work tomorrow". He said, "you know that it is only me who has hired you. If I file a 
complain to the pólice, they would send you back to Pakistán". I said to him, "don't complain but 
do sack me and keep the money due to me". They used to pay on Sundays and the Eid was on 
Thursday. I said to him, "keep my week's wages but don't complain. Let's part as friends". He kept 
insisting that I should come to work and so I was left with no choice but come to work. But there 
were no customers that day and after mid-day he allowed me to take a half day leave. He knew that 
if he was to replace me at the least wage of £1 an hour, he would have to pay £96 a week. 
On another occasion, a friend of mine carne at 11 at night and told me that the brother of a 
cióse friend had died. I wanted to go for condolence. I said to the owner, "my job is all done and I 
want to go for condolence on the death of a friend's brother". He said, "there is still one thing to do; 
you haven't mopped the floor". I said I would come early the next day and mop the floor but this 
friend was waiting outside for me and we would be very late to the house where a man was laying 
dead. He said, "no, you must finish before you go". It took me 45 minutes to finish the work and 
my friend kept waiting for me outside; this was the attitude of this Pakistani. After five months, the 
Indian took over and the Pakistani became the assistant. The Indian was a bit better in that he raised 
my wages from £30 to £35 and allowed me one day off in a week. I requested him to keep my wages 
low at £30 but allow me two days off because I was not able to work so hard. I wanted two days to 
be able to look for other jobs, but he refused to allow me two days off. I worked for nearly a year 
and a half until I saved some money. 
I was paying rent to a friend with whom I shared accommodation, £7 a week, and I could eat 
at the restaurant. The most difficult task in this job was to load and unload heavy objects. The van 
would come and deliver heavy things like sugar and flour sacks. He would say, "you have such a 
healthy body, these sacks, even a child can lift them up". I used to tell him that I had a back-bone 
problem and if some thing happened to me who would be kind enough to give me food at home? I 
was not entitled to any welfare benefits, who would support me? On the other hand, if something 
happened to him, he could even take a prívate treatment. But he kept insisting that I should lift those 
things as well as do my regular job. And he used to say that in a taunting tone. Once he asked me 
to lift a huge pot of boiling milk which I couldn't. His partner had had an operation but he lifted the 
pot and then they made fun of me. I said I got £30 a week but he made between £1000 and £1500 
every week and so his morale was high and he could take risks but I couldn't afford to take a risk 
with my physical safety. If he got hurt, he could still manage, but if I was sick and off work, they 
wouldn't pay me a single day's wages, so why should I endanger myself? However, they kept 
criticizing me that I didn't do this or that. When I had saved some money and cleared my debts (I 
had borrowed money to buy a ticket to come to Britain) I gave up that job. But the first five months 
were horrible. I knew nothing and would understand little of how to wash and clean things and he 
would criticize me all the time. The first five months were terrible. But then I learned. 
(We may note the dijference between the earnings of the employer [between £1000 and £1500 
a week] and the employee [£30 a week] though they were putting, at least, equal efforts in making the 
business succeed. Most Western employers in such circumstances would normally be more considérate. 
Many hard working men in America and Europe have the chances to rise and even end up as general 
managers in the businesses they put their efforts in, but Kalim, as are most of his social class in 
certain cultures, was exploited in one business after another). 
In my second job, the wages (£1.25/hour) were cash-in-hand wages. No tax was paid on these 
wages and they never gave any wage slips. At no job I was given a wage slip and no one else got it. 
The supervisor, though he was not really a supervisor, would tell the office how much overtime 
anyone had worked. If there was a mistake we could go to him. There was no clock system. Nothing 
written. They just remembered it that, for example, I worked three extra hours on Monday etc. There 
332 
was never a quarrel about this, it was ali on memory and during this they also would take some hours 
off if someone had to go to the doctor or for another problem, and ali this was remembered. They 
allowed me a leave on Eid day and didn't deduct wages. 
(In his circumstances in this later acquiredjob in a large factory, Kalim was gratefulfor only 
two paid leaves in an year, and one hour paid leave for prayers in a week). 
But that was just two days in an year; if we needed a leave other than that on Eid day, we 
could get leave without pay. No leaves with pay. Not even on a sick note. If you miss a day they 
would deduct wages for the day. One day, I said to them, "look, I am the most senior worker in your 
factory, I have worked for so long with you, for about three years, and if you calculate the tax you 
would have paid to the government it comes to several thousand pounds which you have saved. Now, 
as a favour to me, why don't you give me a return ticket to Pakistan because I want to go for a 
month". They consulted with each other and agreed that they would give me a ticket, which was 
worth £400 those days (1985), and a leave without pay for sixty days... I carne back after an year and 
they welcomed me back to work. 
(However, Kalim 's weak point became a source ofblack mail when his supervisor, who didn 't 
want him to jeopardize the latter's privilege, of being the only man trusted by the owners, began 
harassing him. The supervisor didn 't want Kalim to be dose to the owners and he harassed him so 
much that Kalim had to leave his job. When the supervisor and his men wanted to fight with him, 
Kalim couldn't retaliate because of the fear that if polke was called in, his secret would befound). 
The supervisor was astonished that I could be such a coward. When I refused to fight, they 
knew that I had something to hide - some weak point. The next day I went to one of the owners and 
told him everything and said, "look, he wants to put me in trouble and if the case was to be brought 
to police investigation, it would be bad for me and bad for your reputation as well. Perhaps it 
wouldn't harm you much but I will be ruined and so please just sack me". He didn't want to sack me 
and so he called the supervisor in and, pointing at me, said to him, "this man, even if he does not 
work at ali, don't bother at ali. Don't even teli me about his time of arrivai and time of leaving. 
Leave him on his own. Even if he wastes time in the toilet or steals, let him do what he wants to do". 
The supervisor was very angry to find that I had such intimate relations with the owners. But the fact 
was that the owners knew that I was worth a lot to them. They paid me less and got so much work 
done; they would cali me whenever they needed me. And then they knew that I could not leave them. 
The other workers, when they got legalized, learned the language, had some experience, and would 
leave for better jobs but I had to stay where I was. I was the only senior worker who also gave 
training to the newer workers. It is hard job to train a worker; you have to spend hours training them 
and save material from wasting. The point is that it was not that they liked me, they just needed me; 
I was invaluable to them. [But] the supervisor had become a senior member of the staff and he 
quarrelled with me almost every day. He would find newer and newer persons to incile them to Fight 
against me. One day I became so upset that I told everything to a friend that the supervisor prepared 
men to challenge and fight with me and I had to beg apologies from them for I could not fight on 
account of being an illegal person in the country. He said, "don't worry, when they come to fight, 
you just escape from the situation so that no blame should come to you and I will teach them a 
lesson". He was very strong and he worked as a bouncer at a club. He was Pakistani, an uncle of 
those with whom I was living. He knew my position as an illegal immigrant. He waited outside the 
factory. When the supervisor sent his man, drunk and shouting obscenities at me, I told him to shut 
up, that I would break his teeth. When he carne to fight, my friend intervened and asked him why 
he was mad at me. "You have insulted a Pakistani", my friend said, "I am a Pakistani too and I can 
fight with you ali. Come out ali of you". When they realized that this wouldn't work, they abstained 
from fighting with me and began thinking over some other scheme. Realizing that their next step 
could be dangerous for me, I just left the job. If I had a legai right to stay in this country, I would 
definitely have tried to get him sent to the police and to the prison for his mischiefs with the workers 
because it was only because of him that the poor new entrants got lesser wages. 
In my fifth job, my new employer was a nice man but someone complained against me to the 
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authorities and I left the city. 
2- 1 didn't have a work-permit and there were three or four men and a similar number of 
women [in my section] who didn't have work permits and these were particularly pressed by the 
owners to do more than the others but were paid less than the others. We were paid just £1.00/hour 
but we had to do almost double the work than the others. After two and a half months I left the job. 
In my next job, they gave us £40 a week out of which £5 had to be paid towards petrol-share to go 
to work. When I went to work there I told them that I didn't have a work permit. So they said they 
would pay me £2.00 an hour. I was told that there would be lots of overtime work. But then they told 
me to work on piece-work because that meant that the more I produced, the more I could earn. It all 
depended on one's efforts. So I worked and worked hard. I went there at 7 in the morning and left 
at 7 in the evening. I had the greed to make more money so I produced bundles and bundles. But at 
the end of the week, when I was to collect wages from that officer who paid wages, he just gave me 
the fixed wage. When I asked that I had worked on piece work basis, and that I had worked so hard 
and made a lot of units, they said there was no need for me to talk much, and that if I wanted to 
demand to be paid on piece-work basis, I should first get my work-permit. He said, "here's your 
wages, if you don't want it than you may leave the factory". What happened was that they used tricks 
to get more work out of us but when they found that the wages came to an amount more than their 
limit, they would refuse to give more than the limit. That is, they had a fixed amount of £60 a week 
as maximum wage limit. If the actual wages amounted to more than £60, they would not give more 
than £60. But the supervisor had told me that if you work on piece-work basis, you earn more. He 
said that I could work on piece work basis. And he even calculated my wages on piece-work basis 
and handed over his calculations at the counter. But when he tried to get our wages from the office, 
they said they won't pay the exact amount because they weren't authorized by the owners to pay more 
than £60 a week. They told me to get confirmation of wages from the boss's wife. When we went 
to see her she said, "you can only get £60 a week and not more than that". If I had argued further, 
there would be a quarrel. I just left the work after three weeks. The first week I worked eight hours 
a day. The next week I worked twelve hours because it was summer and days were long. But when 
they didn't pay me my due amount, I worked eight hours the third week and then left work altogether 
because they made us work too hard. Some people worked five days and some worked six days. But 
this was meaning-less for those who didn't have their work permits. They won't pay more for more 
work, no over-time, and no piece-work. (Manchester). 
3- Most of my fellow workers suffer from bad temperament. They have just arrived from 
Pakistan as spouses. Many have regular quarrels with their wives because the wives talk in English 
which they cannot understand. In the factory they take their frustrations out on others. (Manchester) 
4- The largest problem they had was that they got a lot of men who had come to Britain as 
spouses and as such were not entitled to income support for an year. They couldn't speak English, 
and knew nothing about this society, the offices and other things. So they just lay wasting in the 
homes... they were spouses and were bullied at the home of the in-laws where they lived... and they 
kept searching for other jobs. Now when they weren't even allowed to talk [at workplace], when they 
had weaker immigration status, and had to work nearly double than an average worker at wages of 
just 50p an hour, because they were new and it was said about them that they knew nothing... they 
would get say 50p an hour if the usual rate was £2 an hour. They were even happy with that for they 
thought they would learn to work in a factory and then would have some prospects. But the owners 
took advantage of their weak points. They would call them whenever they needed them - even on 
Saturdays and Sundays. These new-comers knew that if they didn't obey, they would rot as jobless 
with absolutely no source of income. (Keighly) 
5- Many times there were quarrels among the workers. The Asians working there all had a 
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weak point that they were newly arrived from India or Pakistan, and when they would corne, usually 
as spouses, they didn't know English. Second, they could not work in the English firms for they 
either couldn't talk to them or knew nothing about the English firms. (Birmingham). 
6-When I began my first job, I had no desire to work in a factory. I had just come from 
Pakistan and I wanted either to continue with my éducation or go back to Pakistan. I had no intention 
but I was compelled to work... there was a tensionamong my relatives about why I was not working. 
I neither had funds for éducation nor was entitled to a grant. I didn't even have money to go back 
to Pakistan (where higher éducation is very cheap compared to that in Britain). I therefore began 
working. After some time I began losing interest in work especially because of the drudgery of twelve 
hours a day; monotony and length of hours. Gradually, I began developing conflicts. (Brentford). 
Low Wages in Asian Businesses; Money Motivation: Exploitation 
1- 1 thought, £2 an hour, having looked around everywhere, it was £1.50, £1.75, and £2 was 
décent compared to what was going... I have never heard of that thing called, there was no 'basic 
wage'. I heard about a basic wage in this kind of a field when I was talking to a friend who worked 
for 'Marks and Sparks' and she said that they had a basic wage and then what they did on top, that 
was a very good idea, I thought, and I thought if there was a factory hère (with that system) I would 
love to work there, but, you know, this is very very high class, I'd love to work there instead of 
£1.50 or 1.75 being morally, emotionally screwed up; that's what I cali it... (Leicester). 
2- Even if you worked extra hours, they didn't pay the extra sum. There is no rate system [for 
wages & overtime] in thèse (Asian) factories. (Slough). 
3- Because it was ali piece work, so what happened was that women were also driven to work 
harder, thinking they will make more. And they were obsessed by that little books they had and how 
many pièces they had made. I mean, like if they made 150 pièces at 50p, or whatever, they would 
write it down, right, and he (the employer) was always checking that they didn't add more on. And 
there would always be slight skirmishes about how much. Even if paid 50p less, which he always 
tried to, that was his nature, what they would do, they would say, "no -1 want that 50p", they would 
demand it. And, he (the owner), he used to be very religious, he was a very nice person but what I 
couldn't understand was that he was obsessed with money, and I used to think, how can you be 
religious, because your religion doesn't say that you have got to hoard ali this money, and he was 
very niggardly, I would say, penny, he used to calculate every penny. And, (his) sister-in-law, she 
told me that one of the brothers, he was kind of a millionaire in India. So that was what puzzled me. 
That religious, you know, religious piety, when he was talking, and yet the accumulation of wealth 
he had. I used to get on him on that and he didn't like it. (Leicester). 
4- When it cornes to pay you, its like you are taking an arm off them, you are going to hurt 
them to give you the wages even though you have earned it, you have done more than enough to earn 
that money, you really have. (Huddersfield). 
5- An Asian employer reasoned as follows: 
We have girls working who have also worked in English factories and found no différence 
in wages or in working conditions. Girls in the fashion or knit wear trade make a piece that sells for 
£5.99 on an average, while our product sells a dozen for £5.99; there is a différence of one to twelve. 
According to the custom hère, the company rates, i.e. the government fixed rates for underwear/ 
socks manufacturers, are exclusive of the fixed rates. So our profit ratio is very small. One knitwear 
jumper is equal in price to 12 underwear. For an underwear we have to put in pièces as small as three 
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to four inches - jumpers are made up of larger pieces - so more work is put in for lesser unit price... 
We give our workers the same facilities as they would get in English firms... The girls who make 
underwear in English factories are paid the same as we do. Then we do give them a 10 to 15 % bonus 
so that if someone has been paid less, the shortage is made up for by the bonus. If someone has been 
paid more, the bonus would encourage her to keep working better. (Ashton-u-Lyne). 
(A logicai conclusion of such reasontng as given above about the difference in unit price 
between an underwear and a larger piece of clothing would he that workers in the latter industry 
should be better paid. But it turned out that wages in knitwear and other Asian textile industry were 
equally low: But then, again, this could be reasoned out as that the amount of work put in for one 
jumper would be much less than that put in for a piece of underclothing). 
6- The doctor gave me a sick note and said that I was not fit for work, from the first of 
November. And Shahid (the employer) didn't pay me due wages for two weeks although he told the 
DSS that he had paid me wages for two weeks. So neither the DSS nor Shahid paid me. The DSS said 
that the factory owner had written that he had paid me. In addition to the money he owed me, he 
didn't even pay the sick-pay. When I went to the factory to get a sick pay form they made me wait 
outside the factory for three hours. At first, on telephone, he said they had no sick-pay forms. I went 
there myself and after three hours when they gave me the forms, they would not fili it in. They said 
they couldn't fili it for me and that I should get it filled in from the DSS. I went to the DSS and they 
said that the form should be filled in by the factory owners. So I went back to the factory and when, 
finally, they filled it in, they filled in the wrong dates and they didn't sign the form, which the DSS 
pointed out, and so I had to go back to the factory again. Then they refused to give my P45. On 
telephone he said that he would report my doctor for giving me a sick note for a very long time. I 
got my P45 later after too much hassle. Pakistanis don't deal properly. But not ali of them. Some 
businessmen, even though they give low wages, talk politely and give you respect. Shahid was upset 
at losing an experienced worker. It was not my fault that I left the job. I wanted to work but the 
doctor said I should not. (Manchester). 
Off-the-Books Employment; Low Wages; Harsh Working Conditions: Corruption; Tax Evasioni 
Exploitation: Money Motivation: Luxurious Life Stvles; Perceived Upper-Class Power 
1- 1 have always tried to work off-books because, you see, living expenses are high, right, and 
so, this job they only wanted to give me £1.50 an hour and I said no, I wanted a bit more. And they 
gave me £1.75. Now, if I could afford to go some where else where I was on the books, I couldn't, 
and I couldn't say no to them and you feel bitter because you are paid £1.75 and you do so much, 
its more the jobs, this again consisted of packing but it was good quality stuff; it was for Dorothy 
Perkins, C&A, who would be selling a garment for £50 yet the people who are making these 
garments, people like me, were paid a pittance. And they (the owners) were paid much, they got 
enough to make a profit but I used to think, my God!, I buy these garments from these reputable 
shops and its people like me who are working. When you need money, when you have your own bills 
to pay, and food, and God knows what else you want, you would do anything, well, within limit, I 
mean like, they were going to pay me £1.50 but I said, "look, pay me a bit more because I am damn 
broke; £1.75", they were doing me a favour, the man thought, 'Oh great, I am paying her 1.75 and 
I am doing her a big thing', the bastard, I felt really angry but that's life. (Leicester). 
2- It does help. For example, if I was to work off-the books, I could get DSS help in mortgage 
payment. But these days it is risky because the VAT officials and tax officials keep inspecting the 
place so they try to avoid illegai workers. But this was quite common in the past. For example, they 
entered fewer hours worked in the books to save tax. (Manchester). 
336 
3- 1 had been unemployed for six months and so I thought I must work. My job was off-books 
and my wages were £70 per week cash-in-hand. It was an off-license and general store. The working 
hours were very long; I worked from nine in the morning until eleven at night; sometimes more than 
that, and for almost seven days a week. (London). 
4- The Asian manager seemed to be doing more people off-books, and they [the owners] 
seemed to be getting more money than they would by doing on-the-books because the cars they had 
got, they couldn't possibly be earned, like Mercedes Benz and things like that and I mean, for a small 
factory only having eight people, you can't get a car like that. And they [the owners] can afford a 
luxurious life style, and they are not scared of showing it. Because, another thing, Asians always want 
to sign on (DSS) and work off-books to get more money since they come from another country where 
you don't get; once you've got the money, like if you come from a country where you have got no 
money, into another country where you have got some money, you want more money. Why should 
you have a little bit? (Huddersfield). 
5- 1 think it would be hard to make a good profit from that kind of work if the workers were 
not exploited the way they were. But because they paid too little to the workers and seldom hired one 
on NI card, hired mainly illegal residents, irregular workers or people in hardship, that is, people 
who could work at the least pay, some were even paid 50p an hour, they made money basically 
through exploitation. If they had workers on regular payroll and at legally acceptable wages, perhaps 
they couldn't make a profit. If they could, I presume the profit would be barely enough for the 
owning family to survive. (Manchester). 
6- When I joined there as a manager [an Asian warehouse], the owner was very friendly with 
me and kept calling me "brother". "You are my brother, my friend", he said. I said, "I am grateful 
and thank you for that. Now what about my designation and my salary". He said, "don't you worry 
about that, we shall keep you happy". I kept asking about the terms and conditions of the job and he 
very politely and very amicably kept avoiding the real issue, "don't you worry we will give you more 
than what you were getting before". I told him that now that I was a legal resident of Britain and had 
a NI card, I wanted to work in the legal way and wanted my tax and NI contributions to be deducted 
from my salary, but he said, "you just start work, after a week or two we will sort out this matter, 
we have just opened this warehouse and we have to make it a success". I worked for the first week 
and when it came to wage payments, he paid me £80 for 6 days which was less than my expectations. 
I had been working from 10 in the morning till 9 and 10 in the evening. I said, "Mr. Farhan, what 
would be my salary for six days, twelve hours every day?". It was not only sales job but all 
arrangements in the warehouse and there was only one man working with me in the warehouse. We 
were dealing with the customers, receiving deliveries and displaying the clothes - doing all tasks at 
the warehouse. I told Mr. Farhan that I used to make around £120 a week at G. Brothers and 
therefore, when he had asked me to work for him, he had promised that he would give me more than 
what I used to get before. I said that if he didn't want to give me more, at least he should give me 
as much as I got at G. Brothers especially that I had resigned from there because I was told that I 
would get better pay. Mr. Farhan said, "lets see what happens the next week". The next week he gave 
me £100. I protested again but again he was very friendly but evasive on the real issues. He treated 
me as a friend, used to call me to his office to have a chat with him, have lunch with him but when 
it came to salary, he very nicely evaded the issue. I felt bad especially because I had waited so long 
to get the NI card in the hope that I shall have a decent wage, a legal status as an employed person 
and a record of work so that I could rise in a legal way, and that I had so much valuable experience 
in sales and Mr. Farhan badly needed a man like me to increase his sales in his new warehouse; it 
was because of my contacts that they were getting many new customers but he was not being fair with 
me. The next week I pressed hard and I said that I wanted a decision about my status and salary in 
that firm. He asked what I wanted. I told him that I wanted to work on the NI card, as a legal 
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employee, and on a decent wage. I told him that I wanted to be on the payroll, I wanted a job 
description and hours of work and all terms and conditions of my job and I wanted a job title and a 
position and a fixed rate. He uttered, "all right, lets say that you are the warehouse manager". I said 
that was fine with me, and what about my salary?. He began arguing, "see there are many problems, 
we can't be successful if we pay taxes on wages, running a new business is not easy, we haven't yet 
begun to earn much and I have to give a share of profits to the partners as well; you don't know 
about many things". He wanted me to work off-books. That was his whole point and I refused. I said 
I had waited for the day when I would be a legal resident and a legal employee in Britain and now 
that I had got it, I couldn't carry on being an illegal employee. He said, "all right, lets do it this way, 
we will officially declare that you are our legally part-time employee; in this capacity, we shall pay 
you £40 a week from which tax and NI contributions will be deducted, and you would benefit from 
this arrangement that the tax and NI contributions on £40 would be minimum, and we would benefit 
that we will be paying an insignificant amount to these institutions (DSS and Inland Revenue), but 
in fact you would be our full-time employee and your full wages will be given to you as cash-in-hand, 
and for this amount, no official records will be kept". I asked what would be my total wages, at 
which he replied that the total per week would be £125 from which £40 would be paid on record for 
my NI contributions. Although this offer was not the ideal one, I had no alternative and I thought 
at least I have progressed that bit further. When I asked about the timings of work, he said, "brother, 
why don't you consider it your own business, your own home, just feel at home here and don't worry 
about the hours, come when you feel like coming and just see that all work is done; we are all a team 
and a family here". I said, after all, I had a family and they needed to know when I shall be back 
home. He said, "come on now, this too is your family here and just see that customers get what they 
want and when there is no work, you can go home". He didn't fix any time. 
I worked there for more than two and a half years and I realized that none of the Asian 
owners ever want to employ one on legal basis, they cannot refrain from exploitation, and if they 
would hire someone legally, they would either exploit him in an outright and obvious manner or they 
would exploit by using a very polite and brotherly tongue. The second kind of employers would make 
you feel as if you are one of them but would not give you a dime more than what is the barest 
minimum and without which nobody would stay. 
At this job, apart from that my working hours were so long that we sometimes had to work 
well past midnight, I was generally treated with great respect and politeness. However, there was 
never a pay rise given and whenever I would ask for a bit more, he would evade it; there were no 
overtime or extra benefits. After six months, I asked them to make me on their records a full-time 
legal worker, he said, "come on, why are you so keen to pay taxes? have you lost your head that you 
want to put yourself and us in this hassle of government institutions?". 
My basic reasons for quitting was that I wanted a legal job where I would feel secure in the 
eye of the law; I wanted to pay tax and NI contributions and that if I ever wanted to apply for better 
and high status jobs, I should have a valuable experience and a good background. This desire was not 
being fulfilled there. They didn't want to legalize my status as a full-time employee and I knew that 
I had no employment rights unless I was not a legal full-time employee. Eventually I got fed up. After 
submitting my resignation, I tried at a few places to get jobs in sales but because, in Manchester, 
particularly in clothing sales, the market is perhaps dominated by Asians, they exploit their employees 
too much and secondly, they try to keep you as an illegal employee or a part-time legal employee. 
I talked with about fifteen employers whom I had come to know in the course of my work at the K.S, 
at G. Brothers and at D. and C Many wanted to hire me but at the same conditions as were common 
in the industry and for which I had resigned from D. and C So I decided not to seek employment 
at all and instead I bought a taxi and became self-employed. I saved some money from this job and 
opened a gold smith shop in partnership with a skilled gold smith. He used to work at the shop while 
I did the taxi job. I was a sleeping partner at the gold shop because my partner was the skilled man. 
In a goldsmith business, even if you make twelve bangles of a tola (10 grams) each, it comes to 
£1200 and so very quickly you get a high VAT amount that you must pay if you are doing your work 
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honestly. Many of my relatives have made millions from goldsmith business because they do not keep 
any records and do not register themselves with the concerned institutions. The way Asian goldsmiths 
do business, they become rich quickly but in fact if they do their work on a legal bases, the profit 
would not be that high unless they increase the price of the finished goods by the amount of the VAT. 
Hence we began losing Asian customers because they go to the goldsmiths who do not charge the 
VAT amount. The only alternative for me to succeed, after having registered myself for VAT, was 
to make fake invoices to pay small amounts of VAT, keep the VAT inspectors satisfied, and sell the 
rest underhand. So these two factors, my desire to be honest and the disorganization of my partner, 
led to failure and finally I closed the shop after having made a net loss of £6000. Because my 
competitors were doing business without paying the VAT, there was no way for me to win customers. 
For six months, I lived on income support and kept looking for jobs. When I applied for jobs in 
English-owned factories where I hoped to be employed legally, they asked for relevant experience and 
skills. Eventually, in great depression, I left Manchester and moved South because I was told that job 
prospects were better in the South. I applied for jobs in about six or seven factories but the problem 
of having all experience in sales became a barrier in getting jobs in production. When I applied for 
income support, I mentioned that I had a house on mortgage at which the DSS refused to give me 
financial support on reasons that I owned a house. I told them that the house was not a property but 
a liability because it was on mortgage. But they refused to give me any help. One of the dealing 
clerks at the DSS said to me, "I don't understand why you had to mention that you own a house; 
there are people here who own six houses and still live in council houses". 
7- ... some of the women, they work there because they are supposed to work only 15 hours 
a week, and that because they have a child and the benefit (Single Parent Allowance) is regulated in 
such a way that they cannot work more than 15 hours, and there is a factory where I was supposed 
to go and my friend told me not to work there because they, what he used to do was give you £5 a 
day no matter what you sew and you have got a lot of those women working there. There are many 
factories in Leicester you could move to but that one that we are talking about, I couldn't understand 
why they worked there at £5 a day. [I later found that] they were on the DSS. And some of them 
were working off-books and the owner said if they quit job he would tell the DSS. I was going to go 
there, I was ready, but my friend warned me, look don't go there because once you are in there, if 
he said I will go and tell [the DSS], I'd lose everything. I mean I'd lose my income support. 
But if he was keeping them off -books, how could he tell the DSS ? Wasn't he equally guilty ? 
Yes. But the problem is what would he lose? Not that much as the other person. Because they 
(the workers) themselves had told the DSS that either they were not working or working 15 hours, 
but were working full-time, he had the upper hand. 
/ see. But wait, he had no record of the workers who were off-books? 
You can tell that to me and I will find a way out, right, but you tell that to the illiterate 
women! And even if they do, right, so much information comes to them that so many cases are 
quoted, 'Oh, I know sister, I know pahn jee (dear sister), this is what happened' and they get 
frightened. And if your best mate tells you, or the one who lives next door to you or works with you 
tells you oh don't do that, this is what happened, then you get more scared. (Leicester) 
8- Even the legalized workers had a weak point that they all claimed social security benefits 
as faking unemployment. The work at the factory was just an extra source of income to them. If 
someone complained against the owners, his own status, his records showing him as an unemployed 
person who got everything from the social security, could be pointed at to the DSS or concerned 
authorities. So the workers as well as the owners were thieves in collusion and no one could complain 
against the other. 
My point was that, for example, when the owner threatened you that he would report you to 
the immigration, couldn't you say that he too would be charged with employing illegally? 
No. It was never known that if an owner had hired an illegal worker, or a worker who also 
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claimed welfare benefits, and the matter was reported, that the owner was ever fined or jailed. 
Nobody thinks that there is some law of the government that says that owners are responsible for such 
things, or so did the workers explain, or it was said that if someone was caught working illegally, 
he will just be deported. This meant no harm to the owners. (Bradford). 
Conflict Related to Religious Divisions: Hooliganism: Non-Work Conflict: Social Control on Personal 
Beliefs. Values and Activities 
1...there used to work, in that factory, a Muslim girl, who used to sew. Ramaish [a Hindu 
manager] fell in love with this girl to such an extent that he converted to Islam and married her, but 
because of the affair between the two, the Muslim workers in the factory caused a lot of trouble. The 
majority of workers there were Muslims and therefore the conflict became serious. They refused to 
cooperate with the manager, refused to obey his orders and worked as they liked. For example if he 
wanted to stop the workers and offer them overtime work, when there was an emergency order to 
be completed and shipped, the workers wouldn't stay to work. The usual way of resentment was to 
disobey his orders. They [the Muslim workers] approached her [the girl's] family and put pressure 
on her to such an extent that she ran away from her parents and took up residence some where else. 
The major reason for my leaving that factory was that I had a confrontation with Ramaish, not on the 
issue of his love affair and the workers resentment, but because Ramaish got this false idea into his 
head that I was leading the workers against him, that I was inciting them against him. He got this idea 
because he saw that the workers used to come to me. He also felt bad at the bit of influence I had 
with the owners and he began playing tricks to downgrade me in their eyes. The tactics he used 
against me were religious background, religious divisions; he told the owners, who were Hindus like 
Ramaish, that I resented Ramaish marrying a Muslim girl because I was a Muslim and hence, I have 
joined the gang of Muslim workers who were creating trouble in the factory. 
The owners were very religious and they resented Ramaish accepting Islam but when he told 
them that he loved the girl and wanted to marry her, and that his conversion to Islam was not genuine 
but an act put up only to marry the girl, they stopped bothering about him. Then they began 
supporting him and offended many of their Muslim workers to the extent that many left their jobs. 
2-In the beginning they were three partners. Two Sikhs and one Hindu. But when the 
Khalistan movement was at its peak, the Sikhs developed some differences with the Hindu and the 
differences became so sharp that even the factory workers would get involved and it seemed that the 
factory would shut down. Then the Hindu's partnership was dissolved and his share was paid back... 
The Sikh factory workers began hating the owners for favoring a party that had led the attack on the 
Sikh independence movement. They said how could they join a party like the Congress when they 
are Sikhs and how could they entertain Hindus and be hospitable to them. The Sikh workers began 
whispering to each other. Even the supervisor would join in this gossip against the owners but never 
in front of them. Then the supervisor did a mischief. He got a worker drunk and planned to create 
a scene of a brawl between a Hindu and a Muslim. Prompted by the supervisor, this worker got 
drunk and he came to me and challenged me to fight with him. I thought how could he fight with 
me?; he was so weaker than me that I could have beaten him very easily... (Birmingham) 
Inter-Personal Conflict Related to Sexual Harassment: Sexism due to Segregation of Sexes 
1-1 know of three cases, but the supervisor would trap only those girls who had just arrived 
in the country, particularly from India or Pakistan, who needed help. Later these girls would tell other 
girls and they all turned against him so that they went to the owners and demanded that this man 
should not be allowed to come to the 'women's section', and they demanded that instructions be given 
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chat instead I should be sent to the girls. In fact I worked in the 'women's section'. They said if the 
owners need some urgent work to be done, or if they had any complains about women's work, then 
I should be told to come to them. Then the owners told him [the supervisori not to go to the women 
and this led to another problem that he bore a grudge against me and he was angry why the women, 
senior and junior alike, supported me for supervision instead of him. 
On one occasion, the supervisor said some filthy things to a girl. She brought along her 
husband and when the supervisor went out of the factory, he beat him black and blue so much that 
the owners had to go out of the factory to his rescue. They grabbed hold of the husband and handed 
him over to the police. (Birmingham). 
2-(The following narration cornes from afemale interviewée. In the beginning, she asked me 
to turn the tape-recorder off, but when I did, she changea her mind and allowed me to turn it oh). 
In an Asian factory, when I was at work there... because thèse people expect a woman to be 
religious, an Asian woman, you know, because she is not supposed to know about marriage if she 
is single, and she is not supposed to know about - er - any other matters. So when women used to 
talk, they would talk, kind of, very low (voice) because they considered, even though I was 20 or 21 
at that time, I was too young to know about such matters... I think one of the brothers [the owners], 
I think he liked me. Well, because his wife was there, and you see, when you work in a place like 
that, what you do is you prétend that you don't know about these things; you would when they make 
a, er, remark that is very 'suggestive', you kind of cut them very kind of - innocent, that either you 
don't have enough expérience, you don't know what that remark is and you look at them. I think he 
did that about three or four times to see 'is she aware of what I am up to'. I knew what he meant but 
I kept my face straight and said "bhaijee" (dear brother), and that used to really get him. (Miss O. G. 
seemed well aware of the cultural symbols of the sub-continent where the best way to deter a man 
from making advances would be to cali him a brother; thus implying that his unwanted thoughts are 
too horrid in the cultural context where men are raised to protect their sisters to an utmost level; many 
a murders have been reported to have cause in just leering at the killer's sister. Note Miss O.G. 's 
awareness ofthe employer 's frustration at being called a brother).. .because, to be always on the safe 
side, you always say to every one, er, "aunt jee", "uncle jee", or "bhaijee" (using the familial terms 
in order to evoke a normative concern in the other for the maintenance of respect and decor is a 
psychological way of normative control which is often used in the sub-continent in many contexts, also 
in contexts other than the one being discussed; e.g. a sales deal maybe sought by calling each other 
'brother'if only to get theprice changea) depending on their age and everything, and I used to think, 
"put him off", and I kind of look at him as if saying, "oh, what did you say? what did you mean?". 
But it was very frightening, sometimes, because I was working after the other women had gone ... 
We do some kind of ground work before we go to a factory to work; like asking people if 
they are decent enough to work for them? that they won't want to exploit? Because, what happens 
is that most, yes, 'cause, I'H teli you why because I used to work for - I was very desperate for 
money- and, what happened, this was absolutely terrible because the women there, er, I usually find 
that women are very good, er, cooperative any way to work with, right, but this woman [the wife 
of the employer] was very very hard to work with, you know - my fingers, sometimes I would catch 
them on the hanger that I used to put, right, and it used to tear the skin, and even though I worked 
as hard as I could, right, she was never ever happy. And, what happened, I think she knew that her 
husband - right - was one of those what we cali, funny men... and he really was, er, er, always 
touching - everything like that, right, and she [the wife] used to be really nasty to me. Every time 
she carne, right, and her husband was there, right, or he would come, right, like he would send his 
son away, "go and get that", and then he would kind of talk to me, look at me, some of the things 
like, "have you got a boy friend, and where are your parents"; I mean it was one barrage of personal 
information he was demanding out of me, regularly, about everything, right, and I don't understand, 
I think, she [the wife] knew that her husband was, kind of philanderer, to cali him. But she would 
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get angry with me, and I just didn't understand. You know, I tried to teli this other woman, only one 
woman who used to come in, right, it's not very nice thing to say but she [the wife] was not exactly 
pretty, she had about two or three children. I think men would generally say pass it, you know what 
I mean, and I would ask why would he do that to me; it's like he was always talking to me, because 
it was just a coincidence that whenever she [the wife] carne in, right, that man was talking to me. He 
was always talking to me and I couldn't, what could I do? Could I say, "shut your mouth please?", 
he was my boss. Do you understand? er, she never, I think, it was like doing the early stages, lets 
see how far we can go, right, and she [the wife] used to ring from the home, she used to absolutely 
run, "I am coming to the factory", she used to come, straight, I couldn't believe how fast she would 
come to the factory, right, I think she knew and it was terrible. Because what happened was that he 
was like touching my clothes and practically breathing in your face and you can't even say well 
you've got bad breath you know, and you can't say that to him that you are a small ugly man, right, 
you are old enough to be my father; but - it was terrifying. But , er, he had, he had the power. I 
mean she [the wife] used to harass me to do more work, he was harassing me like, emotionally. I 
mean, how much â person, how much can you take if some one is always like, bumping into you?. 
And it was terrible. I would never ever want to work there again. For a woman, its much harder 
because you see, I don't know, maybe, when you stand next to a man, or a man standing in front of 
you, you tend to feel very small. You feel as if, if he was to touch you, you couldn't fight back. If 
you feel that much, but then, having said that, maybe its because of the way I was brought up. 
(Miss O.G. told me later that she had oppressivefundamentalist parents). (Leicester). 
3-There were between fifteen to twenty female machinists, three male cutters, four men who 
laid the clothes for cutting, four press men, five packers; I think there were about forty workers in 
ali. The three brothers [the owners of the factory] were well behaved and decent and didn't take 
advantage of the female workers but their brother-in-law, whom they had brought over from Pakistan, 
did ali that. He took advantage of his position in the family and in the factory and he began having 
affairs with the Asian girls in the over-locking section. The brothers and their sister, that is, his wife, 
knew about his flirtations but they usually turned a blind eye to this because any confrontation with 
him could lead to their sister getting divorced and thus stigmatized in the Asian community. Besides, 
the girls he had affairs with, never complained and therefore it seemed that they were willing 
partners; perhaps the girls allowed him to exploit because they were hard pressed financially, or they 
were afraid he could dismiss them from job, or there could be other reasons. 
The brothers were only concerned with the work and were reserved in their attitude; they 
sorted out the wages but while they played soft, the brother-in-law was there to control and pressurize 
the workers. The supervision was ali done by the brother-in-law and during supervision, he used to 
get his own purposes sorted out. (Manchester). 
Racial Situation in Asian Businesses: Différences in Work Patterns and Life Styles: 
(Analvsis given in pages 191 to 198) 
(There werefewer statements about racial situation in Asian businesses than those about the 
same in native British businesses because the former predominantly emptoyfrom among Asians only) 
l-[When] the White people said well I want a break he could have a break, when an Asian 
said can we have a break he couldn't. The White employées were treated much much better; they 
were at par with the manager who was there, an Asian manager, though he didn't get as much work 
out of the White employées as he got from the Asians; the Asians sometimes stayed till night. This 
was because they (Asian owners) are from the same culture, they know how we live, they come from 
the same background [and so] they know that the Asians are more easily - you can get more work 
out of the Asians (but they) won't give them (much) but they give it to the White employées and 
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another thing, they told the White employées not to tell it to the Asians that they were giving (more) 
so there was a secrecy in pay nere. Nobody knew how much the other got. The White employées 
sometimes got together at the end and compare, I think, but when an Asian came (they were not 
supposed to tell) - and there was a lot of préjudice between the Whites and the Asians which I 
couldn't understand because the Whites didn't want to do that much work (more than eight hours a 
day) and there was already préjudice about being Black or Asian that they shouldn't come together 
because, people, and another factor, that people who were working in this factory were ali the 
working class - there is a lot of préjudice in working class - préjudice against each other on racial 
grounds. Well, left the Asians because the Asians have nothing to gain from préjudice, they are here 
to make money, the Whites are because the Asians are going to take over their jobs which 
[resentment] is rightly so because in Huddersfield if you look anywhere there are Asian factories here 
and there scattered around and you won't see many White factories, right, the White employées, now 
I am talking about the old ones, who got out of school at 15 and started working, now when they 
were working, there were White employers, and there were a lot of them; if they [White workers] 
got out of one job, they could go to another. Now there being, they [White employers] normally used 
to employ Asians; now its the reverse, the Asians are employing the Whites which disillusioned them 
[the WTiite workers] because when they were little they used to have a lot of White businesses and 
this gets them angry because, I mean, wherever you look you've got restaurants, you've got take-
aways, taxis, you've even got the higher-up, which were all White dominated, well now it isn't, and 
the White people are getting angry. 
Asians are employing Whites because Whites are more reliable. True that Asians are more 
hard working than the Whites but only to a certain extent. If the manager is there on the shop floor, 
and he looks over them, there is nothing like an Asian worker, but when he goes, they start talking 
like women and do what they find. And if they hear that the manager is back, they go on. The White 
worker is constantly with the work even if the manager is not there: They are very loyal to the firm. 
But another thing; if they [the Asian owners] do have Asians, they know that they can do it off-the-
books, and that brings them more profit. (Huddersfield). 
2-Two of them are Asian girls, one Muslim and one Sikh, and then one White boy, Ryan. 
They don't consider; we talk about White people considering Black, coloured people, not much, well, 
they treat him like, something out of - the dust bin. The employers don't want him to do anything 
like going to the safe, and (they assume he would) take some money out - he is not allowed to go in 
there. Ail he has to do is pack and stand at the shelf - and that's it. The other workers think like he 
is always, you know, he is very clever. I feel sorry for him - the poor thing. 1*11 never do that to a 
person. (Leicester). 
Racial Situation in English/Western Businesses (Analvsis given in pages 191 to 198) 
1- The workforce [at Ford] was mixed; Africans, Asians, Whites. In my section, the majority 
of workers were immigrants. The total number of workers at that plant were between four and five 
hundred. There was no conflict; the relationship environment there was pleasant. There were just 
jokes about each other but even that too happened within one's group. People usually stuck to their 
own kind; for example during tea and lunch, the Asians sat together and chatted in their own language 
about their own affairs, the Carabians sat with their own kind and talked about their own affairs. 
Sometimes they also mixed and sat with other groups. Jokes were quite common and sometimes we 
used to refer to some characters in some movies and make fun of the Carabians who then called us 
names but only in fun; generally it was quite pleasant there and mostly we talked about work and 
compete with each other, "you have worked less, I have done more than you", etc. (Slough). 
2- There was no conflict between the Asians and Blacks but the Blacks have somewhat lesser 
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understanding than others; they are a bit wild in their treatment of others. But that is ali. I once did 
some favour at work to one of them but after that he used bad language with me and expected me to 
go on doing further work for him. I told him that I had done a favour to him but I would not go on 
doing his work ali the time. At first he tried to bully me but when I didn't budge, he became alright. 
If they treat me bad, I do the same to them and then they settle down. Perhaps there is a value among 
some people that if you assert yourself and show that you are not weak, then you are accepted as 
equal, then they are friendly. Otherwise they want to press their colleagues. They don't care for a 
friendly environment but only for their money and if you treat them nice, they think you are soft and 
they want to encroach further to get more favours. If they give you a bad response, give them a bad 
response because if you are nice to them, they won't care. (Slough). 
3- It did not cause any resentment among the English people that Asians were taking up their 
jobs because at that time they needed workforce. And a lot of Pakistanis came to textile industry 
which demanded a lot of people. And they carried on... In those day s because the employaient 
situation was fairly good, nobody took notice of such things if anyone was coloured or White or Black 
- whatever it was. Everybody carried on. (Manchester) 
4- There were no tensions between the Whites and the Asians. But as far as the Whites (are 
concerned), a wonderful term once used by my manager, said to me; there was an Asian lady who 
had just joined in, and it was Saturday morning and he said, "we'll let the Asian invasion stay on the 
shop floor and we are going to the back and finish the back off". You know; clearly amused, small 
remarks like that but ali ignorance, White ignorance, I cali it, that only Asians torture Asians or only 
an Asian can be attracted to an Asian - you know, things like that, but I mean thèse are petty things 
[not confiict]. (Leicester). 
5- 1 am sandwiched between the Whites. But I have got no problem, no problem working with 
them. I don't know if there is any resentment really because everywhere I have worked, you know, 
I mean, when I started at the age of sixteen, I was the only coloured apprentice. You get little 
problems but you get on with life, there is no point in making big deal of it, there might be someone 
calling you names but that happens everywhere. If you prove yourself that you are better, if you 
prove that you can not only manage yourself but others effectively then obviously people have respect 
for you. I don't know if there is racism; maybe if I was White I may have progressed a bit quicker 
but there is a 'maybe' in everything. Isn't it? Maybe if I was in my own country, I won't have got 
respect because over there you need, you know, you need personal contacts for a start. (Slough). 
6- Well, after living in Britain, we start criticizing the system nere like the locai citizens do 
but there are many times more efficient Systems here and in the offices they show you many 
courtesies in an impersonal way, which would not be extended to one in Indian offices unless they 
personally know you... I have really come to believe that people in poor countries exploit their fellow 
countrymen much more than people in rich countries do, and I think this is because of the need to 
have some security first before we could be charitable to others. (London). 
7- It generally appears that there is not a préjudice here against any race but in some acts and 
in some events, one may feel such a thing and only a very sensitive man can feel it; it does not 
normally show up and it's manifestation is normally resisted. For example, when I was an operator, 
I worked for some time in the morning shift with ali White workers, and then I worked in the evening 
shift. I used to keep a diary in which I noted my observations. I observed that the speed of machines 
during the morning shift was reasonable. As soon as the evening shift took over, the setters used to 
increase the speed of machines but our Asian workers seldom noticed the différence; only very few 
noticed this change of speed. I used to wonder why the moment I sit to work, the setter comes to the 
machine and adjusts i t . I then began noting the speed on the counters of the machines when I would 
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enter the factory and then I noted the speed after the Asian workers had taken over. Twice, in front 
of the manager, I alluded to this increase, I didn't say it directly but I just said, "I wonder why the 
machines work faster when the Asians take over"; the manager explained it by saying, "that is 
because you Asians are among the best workers in the world". (Slough). 
8- There were two persons, one was an Asian chap and one was an English chap. The Asian 
chap, he claimed that he was being racially harassed and also that he was being discriminated against. 
So, there was an inquiry about that. And the other chap was transferred from our department to 
another department - that was basically it . . . according to the management, they were both not pulling 
their weight, not doing the work that was expected of them. The Asian had been on numerous 
occasions, according to the management, not doing his work, wasting time, wasting resources. But 
according to him, he said he had been threatened, bullied, harassed. The Asian chap gave his notice 
in. He resigned. Then he went to the personnel and said, you know, I have been racially harassed and 
everything, there was an inquiry, everybody was called in. Half of them would not say anything for 
fear of losing their jobs. One chap, er, before he went to see them, the personnel people, his manager 
said if you say something wrong, you know, your job might be on the line so he didn't say as much 
as he would have said otherwise, and some, they spoke the truth to an extent. I myself said, I was 
leaving any way, so I said to the people who did the interview, l'Il speak my mind because I don't 
care, I am going any way, and I said, it wasn't a colour thing, because if it was a colour thing I 
would be in the same position as well, it was just that, you know, because they thought he wasn't 
working hard enough, they kept him messing around and, he had said that he had been threatened, 
pushed around, but there was no proof because it was basically the manager's word against the 
Worker's word, and basically the manager, he is looked upon as telling the truth while the workers 
are probably just complaining ali the time. So then I said that I believe him, in the sense that he had 
been pushed to this position any way, so, but there was no result. The inquiry went on for two weeks. 
I spoke for about forty-five minutes. Just said yes, no, yes, no, and then what I found out and what 
I said to the personnel people, was that she, the personnel manager, was writing everything that I was 
saying, in an abbreviated forni, and when she reread it, it didn't sound the same as what 1 had said; 
it was watered down, and I said to her, "you seem to be watering this down you know, you do not 
seem to be taking this seriously", she was surprised by what I said, you know, basically nobody had 
been bold to say this to the Department (Personnel), and I said, "if this was a manager complaining, 
you'd be quick marching to find out where the thumb was, but because he was just a worker, you 
don't give a *** basically", and so I said, "could you write down what I said", so she said, okay, and 
she had to, you know, it was my statement, so she said, fair enough. But nothing carne out of it. 
During the last year there been three situations of dispute but thèse are classed as minor incidents. 
There maybe (more) but nobody was brave enough or out-spoken to say something about it. The only 
complaint I had was once mismanagement of my wages. Apart from that I had no conflicts or 
confrontations with the management at ali. (Leicester). 
9- 1 was in-charge of White workers. The workers there had no resentment at ali. It was the 
assistant manager, you see, who didn't like me; it was a personal affair. For some reason he had a 
notion that a Black man, or a coloured person should not be in a position of management or - because 
I stood a chance of getting further beyond, and there, I was dismissed. A few months later I received 
a cali and I was offered a position of a training officer by Courtauld in the Head Office. I went back 
and I was told about the situation that "we know what happened to you before and if we had borne 
that in our minds we won't have offered you the job. We know, we sympathize with you but lets 
forget the past and start again". As a training officer I did my functions properly, build my trust but 
somehow, after a few months, I realized that whenever a vacancy came up, for a job as a group 
training officer who is in-charge of training of a few milis, instead of offering me the job, they 
recruited somebody from outside. They would not offer me the job of a group training officer but 
kept me as a training officer in the Personnel Office. When my divisionai manager died, I was the 
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senior most person with higher qualifications, practical and theoretical, I was a group training officer, 
he was a group training manager, I was the next person in line for promotion. I was not given the 
job.... [but] somebody who had no knowledge about the textile industry. 
I don't think that the English saw me as culturally incompatible. They knew I was a Muslim, 
I stick to my views, I was unbending in that respect that whenever we had our annual parties I would 
take my wife with me but we never danced, we never took wine, we ate exactly what suited us. We 
would say we would come if you provide us with our meals and they were cooperative in that. 
Have you ever seen a person who mixed with them entirely, ate pork, drank and danced, and 
adopted all their habits, was there a greater chance of him being promoted? 
Tony was promoted. He was like that. He was a Black Indian Christian but he never rose 
above the post of training officer. However, he was working on a machine before that. 
10-For one year I worked as a machine operator after which a vacancy arose in the 
Maintenance Department. I applied for this vacancy. There was a senior worker in the Maintenance 
and his son also worked in the factory as machine operator. When I went for the interview, the 
manager and the supervisor of the Maintenance Department were there. The supervisor asked me 
some questions which I thought were irrelevant; for example he asked, "how would you feel working 
with all White colleagues?"; this he asked because the maintenance staff was all White. I said, "there 
are people of many races working in this factory, I don't understand why there should be a special 
racial consideration for the Maintenance Department". Perhaps he had in mind that Asians could only 
be machine operators. I further added, "I am living in a country of White majority, the staff in this 
factory are predominantly White, if I have no objection to living in a White country, why should I 
feel awkward working with all White people. I have been going along well with all kind of people 
and I have no qualms about working with all Whites". There was a long list of attributes that they 
wanted in the person to be taken for the said vacancy and this included that the candidate should have 
some O levels etc. Eventually they refused me the job and gave me a letter which did not mention 
any reasons for refusal. The one who got the job was the son of that senior worker whom I have 
mentioned earlier. When I got the letter of regret without reasons, I just forgot about it and didn't 
go to ask for the reasons of refusal. Perhaps the supervisor, who had asked me critical and irrelevant 
questions, felt some guilt or something and he came to me of his own accord; I hadn't complained 
or anything, and he began explaining that the reason they took that man was that they wanted to train 
a young apprentice with a view to sending him to college for further education in mechanics. I said 
I didn't mind though I felt bad at not being given the opportunity. After some months, the same 
vacancy arose again because the man they had taken for the job instead of me was not regularly 
coming in and was therefore sacked. When the vacancy was advertised, I didn't apply for some 
reasons. This time they took in a brother of the maintenance supervisor. Anyway, during the time 
when I was refused that post in the Maintenance Section, another vacancy arose in the Inspection 
Department. This vacancy had arisen from the resignation of a Pakistani worker, the only one 
Pakistani working in the Inspection Department who had been facing some problems about which 
there was a general impression among the Pakistani workers that the problems arose from his being 
coloured. When this Pakistani worker resigned, there were rumours that he had met with racial 
prejudice but no one knew the truth. People used to say that, "he got so fed up that he had to resign". 
When this vacancy arose, it was advertised on the factory notice board. I applied for this job though 
the requirements and person specifications for this post, as mentioned in the advertisement, were quite 
discouraging, for example, so and so number of O levels - high sounding phraseology - good 
command of English language and some very high standards of experience which showed that they 
wanted to discourage Asian applicants. But I was a man there who considered himself well educated 
compared to an average White worker and was trying my best to get into a better position. I was 
undaunted by the high sounding phrases and eventually I applied for the said post. There were about 
twelve candidates, including some very senior operators, at least more senior that I was, but only two 
were short listed; I and a White woman called Maria. Now Our Production Department consists of 
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two shops; one is the 'Mould Shop' and the other is called 'Secondary Opérations' where we do the 
sealing and packing and other things. Among the two people short-listed, I was an operator at the 
Mould Shop, and Maria, the other candidate, was an operator in the Secondary Opérations. Now, 
when workers are taken in as operators, they are told that the operatore at the Mould Shop are the 
'first inspectors', because, they have to check their product first and then send it to the 'Secondary 
Opérations' and any faults must be discovered first by the operator himself; the operator at the Mould 
Shop is supposed to mark and rectify the faults before sending the product to the Secondary 
Opérations, or at least, mark the faulty producís for recycling. The operator at the Secondary 
Opérations has only to take out the marked faulty producís and pack and seal the rest. I believed that 
because I was a Mould Shop operator while Maria was at the Secondary Opérations, I was more 
suitable for the post of an inspector than her. But Maria had joined the factory a few months earlier 
than I had and was therefore considered senior to me in terms of length of service; she also had done 
some O levéis and worked as a nurse as well. But then Maria had never worked in the Mould Shop; 
she had always been in the Secondary Opérations, and I believed that I was more educated than she 
was because I had a B.A. , though from Pakistan and that I had the relevant expérience of being the 
'first inspector'; her expérience at the Secondary Opérations was not that relevant. However, after 
conducting the interviews, the management offered the job to Maria. After giving the job to Maria, 
the personnel manager, the manager for Quality Assurance, and the supervisor of the Inspection, 
without any complaint on my part, without any protest or initiative from my side, called me imo the 
office and instead of giving me a formai letter of refusai, said to me, "we are sorry that at this time 
we have not given you this job; the reasons are that Maria is senior to you in length of service". I 
said, "I have no objection to that though I feel that I have been evaluated with less than fairness; first, 
I had more éducation than you demanded, secondly, my relevant expérience is more than that of 
Maria; she has worked in the Secondary Opérations while I have been in the Mould Shop, and I was 
always told that the operators in the Mould Shop are the first hand inspectors. Even then, now that 
you have decided to give the job to Maria, I will not protest". Perhaps they felt that I had been 
treated with some injustice and therefore the manager of Quality Assurance said, "I have an idea, we 
would be having the post of a back-up inspector soon, we would like to offer you the post of a part-
time back-up inspector and we would give you training for this post; for the time you would work 
in the Inspection, you would be paid in accordance with the wage rates of an inspector but on ali 
other occasions you would continue to work in your présent position and we would keep calling you 
to work as an inspector when one of our regular inspectors would be on leave; in addition to this, 
when we would have a full-time vacancy, we would give you priority in considération for the post". 
I accepted the offer and worked as a back-up inspector for an year and a half. I was given training 
for a quality inspector and then I began working as back-up inspector in addition to my work as 
machine operator. Then I got myself transferred to a night shift job in the Secondary Opérations 
Department. I worked two months there. Then an inspector, a White women, was sacked on charges 
of gross misconduct and the vacancy arose at the post where she worked. I had been promised that 
as soon as a vacancy of full-time inspector arose, I would be given first préférence and therefore I 
applied for it. An assistant manager said to me that the vacancy of inspector would not be 
automatically given to me but would be advertised on the notice board. At this I protested a lot 
because I had believed that this job of inspector was my long due right. We exchanged hot words and 
arguments. I said, "why do you want to advertise this post when you already have a fully trained 
back-up inspector who was promised that he would be given priority for this post - why then 
advertise?". He said that it was a normal procedure at the factory that ali vacancies should be 
advertised. I quoted several examples of vacancies that had arisen before and given to people without 
advertisement. I said that if I was given this job without advertisement, it won't be considered 
favouritism because I had been promised earlier that I was being trained with a view to be taken in 
as full-time inspector. He said, "even if we give this job to you, we must advertise it". The job was 
advertised and nine people, including Whites, Blacks, Asians, applied for the post. These people knew 
that the job was my due and they kept saying to me that they knew the job was my due but they had 
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applied for it only because it had been advertised. Interviews were held and eventually, I was offered 
the job. Now I have been working as a quality inspector for the last two years. 
We had a iemale inspector with whom I once had a conflict and I wrote a letter of protest to 
the management about it. She had often been rude with the operators and ail including her supervisor 
and manager knew that she had an insulting longue. It was said that she had, in the past, been a 
reason for getting two Asian operators sacked because she had presented her side of the story well 
enough but the Asian workers had been unable to défend themselves against the charges she levelled 
against them and certain facts remained unproven. On one occasion, an operator was standing by the 
clock-in/clock-out machine. She was standing in front of him in the queue. This worker, only in fun, 
went ahead and said that he would clock-out first; she retorted seriously by using the F-word and a 
racist invective. The operator in turn did something not mentionable. She complained to the 
management and the operator was given a written warning. The incident did not occur in my 
présence. I didn't know what happened because I was at the end of the queue; what I am telling you 
is what I heard from other operators who were nearby. The operator couldn't explain well and he 
took an interpréter with him when the inquiry was held. There had been two similar incidents 
involving her in the past and two operators had been sacked. People used to talk about them but I 
don't remember them exactly. She also had a conflict with an Asian material handler who was a kind 
of chatter box and used to make jokes with ail people. Ail knew that it was his habit to joke around 
and so no one bothered. But one day when he joked about something with her, she threw a bundle 
of tie wraps, which she was holding in her hand at that time, righi into his face. She then ran to the 
shop floor where there were many people working so that she should have witnesses to whatever 
happened later; the man ran after her and slapped in her face in front of ail the workers. The man 
was so angry that he slapped her again. The supervisor on the shop floor saw ali this and when the 
case was sent to the Personnel, he gave his testimony that he had seen the man hitting her. The man 
was suspended from job and sent home. But then, another material handler, an Asian, came forward; 
he had been working in a corner and had seen her hitting him with the tie wraps first. He gave his 
testimony that she had hit him first, and so she too was suspended until further instructions. The 
second day, there was a meeting among the personnel officers and both, the Asian man and the White 
woman, were sacked on charges of gross misconduct. (Amersham). 
W-The following statement was discounted on account of self-contradiction and for reasons 
given in p. 198, footnote 13: 
Mostly they pressed the Asian workers too hard - the English workers never stayed in the 
factory because they could not work that hard. They promoted the English and looked after them 
well; if they did something wrong it was ignored but if we made mistakes, we were given strong 
warnings. An English man worked with me. He was usually absent from his work in the beginning. 
I complained that because of his fréquent absence, I have to do his work as well and therefore, either 
he or I should be transferred to some other department. But no one paid attention to my complaint 
because I was an Asian while he was White. When I requested several times, they finally transferred 
me to another department. I once got a very good place in the factory; it was a very good task with 
good money and I considered myself lucky but later on, an English superintendent transferred me to 
another department and appointed an English man, who had recently joined the factory, in my place. 
When I asked the superintendent why he had transferred me, he said that he had the authority to 
transfer and I had no rights to stay at one place. I think I should not have been transferred. 
Any other incidents to show that they were unfair to Asians? 
No other such event took place. 
Are there only thèse two incidents that made you unhappy? 
Yes, the two incidents. (Slough). 
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Control Attitudes in Enelish Firms: Impersonal Means of Control: Task-Related Control: No Non-
Work or Personal Control: Considération for Omers' Cultures. Values. Beliefs 
1- There was a system of control. Each noted one's production on sheets at the close of the 
sfiift. Registers were kept. There was a Quality Control Department and inspectors used to corne for 
checking the quality of product.... there was a certain discipline. There was one foreman to whom 
we were responsible. Not every manager would come down to pique us. There were clearly defmed 
jobs and responsibilities that were easy to follow. (Oldham). 
2- The method of control there was simply that whatever we sold was there on the registers, 
recorded, and that determined how much we had been successful. (Manchester). 
3- Personal watching of the subordínales does not play a role in our control procédures. In fact 
we have no regular control system because it is never the same; one day a forklift may break down, 
the next day we might get a problem with a lorry outside. Next day, the temperature of the ware-
house might be rising. Next day the system computer maybe malfunctioning or a conveyer break-
down; its always différent, everyday it is différent; its never the same. You can't say, "I am watching 
you fixing this truck"; there is no predictability. Obviously, once you get better and better, you can 
do the job quicker, it is like this, if, while I am working and the system is always running, and it 
hardly stops, then I must be doing something right. If the system stops, then I must not be doing 
something right. (Slough). 
4- Regarding control on work, they used to give us a work sheet which was a list of jobs or 
tasks that a worker had to do each day. The quality of work was checked personally by the supervisor 
and the owners; if they were not satisfied, they would instruct you to do it in some other way. I had 
no complains there. (Brentford). 
5- The control on my work was only through the phone calis and there was a gap of one hour 
between two phone calis. There were certain points in that huge building where, after fixed intervais, 
we had to go and check, patrol the ground area to see if there was an intruder there, see there was 
no power failure, take more observations in wind and stormy conditions; if there is a work going on 
in the building, then we had to see that it did not interfere with the security installations. There was 
a clock there and a key with a certain number for every check point and we had to key in ali the 
points. When we would apply the key, a print came on which told that at a certain time the key was 
applied. So they controlied without anyone watching what we did. In the morning they would get the 
détails of the times at which ali the points had been checked. (Slough). 
6- Our work was checked by the seniors by personal observation made by the next person in-
charge of you, but generally, like myself, or another one or two people of my department, we worked 
our way up, worked our way up in the sense that, you know, we were trusted that we could work 
ourselves so we were in-charge of our department and we handled it the way we thought was best; 
so basically, we became the managers in that sense. When a manager was away on a whole day, we 
took his jobs up. We were Controlling our work ourselves. The management fond out that we did our 
work properly just by looking at the shop floor. If it looked tidy, we were okay. If there were any 
Problems, we were told. So they weren't observing personally but observing the situation. We had 
a new system brought in; then everything was monitored; our dress codes, we were marked on, 
performance was noted. When you first start your job you were on temporary parole, what they said, 
for four weeks your performance was noted and then management decided to keep you on job or not 
so that's the only thing so, otherwise you never get - you got compliments now and then for what you 
have done that everything is okay, you know, carry on. They were strict in that if you did your job 
the way you were told, then you are okay. (Leicester). 
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7- This too was owned by the English. They were good people. They made us work hard but 
they did not oppress us. We could take rest for half an hour to an hour between work, we could go 
to the toilets and we could wash or comb hair, or take tea time, but so long as we produced a certain 
amount of goods they didn't bother about what we did in spare time. We worked eight hours a day, 
we could also work ten hours, but it was flexible to suit our convenience; we could work less on one 
day and make up for it the next day. I was happy there but they too moved the factory elsewhere. 
(Windsor). 
8- 1 have worked for a number of White employers. I have worked in four shops. Al i owned 
by Whites. Work expérience - summer jobs, things like that. There is a différence between an Asian 
employer and a White employer; They [the White employers] give you good pay, they let you have 
proper breaks, and they let you, they don't supervise you; in fact you are your own supervisor; at 
the end of the day they go with stuff like, I was working in a book shop and how much books I did 
repair in and they say well, you know actually you do more, and you need keep count of the numbers 
that you are doing. (Huddersfield). 
9- 1 had a responsibility for certain machines that I had to make sure that those machines were 
maìntained and were running and that the operatore working on those machines came on time; if they 
didn't, I had to report to the Cadre. Actually you are a 'general dog's body', responsible for a lot of 
things, ... The position and authority remains with the manager and the Cadre. You are simply a 
Cadre's arm. To go around and if he has to teli the workers something - nasty things - then Cadre 
can't go. He sends you there and asks you to teli them off... there was a resentment among the 
English workers that there is a Paki telling them what to do and what not to do. But the job was such 
that if the machines kept on working and everything went going then nobody bothered about other 
things. There were no physical conflicts but a lot of verbal conflicts. But generally there was 
tolérance, because in the textile industry, if a person is working on one machine, he is working on 
the machine on his own. He is not concerned or connected to anybody else. The work does not 
dépend on somebody else. So if you put him on one machine, as long as he keeps running that 
machine, looks after it, and the production is okay, no body is bothered. (Manchester). 
10- 1 would like to see better relations between management and workers. Each manager is 
only interested in reaching his target. Also they have - basically, they want to be looking good in their 
senior manager's eyes; so his department is okay, you know, he's given the okay - that's the main 
reason. This is not always troublesome to the staff but depending on which manager you have, it can 
be a big problem. I have no complaints about the attitude of my supervisor. If you know how to 
handle your supervisor, or anybody in authority, you just be nice, you do your work - thing I 
believed in was, you do your work regardless of anybody else, you do what you have been told to 
do, there is no complaints that could be made against you. I have no problems with the management. 
Not myself. No. About attitudes, I never had a chance, never had a reason to make complaints. But 
one manager in particular, ali he was interested in was to be the number one, he was like that, there 
was an incident in the cafetería, some workers, gave them two minutes to have a break, you know, 
and he was very, I mean its gone to his head basically to be the power, be the manager, you know, 
lucky I had no confrontation with him but the people who had, hadn't had the guts to basically, go 
to the Personnel and complain; nobody had made any complain against him. Two of my friends, not 
in my department but another department who had been sent to have their break, morning, it was two 
minutes to ten o' clock, this manager, he is the Food-Hall manager, he had just finished his breakfast 
and he was on his way down and as he bumped imo them, the two workers, he said to them, "ten o' 
clock, on the shop floor", and they looked at him, looked at their watches and said okay. Basically, 
they had only two minutes break, they didn't say to him that they had just been seni up and the next 
thing is the command from you. They said okay. And I asked them, "are you going to go 
downstairs?" and they said, "yes, its not worth a hassle". If it was somebody like me, I would have 
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said, "I am entitled to a fifteen minute break", and if not, you know, if he had made fuss, I would 
have gone to the Personnel and made a complaint. About the attitude of seniors/management, 1*11 give 
you an example. My first day on the job, I was waiting to be received by my manager. I was waiting 
in the hall. I didn't even know what provisions (I was to handle) were at first and then I found out 
it was méats. So I went to see the personnel manager and I said, "is it possible to get - 'cause it's 
against my religion to handle meat", and she said there is nothing, and there my manager - the 
manager - walked in at the same time, and he overheard this conversation, and she (the personnel 
manager) said we will see what we can do about it but just try it out and he (the provisions manager) 
goes to me, "do you want the job?", I said, "yes", goes, "we have got the job, go over there, if not, 
tell us now we get you out - hop out if you don't want it", I says, "I want the job, I want the job, 
yeah, ail right", and 1 stuck with it but he, you have to watch out for this guy, you really have to, 
he was a Polish chap. And 1 says yes and he says, well go on with it, and I say, okay fair enough: 
I understand that he has a job, you know, business to run and he does not want anyone messing 
around, could be understandable. But if you can't handle meat you can stili work in another 
department. I didn't work in the méats though, they put me to frozen foods, so it did work in a sensé. 
[One problem was] différent implementation of rules. Every so often we had some new rule 
in and the old rules were disregarded. Like we had a period when we never had a food manager, so 
we had temporary people coming in each with his own system of rules. One would say, once empty 
boxes have been used, they should be immediately discarded, then someone would say, just leave 
them in the back, someone would say, bring them down. We had at one period because there was 
nobody to fili a vacancy; we had différent people acting fresh-food managers as they say. So they ail 
had a différent rule system but usually you know what is expected and you know what is not 
expected, so you don't bother what is not expected and you are not always to comply to the rules any 
way so, you know, like I said, if you can reach this position where the management can leave you 
on your own and they are not on your back and they basically expect that you know what you are 
doing, you are on your self, then you are not questioned as much, you are careful. (Leicester). 
1 I-Personal authority was not exercised. There was no non-work control. 
12- We were allowed to pray. We could keep fast. (Oldham). 
13- At Courtauld ... culture was not a barrier as such. When Ramadan came or the Eid came, 
I fought for my people that they should be given "taraveh" (long prayers during the month of 
Ramadan) time. There was a lot of resentment from the management that why were they given time 
(note that the taraveh prayers during the whole month of Ramadan take more than an hour each day 
and as such should be seen a big concession on religious grounds. Even in Pakistan, workers are not 
allowed free taraveh time during work, particularly in private enterprise. I know many Christian 
workers were not allowed a day's leave on Christmas). Finally they were given the time and paid for 
it. The taraveh time changes. When it was deep winter they used to come at ten at night and go 
straight for taraveh. Within an hour they would finish and start working. That one hour was working 
time. But the problem (among the Muslim sects) was always for the Eid time because the mullahs 
could not agrée amongst themselves when the Eid should be from among three days (because the 
Muslims follow the lunar calendar for their religious festivities or prayers, the days do not fall on 
fixed dates in the Gregorian calendar and henee there is ali the room for sectarian disagreement on 
which dates to celebrate Eid). This was the most embarrassing situation for me, what do I tell the 
management as to when Eid would be?, because I had become the spokesman. Différent Muslim 
factions celebrate Eid on différent days. Whose spokesman should I be? One faction or the other one. 
So whatever I did, the people of the other factions would say, he is a dictator, so I was in a difficult 
position. Half of them would agrée (on which day to celebrate Eid) and those who didn't agrée would 
corne to work. (Manchester). 
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Speed and Level of Difficultv at Work in the English Firms (Analvsis on page 159) 
1- The union had agreed with the management on a maximum limit of 160, and told us that 
130 was acceptable limit. But many could make 140 or 150. Some made as less as 120 and were 
tolerated. (Oldham) 
2- The speed of work was checked in this manner; if a worker in the day shift could prepare 
700 moulds, then I was supposed to make at least that much; in other words there was an average 
production target. If I made ten or twenty less, they won't bother but if there was less production than 
that, we had to explain to the management what were the reasons for less production such as machine 
break down or something. If you made 750 or 800, it was deemed good. (Slough). 
3- The machines were automatic and we had to ... feed stacks to the machine after regular 
intervais ... the product would come out and was packed in boxes automatically. We had to give 
plastic bags to the machines and a robot like arm would put a plastic spoon in each bag. It was an 
easy job but had a lot of responsibility to see that for example, every bag had a spoon - somebody 
could complain that there was no spoon in his pack. Our speed of work was determined by speed of 
the machine and it was very high, in eight hours, one machine would made around 4000 boxes... (The 
interviewée contradicted himselfin the subséquent passage by saying that the speed was ail right). It 
was ail right because we got time - it was easy to control the work because the machine was automatic 
and ali we had to do was to see that the packing was being done properly - that it was not wrongly 
packed - that the boxes were going in the right way, and that the weight in each pack was of the right 
amount. (Slough) 
4- There was a "bonus system" to regúlate the speed of work; if you haven't given the 
specified amount of production within the specified period, they would ask why, or give you a 
warning. We used to get a bonus if we produced the given amount within the given time. (Slough). 
5- You are monitored by if your manager is standing there, you work, as soon as your 
manager disappears on a side, you know, you don't work that hard, but the manager is not always 
there. Main complaint was that they were asking for continuous work; work, work, work, work. 
Basically that was it; you were being watched constantly. If you weren't watched by your own 
manager, you were watched by the équivalent of a floor manager or the équivalent of a fresh food 
manager who kept eye on everybody who was everywhere. I don't know if he was a fresh food 
manager, but he was a manager and he kept an eye on you. So, once or twice I was told for being 
slack and my manager was away, supervisor was there, and she said to me how corne this hasn't been 
put away; you give them one cage of goods to put out and because it was ice cream, they would melt 
and the fresh food manager went over to the supervisor, had a word, came over to me and she said, 
"why haven't you put this away?", I said I was doing it. She said, "you have been here half an hour". 
I said I've been here only fifteen minutes and she said, "just get on with it". I said, "I am doing it 
as fast as I can", she went off. That was it but they expect a lot from you, you know, this one, this 
one, this one. To an extent but not continuous. They were overdoing it. Robotic. It came to a point, 
Zahid worked there (Wines and Spirits Department) and he witnessed surprising things. There were 
the pre-Christmas results for that Department's performance; only one person in that department 
works ali the time, yeah, very large department, the manager, again - Mr. Putnik - came on a tour, 
the lady supervisor or acting supervisor what she was, he says "do you know that since such and such 
date, sales in this department have fallen", she says, "no", he says, "do you know that this is ali your 
fault that we are making this money (less)". Zahid was just watching this and she goes, "well you 
can't blâme me, I only work here, I don't, you know, stimulate the business here by any sense", and 
he, you know, he, there and then, blamed her for lack of sales. Zahid, it happened with him, he was 
working, and [the manager] says to Zahid, "work faster", and Zahid said, "yes", "work faster", and 
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I think Zahid probably under his breath told him to *** off or something like that I am not sure, any 
way, so, but then he carne around and he says, "go to this, go to that, go to this"; Zahid gave his 
notice there and then. He went off and he says I am not working for you. And they said to him, can 
you please come in tomorrow, this is Christmas season, we need staff. And Zahid says, "if I am 
treated like **** I don't know why I should come in and he said can you please send me the money 
I am due, thank you very much but I am not working for you any longer. (Leicester). 
6- 1 did not find any differences there than the Asian ones. They were always around you and 
you were always working... they were also very demanding. By the time I had finished at eight or 
nine, it was hell, because what they would do, they made ski-pants, ski-tops and they would lay these 
huge garments out and I had to fold them and pack them and put the sizes on them and also, you 
know, those labels that go inside, that very sophisticated labels, and the price, everything that goes 
in, had a machine to put it in, and, it was just so hard but because they were so experienced they 
could put the labels on, they could fold them up, put them in bags and throw them in boxes, they 
seemed to think oh yes this is so easy. I mean, because they also gave work out because it was a very 
good factory any way, you see, they never employed anyone who, unlike the other (Asian) factories, 
couldn't work on a machine and like that, there were experienced workers. I think if I had stayed 
there long enough I would have been as experienced as them.. it is the quickness of the hand you 
know and that comes with experience (in time). (Leicester). 
7- At this sixth job, the management and the supervisión were English. There was no unión 
there. I don't remember any incidents of conflict but the owner there was very strict and would fire 
a worker immediately for minor negligence. If you were slow, you got fired on spot. Many times, 
I saw a worker beginning work at 7 in the morning and found that he was not there at 12 in the noon 
because he had been fired or because they could not work as fast as they wanted them to do. We 
didn't have complaints but even if we had they were not of the listening type. (Luton). 
Better Wages and Working Conditions in English Factories: No Non-Work Control and Conflict 
1- 1 think people are happy with the wages, they pay wages which are quite well but I think 
they expected more, but when they found out that they would go down hill, the company as a whole, 
then they won't [demand]. Overtime depends on the hours you do. Sundays is double time. Anything 
after eight o' clock is time and half. Anything before that is a time and a fifth. (Leicester). 
2- They made us work hard but they paid good wages. This was 7 years ago but we made 
between £100 and £130 a week. (Windsor). 
3- It all depends on the owners. Some English too pay less but they are honest in their deals 
in that they pay the exact wages as per the deal and don't deduct unfairly. (Oldham). 
4- There was no conflict, no unión. People had been working there for long periods of time 
and getting proper pay rise every year. (Slough). 
5- The Asian workers at Courtauld behaved better than they do in our Asian factory because 
they had good wages and good environment. Hours passed quicker than they pass now. They had 
showers where all could wash after the work. We were friendlier to each other. Good working 
environment made us work better, and treat each other respectfully. (Manchester). 
6- 1 have worked for eleven years with three English-owned factories. They calculated our 
wages correct to pennies. They properly deducted tax and national insurance. (Huddersfield). 
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7- Issues of conflicts usually, I would say, like people not willing to do what you ask them 
to do. There are no non-work conflicts. They don't really mix them with outside work, you know, 
with the English, they have a different way of living to us. (Slough). 
8- 1 was a shop steward ... I used to listen to the problems of new entrants and interpret them 
to the management. Those were good times. (Windsor). 
9- 1 never made any complaints. Once you've worked in an environment you know who does 
what and who is like what and there is so much to wince all the time about doing the work; why isn't 
he doing it and why am I doing it but then you just sit on it, basically. That's about it. The fellow 
workers were generally okay. We generally shared the same views; management are pain in the *** 
and that was it, basically, you know. In the eyes of the management you can easily be a pest. I never 
carne into conflict with a fellow worker or sénior or another at the workplace. The attitude of fellow 
workers was very easy going. I mean you always get one who is only concerned about the work and 
the rest don't give a damn. And one other thing, if you are new, they start to take advantage of that 
and they say, "oh you gona do this and you gona do that, you do this", but basically if you just sit 
on it, then they know he is okay. (Leicester). 
10- 1 had a good fortune of getting a good job in a well paying firm where I was in the day 
shift where, for only forty hours a week work, I got the same amount as I was getting in my previous 
job (£130) for sixty hours a week work. This firm too was English owned and they ... also had a 
workers' pensión scheme, life insurance scheme and sick pay scheme. There were some other 
facilities as well such as five week paid holiday in an year. The overtime was time and half for 
Saturdays and double for Sundays but we normally worked only five days. The workers were almost 
all Asians. The Whites were only in higher ranks such as setters, the foremen and above. (Slough). 
11- The workers unión at Ford was comparatively a strong unión and if we had any problems 
we used to take it to the shop steward and to the unión. Union membership was compulsory. We had 
some minor conflicts with the management about pay rises but there was never a strike. I don't know 
how the collective bargaining process took place because such negotiations were conducted between 
top unión officials and the management but I did attend many unión meetings where issues and 
problems were discussed; the issues usually discussed were related to pay rise or working conditions 
but such issues aróse rarely - probably once an year. About working conditions, there were hardly 
any significant issues but minor things about adjustments at the assembly line which were solved 
without much trouble. There was neither a major conflict ñor a big issue there. (Slough) 
12- There was no dispute that I could recall, about pay rise or other issues; the management 
used to give pay rise itself to workers who worked harder. The owner used to visit after a week or 
two, observe the work, and increase the wages of good workers. There was no opportunity to demand 
a pay rise; it was all on his discretion. There was no unión. (Brentford). 
Tensions amone Asian Workers in a British-American Firm: Team Leadership as a 'Status Symbol*; 
Intrigues: Fear of Management; Inaptitude for Collective Action (Analysis given on page 169) 
Thefollowing narration comes from a quality control inspector in an American industry with 
a multi-cultural workforce, operating in Britain. As is usual in companies employing Asian and White 
workers, the White workers worked in the morning shift and the Asians worked in the night shift. The 
events described below took place among Asian workers who worked in the night shift: 
There was a rota system among operators on the shop floor whereby, at one time, one or two 
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operatore would not operate the machines but do auxiliary tasks such as putting boxes nere and there, 
fixing tags and so on, which were easy tasks compared to operating the machines. The rota system 
enabled the operatore to taxe turns in doing the easy tasks once a week, which enabled them to relax 
once a week, otherwise it would be very boring and dull to do the monotonous, hard and fast job of 
operating the machine ali week long. 
When a new English production manager took charge, he began doing things in a différent 
way. To bring in changes in the work organization, he created a new job title among the machine 
operatore; he selected team leaders from among the operatore so that for every four machines, he 
created one team leader who was not to operate a machine but do ali the easy tasks so that often he 
would do almost nothing; at times he would just stand smoking and watching the hard pressed 
operatore. On top of that, because the new selected ones were team leaders, they were given more 
wages than the operatore. Under the previous rota system, ali operatore used to get a chance of doing 
relatively easy tasks once a week but under the new system of having team leaders, ali easy tasks plus 
more wages were handed over to the latter, and the once-a-week opportunity to do easier work was 
taken away from the operatore. This system of team leaders brought no benefits to work organization 
but added an idle rank in the hierarchy among the workere which was previously like this; from the 
bottom, first there were the machine operatore, then the setters, then the supervisore. Now in between 
the operatore and the setters, the new manager placed this additional rank of team leaders 
unnecessarily, another carrier, another watch dog who could do the dirty job of pressing upon the 
operatore so that the operatore got one level more separated from the supervisor and, in addition to 
the scolding from the supervisor, they had to listen to the exhortations from the team leaders as well, 
"your production is less, you are not concentrating on the job" etc. etc; things that previously the 
supervisor used to say, now the team leaders would say as well. It caused hurt and resentment among 
the operatore especially because the one-day relaxation of doing the easier tasks had been snatched 
away from them and given permanently and for all-the-week to the team leaders. The workers used 
to say, "what is the task of these team leaders?, they were operatore like us, we shared the hard work 
and we shared a day of easier work, what are they doing now?, they are doing almost nothing and 
stili they get more wages than we do". A lot of complaints and conflicts emerged because of the team 
leaders who had got the privilège of more pay for less work and were keen to retain their newly won 
status. Some workers said that the management had created this new system in order that workers 
should forget their major issues and begin quarrelling among themselves at the lower level. The major 
issues the workers had, stayed where they were, and new issues sprang up which were these, "the 
team leader has said this, the team leader has said that, the team leader has done this, the team leader 
has done that". The operatore no longer had direct conflicts with the supervisor but they began 
considering t n e supervisor their patron and went to him for complaining against the team leaders. 
Our major issues were issues such as not getting a break at the right time, or that one wanted 
to go to the toilet but no one carne to take his place and so he had to continue work in discomfort -
now our machines are automatic machines and you cannot stop them, they have to carry on working, 
no operator can leave his station unless someone else takes his place. In this context, where the work 
is very hard, routine and continuous, going to the toilet is a big relaxation because it enables one to 
straighten his back and relax for four or five minutes. There was another issue that the Asian workers 
wanted a permanent holiday in Ramadan. The management had allowed us one holiday on the Eid 
day but we had to work an extra day to make up for this holiday. But it was not reasonable to ask 
the management to dose the factory for a day, or add one leave for us especially because the Eid day 
dépends upon the lunar calendar and therefore has no fixed date. Among other issues was one that 
when the machines are malfunctioning, the setters do not come exactly when called and sometimes 
they delay for as long as two hours and it is frustrating to run a malfunctioning machine and then get 
blamed for low or faulty production. The operatore get the blame when basically it is the setter's 
négligence in adjusting the machine. Other major issues were related to the over-time; there was 
another rota system under which ali operatore got overtime on their turn; sometimes the rota system 
was ignored and those who couldn't get overtime resented the Ioss of overtime wages. 
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The team leaders were getting 50p an hour more than a machine operator though their work 
was less than the operatore'; on top of that, they began getting the rota overtime that was the due only 
of the operatore; now this was unfair because they in fact were not operatore. They were team leaders 
and if one team leader was on leave and another worked overtime at his place, no one would have 
objected. But when the overtime is available on a machine, only a machine operator should get it. 
When a team leader was given overtime to work on a machine, that meant taking due overtime work 
from a machine operator and the operatore resented it. The team leaders felt that they were a high 
status rank, that they were différent from the operatore, and so they ignored the requests of the 
workers, they won't do a thing for them, and won't give them a break when they deserved, won't 
relieve them at the proper time when they rang the beli for going to the toilet. The operatore now 
forgot the major issues and bickered about toilet breaks and tea breaks. They were entangled in the 
unfair treatment from the team leaders so that petty squabbles went on. We had a mutuai 
understanding among the team leaders and machine operatore that in between the two tea breaks, they 
would relieve us, for fíve minutes, to go to the toilets; there was no rule or régulation about such 
arrangement but we had agreed upon it for our convenience. The operatore used to cooperate in that 
even if they needed to go to the toilet, they would wait for the toilet break and did not cali the team 
leaders every now and then. Now, when the resentment about the unnecessary création of a team 
leader position among the operatore was at its peak, and the former used to exchange hot words with 
the latter, the team leaders decided to show their authority over the operatore by refusing to allow 
them the toilet breaks. They said there would be no fixed toilet breaks but the operatore should cali 
us to replace them when they want to go to the toilets. When this issue sprang up, the operatore 
resented the décision of the team leaders not to allow them fixed toilet breaks. They could not 
understand why this routine was changed. But none had the courage to challenge the team leaders and 
so they carne to me, talked about it along with other issues, and asked me to talk to the management. 
First, I talked with the supervisor about the issue of the toilet breaks. He said there was no 
such rule that we should be given a toilet break at a fixed interval. I said that convenience should be 
the guiding force behind such issues; it was not necessary to write régulations for everything. And 
besides, the system of toilet breaks was operating very well and everyone was happy with it, why 
should the team leaders suddenly decide to abolish it? The supervisor said that there was no way that 
we could have the arrangement back and that if one wants to go to the toilet, he should ring the beli 
for the team leader to come and take his place. He refused on account that once such an arrangement 
gets going, it would become a rule which could not be changed. I then talked to the manager and 
explained ali our problems to him. I said to him that some problems were related to the setters, some 
to the supervisore, and some to the team leaders, and won't it be appropriate if he called in a meeting 
of ali these people, or cali représentatives of operatore, team leaders, setters, and supervisore. The 
manager called in the meeting and I was asked to represent ali the operatore. The supervisor was also 
there. Two men represented the team leaders and two represented the setters. I narrated ali the 
problems, toilet breaks, setters not responding to the operatore when called for adjusting the 
machines, undue castigation such as criticizing the operatore for not properly handling the machines; 
this said criticism had a psychological effect on the operators in that they felt afraid and were 
reluctant to ring the beli to cali the setters. The operatore were getting a rough deal from ali sides; 
the inspection personnel would reproach them for not ringing the beli in case of machine troubles, 
the setters would chastise them for 'undue disturbance' if they rang the beli; "you don't know how 
to run the machines and that is why you have to disturb us now and then". I narrated ali the problems 
to the manager including the complaint that why the team leaders were given overtime from the rota 
meant to be for the operatore, that the distribution of work between the team leaders and the operatore 
was uneven in the favour of the team leaders. I suggested that the old system was better because it 
enabled ali operatore to have a day of easier work once a week. Either the team leaders should also 
work on the machines, or should have their own rota for overtime. The manager accepted some of 
my suggestions and instructed the setters to respond quickly to the operatore' calis. About the toilet 
breaks, he argued that it was not possible to have such a thing as a toilet break, but without declaring 
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it on paper, a mutual arrangement would do no harm, or otherwise the person who rings the beli 
should be responded to. He also saíd that such complaints as I had raised had never been raised before 
and therefore he would like to talk to ali operatore one by one and see if the complaints were raised 
by ali or was it just me who had the complaints. But when the manager called the operatore 
individually, almost ali denied that they had any problems; the typical Pakistani fear when confronted 
individually by a senior manager; "it was not me, it was the others": I was shocked at their first 
sending me in with a list of complaints and then absolutely denying that they had any complaints. The 
management would consider many demands realistic and if we pressed them for acceptance, they 
would sure accept them but the workers have become so afraid of any kind of protest that they didn't 
press ahead. But because such an event had happened to me for the first time, I was shocked; the 
manager said to me, "you were raising such a hue and cry about these problems but the operatore say 
they have absolutely nothing against the team leader system". I discovered later that most operatore 
had close relations and friendships with the team leaders and henee they didn't want to talk directly 
about the latter's disorderty conduci, but because I was a new corner in the factory, they had thought 
that they could fire a shot by placing the gun on my shoulder; that their complaints would reach the 
management through me and no blame from the team leaders would come to the operators; in case 
the manager had decided to abolish the privilèges of the team leaders, the operators could assuage the 
resentment of the team leaders by saying, "we didn't say anything, it was 'he' who got the team 
leader system abolished", and thus have the advantage of first, having the team leaders brought back 
to their proper station of being an operator, and secondly, keeping their relations and friendships 
intact. The reason for not speaking up was to avoid spoiling good relations with the team leaders and 
so they said to the manager that they had no conflict with the team leaders. They had made me the 
scape goat and the team leaders got furious at me so that they stopped talking to me, they won't 
exchange greetings with me. And because I had complained against the setters as well for not 
responding in proper time, they too got offended. Had the operators propped me, I could have got 
ali our demands accepted by the management; the team leaders would have been out of our rota 
because the manager had agreed with me in principie that the team leaders should not get the rota 
overtime from the operatore' due. The conséquence of the operatore' back-out was that even those 
demands with which the manager had agreed with me in principie, he did not implement. He not only 
forgot the whole list of requests but considered them a figment of my imagination and said that I was 
just making a tuss for nothing real. I was disappointed from the operators and refused to take part 
in any protests, or negotìations in future. I said I would not be their advócate in future. The problems 
for which I had taken ali this trouble were stili there; there was bickering about toilet breaks and nasty 
remarks going on and because we had failed in getting anything done about it, the team leaders and 
the setters felt victorious and exonerated from blame; they become more courageous and ignored the 
operatore' calis even more than they did before. 
The team leader system was not only for the Asians. It was for ali workers. In the morning 
shifts, there were ali Whites and so the team leaders were Whites too, in the evening shifts, they were 
ali Asians. Now what happened, I have seen that the White workers, it is very rare that they have 
complains, it is very rare that they need to go to the management and ask that something should be 
done for them; their demands are automatically accepted as a matter of routine and that is why the 
morning shift in which only Whites work, is considered a very favourable shift to work in. 
From then on, I didn't complain to the manager directly because I knew that the Asian 
workers would never back me up; they are ali illiterate and are so fearful in front of the manager that 
they won't say anything even if the machines are too fast, even if they are badly Ioaded with work. 
Whatever the burden on their backs, they would try to finish the work but seldom protest. The Whites 
are différent; you press them and they would straight away protest, give them extra work and they 
would refuse, "it is not my job". Asian workers, there was a time when one would operate one 
molding machine, then another machine was added for him to work on two, and then he has to pack 
as well but they do. The faster you make the machines work, the faster they work and none calis the 
setter to say, "this speed is too fast". They try to cope but do not take demands to the management. 
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Asian Workers' Attitudes Towards Unions in Native British/English Firms: Chaotic Behaviour; 
Pseudo Leaders: Leadership as Status Symbol; Misconception of Union Functions: Abuse of Powers: 
Inaptitude for Union Formation: Fear of Management; Individual Betraval of Collective Décisions; 
Ineffectiveness of Unions: Strikes for Wage Increases: (Analvsis given on pages 209 to 213) 
Ì-A retired group training officer at Courtauld, narrated thefollowing events: 
There was one thing which was very unfortunate. That the majority of the Asian people that 
were recruited, were illiterate. They did not understand what a trade union meant and what the trade 
unions were for. Despite that they paid the trade unions their dues, when ever the conflict came, they 
never took advice from the unions. They jumped into the situation themselves and developed 
confrontation with the management - head-on collision themselves. This is true only of the Asian 
people. The Asian people, when ever there was a conflict, they always created a situation where the 
trade unions were left out. 
English people - they never took their décisions without Consulting the trade unions. But by 
that time they were in such small numbers that even if they took décisions without Consulting 
somebody, they couldn't be effective. Some departments were manned hundred percent by Asians. 
Especially the Ring Room and the Cadre Room. 
The Asian workers went on strikes a number of times. Mostly they would complain about the 
wages. I will give you one example about the wages. How they tackled it, and what happened. There 
was a mill called the Moston Mill on the outskirts of Manchester. The workers over there decided 
that they were not happy with the pay scales that they would like to have more money. The 
management said, "okay, we will discuss it". They asked them, "can you have three persons as 
représentatives - those who are good in speaking and could discuss on your behalf with the 
management, and whatever décisions we would corne up with them on mutuai agreement, we will 
abide by it". I was instructed, as a training offìcer, by the personnel director that I should présent 
myself at the meeting during discussions, sit on a side so that should anyone need assistance in 
interprétation, or something like that, I should be able to help. Otherwise, I had no part to play in 
the matter. This thing went on for three consecutive nights. Discussions went on. Those three people 
used to come in to the Board Room, the management's office, there was the group manager, local 
manager, and an accountant or something like that. So the discussions went on for three nights. At 
the end of the third night they were told, "now that we have heard everything from you, will you go 
back to your friends, the workers, explain them the situation and let us have the answer on the fourth 
night". They went. I was asked to come on the fourth night also and make sure that there was no 
misunderstanding. Ai l workers were gathered in one big room. The managers and the assistant 
managers came and they were asked, "we have had the discussion for three nights, what do you 
say?". The workers représentatives said that they disagreed. The manager asked me, "could you ask 
thèse people if they understood what has been discussed - because they have come up with a straight 
answer straight away without any discussion amongst themselves (it was the first time that they were 
all together after the représentatives1 last meeting with the managers). They must first know what has 
been discussed. Do they really understand what was discussed?". So I asked them, "you have given 
your verdict that you don't accept but do all workers know what has been discussed over the last three 
nights?; and if there is anything which you don't understand, you can tell me". They said, "we don't 
accept", and they all took their aprons off and walked out. 
They walked out. I, on my part, approached them again and said, "look brothers, what are 
you doing? At least discuss". They just pushed me away and went out. They went out and the next 
morning they reponed at the Employment Exchange that they were unemployed. Because they had 
walked out of the mili at ten o' clock at night, they went to the Employment office the next morning. 
The Employment Office people, at eleven o* clock in the morning, phoned the manager at the mill 
and said, "look there are twenty odd people here - they have been sacked last night". He was amazed, 
"what? who sacked them?". He said, "they say they have been sacked". The manager said, "they 
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walked out last night and we haven't done anything yet". The workers took it to the Industrial 
Tribunal that they had been sacked and the Industrial Tribunal rejected their case outright: These three 
people who were there in the discussions as the spokesmen, when they went to the Tribunal, they 
wanted an interpreter! Can you explain that? For three nights, three hours solid, they had discussed 
the wage scales on their own with the management, but when the Tribunal carne, they wanted an 
interpreter. And then they swore on the Quran that they will tell the truth, but the Tribunal found that 
there were thirteen people in the room who were saying exactly, word by word, perfect statements, 
the same thing - there is something wrong somewhere. They had learnt by heart the statement they 
were going to make. So the Tribunal threw them out. Who got the blame? Me. And I took no part 
in the whole thing; my simply being present there, that's what happened. AH I spoke was, "friends, 
do you know what you are saying no to, have you discussed this thing with your friends who have 
now come back after three nights?". Those were the only words that I spoke. So who do you blame? 
Should you blame the unión? or the management? or the workers? 
Some people were taken back later. They were told that if anybody wanted to come back to 
work, they would have to sign a contract, a new contract; they had to give up their past service and 
start all over again; they lost all the privilege they had accrued before and had to start all over again. 
So that, at the end of the day, they lost. 
I will give you another example. There was a case in Dee Mili in Shaw. There was a conflict 
about wages and the workers wanted to discuss it with the management. The management asked them 
to go and consult the unión and then they would discuss it. They said no, they simply, everybody 
walked out and stood on the gate. The management sent for the unión. When they carne they were 
asked, "what is the matter". They said, "this has nothing to do with the unión. This is not our 
problem". They were all sacked. The funny thing is that because I was the only Asian who was in 
the position of some authority on the management side, despite that I was part of the management 
team, I was there only to help the management and to help the workers as an interpreter. I will tell 
you one thing confidential; that while we were discussing this thing and the workers were standing 
outside, the unión and the management got together and said, "lets bring them into a situation where 
they have to say either yes or no. Because it's no use discussing, as they do not understand 
discussions. If they want to go on head-on-clash, so be it". So they were asked to send four or five 
representad ves, but they won't have it because everybody wanted to be present. The management 
said, "but there is no room in the Board Room, we can't entertain hundred people at the same place. 
You bring five people - those who understand the rules", but the Asians won't have it. Eventually 
the management agreed to have everybody. The moment they all carne in, I told one of the leading 
chaps in our own language, "look friend, don't answer in a hurry. If you don't want to answer, keep 
quiet. If you do answer, be very very careful in what you say". I spoke to him in our own language 
so that others won't understand what I was saying. I was trying to help them but they suspected my 
intentions. The one who was their spokesman, the criteria for his selection was that he was the biggest 
idiot of all. He carne forward. The managers asked, "do you want to work here?" He says, "No". 
"Do you want to go outside?". "No". 
"What do you want then?". "No". 
"Do you understand a thing?". "No". 
"Do you want to work here?". "Yes". 
He did not know what to say. The unión people said, "we are prepared to have these people 
to consult us but they do not accept our help". Thus the unión was fed up with them and so the unión 
jacked the management. Because the unión officials were all English, the Asian workers suspected 
them as a part of the management but at the same time, the unión also had to play a bigger part - they 
have to take some blame for that because the unión was always willing to take money from them but 
never took a representative out of them in their meetings. There was no representation of the Asian 
workers in the unión. Despite the fact that there were ninety percent Asian workers on the shop floor, 
the unión management comrnittee always comprised of the White people. Regarding elections or ballot 
or any system of electing unión representad ves, the Asians never knew of such things. Nobody even 
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knew when the meetings were held. The White people knew when the meeting was and they used to 
go and they would appoint the officials themselves. The unión claimed that they informed the workers 
but actually there were no genuine or serious efforts made to inform the Asian people what their 
rights were, where did they stand, what they could do, what they could not do. If ever a person went 
to the unión office with a complaint, they would say go and bring an interpreter with you. Now the 
chap has worked all night, if he has a problem at ten o' clock in the morning and he is asked to bring 
an interpreter, where is he going to find an interpreter? So they Iost faith in the unión, and when a 
conflict aróse, they left the unión out and take it on direct with the management. (Manchester). 
2- There was a unión there. The management used to offer a pay rise which, at first the unión 
would reject and demand a greater pay rise. There used to be voting in which normally the workers 
would vote against the management offer. The management would then come with a bit more such 
as half percent or one percent and that would settle it. There was never a question of strike and no 
strike ever happened; no significant conflict between unión and management .... But then the unión 
there was just nominal and it didn't have much powers. It was not a strong unión...[because] there 
was never a strike and that is because the unión there was almost as if there was none. The power 
of the unión had been lost ... its word was not considered important and, the important thing I tell 
you is that many among the unión colluded with the management. 
But it was the unión which arrangedfor the ballot to see if the pay rise was acceptable to 
workers; how can you say that they colluded with the management? 
Voting was for opinión sake to see if the workers agreed or not for the pay rise. But there 
was never a strike because the workers had no choice. (Slough). 
3- Because i have been involved for long in Pakistán in trade unión activities, and I knew 
about trade unionism, some Asian workers in our factory who were keen to make a unión and were 
active about it, carne to me and asked for my opinión in this matter. I told them that the management 
won't allow the formation of a unión. I told them that I was not against trade unions but ever since 
Thatcherism began, unions do not have significant powers and are generally ineffective; all that has 
been left of the trade unions is the trade unión bureaucracy which collects and consumes funds 
without achieving much for the workers. The unions are incapable of solving our problems. But even 
then, I said, if a unión was made and allowed, I would definitely join it. These fellows insisted that 
I should join their unión even before a permission from the management was sought. They had made 
some contacts with TGWU who, they said, was supporting their move to make a unión. I told them 
that because I was still in my probationary period, and though I was an experienced trade unionist 
and could work better for a unión than many, I could not play an active role. I could not afford a 
direct conflict with the management because, on account of being in service for only three months, 
it was very easy for the management to sack me. However, I was willing to be a silent and passive 
member of the unión and therefore I filled in the form and handed them the fee for membership. 
There were seven workers who were playing an active role in the formation of the unión and they 
had talked to nearly all the workers, Whites as well as Asians. I don't know what response they 
received from other workers or how many members they could make. The representative from the 
TGWU had not yet contacted our management. He had told these seven workers to make a large 
enough number of members for the unión and only then he would talk to our management that they 
had registered our unión with them. Meanwhile, when this secret activity, whispers and rumours, for 
a unión was going on, a certain Asian worker, who was weak-willed for the unión, told his Pakistani 
supervisor that boys were trying to make a unión. This supervisor considered himself more a part of 
the management than that of the workers. To score high marks in the eyes of the management, he 
immediately informed the management that so and so, all the ñames, were trying to form a unión. 
When the secret was disclosed, and there were no points to be gained by further secrecy, the workers 
went anead and the TGWU wrote to the management that they had registered a unión made by their 
workers. The management wrote back saying that they do not recognize any workers unión in their 
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factory, and then, immediately, they made fourteen workers redundant. At that time, I had been with 
the firm only three months, and I saw fourteen workers made redundant. I don't think there was any 
need at that time to make fourteen people redundant because the factory was running well and in 
normal routine. But the management said that there was a shortage of work and hence they were 
making fourteen people redundant. 
Regarding how the management ensured that it was those workers who wanted to make a 
union, the production manager and the shift manager were very much involved into workers and they 
knew very well who were active, who stood up for protest, and who were more challenging than 
others. Besides, the worker who let the cat out of the bag, supplied the names of all those who were 
organizing a union, and, on top of that, when these workers were questioned, they did not deny that 
they were forming a union. They did not deny but said that making a union was there right and that 
the management could not stop them from making a union. The manager called me as well, because 
I too was a member, and he said to me, "I have heard that you are actively participating in the 
formation of a union". I said, "I was not actively participating but the truth is that some workers had 
come to me and asked if I wanted to become a member of the union. Because I believed that forming 
a union or becoming a member of a union was not against the British law, I therefore filled in the 
form. I haven't done anything else and I haven't participated in any activities; if you think that what 
I have done is illegal, please tell me". He said, "it is not illegal to form a union, but that is all". Any 
way, he spared me and I was not dismissed. But because I was new and 1 presented myself in a very 
innocent manner, that I had no special interest with the union, and that I had only filled in the 
membership form believing there was nothing against the law in it, I was saved, and many others too 
were saved. Now there, I was a new comer and the management knew how desperately I had sought 
the job, and they perhaps thought what could this poor man do?; he has just joined the factory and 
he has too many personal problems. But they sacked fourteen men. These included workers who had 
been with the factory for four, five or six years, and had all the employment rights. 
Regarding why they wanted to make a union, I think they had neither proper reasons nor a 
plan and because of this I had differed with them when they came to me. They had neither done a 
thorough study of unionism nor they had any genuine complaints. They were making a union under 
a belief that they would have a status and prestige if they became 'shop stewards'. Other than seeking 
status and power, they had little of a clear picture of what actually a trade union is and what are the 
objectives of a trade union. We need a union only if the management does not listen to complaints 
and does not try to solve problems. I don't think that they had any major problems which could be 
solved only through a union. They just had a belief that they would get authority and prominence 
through union leadership. That union representative were dignitaries was the basic reason for which 
they wanted to form a union. 
4- It has happened on numerous occasions and in many worker meetings, that in the company 
of other workers they say, "we work seven days a week, lets take a day off"; but one by one they 
go to the manager and say that only the others don't want to work: They decide one thing collectively 
and betray it individually by showing, personally, "see how loyal I am, what a good worker I am, 
I work more than others, I am willing to do a favour that others are not prepared to do, I am more 
cooperative than the others; the problems do not arise because of me; its the others" (Brentford) 
5- Many times the manager has a meeting with us and he asks, "are you willing to work in 
the holidays?", and while outside the workers had decided not to work, none volunteers to 
communicate this to the manager. At his best one would say, "if others are willing to work, I have 
no objection to work myself as well". (Slough). 
6- When the Asian workers do take a collective action, they do it in an irrational manner. Like 
for example the strike we once had; the management was trying to reduce working hours as well as 
wages and the workers just decided they would go on strike and went home. (Manchester). 
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7- We used to have a day off but with wages. The management decided that the day off would 
be without wages. The workers got angry, didn't think with a cool head and just went home when 
in fact what they needed doing was to go to the management and discuss and negotiate or at least 
express that there was a dispute arising there which needed solving. But they just went home thinking 
that they were so important for the factory that the management would not only reven its decisión 
but cali them back to work. Instead of getting called back, they were all sacked. When they were 
sacked and the management hired new workers, they went to the Industrial Tribunal. They also went 
to the labour advisors who didn't support their case because these workers had just went home 
without even talking to the management. Finally, they got a bit of money but lost their jobs because 
they hadn't given in any notice of strike, placed no demands but just left work and went home. After 
losing their jobs they regretted it very much. (Brentford). 
8- Our client American company is said to have set conditions that if we have a unión, we 
would lose the contract with them. American companies usually do not allow unions. They treat 
workers as individuáis; everybody for himself. I have seen some performance appraisal forms of some 
workers. After the appraisal is written on the form, they ask the worker to write his/her own view 
of his performance. They ask what would the worker like to do to improve, what son of training he 
wants to do; "do you want to do any external courses, how can we improve your life", they ask all 
sorts of questions. But there is always a need for unions because the management would primarily 
look after their interests first. If there was a unión, the management won't get away with few things; 
sometimes they can actually let things happen that they should not. Like in our company they used 
to give us a bonus sum on Christmas. But last year, they took this bonus away from the workers but 
the management still received this bonus. They kept it for the management. There has been so much 
propaganda against the unions for the last decade people have to take influence. I am personally not 
for unions because unions did a lot of damage to this country, but on the other hand, some times, 
with a limited power, they can do good. Originally, unions were getting away with a lot. Like for 
example, at MOD, every time, if you wanted to get promotion, you joined the unión, and you go up 
and you become a shop steward and then a top unión man and you got promoted to management. So 
every time you wanted to be promoted, you go that way that you go against the management and 
then, in order to get you aside, they promote you. I was not really for unions, you see, because they 
had too much power, anytime they would say, "well lads, put your tools down, lets go", and they 
did abuse their powers. I personally know that unions have exploited the management. At the MOD, 
we had one worker in the tool room. The MOD pólice stopped this tool worker when he was going 
out and said, "can we search you", to see whether he was stealing or anything. And he refused to let 
them search him and he just went out and as soon as he was off the MOD propeny they could not 
search him, so when he carne back to work the next day, the MOD pólice stopped him and said, 
"right, you did not stop, you did not let us search you, you are suspended from work for three days 
because we have to carry out an inquiry". The unión said, "right, you asked him out, tools down, 
everybody out". And whole of the tool room staff, fifty tool makers making tools for whole of the 
factory, were at a stand still. And if the factory doesn't get the new tools, whole of the factory is at 
a stand still and that is about two thousand people. And that's what I mean when I say unions were 
getting away with murder. It was outrageous. Eventually, they went on a strike and they were on 
strike for three or four days and then the management said, well, three days, he could still work and 
we will carry out the investigation and then it was watered down. He got a bit of warning and that 
was it because the unión backed him. The MOD pólice were told by the management, well, don't 
worry, next time. Now, those were the days, when I say that unions were getting away with murder, 
that was one extreme, right, but here now, it is the opposite, now we have no unions and the 
management keeps vacancies free for three or four months, others work double, and the management 
sometimes can get away with it and during these three or four months, they save that salary. They 
are getting away, aren't they? But if there was a unión, they couldn't do that, they would have to fill 
in the vacancy. The unión would have said, look, this person is doing this job which is not his job. 
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performance appraisal and, 139, 140; non-
work/ regional/ linguistic/ religious/ 
political/ caste/ ethnic; 75 to 80, 82, 106, 
107, (Asian) 162, 163, 183, 195, 196, 211 
to 213, 222, 223; tribal, 83 to 85, 237; 
strikes, 102 to 104; pressure groups, unions 
and, 99 to 107, 133 (Asian) 168, 211 to 213; 
related to control, 154, 155, 162 to 164, 
251; dominance-seeking, 162, 163, 164, 
211; equated with trouble making, 164, 221, 
222; new immigrants and, 164; low wages 
and, 62, 168, 179, 180; sexual harassment 
and, 55, 56, 166 to 168; race and, 191 to 
196, 211; ethnoconflict theory and 
ethnopraxis, 194; hooliganism, 99, 102, 103, 
105, 211, 212, 213, (Middle East) 122, 123 
Conflict-prone-ness: 15, 94, 195, 196, 202, 
211; Arab, 83 to 85, 195, 196, 206, 211, 
237, 248, 252, 253; tribal, 83 to 85, 237; 
and schizophrenia, 208; mass media and, 
246 to 248 
Conflict resolution: cognitive approach to, 
21, 248; playing down, 164, 167; hard 
bargaining, 202; tribal methods of, 85, 90; 
oppression in the Middle East, 202, 206, 
207, 208, 209; in Western firms, 153, 159, 
160, 168, 192, 193, 280; integrative 
approach to, 251 
Control: education and extent of, 14, 232; 
cognitive understanding of, 21; tribal 
membership and, 46; father-figure managers, 
50, 98, 99, 101; authoritative control (theory 
X), 91, 94 to 96, 146, (Asian) 154, 169; 
democratic/ participative management and, 
(theory Y), 16, 94 to 96, 229, 230; 
patriarchal, 98, 99, 101, 104, 201, 203, 254, 
255; dislike for challenges, 98, 101, 111, 
116, 254, 273; on personal beliefs and 
activities, 113 to 116, 129, 130, 156, 240; 
bureaucratic, 104; pseudo, 109 to 111; 
misplaced in Middle Eastern organizations, 
111, 112, 126, 127; by subtle coercion, 112, 
113; centralization, 119, 141; performance 
appraisal and culturally engendered non-work 
considerations, 139, 140; implications of 
status perception for, 44 to 46, 141, 157, 
158, 169, 217, 218; by personal observation, 
154, 155, 156; employees not trusted; 154; 
non-work, 142, 154, 155, 156, 221, 239, 
240; resentment at, 154; related to conflict, 
154, 155, 162 to 164, 251; by informers, 
155; Machiavellian, 155; dominance-seeking, 
162 to 164, low wages and, 186 
Coercive control: on workers, 23, 91, 146, 
147, 149, 157, 162; intra-class, 158; in 
absence of social security, 23, 113, 117, 
118, 181, 234, 237; in Asian factories, 162 
to 164; vulnerability to, 153, 162, 164, 165; 
over illegal workers/ new immigrants, 156, 
157, 164, 179; as source of conflict, 164; 
demeaning attitudes, 177 to 179; repression 
of criticism and non-conformism: 11, 98, 99, 
101, 102, 221 to 223, 254, 255 (Middle 
East) 52, 83, 113 to 117, 123, 124, 129, 
130, 254, 255; Middle Eastern autocratic 
values and coercive control, 203 to 209, 
254, 255; effects in the form of constraint, 
avoidance, and alienation, 207; effects on 
creativity and initiative, 114, 116, 222, 223, 
245, 255; 'thought control' in the Middle 
East, 123, 124, 130, 131, 223, 255 
Corruption/embezzlement: low motivation 
and, 15, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131; low 
salaries and, 137; in job appointments, 15, 
104 to 106; Eastern family and, 57 to 59, 
63, 234, 235; upper-classes/ private sector, 
70, 71, 110, 111, 136, 137, 141, 146, 149, 
239; taboo subject, 71, 239; in education, 
77, 118 to 127, 130, 131; sifarish in 
promotions, 139; government, 103 to 106, 
110, 136, 137, 149; implications for 
motivation, 105, 136; electoral democracy 
and, 111; illegal/off-books employment and 
375 
tax évasion in Britain, 156, 157, 175, 176, 
180 to 183; social status and, 157, 201; 
fiddling with figures, 174, 180; cheating in 
arguments, 179, 180, 238, 239; DSS, 
welfare services and, 63, 65, 180 to 183, 
186, 198, 234; in mosque committees in 
Britain, 183; poverty and, 186, 234; Islam 
and, 183, 239, 240, 241 
Culture(s): areas, 2; continent, 2; 
dissimilarities in, 1, 2, 3, 250; common 
characteristics o f , 1, 2, 3; and personality, 2, 
3, 130, 246, 250; national, 3; profile o f , 
251; collective psyché, 3; focus/ dominant 
principle, 250, 251; perspective, 5; 
primitive, 5, 206; communistic, 5; slave, 5, 
6, 203, 225; feudal, 5, 6, 98; patriarchal, 
98, 99, 203, 254, 255; traditional, 117, 123, 
124, 246; modernist/Western, 2, 8, 246, 
250; imitation, 110, 118, 224, 245; criticism 
of literature and, 14; diffusion, 100, 252; 
self-reference criteria, 74, 75, 119; British 
influence on the sub-continent, 55, 100, 104, 
105, 108, 256; tolérance in English culture, 
160; European influence in Middle Eastern 
législation, 202, 203; intrinsic motivation 
and culture, 219, 220; sensitive S y m b o l s of, 
232, 245, 247; and chauvinism, 244, 245 
Data collection: abstract of methods of, 17; 
qualitative/case studies, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18; 
cultural considérations in, 10, 12; 
formal/informal methods, 11, 12; study 
circles, 19; interviews, 11, 18, 19, 20; 
sampling method/sample, 18, 19, 121, 226; 
interviewing methods, 18; long-term 
Observation, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19; surveys, 
questionnaires, 11; participant observation, 
12, 17, 19; secondary observation, 17, 19; 
reliability, 12, 24; skills in, 12; defence of 
idéographie methods, 14, 18; use of 
documents in, 19; quality of, 25; (also see 
'Data analysis', 'Research methodology and 
'Theory') 
Data analysis, 7, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 255; 
Classification of catégories, 19, 20; 
developing links between catégories, 19, 20, 
21, 23; qualitative coding, 18; literature 
content (item-wise and thematic) analysis, 
20; interview content analysis, 20, 21; 
typical narrations, 20; cognitive approach to, 
21, 89; level of complexity, 22, 28, 29; 
period of, 22; cause-effect properties, 22, 
260; (also see 'Data collection', 'Research 
methodology and 'Theory') 
Definition(s): Asian/British-Asian, 1; 
conflict, 3; control, 3; culture, 1, 2; Eastern, 
1; Euroamerica, 1; familism, 51; interpretive 
paradigm, 275, 276; motivation, 3; 
paradigm, 279; patriarchy, 98, 99; pseudo-
organizations, 109, 224; strueture-
functionalism, 274, 275; subjectivism and 
objectivism, 28, 29, 280; sub-continent, 1; 
West, 1 
Democracy/démocratie: 4, 94, 111, 130, 
133, 226, 229; human rights, 206; protest 
and, 213 
Family: Eastern procreative familism as the 
only socially acceptable mode of social 
conjugation, 49, 50, 51, 236, 246; social 
disapprovai of life outside procreative, 51, 
246; control of business, 146, 154, (reasons 
for) 57 to 59, 140, 141; conditioning imo set 
patterns of behavior, 50, 63, 64, 138; 
Eastern family values, 51 to 59, 62, 63, 93, 
234, 235; differentiated from Western, 50 to 
59, 62, 63; indoctrination and excessive 
control of children, 49, 52 to 54, 56, 63, 64, 
195 to 197, 201, 250; dowry, 51; influence 
of relatives, 53, 169, 170; economic 
dependence, 53, 54; variations in values 
(among Indian communities), 54, 80, 81 
(among classes) 56 (among Arab Muslims 
and Christians) 250; feuds, 55; extension of 
relations at workplace, 55; exclusion of 
societal and broader concerns, 57, 58, 59; 
embezzlement and, 57, 58, 59, 63, 141; 
bonds and divisions, 58, 169, 170; tribal 
family values, 84, 93; patriarchal, 99, 201, 
254; as cause of racism/ communal conflict, 
234, 235; as cause of nepotism, 235; as 
cause of concentration of wealth, 58, 239 
Historical: conditions, 6, 7; nature of a 
culture, 206; zeal for ancestral héritage, 245 
Holistic approach: significance of, 7, 89, 
250, 275; perspective, 22, 275 
376 
Individualism: Middle Eastern, 125; Asian, 
169, 210, 212; Western, 279 
Inequality values/norms, 104, 125, 141, 157, 
158, 164, 177, 178, 217; Tribal (Middle 
East) inequalities, 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 206 
Islam/Islamic: psychotherapy, 9; dress 
codes, 23, 129; attitude towards peasants, 
33; law of inheritance, 51; priority of kin, 
57; Qasas (blood-money); 65, 205; social 
divisions and, 75, 76, 194 to 196; courts/ 
Qazil Fiqaht Sharia (Islamic justice), 105, 
109, 112, 204, 205, 207; party, 104 to 107; 
rituals, 9, 124, 183, 239; Ramadan, 121, 
129, 156; prayers, 114, 121, 160, 240, 241; 
t/mra/pilgrimage, 115, 240; Darás, 129; 
relationship of rewards with 'divine 
providence', 238, 239; support for the rich, 
180, 203; Imam Bukhari, 33, 180; divorce 
in, 183; mosque committees in Britain, 183; 
checks on sexual behavior, 183, 194 to 196; 
the pig, 194; Haram and Kaffiri negative 
stereotyping of non-Muslims, 194 to 197, 
246, 252, 253; 'House of WarV Jihad, 246; 
traditional education, 195, 232; history, 33, 
196; conflict prone-ness and, 84, 195, 196, 
206, 211, 252, 253; preemptive strike 
commended, 195, 206; indoctrination to 
children, 195 to 197, 201, 252, 253; family 
planning and, 13, 14, 81, 233, 236, 249; 
Shura, 202; slave management in the Quran 
and Hadeeth, 203; patriarchal ethics, 203, 
254, 255; Kafeel, 203; SuraAl-Noor, 
malakat-imanokum, mukatibat, 203; total 
control, 207 to 209; submission to 
patriarchs, 233, 255; and corruption, 183, 
239, 240 to 242; Zikr, Khatm, Halal, Zakat, 
241; as a marketing gimmick, 241; and tax 
evasión, 241, 242; superstition/ dogmatism/ 
fatalism/divine determinism, 13, 124, 130, 
131, 180, 195, 201, 207 to 209, 233, 238 to 
241, 247; charity, 179; religious conflict, 
82, 162, 183, 195, 196, 255; Quran and oli-
al-amr, 255; support for autocracy, 254, 255 
Key issues (major problems) summarized: in 
socio-cultural and orgarúzational 
stratification, 217, 218; in class and cultural 
background orientation, 218; in motivation, 
219, 220, 223; in control, 220, 223; 
in conflict, 221, 222, 223; in the Eastern 
familism, 224, 225, 246; in the broader 
cultural context, 225, 246, 247; 
mystification/ subjédification of issues, 233 
to 242; over-determination by familism and 
superstition, 226, 227, 233, 234, 235, 236, 
238, 246, 247, 251, 256 
Key organizational-cultural différences 
summarized, 219 to 227, 246; in 
organizational boundaries (Le. relevance of 
socio-cultural context), 22; influence of 
structural features of society (Le. social 
stratification) on organizational imperatives/ 
hierarchy (e.g. Western task-related 
classification ofpersons against mat with 
respect to social background in the other two 
cultures, and, relationship of power/ 
promotions to performance in the West 
against socio-economic status in the other 
two cultures), 217, 218, 220; in Western 
materialist/ objectivist définitions of issues 
(e.g. ofpoverty and coercion) against 
mystification/ subj édification of issues in the 
other two cultures, 233 to 244, 256; in 
traditional ist and modernist cognitive 
cultures, 246; in over-determining structures, 
226, 227, 256; key cultural- organizational 
characteristic différences, 255 to 268 
Key relationships/analogies summarized: 
relationship of social status to motivation 
and control, 218, 221, 223, 224; of 
inéquitable treatment to social divisions and 
non-work conflict, 222, 223; analogies in 
familial and organizational behavior, 49, 
224, 225, 230; analogies in familial and 
organizational control, 112, 225, 230, 262; 
favorite organizational pyramid (analogous to 
acute social/tribal stratification) 111, 119, 
126, 220; analogy between autocratie values 
and 'divine determinism', 207, 208; between 
motivation and socio-familial structure, 219, 
220, 246; between control and beliefs, 225; 
between organizational and socio-cultural 
development, 228, 230, 231; between rigid 
control and conflict-prone-ness, 251; 
between over-population, coercive control, 
obsessive money motivation, nepotism, 
communal conflict and mysticism, 233 to 
238, 267; between organizational, social-
377 
familial, politicai and religious control 
Systems, 254, 255; between socio-cultural & 
organizational control, 256, 257; between 
authoritarian values and coercive control, 
264; between social class structure and 
organizational structure, 217, 218, 220, 262; 
between socio-cultural confi ict and 
organizational conflict, 266; différences in 
living standards related to incentive 
structures in organizations, 261; family 
values related to communal conflict, 262; 
effects of coerción and repression on 
creativity and initiative, 264; relationship of 
rewards with divine providence, patriarchal 
generosity and fate against performance, 
265; key cul tu ral-organizational 
characteristics, 255 to 268 
Language: context, 9, 232, 246, 247; skills 
and expérience in interprétation, 12, 13; 
cognitive aspects behind use of, 13, 246, 
246; social status and hierarchical patterns 
of, 37, 45, 158, 247; and control, 45, 92, 
232; in authoritarian-conflict-prone cultures, 
246, 247; structure and fonctions of, 276 
Manual work: dégradation of/ cultural 
préjudice against/ negative motivation for, 7, 
15, 33 to 38, 66, 157, 177 to 179, 210, 211, 
(Middle East) 38, 39, 119, 120 
Middle East: suspicion of criticism and 
research, 11, 25; self-justification/self-
glorification, 12; Arab family, 51, 52, 57, 
250; politicai parties and family, 51, 85; 
status symbols, 64, 251; negative status, 38, 
39, 119, 120; Bédouin, 84; autocratie 
values, 91 to 93, 113 to 116, 129, 130, 166 
to 168, 201, 203 to 209, 211; face and 
shame, 117, 127, 131; external conformism/ 
hypocrisy, 115, 117, 127, 131, 245, 255; 
relationship of rewards/penalties with 
patriarchal generosity/anger more than with 
work, 117, 124, 125, 203; line-hierarchical 
Organization as most favorite, 111, 119, 126; 
very low motivation to work or study, 121 to 
124; less concerned with time, 121, 122; 
Arabs in Western schools, 124, 232, 233; 
lack of initiative and creativity, 114, 123, 
124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245; racism 
in rémunération, 175, 185, 204; racism, 
204, 205, 206; sexism, 205 , 206; 
employment législation, 202 to 206; traces of 
slave society, 203; students' pressure groups 
hooliganism, 122, 123; labor législation, 
institutional-personal bondage, scant rights, 
exploitation of labor, 202 to 206; reasons for 
absence of protest, 202, 206 to 209 
Motivation: case studi es in the sub-continent, 
15; in managers in the sub-continent, 132 to 
144; government job security/stability versus 
private sector ambitions/ risks, 132, 133; 
and class, 5, 116, 132, 133, 158; cognitive 
understanding of, 21; coerción and negative, 
207; class différences and motivation for 
social mobility and status symbols, 30 to 32, 
39 to 44, 63, 64, 119, 138, 169, 209 to 212, 
218, 239; for power/contacts, 42 to 44, 65, 
104, 111, 126, 138, 162, 163, 179, 223; 
community membership and, 54; Asian/sub-
continent work patterns differentiated from 
the English, 61 to 64; in upper-classes, 70, 
71, 111; éducation and, 76, 77, 119, 232; 
community membership and achievement, 
80, 81, 82, 250; Arabian Gulf states 
pampering of Citizens and patriarchs, 
implications for, 117, 125, 203; negative 
motivation in the absence of social security, 
113, 117, 118, 181; higher than deserved 
expectations, 123, 137, 138, 201, 209 to 
212; incompétence, 105, 106, 117, 119, 
135, 137, 138; salaries/wages less than 
European social security payments, 134, 
137, 140, 238; rewards/ penalties not 
performance-related, 138 to 140, 238, 239; 
low worker motivation (Asian) 156, 172, 
173; inéquitable treatment and 
demoralization, 80, 158, 164, 174, 181, 
185, 186; aliénation from workplace, 147, 
158, 177, 178, 207; high turnover in Asian 
firms, 172, 173; relationship of rewards with 
socio-economic status more than with work; 
31, 32, 64, 65, 156 to 158, 174, 175, 178, 
217; Asian wage management practice in the 
Middle East, 183 to 185; Napoleonomania 
(excessive desire to be in high positions), 
137, 138, 201, 209 to 212; lack of 
achievement need/intrinsic, 219, 220, 245, 
235, 250; review of popular théories of, 268 
to 272; expectancy theory of, 270 to 273 
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Money/instrumental motivation: 15, 44, 61, 
62, 184, 219, 220; family and, 53, 54, 63, 
64, 234, 235; strikes for wage increase, 62, 
168, 212; causes of excessive, 62 to 66; 
compensation of low status by, 66; aversion 
to responsibility without, 66, 67; religion 
and, 67, 70, 179, 233, 234; regional 
différences in, 67; caste and, 67, 69; class 
and, 68, 69; sub-culture and, 69, 70; power 
and, 179; beliefs and, 233, 234, 240, 241 
Nepotism; 55, 56, 104 to 106, 134 to 136, 
144; sifarish, 139; implications for 
motivation, 105, 134, 135, 136; effects on 
effectiveness, 135, 136; large-family as a 
cause of, 235 
Organizations/organizational: behavior, 3, 4, 
5; comparative studies in, 8; effectiveness, 
8, 111; boundaries (socio-cultural context), 
22, 231; structure in sub-continent 
ministries, 42; multi-racial, 191; 
development/change, 228 to 231, 247; 
résistance to change, 229; theorists, 231, 
276, 277; radical structuralist theory, 231; 
rigid structure related to control and conflict, 
251; Family Planning Association, 9, 17, 
236, 237 
Over-population: in under-developed 
countries, 233; Malthus, 233; cause of 
poverty, 9, 14, 151, 201, 233 to 237; 
reasons for, 13, 49, 50, 51, 209, 233 to 237; 
cause of aggression and communal conflict, 
14, 76, 79, 227, 234, 235, 237 
Paradigms; 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280; 
structural-functional, 274, 275, 276, 280; 
interpretive, 275, 276, 280; eclectic use of, 
275, 277; radical structural, 276, 277, 280; 
voluntarism and determinism, 278; définition 
of, 279 
Poverty: material, 13, 17, 18, 100, 146 to 
148, 233, 236, 242; concealing, 64, 74, 180; 
corruption and, 186, 234; mystification of, 
238, 239, 244; and vulnerability to coercion, 
157, 186, 233 to 237; over-population and, 
9, 151,201,233 to 237 
Power: 2; upper class/socio-political, 6, 42 
to 44, 65, 70, 71, 102, 104, 105 to 107, 
141, 183; tribal membership and 6, 46, 85; 
seeking; 42, 43, 44, 65, 104, 111, 126, 138, 
162, 163, 179, 223; centralization of, 99, 
119, 230; race and, 191; abuse of power/ 
personalized power; 154, 155, 158, 162, 
163, 168, 177 to 179, 208, 220, 239, 240; 
power and money, 179; regional bargaining 
power, 184, 185, 186; exhibition of, 251 
Pseudo organizations: characteristics of, 109, 
111 to 117, 224; causes of, 117, 224; in 
éducation, 118 to 127, 130, 131; imitation 
and, 110, 118, 224, 245; and international 
developmental programs, 110, 133, 135 to 
137, 224; in the private sector, 70, 71, 110 
Racism: inter-race perceptions, 191, 192, 
194 to 196; dissimilar work patterns as cause 
of resentment, 191, 192, 234; in-group/out-
group psychology, 79, 192 to 198, 213; 
partisan description of events, 79, 193 to 
198; culture of, 194; minorities and 
'résistance', 195, 197, 198, 211; high 
subjectivity, 197, 198, 211; regional 
bargaining power, 184 to 186; Arab racism, 
175, 185, 204 to 206 
Research methodology: key questions and 
Problems, 3, 4; qualitative, 5, 9, 16, 24, 25, 
26; logicai extrapolation, 6, 22, 23; 
operational définitions, 9, 16; cultural 
considérations in, 11, 12, 13; straight 
déduction, 11; outsider's objectivity, 13, 14; 
multiple modes of, 16; quantification of 
concepts, 16; assessment of techniques, 24; 
ethnographie; 7, 26; directions in OB, 27; 
fragmentation, 279; (also see, 'Data 
collection', 'Data analysis', and 'Theory') 
Ségrégation of sexes, arranged endogamy, 
prohibition of inter-communal marriages, 
kinship Systems, and the conséquent class/ 
communal ségrégation, 71, 79, 81, 82, 86, 
222; as basis for conflict, 130, 222; 
segregated workplace and conflict, 93, 130, 
162, 166 to 168, 253 
Social: psychology, 3; history, 5, 6; 
'dynamic' and 'static' sociology, 231; 
379 
transformation, 6, 7, 98, 100, 179, 206; 
stagnation, 226, 227, 232, 251; control, 9, 
207, 208, 227, 246; control and mental 
illness, 9, 208; control and dress codes, 23, 
129, 260; bargaining power, 31, 32, 64, 65, 
156 to 158, 164, 174, 175, 185, 191 
Social security: system as safety against 
exploitation, 181, 234; dependence on family 
in absence of, 53, 54; European, 69, 243, 
244; Middle Eastern individualized welfare, 
117, 125 
Socio-economic development: 7, 179; and 
international agencies, 133, 135, 136; and 
privât i zation, 133, 134; and public/private 
mix, 133 to 135 
Solutions: 227; at organizational level, 228 
to 231, 251; objectivity generating éducation 
system, 14, 124, 231 to 233; family 
planning, 233 to 237; the need to abandon 
mystification of issues, 238 to 241; the need 
to discuss in problem-solving terminology, 
242, 247, 251; the need for creativity, 244; 
modernization of traditionalist cognitive 
cultures, 246 to 253 
Status: symbols, 30, 31, 63, 64, 137, 138, 
157, 158, 169, 201, 209 to 212; negative, 7, 
33 to 36, 119, 120, 210; éducation and, 39 
to 41, 64, 65, 119, 233; significance of, 64, 
68, 157, 158; flaunting of wealth, 63, 65, 
73, 134, 179, 239; cognition of, 74, 157, 
158, 217 
Stéréotypes: 2; male/female, 36, 92, 93, 
165, 166, 167, 168, 211, 246; inter-race, 
194, 195, 196; propensity to stéréotype, 194; 
negative, 194 to 196, 252, 253; positive, 195 
Strucmral-fiinctional: properties of cultural 
institutions, 24, 217, 218, 233, 246, 254, 
255, 274, 275; Althusserian structuralism, 
226, 278, 279; radical structuralist theory, 
231, 277, 280; over-determining structures, 
226; over-determination by familism and 
superstition, 226, 227, 233, 234, 235, 236, 
238, 246, 247, 251, 256; structure-
functionalism, 274 to 278 
Theory: grounded, 5, 9, 22, 24, 25, 26, 254 
274; theoretical orientation/ preconceptions, 
5; construction, 6, 254 to 274; class-based, 
6; generalizing from the spécifie, 15, 18; 
cause-effect properties, 22, 260; logical 
extrapolation, 6, 22, 23; conceptual 
élaboration, 23; spéculation on a given 
empirical base, 23; developing links between 
catégories, 19, 20, 21, 23, 254 to 274; 
catégories from various cultures help build 
links, 23, 24; differentiating model from 
theory, 24, 29; theoretical sub-systems, 24, 
29; theory of socio-organizational behavior, 
24, 274; attributes of, 25; ethnographie field 
work and grounded theory, 26, 275; 
summary of key cultural-organizational 
characteristics, 255 to 268; analogies and 
causal connections, 260; placement of the 
grounded theory in social sciences 
paradigms, 274 to 278; fragmentation, 279; 
(also see 'Data collection', 'Data analysis, 
and 'Research methodology') 
Tribal: society, 5, 83 to 85, 203 to 206; 
barriers, 6; cognitive nature, 206, 237; 
inequalities, 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 206; 
kinship, 51; conflict, 83, 84, 85, 237; 
conflict resolution, 85, 90; membership and 
implications for control, 6, 46; family 
values/ethics, 84, 93, 237; membership and 
power, 6, 46, 85; laws, 202 to 206 
Unions: (a)In the sub-continent: 
misappropriation of funds, 15; favoritism, 
15; chaotic behavior, 15, 94, 99, 102, 106, 
107, 201, 202, 210 to 213; pressure, 99 to 
107, 133; pocket unions, 99, 100; control 
and, 100; nuisance value, 102, 103, 201, 
202; ILO charters, 103; political parties and, 
104 to 107; influence on employment 
practice, 104 to 106, 139; and wages, 133; 
in MNCs, 142, 143, 150; pseudo leaders, 
201, 209 to 212; reasons for failure of, 201, 
202, 210 to 213; prohibition in the Middle 
East, 202; (b)Asian groups/unions in 
Western firms, 168, 169, 209 to 213; inter-
ethnic difficulties in communication, 209, 
210 to 212; ineffectiveness of, 192, 210; 
inaptitude for union formation, 192, 209, 
210 to 212; misconception of union 
fonctions, 211 
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Unitary view of society/ organization; 23, 
75, 112 to 116, 129, 130, 256, (Middle 
East) 120, 253 
West/Western: differences, 3, 8; text books, 
3, 118, 253; culture, 2, 8, 246, 250; role 
authority, 8; increase in individual 
autonomy, 8, 14, 153, 227, 279; 
individualism, 279; formal communication, 
8, 12; equalitarian values, 8, 95, 158; 
informal human relations, 8; participation, 8, 
230; democratic ideology, 8, 95, 230; 
unions, 8; organizational boundaries, 22; 
attitude towards manual work; 39, 242; 
social family, 58, 64, 246; entrepreneurial 
motivation, 71; kinds of compliance and 
control, 91, 92; cooperation reciprocated, 
94; impersonal rules, 95, 104, 217, 218; 
impersonal means of control/task-related 
control, 158, 159, 160, 217, 218, 221; 
influence transactions related to 
organizational roles, 220; means of control 
explained, 159, 160; control not related to 
conflict, 159; means of control tend towards 
the utilitarian-normative end, 221; equity in 
treatment, 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 
209; equal opportunities legislation, 192; 
merit based systems/ relationship of rewards 
with performance, 57, 104, 140, 175, 217; 
schools, 124, 232, 233; familial obligations, 
135, 246; integration of employees, 140; 
collective bargaining, 153; control adaptive 
to human nature, 153, 159; self-control, 159; 
intrinsic motivation/ innovation/ creativity, 
219, 244; internalized motivation, 159, 207; 
channels of protest registration and conflict 
resolution, 153, 159, 160, 168, 192, 193, 
280; integrative approach to, 251; awareness 
of more rights in, 213; conflict seen as a 
positive, integral, productive, creative, 
stimulating and manageable part of social 
and organizational process, 221, 222; 
conflict related to distribution of rewards, 
task-related status, 'occupational 
ethnocentricism', resource allocation, 
jurisdiction between departments, autonomy 
and control etc., 222; absence of non-work 
conflict, 168; task-related conflict, 168, 222; 
greater motivation to work for, 213; 
humanistic treatment of other religions and 
ethnic minorities in the workplace, 160, 209; 
reasons for greater motivation, 173, 174; 
higher wages, 176, 177, 179; abidance by 
labor legislation, 176, 177, 179; racial 
resentment is minimal, 192; scrupulosity in 
jurisprudence, 206, 207, 209; workers' 
abidance by collectively taken decisions, 
212; social security and social services, 243, 
244; objectivist attitude towards poverty 
(materialist definitions of issues of poverty 
and coercion) 242, 243, 244; European 
creativity, 244 
Western multinationals in the sub-continent: 
differentiated from native, 140-144, 217 to 
224; better wages, fringe benefits and 
facilities in, 133, 134, 142, 143, 150, 151; 
managers trusted with authority/ 
responsibility, 141, 142; independence in 
decision making, 142; creativity encouraged, 
142; greater status, 142; effectiveness/ 
result-orientation in, 143; better industrial 
relations, 150; greater motivation to work 
for, 143; abidance by labor legislation, 150; 
replacement of top ranks with native 
managers, 135, 143, 144; transformation of 
MNC culture towards Eastern; 143, 144 
Women: Eastern inequality of, 51 to 53, 55, 
63, 165 to 168, 205; greater amenability to 
control, 55, 93, 176, 201, 205; sexual 
harassment, 55, 56, 166 to 168; preference 
in employment, 173, 176, 177; abuse of 
expatriates in the Middle East, 168, 203, 204 
Workers: less stratified, 146, 147; lack of 
class/group consciousness, 146, 147, 201, 
202, 209 to 212; unregulated market, 146, 
181, 184 to 186; low wages, 149, 236, 238 
(Asian) 157, 164, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 
182, 183, 186; scant statutory benefits, 149, 
150, 151 (Asian) 175; rights/ protection (in 
domestic companies), 146, 149, 150, (in 
foreign companies), 150, 151; exploitation of 
and among, 15, 100, 133, 134, 147, 148, 
149, 150, 177, 178, 179, 201, 202, 234, 236 
(Asian) 157, 164, 173 (Middle East) 203 to 
206; labor legislation, 149, 150 (Asian) 173 
(Middle Eastern) 203 to 206; child 
employment, 176, 236 
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